Battle of Germany= Could LW have done better?

lesofprimus · 11-25-2007, 11:19 AM

Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...

I have to admit, my "deep" knowledge and info lies in the latter parts of 44 and 45, as well as the VMF-214 saga, so these spring/summer 44 conversations always get me going...

I have to agree with just about everything being said here, cause its all correct.... I cannot cite specific information like Bill and erich can, but there are some obvious points being made here....

Tacics seem to be the big denominator here... Like Erich and I have said before, taking out the escorts BEFORE the Sturms and Zerosters get there, now theres an idea that could work...

Did they try it??? Of course they did...

Did it work??? On several occasions, yes....

But truth be told, it was ineffective, and waaaaaaayyy too many experienced pilots died in the seats of those heavily armoured up crates... Schroeder stated that it was an utter pig to dogfight with, and he knew what he was doing in the cockpit...

Anyways, getting sidetracked.... Id say that the ground control the LW had was OK at best... Many times, they were routed to the wrong area, either by Allied feint of just plain GCI ineptitude... Then re-routed again... Next thing u know, that little red light is a flashin away, and u got to set it down....

Mission over, no contact made...

Glad we agree about the "local" superiority thing.... It swung both ways... I actually dont think we disagree on anything....

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 11:24 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Erich

back for only a moment, the truth is in my mind it is about tactics, literally sending enmasse like the Sturmgruppen wedge and line abreast in company waves in late 43 if this is the start of the time frame. the Fw 190A-8 was coming into it's own, the 30mm cannon was coming on the A-7/MK and was a nasty bomber killer.

also the use of the R4M should of been stepped up sooner and easily wooden racks like placed on the Me 262 under the wings for the 109 and Fw 190A besdies the Me 410s. Stepping up the Dora 9 program to intercept the Mustang at higher altitidue would of been essential but this is getting into a hard what-if

I also will go back to the fact the LW could not be everywhere at once, we have to contend also not with just the 8th AF but the 15th AF out of iItaly in November of 43 which also tied up LW reserves and even then they did not have full control over Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and the general area, Night fighters also flew during day light hours getting clobbered out of the day skies up north as well as NJG 6 in the south

I agree all the points, although on the last point the 15th didn't start acquiring the long range escorts (51s) until ~May, 1944 and all the 12th and 15th FC hands were 'full' below Austria... and in all fairness LuftFlotte 2 and LW Kdo Sud Ost were kinda responsible for Italy, Austria, Hungary and Romania.

So, this is primary reason I use Reich as the central core TO&E to meet the 8th AF long range escorts (with 354 and 363FG attached).

The 8th was hitting Germany's center of Gravity and the LuftFlotte Reich was the primary defensive force. Luft 3 had to contend with 8th/9th and RAF Penetration and Withdrawal while Luft 2 and Sud Ost with Penetration and Withdrawal from South.

Erich · 11-25-2007, 11:25 AM

As Bill pointed out about April 24, 44 as an interesting scenario so to 26 November 44, a different light/different battle and defended differently and everything went wrong for the German Luftwaffe even if JG 301 as a whole shot down 21 B-24's. yes true a bloody day for both the LW and the US bomber formations. If I could ever complete my written documentation of the battle from the LW point of view and subscribe it to Bill for the 8th AF account you would just be shocked in awe but in truth a fantastic comparison note(s) to the April 24, 44 aerial battle.

part of the problem too is the LW political game set and forthwith even with the likes of Addi Galland as he surveyed the work of experimentation of the LW arms aresenal of rockets and cannon of different mm's something should of been given as the "standard" and not all the time wasted to perfect the ~~ perfect bopmber killing machine....... this is very important too as to the outcome

Bill even with no escorts in the south from the 15th and even with the 15th heavies unescorted it still take away portions of 109 equipped JG 27, ZG's 101, 1 and 76............and these were needed full time to take on the 8th heavies. it was spread thin even by January 1, 1944. crazy but even the s/e ground attack Fw's were used against the US 15th AF
back soon

pbfoot · 11-25-2007, 11:28 AM

I've tried to build up a picture in my head about the length of the formations the US forces used in the attacks . This is pretty important for if the formation is relativly small in area 40-50 mile as I would assume it would be to facilitate maximum fighter coverage and mutual fire support amongst the bombers . The escort fighters would never very far from the bombers .
Now I might be incorrect but I'm going to assume the LW fighter units were not up to strength and very rarely met the fighters from a position of strength as they were not massed and attacked from various bases and at different times .
I've seen the numbers you've mentioned earlier but LW fighters on the ground does not equate to LW fighters in the air and same area as the USAAF

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 11:29 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by lesofprimus

Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...

I have to admit, my "deep" knowledge and info lies in the latter parts of 44 and 45, as well as the VMF-214 saga, so these spring/summer 44 conversations always get me going...

I have to agree with just about everything being said here, cause its all correct.... I cannot cite specific information like Bill and erich can, but there are some obvious points being made here....

Tacics seem to be the big denominator here... Like Erich and I have said before, taking out the escorts BEFORE the Sturms and Zerosters get there, now theres an idea that could work...

Did they try it??? Of course they did...

Did it work??? On several occasions, yes....

But truth be told, it was ineffective, and waaaaaaayyy too many experienced pilots died in the seats of those heavily armoured up crates... Schroeder stated that it was an utter pig to dogfight with, and he knew what he was doing in the cockpit...

Anyways, getting sidetracked.... Id say that the ground control the LW had was OK at best... Many times, they were routed to the wrong area, either by Allied feint of just plain GCI ineptitude... Then re-routed again... Next thing u know, that little red light is a flashin away, and u got to set it down....

Mission over, no contact made...

Glad we agree about the "local" superiority thing.... It swung both ways... I actually dont think we disagree on anything....

I don't see any disagreement Dan. This isn't about superior US aircraft and/or inferior German aircraft.

It is actually about strategy and hindsight - which for me came from many directions growing up, as it did you with your grandfather.

It is also about clowns and REMF screwing up tactical decision making of the leaders with their butts in the seats day in and day out, saying There's gotta be a better way". There are a lot of 8th and 12th and 15th AF bomber crews that can thank God for Goering!

lesofprimus · 11-25-2007, 11:34 AM

Gotta agree 100% with ur last sentence Bill....

Quote:

There are a lot of 8th and 12th and 15th AF bomber crews that can thank God for Goering!

Insulting his pilots and commanders, calling them cowards and what not, real stroke of genius if ur trying to alienate ur troops...

Soren · 11-25-2007, 12:14 PM

All it took was the LW deploying the Me-262 in full scale in 1943 and the Allies would've been repulsed completely. Hitler made sure that didn't happen.

But still, this wouldn't ensure any victory, it would seriously prolong the war though.

PS: I agree completely with Erich, Les & Bill on most points - good posts guys!

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 12:14 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Erich

Bill even with no escorts in the south from the 15th and even with the 15th heavies unescorted it still take away portions of 109 equipped JG 27, ZG's 101, 1 and 76............and these were needed full time to take on the 8th heavies. it was spread thin even by January 1, 1944. crazy but even the s/e ground attack Fw's were used against the US 15th AF
back soon

True, and when the 15th say, coordinated an attack with 8th and went to Munich or Linz while 8th went to Leipzig then JG27 and ZG26 would probably be on the 15th..

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 12:23 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by pbfoot

I've tried to build up a picture in my head about the length of the formations the US forces used in the attacks . This is pretty important for if the formation is relativly small in area 40-50 mile as I would assume it would be to facilitate maximum fighter coverage and mutual fire support amongst the bombers . The escort fighters would never very far from the bombers .
Now I might be incorrect but I'm going to assume the LW fighter units were not up to strength and very rarely met the fighters from a position of strength as they were not massed and attacked from various bases and at different times .
I've seen the numbers you've mentioned earlier but LW fighters on the ground does not equate to LW fighters in the air and same area as the USAAF

Pb - the March 6 Berlin mission had approximately 30 bomb groups in 100mi stream in three Bomb divisions - escorted beyond Dummer lake by two P-38 and three P-51 groups to cover that entire force.

Each Wing, comprised of 4-6 Groups would fly in about 8-10miles of 'boxes'..

But often many Gruppe's of LW fighters were co-ordinated successfully when the Controllers guessed the target correctly and put them together in perhaps a 10 mile space in front of the bomber stream or in the middle or in trail depending on where they thought the escort 'wasn't'.

Just as frequently individual Gruppe's of 30-100 fighters would hit at different points of this long column, staying for persistent attacks when no escort fighters were encountered or diving away after one pass when the Mustangs were there.

Erich · 11-25-2007, 12:23 PM

in and out today trying to cheer up my beleagured wife

winter drape time with Fw 190A-8/R8's imprinted all over them..you can only see them during late afternoon ................ nah but I wish

Soren I think it would not of mattered even in 43 with the Me 262's there are so many what-ifs about it's short range, extra fuel tanks, too quick power, how many needed yes full strength staffeln or Geschwader or ? Even with the December 43 arrival of the P-51B of the 9ths 354th fg they were definately making their presence felt as the Mustang was going through the LW pilot circles as the main point to shoot one down damaged and have it shown to all to find it's weak points.

and here is my prime point and an early one at that even though the LW called it a victory for the first Sturmgruppen attack the combined ops of the 8th and 15th on 7.07.1944 was to prove a small disaster for the Lw, they could not be everywhere at once, only if the 15th AF would come into the central zone of Germany like they did could the LW in strength in the Northern sphere be best put to use. the JG 3 and JG 300 Sturms attacked both the 8th and the 15th bombers with 50 kills confirmed. and even in the books how strange and convoluted it was as the Me 410 Geschwaders were given kills-quite a few actually, but in reality they were hit so hard they may have scored 1-2, their ranks of the me 410 fell like flies to the guns of the US fighters.

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 01:31 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by lesofprimus

Bill, that link u posted is excellently done, thx for that... I was aware of 24 Apr 44, but now have my fill of it, thx...

.

Forgot to mention this, Dan - the primary reason for that piece was to show just how difficult it was to cover five Combat Wings of 250 B-17s attacking three targets in same area. This particular mission had two experienced Mustang Groups who really cared about protecting the bombers.

The secondary reason was to show how flights here, and sections there, were committed to the battle - as contrast with a commonly held point of view that three squadrons of rabid Mustangs all 'lost their minds' and bounced 6 stray 109s.

The Luftwaffe skillfully stalked the B-17s, attacked, and in turn, were attacked all along the bomber track. After attacking, some of the 51s recovered and climbed back to continue - others headed for home and shot up targets of opportunity... But at the end of the day it was one huge goat for*&%*$#n, particularly when one Combat Wing loses sight of lead Wing and wanders off track.

Erich · 11-25-2007, 02:33 PM

question Bill : has Mike Williams started putting together the materials on 26 November 44 from you or have you sent him anything on this engagement ? Neil Page and I had done up something on 7-7-44 on our old web-pages of the Sturmgruppen but that was only part 1, some new things have come to light, but I am waiting for an anticipated book on 14.Sturm/JG 3 to be released before I put up anything more on the net, am also working personally on 21 Novewmber 44 my cousins first hectic mission he flew and that was a bad op for the LW as well

lesofprimus · 11-25-2007, 02:44 PM

Heres Erichs and Neils page for 7-7-44...
Oschersleben Air Battle July 7 1944

lesofprimus · 11-25-2007, 02:59 PM

21 Nov 44 was a bad day for I/JG301, losing 12 pilots killed/wounded.... The loss of Hptm Burggraf, I. Gruppe Commander was a big blow... II. Gruppe lost 6 killed/wounded, and this was ur cousin Siefrieds Gruppe, 5. Staffel IIRC, who lost Heidenreich and Lt Heise to Mustangs...

Very bad day...

drgondog · 11-25-2007, 03:48 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Erich

question Bill : has Mike Williams started putting together the materials on 26 November 44 from you or have you sent him anything on this engagement ? Neil Page and I had done up something on 7-7-44 on our old web-pages of the Sturmgruppen but that was only part 1, some new things have come to light, but I am waiting for an anticipated book on 14.Sturm/JG 3 to be released before I put up anything more on the net, am also working personally on 21 Novewmber 44 my cousins first hectic mission he flew and that was a bad op for the LW as well

E ~ I haven't touched bases with Mike lately but will follow up.

I've got some stuff on 355FG for July 7 and I'm trying to dig up the 8th AF Mission Summaries for 16 March, 12 May, 7 July, and 26 November.

I'll send you what I have on 7 July/355FG via email