Best WWII Air-Force

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Im trying to see if I can find the figures in my copies of the Kriegstagebuch of the Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (War Diaries of the High Command of the Wehrmacht) because that is also what I allways thought as well.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by DerAdlerIstGelandet

Your numbers for the Do 24 are incorrect however but that is also irrelevent.

Do 24: 279 were built right up until 1945.

Thanks for that, I will update my records.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I am afraid you are quite wrong in this, and I am curious on what you base your fscts on. The 12 Sept 1939 strenght of the LW was 4093 aircraft, and it continued to increase steadilz.

The daz before Barbarossa it rose to 5245 (so much about claims made on the devastating effects of the BoB, in fact it was not any more bloody than the much shorter French campaign).

A week before Kursk, 30 June 1943, it's numbers increased to 7089 aircraft, and ironically it was on peak strenght at around Bodenplatte - on the 1 Jan 1945 it possessed 8764 airraft. (see Groehler)

In short, during the war, the LW's frontline strenght more than doubled. The problem for them was that they were spread thin from mid-war onwards.

Thanks for the info. Obviously my info is different so can I ask for the ISBN no of the book your quoting from, as it seems worth getting.

I have a total strength (all types) of
May 11 1940, 4,782
June 21 1941 4,882

So the losses incurred in the BOB swallowed up all the German production for the next 12 months before the attack on Russia. So yes, I would say that the LW suferred very heavy losses in the battle.

[Hop]

I am afraid you are quite wrong in this, and I am curious on what you base your fscts on. The 12 Sept 1939 strenght of the LW was 4093 aircraft, and it continued to increase steadilz.

The daz before Barbarossa it rose to 5245 (so much about claims made on the devastating effects of the BoB, in fact it was not any more bloody than the much shorter French campaign).

A week before Kursk, 30 June 1943, it's numbers increased to 7089 aircraft, and ironically it was on peak strenght at around Bodenplatte - on the 1 Jan 1945 it possessed 8764 airraft. (see Groehler)

In short, during the war, the LW's frontline strenght more than doubled. The problem for them was that they were spread thin from mid-war onwards.

The number of aircraft in the Luftwaffe certainly grew, but it's important to look at the types. Growth occured mainly in the non combat types like trainers and coastal, the front line fighters and bombers hardly increased at all.

Figure from Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray:

Mon Year Fight Bomb Total aircraft
Jan 1940 1016 1381 4258
May 1940 1369 1758 5398
Jan 1941 817 1339 4347
May 1941 1277 1481 5524
Jan 1942 1324 1351 5133
Jul 1942 1353 1534 5967
Jan 1943 1380 1193 5374
Jul 1943 1849 1663 7203
Jan 1944 1561 1604 6741
Mar 1944 1747 1441 7023

The daz before Barbarossa it rose to 5245 (so much about claims made on the devastating effects of the BoB, in fact it was not any more bloody than the much shorter French campaign

Well, again it's according to type.

The Germans lost 1345 aircraft on operations during the Battle of France. However, they only lost 341 fighters, 604 bombers.

In the BoB they lost 835 fighters and 833 bombers on operations during the BoB. More importantly, they lost large numbers of pilots during the BoB, whereas they lost far less during the BoF, and regained the pilots who had been captured.

Now look at the figures for May 1941. Overall they had more aircraft than May 1940, but they had less fighters and less bombers than they'd had a year earlier.

A week before Kursk, 30 June 1943, it's numbers increased to 7089 aircraft

Look at the figures for July 1943 (which seems to be the beginning of the month, before Kursk). Total aircraft has gone up greatly over May 1940, but fighters are only up by 480, bombers down by 95.

[drgondog]

Udet - back to Mustang aces vs Jug aces.

Complex discussion - simple answer - many more 51 aces than 38 or 47 aces. Simple reason - the bulk of the German Fighters shot down by USAAF fighters were by Mustangs.

Independent of overclaiming by both sides, the AWARDS by USAF were approximately 4,950 a/c in the air (4131 ground) - most by far German- in 213,873 sorties, and lost 2,520 total - all causes. Air to air losses were roughly 25% of the total, flak the highest and mechanical/coolant about the same as air losses, weather and accidents the rest

With 423,435 sorties the P-47 shot down 3,082 in the air (3,202 ground)- mostly German and lost 3,077.

With 129,849 sorties, the P-38 shot down 1,771 in the air (749 ground) - Most Japanese and lost 1,758.

Just looking at January - May 1944 a breakdown on air scores for the 47 and 51 and 38 groups in the 8th AF. The 9th AF 354FG scored large while on loan to 8th AF

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

Keeping this in perspective

P-38 Groups
20 FG Jan-May 50
55 FG Jan-May 25
364 FG Mar-May 30
----------------------
Total LReich ~ 105

P-47 Groups --------> mostly LufFlotte 3

4 FG Jan-Feb 58
78 FG Jan-May 88
352FG Jan-Apr9 44
353FG Jan-May 67
355FG Jan-Mar 8 22
356FG Jan-May 80
359FG Jan-May12 40
361FG Jan-May15 21
--------------------
Total Luft3 ~ 420

Draw your own conclusions regarding the combat effectiveness of the Mustang flying far few sorties than the P-47s in the 8th AF (~16 Group 'months' versus 33 for rough count). Simply stated 1/2 the activity and 2.5 more destruction (air alone) plus enormous damage strafing airfields.

While not all of the GAF downed by Mustangs were LuftReich - most were. Conversely the P-47s dueled JG11 and JG1 often but most were JG26 and JG2 in LufFlotte 3 region because of range restrictions.

Another reason for the higher scorers is reasonably simple - the key high scorers in P-47s started nearly a year before the Mustang aces (Gabreski, Johnson, Schilling, Zemke, Duncan, Mahurin, Christenson, Beckham to name most with scores above 18 were P-47 aces) and of course many have scores in both. For the 355th, they performed indifferently with P-47s and had only one ace that scored more than 3 in P-47s (Norm Olson with six air). Twenty scored from 5.0 to 14.2 - all Mustang aces starting their scoring after mid March 1944

As to low scoring relative to Luftwaffe you may imagine daylight operations against the USAAF offered a target rich environment for the LW while the reverse was quite true for US. My father was able to engage and shoot only five times to get 6 Me 109s and a Stuka from D-Day to September 11. In the latter part of his first tour and all of his second he was depty CO of the 355th and never able to find the LW in the area when he was leading.

Many Mustang aces had the same experience/

Regards,

Bill

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Erich

I will concur with Bill about the 355th fg, he has it all wrapped up........... certainly there are gaps in any history LW or Allied, and if anything interviewing pilots from both sides concerning a dogfight many would tell you if given the chance again they would do things differently if they could.

here is another kicker : comparing the overall strengths in 1944 summer onward of the LW day fighter Geschwader to a typical 8th AF day fighter group. Even with the included extra staffel in a 3 gruppen Geschwader the LW was still under the gun...........

as it turns out this is more of a Udet to drgondog discussion so i will leave it be........

Jump in Erich -

It's absolutely clear that the Geschwaders were operating at approximately half strength - at least from spring 1945 onward based on Walter Grabmann's research. The primary reason is probably a combination of two things - one, a decreasing availability of skilled replacement pilots rendering fewer pilots than available fighters and second, perhaps reflecting damaged a/c under repair due to strafing/bombing attacks.

The German production figures, according to published German records increased steadily despite USAAF attacks because more priority was allocated to production of fighters.

What I haven't figured out is 'where did they go'?

If you look at the LW "balance sheets' of fighters on a month to month basis, look at the losses they recorded (including write offs) there seems to be a significant gap in 'deliveries minus losses'.

The Strategic Bombing Survey points out the question and to my knowledge it hasn't been answered.

Independent of those questions it is clear from Grabmann's work that LuftReich was operating in the 50% range between 'authorized' and 'actual' after May.

Hey Erich - I just got an email from a friend of Dad - Warren Peglar an RCAF pilot that was transferred from a RAF Spit IXunit to 355th to fly Mustangs for two months. He returned to RAF and flew Tempest V's for rest of war -Interesting comments not only about Spits and Mustangs but also Mustangs and Gustavs and Antons.. I'll send it to you.

He flew both 51Bs and 51Ds and shot down 190s and 109s with both. He flew just two months with 355th. In three years in Spit V, IX, Tempest V he encountered one enemy a/c - a 262 - for a draw.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Glider

Thanks for the info. Obviously my info is different so can I ask for the ISBN no of the book your quoting from, as it seems worth getting.

I have a total strength (all types) of
May 11 1940, 4,782
June 21 1941 4,882

So the losses incurred in the BOB swallowed up all the German production for the next 12 months before the attack on Russia. So yes, I would say that the LW suferred very heavy losses in the battle.

I have a good series of books called the Diaries of the OKW each about a 1000 pages long from each year of the war. They list materials and equipment in each front and so forth and it pretty much goes day by day as well as telling what was happening during those time periods.

The Book is in German but there might be an english version of it out there as well if you wish to have the ISBN or info on the books.

There are no pictures or anything it is just documents and so forth.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Hop

The number of aircraft in the Luftwaffe certainly grew, but it's important to look at the types. Growth occured mainly in the non combat types like trainers and coastal, the front line fighters and bombers hardly increased at all.

Figure from Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray:

Mon Year Fight Bomb Total aircraft
Jan 1940 1016 1381 4258
May 1940 1369 1758 5398
Jan 1941 817 1339 4347
May 1941 1277 1481 5524
Jan 1942 1324 1351 5133
Jul 1942 1353 1534 5967
Jan 1943 1380 1193 5374
Jul 1943 1849 1663 7203
Jan 1944 1561 1604 6741
Mar 1944 1747 1441 7023

Balloney.

Indeed it's important to look at the types.

Your list only shows single engined fighters, and tradiational level bombers while basically it ommits a large amount of combat types - Stukas, Ground attacks aircraft, nightfighters, night attack aircraft etc - and you baselessly assume all these latter are liason planes and the kind.

Let's take January 1944 on your as an example. It says :

Jan 1944
1561 'fighters'
1604 'bombers'
6741 in total

I have figures for 31 December 1943, so it should be close enough. It goes as:

1561 SE fighters
1604 bombers
6584 in total*

Similiar isn't it? Well, half the story only. Groehler also gives some other type breakdowns for the date as :

611 night fighters
601 dive bombers and attack/CAS (Schlact) aircraft.

In short there are about 1200 combat types not accounted by Murray and you. And it would be rather odd not considering NF Bf 110s, Ju 88s, which quite often operated in the daylight as well. It woud be also odd not to consider the by then rather numerous FW 190 ground attack units as combat types either... Yet he list still not details Zestorer units. And so on.

Furthermore, Groehler notes that the 6584 in total* Iststärke (oh no, sein und sollen rose it's ugly head again! ) does not include non-combat units : OTU-equivalents, liason, night harrasment/attack units, transport, glider and maritime aux. units.

I must note that it's an interesting custom that you always include Zestörer units whenever you're trying to sell balloney claims about the RAF fighters units being badly outnumbered, you always include Zestörer unit losses whenever you're counting Luftwaffe losses, yet somehow those same Zestörer units suddenly disappear from your totals when it comes to the Luftwaffe's frontline strenght, which you attempt to prove to have not increased at all during the war...

It's similiarly baseless as your claims that the RAF fighters were outnumbered in BoB, and that Luftwaffe was sustaining twice the loss as the RAF.

Take note I am not arguing here this or that airforce was 'better'. IMHO it's a silly attempt to rank them, considering how different their challenges and task were during the war...! However I do feel the need to correct when I see the wrong, especially when it comes from some not-so-naive people who know better...

It's just the same kind of manipulated BS, if you don't mind me calling it what it is.

Well, again it's according to type.

The Germans lost 1345 aircraft on operations during the Battle of France. However, they only lost 341 fighters, 604 bombers.

In the BoB they lost 835 fighters and 833 bombers on operations during the BoB. [/quote]

I wonder how this adds up. Ie. actual German losses in BoB (July-October), from the LW Quartermaster's returns.
On operations.
This includes both shot down (100%) and write-offs (60-99%).

Type / Destroyed by

SE fighters : 502 / 98 = 600 (+63 not on operations)
Zestörer : 224 / 11 = 235 (+17)

A-ha. So 'fighters' means both SE and TE unit when Hop counts losses.
'Fighters' however do not include TE units when Hop counts frontline strenght (when he seeks to prove the LW frontline strenght did not increase through the war. When he wants to prove the RAF was badly outnumbered, TE units are counted again).

In comparison, during the (almost) two month period of the BoF, the LW lost as total loss :

250 SE fighters
124 TE fighters

But again, that's during the two months of the BoF, compared against the four months of BoB. It's quite clear the BoF was not any less costly per month ,yet from what the British had to endure a few months later, it's hard to see they were in any way paralyzing..

Bombers cause more of a headache, losses during BoB, as above :

Kampfgeschwadern : 488 / 205 = 693 (+99)
Stuka : 59 / 10 = 69 (+25)

In comparison, during two months of the BoF :

Kampfgeschwadern : 477
Stuka : 123

It's actually shows the bomber losses were far worse during BoF than during the BoB. For example, the worst month for German bombers over Britain was August 1940, when they lost 259 of their bombers (Kampf, no Stukas, see later). Only 183 of that, however, was attributed to the RAF and British AAA.

In comparison, between 10 and 31 May, in a short 20 day period, the German bomber total losses amounted no less than 350, far worse than the RAF in BoB ever managed in any month during BoB.

Stukas lost 75 aircraft in the same 20 day period, and 123 Ju 87 during the whole French campaign (May-june).

In comparison, their total losses on operation amounted only 69 in the entire four months of the BoB, 94 if you add losses occuring outside operations. 59 of that, however, was attributed to the RAF and AAA.

More importantly, they lost large numbers of pilots during the BoB, whereas they lost far less during the BoF, and regained the pilots who had been captured.

It's a blanket statement. The Luftwaffe lost 1272 dead, 1156 WIA, and 580 MIA during the French campaign with frontline units in just 50 days - that's not including the ones lost with the Flak, in Germany, in schools etc.

The difference is, of course the timeframe.

The German losses in the 'Battle of France' refer to a mere two months period, between May 10 and 30 June.

The German losses in the 'Battle of Britain' refer to twice the time period, ie. four months, between July 1 and 31 October.

During this time, the Germans lost a total of 2073 aircraft, of which 1401 aircraft was a total loss. That's in a bit less than 2 months.

In comparison, during the four months of BoB, they lost 3022 aircraft, of that, 2009 was a total loss. Of the 2009 total loss, 1789 was occured on operations, and of that 1789, 1385 was knocked down by the Britsh Air Force or AAA.

During the same four months, the British ost 307 bombers, and 1140 Fighters as Category C. That of course just Bomber Command and Fighter Command, but figures are not available for Coastal Command, FAA etc., whereas the German figures include a considerable number of Transport,Coastal, misc. aircraft.

The math is simple to do.

Now look at the figures for May 1941. Overall they had more aircraft than May 1940, but they had less fighters and less bombers than they'd had a year earlier.

I look at them but I can't see anything like that.

I.e. German single engined fighter strenghts (not including Zestorer units) :
On-hand strenght, meaning not all being servicable/ready for duty.

29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.

28 September 1940
920 fighters, 917 pilots.

28 December 1940
829 fighters, 915 pilots

29 March 1941
1104 fighters, 1204 pilots

28 June 1941 (take note that Unternehmen Barbarossa is raging for almost a week by now)
1213 fighters, 1309 pilots

27 September 1941
1137 fighters, 1452 pilots

27 December 1941
1233 fighters, 1381 pilots

In fact just by looking at it, they had just the same number of SE fighters and SE fighter pilots on 29 March 1941 then on 29 June 1940, just before the Battle of Britain. And, naturally your double standards are showing off again, you count Zestörers and fighters sometimes, then not, and forgetting of other fighters - by mid-1941, there were about 250 nightfighters around, for example.

It doesn't seem to hold any water that they had any trouble replacing the planes and pilots in short notice after BoB.

Here it should be mentioned that fighter production suffered during the period since Messerschmitt factories and it's sub-contractors had to re-set the production lines as the 109F entered into production and service during the fall of 1940, and lots of 109Es were simply withdrawn from the frontline units and were replaced by 109Fs, instead of just adding them to strenght.

[Kurfürst]

Look at the figures for July 1943 (which seems to be the beginning of the month, before Kursk). Total aircraft has gone up greatly over May 1940, but fighters are only up by 480, bombers down by 95.

Well the figures you posted say
Jul 1943
1849 (SE) fighters
1663 bombers
7203 in total

Groehler has the exact same numbers for bombers and fighters, though 7089 on total for 30 June 1943. However he also notes this Iststärke of 7000+ does not include non-combat units : OTU-equivalents, liason, night harrasment/attack units, transport, glider and maritime aux. units.

He also notes the presence of 554 night fighters.

As a final touch, let's take a detailed look at the details of the Luftwaffe's strenght on 31 January 1945.

On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in types.

These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units (the latter, shown in the second number, being an equivalent of OTUs, non-combat operational training units.
Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. Combat types in bold.

Bf 109 SE fighters (1435/527)
Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Schlacht types totaled (680/375)
Nachtschlacht types totaled (422/95)
Zerstorer types totaled (42/0)
Nachtjagd types totaled (1241, no breakdown between the two)
Kampf types totaled (543/15

Nahaufklarer totaled (407/27)
Fernaufklarer totaled (195/81)
See types totaled (78/17)
Transport types totaled (496/9)

Grand total (6597/1631)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Of that, 1176/134 are non combat types : short/long range recces, coastal/maritime aircraft, transport aircraft.

Of course, recce aircraft were either armed fighter-recons, or bomber types of the standard fighters and bombers : Bf 109s and Ju 88s usually.
Unlike the Allies, the Germans did not employ unarmed recces (with some exceptions, like the Ar 234), each of them was capable to (and often did) carry armament and/or bombs.

There are 5421 combat aircraft with first line units, 1497 combat aircraft with second line units. These break down into :

4662 fighters (SE, TE, NF)
2273 bomber and attack airract, both first and second line.

6935 combat aircraft in total.

Any possible substraction etc. erros after the ----- line are mine.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

Thanks for the info. Obviously my info is different so can I ask for the ISBN no of the book your quoting from, as it seems worth getting.

ISBN 963 326 271 2

So the losses incurred in the BOB swallowed up all the German production for the next 12 months before the attack on Russia. So yes, I would say that the LW suferred very heavy losses in the battle.

I doubt the 'swallow up part' would be true. I base that on the info I have of Bf 109 (which of course, is my main interest) losses and production during the BoB period.

I.e. the Bf 109 losses were between July - August (via Hooton, who quotes the LW Quartermeister).

Permanent (total, 60-99%, 100%) losses : 663
502 to enemy action on operations
98 to non-enemy action on operations
63 not on operations

Damaged aircraft : 259
71 to enemy action on operations
111 to non-enemy action on operations
77 not on operations


During the same period, German factories delivered 643 Bf 109s (incl. 9 Bf 109Fs) between 30.06.1940 and 31.10.1940. (this is newly produced aircraft, excluding the ones returning from repair centres).

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by DerAdlerIstGelandet

I have a good series of books called the Diaries of the OKW each about a 1000 pages long from each year of the war. They list materials and equipment in each front and so forth and it pretty much goes day by day as well as telling what was happening during those time periods.

The Book is in German but there might be an english version of it out there as well if you wish to have the ISBN or info on the books.

There are no pictures or anything it is just documents and so forth.

Please, details, details! I hate pictures anyway.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I doubt the 'swallow up part' would be true. I base that on the info I have of Bf 109 (which of course, is my main interest) losses and production during the BoB period.

I.e. the Bf 109 losses were between July - August (via Hooton, who quotes the LW Quartermeister).

Permanent (total, 60-99%, 100%) losses : 663
502 to enemy action on operations
98 to non-enemy action on operations
63 not on operations

Damaged aircraft : 259
71 to enemy action on operations
111 to non-enemy action on operations
77 not on operations


During the same period, German factories delivered 643 Bf 109s (incl. 9 Bf 109Fs) between 30.06.1940 and 31.10.1940. (this is newly produced aircraft, excluding the ones returning from repair centres).

Something isn't right here. Your posting says that the German losses in July and August (2 months) were 663. It also says that the Germans built 643 109's in July to October (4 months). So roughly the Germans were losing aircraft at twice the rate they could be replaced.
Presumably those coming back from repair wouldn't have been written off in the first place, so including those simply confuses the situation.

Also my comment was based on the figures I have for the start of the BOB and the start of the Invasion of Russia. They were almost the same if there incorrect please let me know
I should point out that your own posting seems to support this statement
29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.
29 March 1941
1104 fighters, 1204 pilots

Also you seem to have a problem with the point that the RAF were outnumbered in the BOB. I have asked you what your figures are for operational fighters for Luft 2, 3, and 5 to ensure that we are comparing like for like. Can you supply this figure?

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Glider

Something isn't right here. Your posting says that the German losses in July and August (2 months) were 663. It also says that the Germans built 643 109's in July to October (4 months).

Yes you are right - both figures are fror July - October, 4 months. I just labelled them mistakenly. They are for the same period and are comparable, my mistake!

i think I have such a breakdown for the Luftflotten, earlz August IIRC, more on that later - but now, bedtime!

[Udet]

Doctor, hello...

Since i am travelling all i am carrying with me is a luggage set, 2 surfboards, iPod, laptop (borrowed) and 2 books (Xenophon´s Anabasis and Numerical Solution of Partial Differential Equations). Also there was a cellphone that my bosses give me, but that i do not know where i put it, possibly i flushed it down some toilet. Feel lighter without that damn gadget.

This means my WW2 materials and stuff are elsewhere, so hopefully within a few weeks -or months- i will be able to come back with the numbers ("my" numbers)

Also i have to say i am to a great extent familiar with the information you are sharing with regard to P-51 fighter groups available to escort the bombers in the ETO/MTO.

I digress, the notion P-51 pilots found themselves outnumbered during the escort runs and still managed to defeat the attacking 109s and 190s troubles me. As i said, this isn´t the first time i come across the notion.

100% agree with you when you say there were many times Luftwaffe air traffic controllers proved their skill vectoring the 109s and 190s to attain local superiority several times, with the German interceptors inflicting high losses to enemy formations.

Where i can not agree, based upon the data i have reviewed, is that numerical inferiority for the escorts was the rule and not the exepction.

The information you posted indicating fighter groups and victories does not seem to support the case: if such high losses of German fighters were the deed of a small number of pilots for a given period of time, then i am forcefully inclined to believe the number of personal air-to-air victories of P-51 aces should be higher.

I now paste the data you cited -since i am away from my papers, i have to rely on something to keep on discussing right?-:

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

1,092 German planes claimed for all P-51 units only between January and May 1944.

Ok, let´s see what we can see...yes, let´s take the numbers of the 4th and 355th FG´s, whose periods of activity on that table seem almost indentical, that is March-May 1944.

So these two units claimed a total (air-to-air) of 399 enemy planes between March and May 1944. Assuming these 2 units were outnumbered when in combat with German fighters, it would be interesting to have a possible break down of victories showing the names of all pilots who flew for both groups during such months indicating the number of victories awarded to each one of them.

So if as a rule, all this groups entered combat outnumbered, then how many German fighters were they facing? 1,092 victories in the first 5 months of 1944 for Lucifer´s sake...

The less people we have at the party to cut the cake, the bigger the slice of cake each guest will have when platting (hmmm...well a party at your place with only a few people coming over could mean you do not have too many friends?)

Ok so how do we proceed with allotment of air-to-air kills to P-51 pilots of the groups involved?

So in your view to what extent the alleged numerical superiority attained by the fighters of some Geschwader from Luftflotte Reich when engaging an escort flight from the 357 FG throughout April of 1944 could have been? 2:1? 3:1? Or perhaps higher?

I will not use the words of Luftwaffe veterans i have met in the past to strengthen my case, which flew during the final 6 or 7 months of the war, which told me of the nightmare they went through when having to manouver as wild as possible to escape from just too many P-51s which would seem to fight between themselves to score the kill, returning to the base completely soaked in their own sweating. One mentioned the fact their arms were hard as steel due to the brutal effort they put when trying to evade the enemy.

Good you mentioned those Bf 110s and Me 410s operating under Reichsverteidigung...what an unwise administration of material and human resources; as i have sustained in the past, had the Germans disbanded all the day-light Zerstörergeschwadern by the closing days of 1943, to use all Bf 110 and Me 410 pilots as single engined fighters, and to convert at least part or majority of those rear-gunners/radio operators for single-engined pilots, the story could have been different. One once told me this is wrong...that training rear-gunners/radio operators and/or convert bomber pilots to single-engined fighter pilots will not yield good results...really? how come? So does that mean that to apply to become a fighter pilot a mandatory requirement states you should have previous fighter pilot experience?

Finally Doctor, this is an interesting debate. From your word i acknowledge the fact you´ve been around in business for far longer than i have...i did not commence the "serious" reading of this stuff until 6 or 7 years ago, when in my mid-teens.


i am surprised that the Chairman of the Board of AIF (Allied Integrist Front), Syscom3 has not yet jumped in to this specific branch of the discussion.

SoDstitch...ok, got it. Tucson is a great city in my view. Of course breakfast is not the time to think about linking up with girls..hehehe...that is why i say the dinner time is better. Also, not that when i went to the restaurant i was trying to hook up with the waitresses, that´d be such a rude unmannered method in such a sophisticated place eh? Sullivan´s is not like a bikers pub -hahaha-. Usually, it is the girls that do all the manouvering.