Could the IJN have launched a "Third wave" at Pearl Harbour?

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by The Basket

Attacking PH was to knock US out the war. The timing was part of the big Jap push against the Dutch and British in se asia. So they were already commited and so they were going to attack carriers or no carriers.

I agree that they could have totally destroyed everything at PH but it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war. Just timing.

They were right to quit while winning. If the carriers had been there then that would have been the prize.

I would tend to disagree that the IJN 'could have destroyed everything'. Contrast the tonnage and the number of facilities that were hit at Pearl against the tonnage and sorties against fewer targets at Rabaul or Truk - in neither case was the target destruction complete or nearly complete - over a two year span of attacks.

The quantity and sizes of the japanes bombs were adequate to breach 6-10" of steel but no where near enough to accomplish more than a few months of repairable damage or loss against the heavy land/portside assets.

I agree that a third strike may have done serious damage to some subs at dock, to the POL in storage and sink some more ships... but at the end of the day probably not enough to slow the build up to Coral Sea.. might have influenced build up from Atlantic, however.

Runways are easily repairable, dock facilities need direct hits with really big bombs to do irreparable damage, ditto for dry docks and machine shops.

Reference the relative ease Germany had in bringing refineries and Ball bearing plants back into some production, quickly - and why they had to be bomber repeadtedly to take them out.

I suspect, except for missing carriers, that the key objectives were met by IJN. I also suspect if they thought the subs and POL were higher value they would have been hit second strike (first goes after Pearl and airfields).

We were hit badly enough that resisting in Java and Phillipines was not a serious option...

[The Basket]

From what I've read, PH was either a knockout blow to keep US out of the war or to keep the US fleet from interfering from the SE Asian invasions.

My point was that PH could not in any way shape or form won the war for the Japs in one day...regardless of any damage they caused.

The Japs would have to march into the White House to win the war...which is why PH was just a plain dumb idea.

But then again the Japs would have gone to war with the US over the Philipines so yeah...the Japs got in the first shot.

[renrich]

The IJN knew the carriers were not in PH as the Japanese embassy sent that message in diplomatic code a day or so before the attack. Since we had broken that code, Washington deciphered that message. They did not notify Admiral Kimmel or Gen Short. They also told Tokyo that the BBs were not deploying torpedo nets. One would think that that information would be useful to Kimmel.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by renrich

The IJN knew the carriers were not in PH as the Japanese embassy sent that message in diplomatic code a day or so before the attack. Since we had broken that code, Washington deciphered that message. They did not notify Admiral Kimmel or Gen Short. They also told Tokyo that the BBs were not deploying torpedo nets. One would think that that information would be useful to Kimmel.

I've wondered if Kimmel was picked as a scapegoat to protect some others higher up the food chain...
I have always thought that the Army shouldn't have expected the Navy to provide ANY defence for Pearl, as there should be enough aircraft, AA & army units to defend the base even if ALL the ships were away.

Originally Posted by The Basket

From what I've read, PH was either a knockout blow to keep US out of the war or to keep the US fleet from interfering from the SE Asian invasions.

The Japs would have to march into the White House to win the war...which is why PH was just a plain dumb idea.

But then again the Japs would have gone to war with the US over the Philipines so yeah...the Japs got in the first shot.

Basket, Pearl was just the start. And the Japanese did not have to "take the White House", only to make the re-conquest of east Asia so costly that the US would decline to do it. {as they were reluctant for an invasion of the Japanese islands in 1945.} They would have to strangle the Allied shipping, that would be #1 priority.

Originally Posted by syscom3

The war in the pacific would have ended exactly on time due to the US receiving the atomic bomb in 1945.

It might be possible for Germany {if not pulverized in '44-'45} would be able to develop a bomb to counter the US/UK's Manhattan project. It's not clear either way that IF Germany was not desperatly defending its territory from mid-1943 onwards, that they might have been able to develop an A-bomb as well.

[renrich]

Freebird, I think you are exactly right that the army should have been responsible for defense of PH. Your point about who defends if the fleet is out is excellent. If a scapegoat was needed General Short should have had more culpability but it was disgraceful the way Kimmel and also Short were treated. There was blame to be allocated for many people but the plain truth was that the US was unprepared for a surprise attack at every level. I need to check my reference but I believe that Admiral Richardson who was CINCPAC before Kimmel was replaced by Kimmel because he kept asserting that the Pacific Fleet was a sitting duck at PH and needed to be moved back to the West Coast.

[Wayne Little]

Originally Posted by freebird

Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?

If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour, should they have risked a third wave?

If I have the data correct, the first wave landed back on the carriers at 10 am, the second wave at 12 noon. The Japanese spent another hour or two searching for the US Carriers, at which point it was decided by Nagumo that the risks of a third wave were too great.

If the US Pacific carriers were all accounted for (either sunk at Pearl or seen at anchor in San Diego), the Japanese could have re-armed the first wave aircraft for another attack and launched right away without losing time searching for the Carriers.

The third wave as advocated by Genda would have targeted the fuel tanks, repair shops, sub base and the cruisers & destroyers at Pearl {5 out of 8 cruisers & 26 of 29 destryers were undamaged following the second wave}

What would have been the result?

Would they have been successful? to some degree maybe but probably not, first the element of surprise was lost, the remaining American aircraft and AA would have exacted a reasonable toll on the incoming Japanese aircraft.The prize for a third attack would need to be a big one. IF the carriers were not there and subsequently discovered, then it probably would be game on, the Japanese figuring that they had the upper hand in Carriers and aircraft.

If the Carriers were at Pearl at the time of the attack they would have been heavily targeted in the first place, and most likely sunk, they would have been sitting ducks! A third wave would not have been necessary figuring that they had eliminated the primary objectives, Carriers and other Capital ships.

Now, all scenarios need to be based on the IJN turn around time to launch another strike. The last of the first wave departed around 8.30 and an approx flight time back to the carriers puts it at 10.00am. So from approx 9.30 to say 10.15 or longer the recovery process would have been in full swing. The aircraft would need to be transferred below decks to clear for other incoming aircraft AND the second wave. Debriefing, checking aircraft for damage, csualties etc. would have taken time. Launch and recovery of CAP fighters.
Then their is refuelling, rearming, transfer back to the flight deck and launch, if this happened quickly it most likely would still have overlapped the return of the second wave and been delayed, the first of which would have been arriving back over the carriers around 11.00. Fuchida did not arrive back on the Akagi until well after 12.00, probably closer to 1.00pm to give his full report of events.

Therefore by the time all was said and done, debrief, refuel, repair, re-arm, co-ordinate a new strike, launch and flight time to Pearl it would have already been mid afternoon the returning aircraft could well have been returning after dark? or close to it. Big Risk I think. Probably only taken if carriers at Pearl and only damaged or if discovered near Pearl, in which case they would have gone after the carriers rather than PH.

How does this sound? with so many if's but's and maybe's, option 2,3 or 4 could apply in the poll I don't think option 1 would fit in my opinion.

[andie0712]

Too many risks for another strike!
Mr.Wayne Little's View Point is perpectly right.

In my opinion,
Third wave is not main factor of Paicific War,
Third wave can not change anything.
No matter how Japanese couldn't win the war

The meaning of Pearl harbor is End of Japanese Empire.
When IJN decided to attack Pearl harbor, Whole thing is fixed.

Attaking Pearl harbor is amazing success of WW2 aviation history.
But it is also national suicide for Japan.

Even If third wave destroyed whole things in Pearl harbor,
Could IJN win the U.S forces in Pacific area?

For U.S Navy and Marines,
To win the war with Japan,
It's just a matter of time~~~~

[syscom3]

Wayne is correct about the timing for the 3rd wave.

From the time the last plane from the 2nd strike is landed untill the time the first plane from the 3rd strike takes off would be over one hour, closer to two.

[plan_D]

How many U.S aircraft would be able to oppose the third wave; if it departed at 1 p.m ? I know the Enterprise was arriving at the scene when the Japanese were departing, but how many aircraft did it have and how many operational fighters did Pearl Harbour have after the first two strikes?

To have a real idea you need to know the AA that was still operational at Pearl Harbour and the fighters available to the U.S forces. And then you have to take into account that the AA of the day was not going to be devastating to a medium level attack, if not in extremely large numbers it would only bloody the nose of the third wave without a decent number of U.S fighters present.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Wayne Little

If the Carriers were at Pearl at the time of the attack they would have been heavily targeted in the first place, and most likely sunk, they would have been sitting ducks! A third wave would not have been necessary figuring that they had eliminated the primary objectives, Carriers and other Capital ships.

Now, all scenarios need to be based on the IJN turn around time to launch another strike. The last of the first wave departed around 8.30 and an approx flight time back to the carriers puts it at 10.00am. So from approx 9.30 to say 10.15 or longer the recovery process would have been in full swing. The aircraft would need to be transferred below decks to clear for other incoming aircraft AND the second wave. Debriefing, checking aircraft for damage, csualties etc. would have taken time. Launch and recovery of CAP fighters..

How long would it take to turn around 35 aircraft? (from each carrier). I would indeed depend on this, that's why I ask the question. If they could do this in about an hour, could they not launch them at about 11 and hold the second wave in the air until 11:30 or so?

[renrich]

Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we did not know location of enemy carriers, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes. Admiral Richardson was CINCUS and Kimmel replaced him prematurely because Roosevelt got upset at Richardson. Richardson was a blunt Texan(hooray for him) and told Roosevelt that the major units of the Pacific Fleet should be withdrawn to the mainland because PH could not be defended against an enemy attack because they had not enough planes to mount a 360 degree fulltime parol schedule. Of course that was exactly Kimmel's problem and one reason we were surprised.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by renrich

Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we did not know location of enemy carriers, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes.

Thanks Renrich, I think the carriers were the main reason, the Japanese waited for some time for the scouts to find the carriers, as they didn't want to send out another attack wave until they found them. Also they didn't want to be surprised. I would think that if they had found & destroyed 2 or 3 carriers in Pearl, there is a good chance that they wouldn't have finished the job on the battleships. (some of the TB's & DB's that hit the BB's would have been busy with the carriers instead.

Also I was thinking, with 6 carriers it's easier to manage things. Suppose that the 200 aircraft from the first wave land back on 4 carriers, and quickly prepare for the 3rd wave attack {along with about 60 aircraft held back from second wave} Then as the 4 carriers are launching the 3rd wave at about 11:30 or 12:00 there are still 2 carriers available to land those aircraft from 2nd wave that are low on fuel. When the 3rd wave departs, the remaining 40-50 or so aircraft can land on the other carriers.

[Wayne Little]

Originally Posted by freebird

How long would it take to turn around 35 aircraft? (from each carrier). I would indeed depend on this, that's why I ask the question. If they could do this in about an hour, could they not launch them at about 11 and hold the second wave in the air until 11:30 or so?

Ok after checking, the first wave aircraft in fact began arriving back at the carriers just after 10.00am, as they were recovered they would have been moved to the forward end of the flight deck. Now the aircraft would not have been left there as by the time all aircraft were recovered it was around 11.00. (Sea conditions slowed the recovery process). The decks needed to be cleared for the second wave's arrival. The carriers actually headed toward Oahu to reduce the distance the returning second wave had to cover.

During this time some aircraft would have been stowed below decks on the forward elevators,mainly Zeroes (forward hangar area)and Vals (Middle area)as these were their assigned positions below decks, the Kates however had to be moved to the rear elevators, once all recovery was complete, under normal circumstances. Now the majority of the attack aircraft in the first wave were Kates, so it is possible or probable that they were moved down the middle elevator and pushed to the rear below decks as other aircraft landed above them. (Zeroes and Kates)

Recovery of the second wave commenced at around. 11.15 and took approx. an hour to complete.

This whole scenario of recovery, stowing below decks, checking aircraft, repairing, refueling, rearming and doing it twice in difficult sea conditions certainly would have slowed the entire process of co-ordinating a new strike.

The first wave took for the most part an hour just to land all aircraft, without doing anything else but move and stow the planes. So even if you were thinking quick turn around you couldn't do anything because the second wave was just minutes away and it was necessary to get them down asap, tired crews, damaged aircraft, fuel? Remember all crews would have been awake since about 04.00 or thereabouts.

Then you need information from all carriers, back to Akagi (flagship) as to how many serviceable aircraft and type are available what target(s)? ordnance requirement and especially how many crews are fit to go. and then you need a plan, when you don't know just what you will be up against? Then you need to distribute the plan for a co-ordinated attack.

One source says Genda did not want a third strike to include the kates (slower and more vulnerable?), now thats a problem because the majority of the Vals were used in the second wave from Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. Only Shokaku and Zuikaku's Vals would initially be available from the first wave and they were in fact the least experienced Bomber crews.

So unfortunately the turnaround time was always going to be the problem, at this time the Japanese were in fact the best at carrier operations and there is not much chance that they could have created a sufficiently equipped third attack force from the first returning wave to mount a successful attack, be it against PH shore installations or Carriers. Time was simply against them.

Hope this helps the discussion.

[renrich]

Remember also that in those days land based heavy bombers were considered a very real threat to warships by bothe the US and Japan.

[syscom3]

In the book "Shattered Sword", the author takes pains to emphasize the slow nature of IJN carrier ops because of two things:

1) The hanger decks were not ventilated and aircraft could not be warmed up below decks.

2) The elevators were slow and there's lots of wasted time for them to be going up and down spotting aircraft.