Bf-109 vs. Spitfire....

[Hop]

Kurfurst's argument appears to be later German fighters like the K4 and Dora outclassed the Spitfire IX. The thing is, in the real world these late war German fighters were too little, too late, and had very little impact.

Let's look at some figures. From the start of August 1944 to the end of the war, the Jagdwaffe claimed 200 Spitfires, 83 Typhoons and Tempests.

RAF Tempests alone claimed 203 German fighters (109s, 190s and 262s) in the same period.

Kurfurst likes to claim the RAF had to soldier on with the Spitfire IX, because they were short of more modern types. As of 26th April, the RAF had on charge the following (figures are UK&Western Europe/Overseas):



Mustang III&IV - 782/224 (Mustang III is P-51B/C, IV is P-51D)
Spitfire XIV - 500/62
Tempest V - 426
Tempest II - 39

Now, as to reconnaissance, we have seen the unsourced opinion of Soren and Kurfurst. Here are some sourced facts, from people with rather better reputations:

First, RV Jones. Jones was in charge of British technical intelligence during the war. In 1940 and 41 he was involved in the battle against the German blind bombing beams, in 1943 and 1944 he was involved in the battle against the V weapons.

Jones writes in his autobiography that he came up with the idea of using a double agent to feed the Germans information that the V-1s were overshooting London. He hoped the Germans would reduce the flight time, causing the V-1s to fall short of London. The double agents then fed back the information that the V-1s were right on target.

Jones says that when the German launching headquarters was overrun, he had two surprises. First was that some of the bombs had been fitted with radio locators. Both the reports of the radio locators and the agents in London were plotted on a map at the headquarters. The Germans assumed the radio devices were inaccurate, because they reported the bombs were tending to fall short, and that the agents reports must be accurate. Jones continues:

In this helpful conclusion, Wachtel was supported by the evidence of photographic reconnaissance, which incidentally revealed one of the biggest surprises of the whole war. It turned out that there seemed to have been no German photographic reconnaissance of London from 10th January 1941 to 10th September 1944. We had expected that the Germans would have flown regular reconnaissances of the whole of southern England, but Fighter Command had been so effective in interception that the Germans had not succeeded in making a reconnaissance of London for 3 years and 9 months, no more than 50 miles inside our own coastline, while our own reconnaissance pilots were often flying over 500 miles of German occupied territory. I knew of no more startling contrast in the entire war, a joint tribute to Fighter Command and our own reconnaissance units.

I had a slight inkling of the situation before we captured Wachtel's map, because I had read a glowing tribute to the new German twin jet fighter, the Me 262, which a secret German report said was so good it had succeeded in photographic reconnaissance of London "hitherto considered impossible".

Jones then goes on to say that because of cloud on that sortie, only the damage in North London could be photographed. Although much of it was from 1941 and 1942, because it had not been photographed before, the V-1 was credited with causing it, which vindicated the reports of the double agents.

Secondly, Dr Alfred Price. He doesn't (as far as I know) detail German reconnaissance efforts against Britain, but he does describe German efforts against the Normandy area:

Throughout the Battle of Normandy Allied army commanders received frequent and comprehensive photographic coverage of the enemy positions in front of them. In stark contrast, German field commanders often received no warning of a build-up of Allied forces until the leading units came within view of their forward positions. During the battle Luftwaffe reconnaissance units endeavoured to fly two types of operation: high-speed low-altitude visual and photographic reconnaissance sorties by day, flown by Messerschmitt 109s of the tactical reconnaissance units; and high-altitude night photographic missions by Me 410s and Ju 188s of strategic reconnaissance units.
The tactics employed by the Bf 109 reconnaissance units were straightforward enough, though often hazardous in view of the magnitude of the opposition. Usually the aircraft operated in pairs, one of each pair conducting the reconnaissance while the other kept watch for enemy fighters. On rare occasions a fighter escort would be provided if a reconnaissance of a particularly heavily defended area were required, but usually the reconnaissance pilots had to penetrate the defences on their own.
In the nature of things, photographs taken at night gave considerably less information than those taken by day. However, the all-pervading Allied fighter patrols rendered high-altitude daylight photography too dangerous to be contemplated. During a night mission the aircraft would run through the target area at high speed, at altitudes of around 20,000ft, and release a photo-flash bomb fused to ignite at about 4,000ft above the surface. On ignition the bomb gave a flash of 6,000,000 candlepower lasting for a third of a second, and this automatically closed the shutter of the camera and wound on the film for the next photograph. Then the shutter opened again for the next shot. Usually four or five pictures were taken in this way, at ten-second intervals. By the end of that time the night fighter and gun defences in the area were thoroughly alerted and the German crew had to dive to low altitude and beat a hasty retreat.
As was to be expected, such reconnaissance methods produced only a fragmentary picture of the Allied dispositions. The powerful defences took a mounting toll of both aircraft and crews, and, if they were to survive, the latter had often to break off their missions at the first sign of trouble.
The lack of aerial reconnaissance had serious consequences.

Price goes on to say the situation only changed when the Ar 234 was deployed.

So that's two respected sources that say the Luftwaffe were not succeeding with their recce efforts.

However, the situation is summed up by a third. The USAF commissioned historical studies of the war effort, their own and the Luftwaffe's. One is on Luftwaffe intelligence operations, and covers recce flights. It was written by Generalleutnant Andreas Nielsen.

Writing about German efforts to photograph the invasion fleet in the run up to D Day:

The almost impenetrable fighter screens above England complicated aerial reconnaissance to such a degree that results were obtained only accidentally. Thus, no information could be gathered as to possible secondary landings, for instance in Norway, Denmark or along the German North Sea coast.

David Kahn, in Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II, sums up German recce efforts:

The curve of the effectiveness of German aerial reconnaissance matched that of the rise and fall of German arms in general more closely than that of any other form of intelligence. In seeking physical evidence, it depended more upon strength—control of the air—or speed to obtain this evidence than almost all other forms of intelligence. This strength was naturally a function of the overall German strength. For the first half of the war, German air superiority permitted German aerial reconnaissance, and it in turn helped German arms win their victories. But with the German defeats on the ground and in the air, reconnaissance became sparser and less effec
. Toward the end it became almost nonexistent. In December 1944, an air force officer noted that no air reconnaissance of British industry had taken place for three years. German aerial reconnaissance made no great discoveries, as the Allies' did of the V-l sites. It could not get planes over London to correct the fake reports of turned-around agents about the impact points of these flying bombs. It failed to spot the bringing-up of the troops from Siberia that stopped the Germans at Moscow. A mournful comment by the navy on 22 May 1944, while the Germans were trying desperately to discover where the expected invasion of Europe would come, may serve as its epitaph: "Especially on account of the lack of constant comprehensive air reconnaissance, the [enemy's] main transport effort in one sector or another of the Channel coast is not ascertainable"

I'm sure the Germans managed night time recce of Britain, the USAF study even talks of successful missions over Britain, although without mentioning the time. But night recce, as Dr Price points out, is very much second best.

[Glider]

What you havent heard of and what you wish to believe has rather little substance behind it I am afraid...

Perhaps do some reading first.

I have done, quite a lot over the years and whilst I agree the He177 was used as a naval recce aircraft I have not heard of it being used over the British Isles. I also know that it was used in the little Blitz in the first three months of 1944 and that all the aircraft that took part incurred heavy losses. Remember that was at night over very short distances with London only being around 60 miles from the French coast.

I have never heard of any German aircraft (Arado 234 excepted) that could fly over the UK in daylight on Recce missions on anything like the basis of the Allied PR aircraft Mossies, Spits and to a lesser degree Lightnings.

You are the one who says that this happened and I am willing to agree with you, but only if you can support that statement.

[Kurfürst]

I guess I must have hit some nerve.

To make things clear, these are some of the favourite subjects of Hop, he use to argue repeatadly over the same for years on various board. Much like David Irving`s favourite subject being non-existance of the Holocaust, Hop`s favourite subject is the non-existance of recconnaisance flights over the UK after 1940. He also resambles Irving in handling the historical evidence.

The 'no recconnaisance occured over England' is one his favourites; this has been discussed over this board already, yet he pretends that he is ignorant of the evidence presented to him back then. It is not neccesary to go over it again, as Hop is very dishonest and will continue to ignore the evidence, and repeat the same all the same, or perhaps in an 'improved' form over the next time, to give a push to the agenda.

It is suffice to notice, though, that in contrast of the opinon of RV Jones which Hop could muster (and usually quotes as 'evidence') with sweat to support his agenda, the more specific, serious literature is replete with description of recconnaissance sorties over England; other than guesses of a British civil engineer from the war who had no idea on enemy reconnaissance operations at all.

Blandford quotes for example He 177 pilots who did their - rather uneventful, they couldn`t be intercepted, though once they saw a Spitfire below struggling to climb to their altitude before giving up - armed recconnaissance sorties as far up as Birmingham in the summer of 1943; initially they only carried cameras, later, as they penetrated so easily at high altitude, they also carried two 2200 lbs bombs to combine PR runs with harassment raids; Clostermann, a Spitfire and Tempest pilot describes his first hand intercepting experience with long range photo-reconnaissance Bf 109Gs (appearantly from Norway) over Scape Flow in 1944; Nick Beale, the author of a great many books on the Luftwaffe and Allied air forces describes how LW recconnaissance photographed parts the Allied invasion fleet in port, which was subsequently bombed by bombers in the night; Petrick/Mankau describes the reconnaissance sorties of Me 410 over England during 43-44; so on.

In other hands, we have RV Jones`s guesswork about LW reconnaissance over England, and the documented recce sorties flown by the Luftwaffe.

The recommended reading is Vol 2 of Aufklärer Luftwaffe Reconnaissance Aircraft and Units, 1942 – 1945, by David Wadman, in the Luftwaffe Color Series.



Its also worth to read the report by Generalleutnant Andreas Nielsen, as not only it gives the reader an impression on German air force during the war, but also of Hop`s willingness to selectively quote and manipulate the sources. For this reason he never provides the link to it, so here it is
AFHRA: Numbered USAF Historical Studies: 151-200

Its perfectly redundant to go into detail over all these again, just because a revisionist re-started his usual 'stuff'. He has been quoting RV Jones opinion, ie. that V-1 launch sites has been issued with old recce photos of London (did Lonndon moved between 1940 and 1944..? I think not.) and because of that could have been absolutely no photo reconnaissance over entire England through the war of course.

As obvious the logical fellacies and dishonesty is, it is one of Hop`s favourite revisionist stories, debunked over far too many boards, so lets leave it at that.

Kurfurst's argument appears to be later German fighters like the K4 and Dora outclassed the Spitfire IX. The thing is, in the real world these late war German fighters were too little, too late, and had very little impact.

I am afraid this isn`t the truth, but barely Hop turning the events upside down; ie. in the end of January 1945, the LW reported 314 Bf 109 K-4s, 619 high altitude G-14/AS and G-10; 431 MW50 boosted G-14s, and only 71 old G-6s. I have no figures for the end of January for D-9s, but a month earlier even those amounted 183. In short, there was no shortage of modern types.

This is in direct contrast to the RAF, which was predominantly equipped by Mark IXs and Typhoons from 1943, and even Mark V Spitfires. A brief glance overt the 2nd TAF`s inventory towards the end of 1944 confirms that.

Like I said above, its and old story and a thorn in the eye for Hop, as on one hand, we have the detailed strenght reports from the RAF and Luftwaffe at this period of the war, and they show the facts on type strenghts, they show the sorties, and naturally Hop was shown all these repeatadly.

Its difficult to argue with these, and Hop doesn`t even attempts, rather resorts to empty rhetorics; Again its not neccessary to go over all of this because someone pretends to be ignorant of these facts.

its sufficient evidence that Hop cannot and will not support his claims with anything; rather, he will jump to his next claim, and when cornered about that and asked to support them with something, he will proceed to another claim. Like Goebbels, he will repeat the same lie hoping it will become a truth.

Let's look at some figures. From the start of August 1944 to the end of the war, the Jagdwaffe claimed 200 Spitfires, 83 Typhoons and Tempests. RAF Tempests alone claimed 203 German fighters (109s, 190s and 262s) in the same period.

Again, its sufficient again to cross - check these claims of Hop with the known RAF loss figures, ie. take example the RAF losses occured during Bodenplatte alone (and the Germans certainly claimed more there then what the RAF actually lost, its common thing).

Like in the case of the availability of late war fighters, everything turns upside down in HopWorld.

Kurfurst likes to claim the RAF had to soldier on with the Spitfire IX, because they were short of more modern types.

Indeed they were. See below :



In fact they had to soldier on with the Mark V for far too long, they didn`t even had enough Mk IXs with units, not to say Mk XIVs.

Lets take for example, No 610 Sqns. They received their first Mk XIVs in January 1944. Production was so slow, they didn`t have a full compliement of fighters - even for a single Squadron, ie. 20-odd fighters ! - until March 1944..

Even by the end of May 1944, the RAF had a mere 60-odd Mk XIVs in service; about 1/3 of these wouldn`t even fly missions, being Sqn reserves.

as on of 14th December 1944, there were altogether 120 Spitfire Mk. XIVs. with the operationally fit Squadrons:

41 Squadron,130 Squadron, 350 Squadron, 402 Squadron, 610 Squadron, 430 Squadron, 2 Squadron.

Of these 120 planes in six squadrons, 72 would fly missions; the rest were reserves, that, in British practice, were directly attached to the units.

Mark XIVs were in fact rarer than Me 262s in service.

Its all documented well.

As of 26th April, the RAF had on charge the following (figures are UK&Western Europe/Overseas):

Mustang III&IV - 782/224 (Mustang III is P-51B/C, IV is P-51D)
Spitfire XIV - 500/62
Tempest V - 426
Tempest II - 39

There is not much to comment on this, expect that figures have been made up, and these can be confirmed by the order of Battles and RAF strenght reports of units.

Hop is simply lying and making up numbers; lately I have seen him lying similiar figures being 'on the RAFs charge'. Truth is, he is selective with the numbers - thats whu you dont see any Mk IX or Mark V figures to get a comparison - and he also manipulated the meaning of the figures he uses as a basis.

This has been confirmed by those who`s numbers Hop is using and quotes either distorted or selectively.

[Kurfürst]

I have done, quite a lot over the years and whilst I agree the He177 was used as a naval recce aircraft I have not heard of it being used over the British Isles. I also know that it was used in the little Blitz in the first three months of 1944 and that all the aircraft that took part incurred heavy losses.

Well this is the source, so all you have to do now is to read it:

Amazon.co.uk: Target England: Edmund L. Blandford: Books

[QUOTERemember that was at night over very short distances with London only being around 60 miles from the French coast.[/QUOTE]

This has been discussed not so long ago, no He 177s were operating 'from 60 miles from the French coast', they were operating from bases much further away - the recce ones in particular operated from the bases at the German border IIRC - yet you continue to lay the same claim again.

So now I ask you to support it.

I have never heard of any German aircraft (Arado 234 excepted) that could fly over the UK in daylight on Recce missions on anything like the basis of the Allied PR aircraft Mossies, Spits and to a lesser degree Lightnings.

Well have you heard of daylight on recce missions by 109Es in the Battle of Britain..? No? Yet it happened.

Its funny you know. All this talk about PR Spits, Mossies - which didn`t came into existance well after the 109s (and 190s, too) were doing the same job for some time - and the firm belief it wasn`t 'anything like the basis of the Allied PR aircraft'.

I guess its just a classic logical fellacy, ie. if we had PR aircraft, there is no way that they could have the same on the other side.

You are the one who says that this happened

Nope, there are plenty of respected authors, too.

and I am willing to agree with you, but only if you can support that statement.

Well, you can do your reading, I gave you plenty of literature above.

[Glider]

Basically all manouvering is about excess thrust. Sustained turning is all about your excess thrust matching the increased decelerating force from increased drag when you are turning (and flying at a higher AoA than when in level flight, ie. higher induced drag).

So to put it into practical terms, lets see an example.

Plane A can achieve 400 mph with 1500 HP at altitude, and at this point it has 0 excess thrust (since its neither accelerating or decelerating). It can cruise at 330 mph with 1000 HP.

Plane B can achieve 440 mph at altitude with the same 1500 HP, and can achieve 400 mph when cruising using 1000 HP.

So similiarly, Plane B has 0 excess thrust at 440 mph, and has 500 HP excess thrust at 400 mph.

So when Plane A and Plane B will start turning at 400 mph, the drag experienced by both will rapidly increase, because in turn your induced drag will increase rapidly. Overall drag will increase on both aircraft, and now both would need greater thrust to sustain 400 mph in turns. Since Plane A has no more excess thrust at all, it will start to decelerate (quite rapidly) when it commences a turn at 400 mph. Plane B can use its 500 HP-worth of excess thrust to sustain its speed AND turn at the same time.

Weight of course matters, but its not so simple (the 109, for example, is much lighter than the Spit); weight actually effects how high your drag is in turn, which gets us back to excess thrust. The Spitfire has large wings for its size and weight, but at the same time its also a very draggy airframe compared to others, hence why its relatively slow, and outclassed by others at high speed turns, climbs acceleration.

This is almost priceless.
1) So in other words your saying that a 400mph Fw109 and Me109 is dead meat for a Mustang which can go 440mph because at 400mph a Mustang has excess thrust that the other two don't have. I somehow don't think you really meant that.
2) You are saying that the Spitfire hence why its relatively slow, and outclassed by others at high speed turns, climbs acceleration
Which of the German aircraft was better at high speed turns?
Re climb we are talking about a 1942 Spit IX that you agreed could match the climb of the end of war 109K with a boost that may or may not have been used in the last few months of the war.
What chance the earlier 109G's which weighed a lot more than the 109K and had less powerful engines?
3) The equivalent to the 109K with the 1.98 boost would of course be the Spit 20 if you want to talk about like for like.
4) You forget that the Spit IX had more or less been replaced as an intercepter by the Spit XIV by the time the 109K was around

On the other hand, it had some serious defects as well. Lack of speed and range should be mentioned first and foremost, and poor control characteristics. Actually, both of the former vices can be traced back the high drag of the design. I guess the death of the lead engineer was a blow that the design team couldnt recover from.

Lack of range was always a problem but there were versions that matched the 109 and it was always sufficient for the tasks as the Allies had other aircraft that had a longer reach.
Lack of Speed I question, certainly when compared to the 109G and 190A. The aircraft performed at different heights but that is no suprise, all aircraft have different characteristics and the Spit was flexible enough to be able to fight at all altitudes.
Poor Control Characteristics I am not aware of any unique poor control characteristics, could you name any one in particular, with of course supporting references?

[Soren]

Glider,

The earlier 109's weren't any heavier than the K-4, the K-4 was infact abit heavier at 3,364 kg.

[Glider]

Well this is the source, so all you have to do now is to read it:

Amazon.co.uk: Target England: Edmund L. Blandford: Books

[QUOTERemember that was at night over very short distances with London only being around 60 miles from the French coast.

This has been discussed not so long ago, no He 177s were operating 'from 60 miles from the French coast', they were operating from bases much further away - the recce ones in particular operated from the bases at the German border IIRC - yet you continue to lay the same claim again.

So now I ask you to support it.[/QUOTE]

Kurfurst
I cannot believe that you are claiming that London isn't 60 miles from the French coast, get an Atlas and look it up.

Let me make it simple for you.
Allied PR aircraft were in danger from when they crossed the French coast, they then flew to Berlin and beyond, hundreds of mile behind the German lines by day and night.
German PR aircraft were in danger when they crossed the British coast and hardly ever made it to London about 25 miles from the British coast by day or night.

Well have you heard of daylight on recce missions by 109Es in the Battle of Britain..? No? Yet it happened.

OK I will give you that PR missions were flown during the BOB, not exactly the same as He177 flying over the UK in daylight is it.

Its funny you know. All this talk about PR Spits, Mossies - which didn`t came into existance well after the 109s (and 190s, too) were doing the same job for some time - and the firm belief it wasn`t 'anything like the basis of the Allied PR aircraft'.

The first PR flight by a Spitfire over Aachen took place on 18th November 1939
On 10 February 1940 PR Spitfires took photographs of the German naval bases at Wilhelmshaven and Emden
The PR Spit IV entered service in October 1940 with a range of 2000 miles taking photos as far away as Stettin
The PR Spit VI on 14th March 1941 took photographs of Berlin.
I think the point is well made. The following source may be of interest
Photo Reconnaissance Spitfires
As an aside, it speaks well of the design team who took over after the death of Mitchell.

I guess its just a classic logical fellacy, ie. if we had PR aircraft, there is no way that they could have the same on the other side.

This is an interesting comment. I was thinking that you may be working on the assumption that if the He177 was used as a Navel Recce aircraft it was also used over the British mainland.
By the way, I am still waiting for a source for this. If its included in the book you mentioned, can I have the page numbers? I remind you that I did this for you when you questioned the 4 cannon armed spitfires mentioned in the book Malta the Spitfire Years.

Well, you can do your reading, I gave you plenty of literature above.

You gave me one book that I suspect doesn't cover the statements you made. As mentioned if you could give me the page nos

[Glider]

Glider,

The earlier 109's weren't any heavier than the K-4, the K-4 was infact abit heavier at 3,364 kg.

My mistake. I thought that postings had been made that the K version was lighter than the G's, but your right, I should have checked it first.

[claidemore]

In regards to the 2TAF documents with plane types used by various squadrons in 1944.

The squadrons shown with Hurricanes or Spit Mk V's, were not front line operational squadrons. They were either new, or being rotated back to England to regroup with new pilots etc. They used those older planes basically as advanced trainers, then switched to newer types before going operational.

The MkV was not soldiering on, it was being held in reserve. No MkVs were stationed in Europe after D-Day, the only time they might have even entered European air space would be when a reserve squadron would do a cross-channel sweep just to give some new pilots a chance to feel what an operational flight was like.

And the Mk IX was already being pulled out of the interceptor/fighter role, and being used in ground attack. There were enough Mk XIVs and Mustang III/IVs and Tempests to do that job, and the Mk IXs were being fitted with bombs etc.

Saying there were only X number of Mk XIVs vs X number of 109/190's is pretty misleading, since there were also, Mustangs, P47s, P38s, Tempests, Typhoons, and Mk IX/XVI/VIII spits.

[Kurfürst]

This is almost priceless.
1) So in other words your saying that a 400mph Fw109 and Me109 is dead meat for a Mustang which can go 440mph because at 400mph a Mustang has excess thrust that the other two don't have. I somehow don't think you really meant that.

Well at 400 mph at high altitude the earlier 109G and FW 190A would of course would be at the same disadvantage against the Mustang as the Mk IXs vs the 109K. At slower speeds it may be a different matter, but at least the LW was introducing a parallel cure to that with the high altitude 109s that appeared the same time as the Mustang.

2) You are saying that the Spitfire hence why its relatively slow, and outclassed by others at high speed turns, climbs acceleration
Which of the German aircraft was better at high speed turns?

Any, which had higher excess thrust, ie. 109K, 190D etc.

Re climb we are talking about a 1942 Spit IX that you agreed could match the climb of the end of war 109K with a boost that may or may not have been used in the last few months of the war.
What chance the earlier 109G's which weighed a lot more than the 109K and had less powerful engines?

a, I`ve certainly not agreed anything like that, the 1942 Spit IX at its +15 ratings was outclimb by its contemporary G-2 with ease.
b, the earlier G-2s were of course much lighter, ie G2 : 3037 kg, K4 : 3362 kg.

3) The equivalent to the 109K with the 1.98 boost would of course be the Spit 20 if you want to talk about like for like.

In timeframe, yes, but not in operational importance. I belive the Mark 20 series didnt saw air to air combat, having done but a couple patrols towards the wars end.

4) You forget that the Spit IX had more or less been replaced as an intercepter by the Spit XIV by the time the 109K was around

No, unfortunately.

The 2nd TAF towards the end of 1944, when the 109K appeared, though it had all the Mk XIV Squadrons in the RAF, had only six Mk XIV Sqns and something like 30+ Mk IX/XVIs.

Lack of range was always a problem but there were versions that matched the 109 and it was always sufficient for the tasks as the Allies had other aircraft that had a longer reach.
Lack of Speed I question, certainly when compared to the 109G and 190A. The aircraft performed at different heights but that is no suprise, all aircraft have different characteristics and the Spit was flexible enough to be able to fight at all altitudes.

Poor Control Characteristics I am not aware of any unique poor control characteristics, could you name any one in particular, with of course supporting references?

In particular I am referring the very poor control harmony, ie. extremely sensitive elevator (made the aircraft difficult to fly to the limit and made a poor gun platform) coupled with excessively heavy ailrons.

One Spitfire pilot put it, very vividly, as it was like 'touching the elevator with a light fingertip while arm wrestling the ailrons'. I am sure you`d agree its not a good combination to have in the midst of combat..

Nice info PR Spits, thank you. Do you read Hungarian, btw - as I can only give you the page in the Hungarian edition of Blandford`s book..

[claidemore]

Lets use 6k and 20,000 feet for climb comparisons, since charts for either plane usually show results for those heights, and they are only 300 or so feet apart.

1942 Spit Mk IX with Merlin 61, time to 20,000ft/6k, is 6.5 min at normal 12 lb boost, 5.6 at combat 15 lb boost.
A recon G2(closest data to a clean fighter G2) according to German data, is 5.8 min at presumably 1.3 ata. Knock off .2 min for the camera weight, and you have parity in climb to 6k, with one plane or the other having the edge at different alts. This pretty much agrees with British tactical trials of the two types. I know the Finnish G2 test shows slightly faster times, but the Finns were cheatin!

With Merlin 66/70 the Mk IX was reaching 6k in 4.75/4.85 minutes.

Clean 109 G-6s were 6.5 minutes, add gunpods it's 6.7min. 109K4 with 1.45 ata was also 6.5 minutes to 6k and with 1.98 ata it was 5 minutes to 6k (still longer than the 66/70 Merlin Mk IX) The superior climb rate of the Mk IX was one of the reasons it could still fight effectively in 44 and 45.

As for excess thrust in turn at high speeds, if we follow that logic, then the Mk XIV should also turn faster than a Mk IX at 400mph, yet all reports say that turn was identical. There is never any mention of the Mk XIV turning better as speed increases. Same thing happened when the Mk V was up-engined to the Mk IX.

[wing angel]

if its a spitfire mk 5 vs bf-109 then its down to skill

if a german ace was vs a british recruit then the ace would win

but if ace on ace then it would be close but the spit would win

BF-109 cant bank and dive lol

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

BF-109 cant bank and dive lol

Care to prove that. I am not saying you are wrong, but lets see some proof of that.

[Colin1]

if its a spitfire mk 5 vs bf-109 then its down to skill
if a german ace was vs a british recruit then the ace would win
but if ace on ace then it would be close but the spit would win
BF-109 cant bank and dive lol

A Bf109 what? Which version?
I'm not sure if you're saying the Bf109x can't bank and can't dive or that it can't bank-and-dive.
Your post is a little lacking in data to prove your point but diving was a stock manoevre of German pilots who'd gotten uninvited company on their tails, they would simply bunt the nose down and dive away, something the earlier Spitfires had no answer for.

[Soren]

The std. 109 evasive maneuver was either a hard climbing turn or a quick dive with full right rudder followed by a spiral climb.