Germany's Greatest General

[parsifal]

Comparing Allie and German commanders is in many ways like comparing apples to oranges. Whereas the German commanders were trained to exploit success, look for weaknesses, and seize opportunities, they were not that strong on combined operations, or working toward a strategic goal. they tended to to see, and deal, only with that issue that was immediately in front of them. Rommels last offensive in NA is a classic example of this.

This tended to make them appear as poor strategists.

By comparison, the Allied generalls were trained to stick to the operational plan much more rigidly, and to consider the higher needs of the theatre as a whole. They were, in other words, much more "strategically" oriented. But this emphasis came at the cost of tactical prowess. This was because the Allied commanders tended to be much less flexible than their Axis opponents.

However, the Allies also learned to co-ordinate theatre assets much more effectively than the Axis. It was quite common for an Allied general to command the land, air and sea assets within his theatre of operations. Examples of this might be Eisenhower, Mountbatten, and Macarthur. This happened to a far lesser extent in the axis camp

[starling]

from an allied point of view,paulus must rate highly.his inability to try and an attempted breakout toward manstein,led to the capture of german 6th army.that was a large bag of prisoners.
the best german general imho was manstein,his recapture of kharkov was masterful.yours,starling.

[parsifal]

Paulus isnt quite what i had in mind. he was not able to manage his LW assets, and was more a hitlerian lackey than a free thinker.

Manstein is a very good choice, and quite out of the ordinary as far as the german generals are concerned. He was able to grasp the wider needs of his front very well, had a good operational insight, and was a good "manager " to boot.

[HerzAs]

Strategist:
Erich von Manstein

Tactician:
Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz

[Juha]

von Manstein to me

[Njaco]

Comparing Allie and German commanders is in many ways like comparing apples to oranges. Whereas the German commanders were trained to exploit success, look for weaknesses, and seize opportunities, they were not that strong on combined operations, or working toward a strategic goal. they tended to to see, and deal, only with that issue that was immediately in front of them. Rommels last offensive in NA is a classic example of this.

Regarding this, heres a question. I remember reading once (can't remember the name of the book or anything so its only on memory) that German officers didn't have that much flexibilty of thought and command whereas the Allies felt confident even down to platoon leaders to adapt to situations presented before them. That there was a rigidness of command within German troops that was a failing. Any truth?

[parsifal]

Regarding this, heres a question. I remember reading once (can't remember the name of the book or anything so its only on memory) that German officers didn't have that much flexibilty of thought and command whereas the Allies felt confident even down to platoon leaders to adapt to situations presented before them. That there was a rigidness of command within German troops that was a failing. Any truth?

I would have to dissent on that one. German officers were actually noted for their flexibility. They were highly adaptable, and trained to be opportunistic, to reinfoce those parts of the front where they were achieving success.

The problem with German military thinking was that they could not think holistically as well as the allies. The allies could seem to work to an agreed set of objectives and employ a range of fiffernt meium and unit types, for example air and naval resources, and to plan what we now call comined operations, to a far higher degree of efficiency than the germans. An example of german limitations might be found in their planning for sea lion, or in Rommels decision to push into Egypt after tobruk. They often failed to see the fores, for the trees that were immediately in front of them.

However, as commanders in a land battle, they were generally much better than eithe the Allies or the Russians. The opponents of the germans were not ever really able to undertake a campaign of manouver against the Germans, it was always firepower, and broad front strategy that won their battles (although Zhukov did come up with his innovative variation of that, in the great 1944 offensives, where the russinas, once they won the initiative would run up and down the front, with successive offensives, where massive local superioirities were abale to be achievede.

[Danielmellbin]

Originally Posted by parsifal

Regarding this, heres a question. I remember reading once (can't remember the name of the book or anything so its only on memory) that German officers didn't have that much flexibilty of thought and command whereas the Allies felt confident even down to platoon leaders to adapt to situations presented before them. That there was a rigidness of command within German troops that was a failing. Any truth?

I would have to dissent on that one. German officers were actually noted for their flexibility. They were highly adaptable, and trained to be opportunistic, to reinfoce those parts of the front where they were achieving success.

The problem with German military thinking was that they could not think holistically as well as the allies. The allies could seem to work to an agreed set of objectives and employ a range of fiffernt meium and unit types, for example air and naval resources, and to plan what we now call comined operations, to a far higher degree of efficiency than the germans. An example of german limitations might be found in their planning for sea lion, or in Rommels decision to push into Egypt after tobruk. They often failed to see the fores, for the trees that were immediately in front of them.

However, as commanders in a land battle, they were generally much better than eithe the Allies or the Russians. The opponents of the germans were not ever really able to undertake a campaign of manouver against the Germans, it was always firepower, and broad front strategy that won their battles (although Zhukov did come up with his innovative variation of that, in the great 1944 offensives, where the russinas, once they won the initiative would run up and down the front, with successive offensives, where massive local superioirities were abale to be achievede.

I'll have to disagree - The faults you mention are correct - but not caused by the military doctrine taught to german officers. Rather by their strategic leadership. More notably Hitler who ensured that after France the war was without any "concrete" goals.

The germans where to my knowledge the first to introduce true "combined arms operations". While in other armies different arms were squabbling between themselves in the interwar years (and early in the war) - the german arms were much more trained for interarm cooperation. For example - All Panzer divisions had luftwaffe liason officers able to call in close airsupport - something not mastered by the allies until later in the war. Operation Weserübung was a near perfect combined arms (Paras, Marine, land and airpower) operation which at the time of its execution could not have been pulled of by any other armies in the world.

Another example of the incredible level of tactical leadership taught to officers in germany is actually the finnish army. At the time of the Winter War virtually all of its higher ranking officers were veterans of the 27th Royal Prussian Jäger Bt. (WW1).

[JugBR]

the guy made a lot with few resources.