Best WWII Air-Force

[Aussie1001]

Facts are like bullets in an argument, if you don't have em' its like throwing stones...
That sounds good maybe i should be a philosipher.

[Soren]

From the site you quoted from Bill:

"The figures represent a remarkable ratio of claim v loss, especially when the hectic activities of the late war period are taken into consideration. Often outnumbered and fighting a defensive campaign against mass RAF and USAAF bomber formations escorted by hundreds of fighters, the "Schlageter" Geschwader did it's best to help stem the onslaught."

http://les_butler.drivehq.com/jg26/claims.htm

The above doesn't exactly strenghten your little theory Bill.

Also you have yet to answer my question of how big a tragedy that day supposedly was for the LW considering that each USAAF bomber they shot down contained 7 or more men ? If you ask me the tragedy was alot more apparent at the USAAF.

[syscom3]

The tragedy was with the LW.

The AAF had so many pilots coming out of flight school, the loss of a heavy bomber and its crew was just a statistic.

The loss of a single LW pilot was irreplacable.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Sys has got a point Soren....

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Soren

From the site you quoted from Bill:

"The figures represent a remarkable ratio of claim v loss, especially when the hectic activities of the late war period are taken into consideration. Often outnumbered and fighting a defensive campaign against mass RAF and USAAF bomber formations escorted by hundreds of fighters, the "Schlageter" Geschwader did it's best to help stem the onslaught."

http://les_butler.drivehq.com/jg26/claims.htm

The above doesn't exactly strenghten your little theory Bill.

Also you have yet to answer my question of how big a tragedy that day supposedly was for the LW considering that each USAAF bomber they shot down contained 7 or more men ? If you ask me the tragedy was alot more apparent at the USAAF.

Soren, the subject was not the tragedy inflicted on the bombers that day. I specifically stated that the Luftwaffe was manuevered with great skill to apply 200-250 s/e fighters into the bomber stream in a way that the two fighter groups were unable to stop them and shot down or forced down a lot of B-17s. Go back and re-read.

The subject and the constant subject is that a much smaller force of Mustangs DID inflict far more losses on the Me109s (plus Fw190 plus Me110s) than the German fighter pilots were able to inflict on the Mustangs.

Your constant thesis has been that the LW was only defeated (and by definition "defeatable') by overwhelming numerical advantage on part of Mustangs. I have shown and would continue to show specific examples, historically and fact based, in which small numers of Mustangs dealt terrible blows to Luftwaffe single engine fighters and pilots.

The author of the quote, Les Butler (and complimentary works by Tony Woods), has done a great job of researching Luftwaffe claims. Their works are the specific source for the 'claims' I cited for you to research when you derided me for stating that the three 355th FG pilots shot down, were probably (NOT 100% certain) shot down by Bartels and Dahl. I cited the Macr reports, the burial locations and the times and locations contained in the Macrs as the link between the losses and Tony Woods accounting of the LW claims by specific time and location. These three match exactly in both time and location.

What are YOU doing to cite and reference facts on this subject?

What are you doing to explain away the huge number of single engine losses for LuftFlotte Reich in January - May, 1944 timeframe? A time when only the Mustangs and 3 Lightning groups were available over Germany for daylight escort? At no time during that period were any other fighters, RAF or USAAF, available to meet and defeat German Fighters from Munster to the farthest reaches of Germany.

Where are YOUR facts, and tables, from corresponding researchers?

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

Its funny Bill cause you don't provide facts yourself, all you do is quote lines from already biased books on the subject.

Anyways keep on the dodging Bill, you're doing an excellent job at doing so so far.

Soren
In case you are wondering, your silence in deafening and we are waiting for some quotes from your unbiased books. I presume you have some, or you wouldn't know that all the quotes from Bill and the others are biased.

[Hop]

What are you doing to explain away the huge number of single engine losses for LuftFlotte Reich in January - May, 1944 timeframe? A time when only the Mustangs and 3 Lightning groups were available over Germany for daylight escort?

Do you have complete figures for Luftwaffe strength and sorties in the time period?

Hooton gives Luftwaffe Reich strength as 562 day fighters at the end of December 1943, and 853 at the end of March 1944. Yet he gives day fighter sorties for Jagdkorps I, which as I understand it included all the day fighters in Luftflotte Reich, as:

Jan 3315
Feb 4242
Mar 3672
Apr 4505
May 3805

To put those figures in perspective, with a similar sized fighter force in the BoB, the RAF flew up to 5,000 sorties a week. They totalled over 15,000 fighter sorties in July, about 17,000 in August, about 14,000 in September.

So, do Jagdkorps I daylight fighter sorties include all Luftflotte Reich day fighter sorties? (Christer Bergstrom gives the same 3672 figure for March as the total for Luftflotte Reich).

If those figures are correct for Luftflotte Reich, why was the Luftwaffe maintaining such a low operational tempo in the face of the US attack? It averages about 5 sorties per fighter per month, or just over 1 a week.

[SoD Stitch]

Originally Posted by Hop

If those figures are correct for Luftflotte Reich, why was the Luftwaffe maintaining such a low operational tempo in the face of the US attack? It averages about 5 sorties per fighter per month, or just over 1 a week.

Lack of petrol? Lack of spare parts? Lack of ammunition? Lack of trained pilots? Bureaucratic mismanagement?

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Hop

Do you have complete figures for Luftwaffe strength and sorties in the time period?

Hooton gives Luftwaffe Reich strength as 562 day fighters at the end of December 1943, and 853 at the end of March 1944. Yet he gives day fighter sorties for Jagdkorps I, which as I understand it included all the day fighters in Luftflotte Reich, as:

Jan 3315
Feb 4242
Mar 3672
Apr 4505
May 3805

To put those figures in perspective, with a similar sized fighter force in the BoB, the RAF flew up to 5,000 sorties a week. They totalled over 15,000 fighter sorties in July, about 17,000 in August, about 14,000 in September.

So, do Jagdkorps I daylight fighter sorties include all Luftflotte Reich day fighter sorties? (Christer Bergstrom gives the same 3672 figure for March as the total for Luftflotte Reich).

If those figures are correct for Luftflotte Reich, why was the Luftwaffe maintaining such a low operational tempo in the face of the US attack? It averages about 5 sorties per fighter per month, or just over 1 a week.

Hop - I do NOT have complete figures for sorties but LuftFlotte Reich, acording to Dr. Price, had approximately 812 Total, 446 Effective Single Engine Fighters in service on May 31, 1944.

Even though not necessarily a good assumption, using 3805 sorties for May divided by only the Effectives - we have only 8 1/2 sorties per s/e fighter for the month. On the other hand, there weren't that many days that the Luftwaffe chose to intercept in force... and when they did a typical force for a strong reaction was 150-200 fighters - or perhaps 1/3 of the available effectives?

Based on the various statements of Luftwaffe commanders, the senior commanders well knew that they could not win an attrition war with the Allies and chose the strategy of conserving strength by massing for isolated attacks at select points in the bomber stream to a.) minimize losses to US fighters and b.) inflict as much damage as possible to try to break the will of USAAF bomber commanders.

The Oil Campaigns starting in May forced the hand of the LW to resist aggressively against targets like Merseburg, Misburg, Posnan, etc.

In contrast the 355th FG flew 22 missions for May in which perhaps the Luftwaffe was seen 6 times by this one group of six operational P-51 wings at that time. I haven't yet bothered to do a precise sortie search but estimate 900-1000 sorties for this one fighter group in May, 1944.

Regards,

Bill

[Soren]

What am I doing to explain away the losses of the LW fighters Bill ??

Well let me repeat what I've being saying all along:

1.) The LW was low on fuel
2.) The LW was low on trained pilots
3.) The dedicated LW fighters were always massively out-numbered
4.) The LW interceptors weren't there to fight off fighters, they were there to take down the biggest thread, the bombers. It was the bombers which were pounding the German industry, not the fighters, therefore taking down the bombers was the no.1 priority - hence the losses caused by Allied escorts. Most of the interceptors were shot down attacking the bombers.
5.) The interceptors were heavily armed and therefore didn't stand much chance if caught by the escorts.

Now despite all of this the LW still managed a decent kill/ loss ratio, and as you can see JG-26 did very well under the tight circumstances.

I also really suggest you read Willi Reschkes book on JG-301 & JG-302.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Soren

What am I doing to explain away the losses of the LW fighters Bill ??

Well let me repeat what I've being saying all along:

1.) The LW was low on fuel
2.) The LW was low on trained pilots
3.) The dedicated LW fighters were always massively out-numbered
4.) The LW interceptors weren't there to fight off fighters, they were there to take down the biggest thread, the bombers. It was the bombers which were pounding the German industry, not the fighters, therefore taking down the bombers was the no.1 priority - hence the losses caused by Allied escorts. Most of the interceptors were shot down attacking the bombers.
5.) The interceptors were heavily armed and therefore didn't stand much chance if caught by the escorts.

Now despite all of this the LW still managed a decent kill/ loss ratio, and as you can see JG-26 did very well under the tight circumstances.

I also really suggest you read Willi Reschkes book on JG-301 & JG-302.

ROFLMAO - When they had fuel and were in the air, in the presence of Mustangs, in the period we are discussing - and, they got pounded.

If they didn't stand a chance - why not?

Prove your thesis that LuftReich s/e fighters were outnumbered by USAAF MUstangs - you haven't come close yet for the 1/1/44-5/31/44 timeframe

JG26 has very little to do in this discussion as they were not fighting the Mustangs over Germany - they were fighting the RAF and USAAF fighters over lowlands and France with JG2 - LuftReich is the force we are talking about - stay on topic Soren

[syscom3]

Soren, these are the number of P38 and P51 groups available at the end of each of the following months. And remember, the 8th AF had three bomb divisions that would attack multiple targets and the P38's and P51's often had to split up to cover them all. Many times the LW had local superiority, yet failed to defeat the AAF fighters.

Jan 1944: two P38 & one P51

Feb 1944: two P38 & two P51

March 1944: three P38 & five P51

April 1944: three P38 & six P51

May 1944: four P38 & seven P51

[Soren]

Originally Posted by drgondog

ROFLMAO - When they had fuel and were in the air, in the presence of Mustangs, in the period we are discussing - and, they got pounded.

LoL, pounded ??! Sure what'ever Bill, I guess those 200 + USAAF personnel shot out of the sky that day were all kamikazes right ?

I repeat Bill, the dedicated LW fighters were out-numbered big time ! And the interceptors although present in higher numbers were, I repeat, after the bombers NOT the escorts !!

If they didn't stand a chance - why not?

Tell me Bill how much of a drop in performance to you think the extra armament caused alone ??? The reason I'm asking is cause I know you're clueless.

And to top that off the majority of the interceptors were carrying the ETC-501 rack, which alone robbed allot of performance.

Prove your thesis that LuftReich s/e fighters were outnumbered by USAAF MUstangs - you haven't come close yet for the 1/1/44-5/31/44 timeframe

Wait a minute are you claiming that you've proven me wrong ?! Let me remind you that you haven't provided a single shred of evidence to support your theory that the Mustangs weren't present in far greater numbers than the dedicated fighters of the LW !

JG26 has very little to do in this discussion as they were not fighting the Mustangs over Germany - they were fighting the RAF and USAAF fighters over lowlands and France with JG2 - LuftReich is the force we are talking about - stay on topic Soren

LoL, stay on topic ?? Bill you're the one who brought up the JG-26 remember

But ofcourse I can see why you wouldn't want to discuss the JG-26, the fact that it out-fought the Allied fighters on an individual basis hurts your case.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Soren

Wait a minute are you claiming that you've proven me wrong ?! Let me remind you that you haven't provided a single shred of evidence to support your theory that the Mustangs weren't present in far greater numbers than the dedicated fighters of the LW !

I am trying not to take sides here but please do me a favor.

I would like you to post facts as well. I want you to post:

a. Sources (that are not biased to either side)
b. Diagrams, Charts, Actual Loss Reports
c. Mission Reports (from both sides)

Why do I ask this?

Because this is getting stupid. You keep asking Bill for the same things that I asked you above but you dont post them either.

When someone asks you for them you tell them not to change the subject. All they are asking you to do is please prove yourself and show the facts that you claim to be posting.

Come on now guys!

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

What am I doing to explain away the losses of the LW fighters Bill ??

Well let me repeat what I've being saying all along:

1.) The LW was low on fuel.

In the third quarter of 1943 when the air battle over Germany was effectively lost Germany DIDN'T have a shortage of fuel. .

2.) The LW was low on trained pilots.

Wrong again. In 1943 the number of German pilots being trained increased from 1662 new fighter pilots in 1942 to 3276 new fighter pilots in 1943

3.) The dedicated LW fighters were always massively out-numbered.

Wrong again. The earlier postings proved that in Europe and over Germany in the third quarter of 1943 the LW a large number of pilots/planes easily outnumbering the small no of long range fighters available to the USAAF.

4.) The LW interceptors weren't there to fight off fighters, they were there to take down the biggest thread, the bombers. It was the bombers which were pounding the German industry, not the fighters, therefore taking down the bombers was the no.1 priority - hence the losses caused by Allied escorts. Most of the interceptors were shot down attacking the bombers.

The LW fighters were to deal with the threat that they failed indicates that their fighters were not up to the job

5.) The interceptors were heavily armed and therefore didn't stand much chance if caught by the escorts..

That the German fighters had to be upgunned (in particular the 109) to deal with the American bombers leaving themselves vulnerable to the escort fighters indicates that their fighters were not up to the job.