Greatest military blunder of WWII

[syscom3]

I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Great to hear about your grades Mark! Keep it up!

[Marcel]

Originally Posted by plan_D

[i]"
"You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass."

You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.

The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Marcel

The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup.

Marcel, with respect, the problem with that statement and even yours is that is opinion. The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?

The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?

I don't know the answers but I do understand logistics in getting airborne armies educated to objectives, staged and moved - moreso in joint allied attacks. I'm not sure what two weeks meant but suspect more a.) staging fuel, and b.) organizing the airborne assault.

As to August -

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign?

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?

[mkloby]

Originally Posted by plan_D

I've been very busy with college and lots of overtime at work; first year went well - I've got extremely high grades (apparently I'm excellent at aerodynamics).

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

[trackend]

I believe that market Garden was far too hastily thought up and executed to have any real chance of total success. I feel that the amount of success achieved is down to the troops determination to carry out their missions despite being dealt a lousy hand from the generals.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by plan_D

"I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation."

If you find it an insult, that's your problem. The problem I've got here is your continued effort to turn this into American vs. British style of argument;

I didn't find those comments insulting, merely uniformed and opinion based rather than fact based

Here is what I found insulting, and still do.

"So, defense at Bastogne, St Vith, Stavelot, etc or the Engineer's clever and effective small unit defenses at all the bridges in front of German armor was 'irrelevant' - it was all about 'Germans not well supplied and reserves"?

The defence of of those places was irrelevant, yes. The capture of Bastogne might have allowed the German forces to push a few more miles but no matter how far the Germans got, they were doomed to fail. The U.S forces could have just melted away and allowed the Germans to drive unhindered to Paris and they would have still failed.

I commented in a previous post that the notion of that defense being "irrelevant" was not only insulting to the 80,000 casualties, but had far reaching consequences to the duration of the war and the political framework of Europe - had the German Army succeeded in capturing the fuel dumps much less 'drive to Paris' as the other extreme of your 'irrelevancy' remark. The remark about Europeans speking Russian is a derivative of what I believe the consequences of not stopping the Germans where they were stopped

This isn't a Brit vs American issue - its about you and your lecturing style and the multitude of remarks that are interesting opinions but not fact based.

I'm willing to be convinced that you have facts but you haven't trotted them out yet.

Here are four Topics:
1. Demonstrate by fact that the Panzer Divisions would not have gotten past the Muese and on to Antwerp had the American units simply withdrawn and melted away versus what did happen at Stavelot, Bastogne and St.Vith Detail specifically how far the Panzers could go with no resistance until the point you define, as the master strategist, as the El Alemain of Belgium (or Paris). What is your 'coup de gras'?.

Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking

2. Demonstrate by fact that the war would not have lasted at least 3 months more in Europe. Expand on the tactics that show beyond a shadow of a doubt that all of the Germans in the Bulge would be trapped and eliminated as you pose. Follow up with Geo Political consequences of a 3-6 month delay if your strategy can't be proven.

3. Demonstrate by fact that the Allies could have planned, supplied and trained the soldiers for the Market Garden attack in August - with particular detail on the airborne divisions. Cite references that Allied Planning knew where the 9th and 10th Panzer were in August and the knowledge that they 'were in panicked retreat' -

To a brilliant strategist like Monty it would have been simple to compel an earlier assault given the above knowledge and available assets? I think so - so why didn't it go forward much earlier? Is it possible that Monty didn't know where they were, and further didn't make that a red flag 'Risk'?

4. Demonstrate by fact how Alexander would have managed the thrust short of Rome to pivot and cut Kesslering off. Asuume you have all the assests available in Italy. Spend some time detailing the differences in terrain from the killing fields from Salerno all the way to Rome and the cleverness of Alexander to demonstrate that he could have managed this coup across the Italian backbone and cite the successes Alexander had against Kesslering in the mountains. Tell us what you do with the forces at Anzio?

Cite as examples other campaigns in other wars as well as WWII where fast attacks across mountains were successful?
You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.

See the above remark on this
).

So, to be clear. I do not despise Brits. or Germans. or Japanese. I'm not happy about Nazi's or our far left politicians.

I think you (who happen by birth to be a Brit) made multiple unsubstantiated statements, and did denigrate the the actions of the 82nd, 27th, 101st/10 Armored, and the Engineers running around blowing up bridges to foil German Panzers everywhere, --- as 'irrelevant'.

I became angry at the last remark because you did not temper the remarks with a shred of irrefutable proof that those actions were in fact 'irrelevant'.

You have offered no thesis to show that absent such defense against incredible odds that the war would not have lasted at least three months more.

If you think that could not have been possible and demonstrate irrefutably that the war not only would not have lasted that long but beyond a shadow of a doubt would have resulted in quicker capitulation -

Then I will publically apologise for thinking you a 'expert Brit' that falls way short of being an expert. Remember, in this debate you are the lecturing authority.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by mkloby

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

Rotary Wing aero is a very specialized subsection of aero as is Ducted Fan.

I actually did my Aero Master's thesis on "The effect of centerbody geomety within a Ducted Fan or Rotor on thrust"..

the math model was all about distributing vortices in a ring/circle and using sources and sinks to provide the centerbody shape - with some interesting (admitted small population of 'interest') conclusions when a velocity distribution is generated..

The math and computer models on rotary wings were not very accurate in the late 60s.

Regards,

Bill

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by mkloby

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

I found rotary wing very easy. Maybe because I grew up with it and learned about it in a Military School which you are doing as well at this very moment.

If you have any questions about rotary wing stuff you know how to get in touch with me Mark.

[pbfoot]

I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
DECISION AT ARGENTAN
While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13]

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads under his control north of Alencon. [14]

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to push on slowly until ... contact [is made with] our Allies," the Canadians. [15] Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the XV Corps was to hold in place. less then 25miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the Argentan-Falaise pocket is the main question of debate

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by syscom3

I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.

My first reaction is to agree Syscom. I'd have to ponder the after effect of the vacuum on the recently freed Italians. The German Army was not known for having Idle hands.

But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.

I suspect the notion was contemplated and rejected for political reasons.

Regards

Bill

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by pbfoot

I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
DECISION AT ARGENTAN
While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13]

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads under his control north of Alencon. [14]

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to push on slowly until ... contact [is made with] our Allies," the Canadians. [15] Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the XV Corps was to hold in place. less then 25miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the Argentan-Falaise pocket is the main question of debate

Bradley says in Soldiers Story that he was ordered by Montgomery to halt at the assigned objective and let the Canadians continue toward XV Corps. I'm going to look at Blumenson's Patton Diaries to see if more is said.

Arthur Bryant author of Triumph in the West, based on Alanbrooke's Diaries, goes into great detail regarding the events and dialogues between Monty and Ike and Bradley - but strangely silent on the failure to close the 25 mile gap.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by drgondog

...
But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.
....

I would say having enough troops in Italy to keep the Germans busy would be preferable, but the bulk of the land forces should have been sent to France and used to invade the German homeland (or even drive eastwards and try to cut off Kesselring in the Po valley.)

Either way, once the allied armies were on the German border, Italy became a sideshow and irrelevant.

[plan_D]

Syscom,

"I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France."

The original plan of Alexander was for the British 8th Army to move up Route 6 through Cassino and on to Frosione while the U.S II Corps moved up Route 7 toward the U.S VI Corps who were to breakout of the Anzio bridgehead. The U.S VI Corps were supposed to breakout and move east to Route 6 to cut off the German 10th Army who were to be retreating after the battle for Cassino.
The idea was that an encirclement of the German 10th Army would allow Allied forces to capture the Po Valley with relative ease and then move through the Ljubljana Gap to reach Vienna before the Russians.

Instead, Mark Clark wanted to gain glory and ordered his men north to capture Rome before the British. He believed that Alexander was trying to rob him of his 'prize'. So insane was Clark that he even ordered his troops to fire on any British trying to reach Rome. Clark got his prize when the U.S 88th Blue Devils division entered Rome, allowing the German Army to escape up Route 6 with the British 8th Army in pursuit. Turning north before Rome the German forces set up the Gothic Line just north of Florence which held the Allies in Italy until April 1945.

I must point out that in the area of operations only Route 6 and 7 were large enough to take the armies of both sides north with any pace - and were vital for movement.

I don't know what capturing Vienna would have achieved in the long run, or how Germany would have reacted to this new front but I can safely say that by allowing the German Tenth Army to escape; Mark Clark spent more lives of his men just for glory and allowed a campaign that should have been over before christmas 1944 to drag on 'til the end of the war.

If drgondog, you want anymore information about Italy - I will happily provide more facts and thoughts.

On to Market Garden -

"The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?"

You are right, it was wrong. The presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions doomed the operation to failure.

"The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?"

Montgomery did consider the operation earlier. The plan of Eisenhower was to clear Pas de Calais and Antwerp to shorten the supply lines, however Patton wanted to advance on the Siegfried Line with greater speed. Eisenhower gave the priority to 21st Army Group but spread the supplies across both Army Groups - allowing no decisive thrust.

In the event, Montgomery made an advance of 250 miles in one week to take Antwerp and Brussels. He was in a position to proceed with Market Garden then - the 1st Allied Airborne Army was ready on the 4th September. Montgomery made his plan on the capture of Antwerp and proposed it on the 9th; it should have been proposed earlier.

If Montgomery were supplied a little better, and he urged his troops forward just that little bit more Market Garden could have been ready at least a week earlier. As it was Eisenhower was being indecisive with his supplies and Montgomery failed to make Antwerp operational because 11th Armoured Division failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary.

The forces were ready but a collection of indecision on the commanders and position of troops at the time made the operation begin on the 17th September.

"As to August -

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign?

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?"

The 1st Allied Airborne Army would have been ready to make the drop by the 4th September; if not earlier. I'm not playing the "what if?" game; I'm simply saying that the plan was a decisive and far reaching idea. If the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions weren't there; we would all be praising Montgomery for a genius idea. He should have listened to his intelligence and called the operation off but for me it shows Montgomery's quality in strategic thought.

As for the "zero facts" on August part; the only reason the plan failed was because of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer - if Montgomery was given priority and pushed his forces over the Seine on the 26th August toward Arnhem - the SS Panzers would not have been present to hold the advance.

On the college subject; No I haven't done rotary wing yet - that's next year. I did eight units in the first year, achieved merits on six and distinctions on two. It's good to finally get back to the debates - I've been reading about the British Isles naval forces recently from 616 AD - 1815 (I've only just finished the American War though). So I might just start bringing up some subjects about the naval war of the War of Independance (or American War).

I shall deal with the Ardennes Offensive in another post.