Best WWII Air-Force

[Graeme]

From WILDCAT,

the infamous raid no. 54 on the 2nd of May 1943. 49 spitfires intercepted 41 Japanese a/c only claiming 4 zero's destroyed. For this the wing lost 14 spitfires

.

The Spitfire received very bad press in Australia as a result of this action, although the losses were not so much a result of the aircraft itself, but due to incorrect tactics. After all, the American P-40 pilots of the 49th Fighter Group had learned months ago not to dogfight a Zero...As for the Spitfire-more fuel certainly wouldn't have hurt.

The Advisory War Council set up an official enquiry into what the public perceived as a debacle-fuelled by the daily press-and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Jones reported to it.
The result was the decision to fit drop tanks to the Spitfires and to ban dogfighting in the classical sense of the word. From now on, No.1 Wing's Spitfires would 'bounce' enemy formations from above, diving through them, shooting as they went.
The new hit and run tactics were tested during the next Japanese raid on Darwin on June 20 when 25 bombers escorted by a "healthy" number of Zeros was intercepted. This time the result was more satisfactory for the pilots of 54, 452 and 457 Squadrons: 16 enemy aircraft were downed for the loss of 2 Spitfires. During this engagement Wing Cdr Caldwell achieved another level of 'acedom' by shooting down his fifth Japanese aircraft, adding to the 20.5 Axis aircraft he'd already accounted for in North Africa.

From-SPITFIRE, MUSTANG AND KITTY HAWK in Australian Service.

[pbfoot]

Originally Posted by pbfoot

I'm trying to put a visual aspect to my view of these formations . So with a bomber formation of about 60 miles long cruising at 180knots at what I'm going to assume in the fl250 area . The fighters would I think cruise economically at about 220knots . I hope my suppositions are corrrect. So would the fighters in squadrons start at the rear of the formation and as they reach the the front of the bombers because of the higher speed turn port and starboard alternately and head to the rear in a cab rank affair?

I must clarify this question I'm looking for how the USAAC P51s etc covered the B17's and 24's .

[Graeme]

Originally Posted by pbfoot

I must clarify this question I'm looking for how the USAAC P51s etc covered the B17's and 24's .

From 'Aircraft versus Aircraft' by Norman Franks.

Chapter on Flying Escorts;

"Staying close to the bombers, however, reduced this range owing to their having to weave to stay with their slower charges".

[renrich]

Good posts on the Spifire in the Pacific and I want to be clear that I believe the Spit was an outstanding Ac with a lot of "stretch" in the design. The Zero too was outstanding also but because of the desire for long range and maneuverability it did not have the ability to continue to accept the large increases in engine power the Spit did. One characteristic the Zeke had apparently which is overlooked possibly is reliablity. In the tests against Navy and AAF fighters the Zeke captured in the Aleutians kept chugging along while the P39, P40, P38 and P51 all had problems that forced them be unable to complete the comparisons. The Wildcat though able to complete the tests was clearly inferior to the Zeke in most respects while the Corsair was the only US fighter that completed the tests and was superior in all aspects except low speed maneuverability. Maybe that episode was a commentary on radial versus inline engines but if possible it would be interesting to compare the serviceability records of the Zero versus it's advesarys. Another note on the Zeke is that the knock on it was that the ailerons became ineffective above 275 mph or so. It is my understanding that the limiting factor was pilot strength in deflecting the ailerons at high speeds. Guess they needed to have stronger pilots.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Graeme

From 'Aircraft versus Aircraft' by Norman Franks.

Chapter on Flying Escorts;

"Staying close to the bombers, however, reduced this range owing to their having to weave to stay with their slower charges".

In the specific example of USAAF ETO/MTO doctrine this not only correct but probably should be noted that most long range escort missions were performed in 'relays'.

The shorter range fighters would provide Penetration and Withdrawal - taking the bombers to a point like Munster or Bingen, where a Mustang or Lightning Group would perform the next relay to and from the R/V to the target and back to the Withdrawal.

In rare circumstances the 'middle leg' for a really long mission, like one of the Shuttles, a Mustang or lightning group would pick up at say Dummer Lake and escort to Stettin, where the Shuttle Escort would pick up and escort to Piryatin or Poltava. On the way back to Italy the same Russia escort covered the bombers all the way back to Adriatic Sea and everybody flew to Italy.

I think I covered the standard Squadron doctrine in which the squadrons usually broke up into 8 ship sections and weaved across the top of the formation (like a huge thatch weave in slow speed) to cover front, back and high middle.

By the fall, then winter of 1944/45 the P-47s had acquired the range to do Target Support also and the number of Free Lance Mustang Sweeps (Rodeo) expanded enabling even more coverage out ahead of All target vans, often breaking up concentrations of German Fighters long before they had assembled into a combat formation and proceeded to a bomber formation.

[The Basket]

The Zero was a clever design but would a European air force take it on with those weaknesses? I bet not.

Gloster did fly a Zero lookalike with similar performance and it rejected quickly.

Although the Zero was a better naval fighter than the Spitfire. In terms of range, reliabilty and carrier operation.

And both the Bf 109 and Spitfire in its later marks could go over 400mph which no Zero could.

How the Zero could have entered Luftwaffe service for 1940 is a bit impossible. Might as well say F-86 Sabre!

I'll keep me Spitfire.

[ToughOmbre]

Originally Posted by The Basket

The Zero was a clever design but would a European air force take it on with those weaknesses? I bet not.

Gloster did fly a Zero lookalike with similar performance and it rejected quickly.

Although the Zero was a better naval fighter than the Spitfire. In terms of range, reliabilty and carrier operation.

And both the Bf 109 and Spitfire in its later marks could go over 400mph which no Zero could.

How the Zero could have entered Luftwaffe service for 1940 is a bit impossible. Might as well say F-86 Sabre!

I'll keep me Spitfire.

I would keep the Spit as well. And the Wildcat (yes even a tough as iron, Thach weaving Wildcat!), Hellcat, Corsair, Lightning, Mustang, Jug, 109, 190. The Zero was OVER-RATED (IMHO). Yes, it was very, very dangerous in the hands of an experienced and skilled pilot, but things obviously changed as the war progressed and the Zero became more myth than reality. (Can you tell I'm not a big Zero fan?)

[SoD Stitch]

Originally Posted by pbfoot

I must clarify this question I'm looking for how the USAAC P51s etc covered the B17's and 24's .

Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood the question . . .

As Graeme said, the fighters had to weave back and forth about 5,000ft above the bombers in order to avoid overtaking them and leaving them behind. I remember seeing a really good picture with contrailing B-17's in the forground, and in the background you can see a couple of flights of -47's or P-51's weaving above the bombers; I think this is it:



The contrails higher up that are flying back and forth at an angle to the bombers are the escort fighters.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Hop

During the BoB the RAF were also ordered to focus on the enemy bombers. And yet fighter losses for the RAF were only slightly higher than fighter losses for the Luftwaffe, and overall losses were almost 2 to 1 in the RAF's favour in the BoB.

If you look at the performances during the USAAF daylight offensive and the BoB, then the Luftwaffe doesn't compare well. Their losses were very high, the losses they inflicted on the enemy relatively low, in both cases.

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Hop

Yes, the effect of the attacks was felt from the summer onwards.



Production certainly fell away rapidly, although that overstates it a bit. The USSBS gives oil production in Germany as something over 340,000 tons for the month, including 52,000 tons of aviation fuel.



Same source.

You said bombs dropped on Germany, the total for the USAAF in the ETO was 604,787 short tons.

The US uses a ton of 2,000 lbs, called the short ton. The UK uses a 2,240 lb ton, called the long ton. To compare US and UK tonnages, you have to convert either the UK figures in to short tons, or the US figures in to long tons. I converted the US figures to long tons.

So from the ETO the USAAF dropped 604,787 short tons, which is 1,209,574,000 lbs

Bomber Command dropped 657,664 long tons on Germany, which is 1,473,167,360 lbs (736,583 short tons)

If you want figures for the whole of ETO, then the USAAF dropped 971,762 short tons, which is 867,644 long tons.

Bomber Command, again excluding tactical air forces, dropped 955,044 long tons in the ETO.

Bomber Command also dropped 47,307 sea mines in the ETO, which are not included in the above totals. Mines weighed between 1 and 2,000 lbs, so probably another 25,000 tons of mines.

Curiously, Albert Speer also have some very unflattering remarks about the insanity of British area attacks on residental areas, in fact it's strikes me that Albert Speer was rather relieved that the British wasted their limited resources on such mindless terror attacks that had little effect instead of systematically analyzing the German industry's weak spots and going after those.

It's a pity that Hop is so selective with Albert Speer's book..

[The Basket]

Hey! I'm a British nationalist!

Albert Speer had a very selective memory of what he remembers. Boy, he could be very,very forgetful.

Losses mean nothing if they can be replaced quickly.

The Luftwaffe botched the battle of britain. Lost a generation of top air crew and future leaders and aircraft which were not there for Barbarossa.

The RAF achieved its war aim and the Luftwaffe didn't.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

At the end of the day Kurfurst the RAF prevailed with a smaller force. (The RAF did not always have superior numbers, fighter vs fighter, at the point of attack - even with radar... and the numbers for either side when ione had superiority were not large enough to make it a huge issue.

The more telling point was that Goering shackled his fighters to the bombers making every battle virtually reactive - whereas the USAAF after January 11, let their fighters hunt rather than try to only 'deflect'

The Germans called off the invasion due to lack of air superiority.

I don't have a real problem with either your statistics or allocation of losses, but the USAAAF lost more than the daily mission Summaries showed due to write offs/accidents (as I suspect the LW also) yet they prevailed because of industrial strength and will.

The LW`failed on the 'will' side.

History shows that the LW may yet have prevailed because of the losses they inflicted proportionately, but they failed on the 'will' and the 'strategy' part of the Battle.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

I admit that my sources have different figures for the German losses. I suspect the problem could be the definition of the Battle of Britain. If it helps

For the period May - September 1940 the figures I have are:-
All Types
Lost due to enemy operations 2,313 (fighters 901, Bombers 1,010)
Lost on Operations not due to enemy operations 487 (fighters 170, Bombers 214)
Destroyed not on Operations 264 (fighters 79, Bombers 12
Total lost 3064

For the period July - September
All Types
Lost due to enemy action 1,184 (fighters 612, bombers 483)
Lost on Operations not due to enemy operations 271 (fighters 88, bombers 137)
Destroyed not on operations 181 (fighters 53, Bombers 89)
Total lost 1636

PS I must disagree with your statement that the RAF were quite badly mauled. If they had been, they would have lost.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by drgondog

At the end of the day Kurfurst the RAF prevailed with a smaller force.

Well the RAF was incapable of stopping German bomber attacks at all, even temporarily. The attacks continued from the Adlertag in August 1940 till May 1941 until the LW bombers were re-deployed to the East.

In contrast, despite the industrial might of the US, the LW had some significant successes despite the small numbers of fighers presen in the Reichsverteidigung until 1944, they won at Schweinfurt, at Ploiesti, above Berlin against the RAF night bombers, and at Poltava; each signified a serious setback, even if temporary to the raging Allied air offensive.

It's even more impressive in the face of the forces deployed to achieve that. The usual nonsense Hop is spouting up about the poor outnumbered RAF and the massive number of Luftwaffe interceptors meeting incoming fortresses, the reality was quite different. On May 31 1943, the LW had as 'many' as 296 fighters with the RV in Germany facing USAAF attacks, 328 in France with Luftflotte 3 to counter the entire RAF and it's short ranged fighters and daylight raids.

The notion that the RAF had a smaller force in BoB is a rather old myth, trying to spice up the story about 'the Few'.

On August 10th, when the whole thing really started, the RAF Fighter Command had 1106 fighters around in squadrons, of which 749 were servicable. At the week ending on 9th of August, they also had 80 Defiants, 160 Hurricanes and 132 Spitfires in storage units, ready to be issued immidietely. And that's only the ones that were immidietely ready, for example at the same time 23 Hurricanes ready within 4 days, and 150 under preparation for issue, 33 awaiting repairs.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe as a whole had 934 single engine fighters (805 servicable), and 289 Zestörern present (224 servicable). That's not the force that actually fought the BoB however, as a number LW units were back in Germany and other places, providing a home defense force.

It mirrors also in the sortie rates of fighters.On the week ending with September 8, the RAF flew 5513 fighter sorties, the LW flew 2555; on the week ending with September 15, the RAF was flying 3152 Fighter sorties, the LW flew 875. And so on.

[quote](The RAF did not always have superior numbers, fighter vs fighter, at the point of attack - even with radar... and the numbers for either side when ione had superiority were not large enough to make it a huge issue.[QUOTE/]

Indeed and of course, but first of all that is in contrast with your previous statement where you say note that 'the RAF prevailed with a smaller force', and in any case, it doesn't shed too much good light on the RAF's organisation of defense, after all, if they had more fighters (being on defense and all), and they flew more fighter sorties, yet if you say they couldn't outnumber the LW always (which is certainly true) , it would only point to that the RAF's forces were deployed quite inefficiently or managed tactically.

The more telling point was that Goering shackled his fighters to the bombers making every battle virtually reactive - whereas the USAAF after January 11, let their fighters hunt rather than try to only 'deflect'

Fighters (meaning here all fighters)were not 'shackled' to bombers, some provided close escort, other provided top cover, and others performed fighter sweeps in front of the bombers, on Freie Jagd or Free Hunt missions. These tactics overall proved very effective. Of course it was the guys flying close escorts were the most vocal ones, but they weren't the only ones around.

In fact the USAAF escort fighter tactics were extremely similiar to those used by the Luftwaffe over Britain in September. Of course with time the USAAF's independently marauding escort fighters become far more noticable, since the USAAF after a while had such a superiority in numbers, that more and more can be allocated to free hunts without compromising close escort of the bombers.

The Germans called off the invasion due to lack of air superiority.

Actually no, though this is the founding stone of the Battle of Britain myth, that there was a real danger of a seaborne invasion. There never was, the Germans were quite aware that they simply did not have the means to transport troops accross the channel, virtually from march after the French campaign, while trying to dodge the Royal Navy's much superior force. It was a gamble that nobody was willing the take. I am not sure if you're familiar with Kershaw's recent books, he gives some excellent examples. von Rundstedt, nominally C-in-C of the 'invasion force', for example, considered the whole Seelöwe 'a joke', and didn't even bother to inspect his 'invasion troops'. The invasion preparations were appearantly nothing more than means of putting politcal pressure on Britain to come to terms with Germany. You can't really call of an invasion you don't seriously consider to execute in the first place.

And air superiority they definietely had over Britain, after all, they bombed everything in Britain at will. The RAF could not stop their bombers. There was of course resistance from the RAF, and losses as a result, which is why they did not have at any time air supremacy, total, unrivalled control of the air.

I don't have a real problem with either your statistics or allocation of losses, but the USAAAF lost more than the daily mission Summaries showed due to write offs/accidents (as I suspect the LW also) yet they prevailed because of industrial strength and will.

The LW`failed on the 'will' side.

History shows that the LW may yet have prevailed because of the losses they inflicted proportionately, but they failed on the 'will' and the 'strategy' part of the Battle.

Bill, I am not sure if I am following you correctly on the 'will' part. I suppose you mean they didn't commit their industrial potential fully to the task..? Or do you mean something different.

[The Basket]

The Luftwaffe lost.

Do you think the cities of Germany were utterly destroyed because the Luftwaffe let them?

The RAF couldn't stop every bombing raid and the Luftwaffe switched to night attacks for the same reason RAF did....heavy losses.

Why were the Stukas withdrawn if the Luftwaffe had control of the skies?
Bf 110 was a loser too.

Do not agree.