Greatest military blunder of WWII

[renrich]

A blunder which did not have huge consequences(unless you were one of Wake's defenders) was the failure of the Task Force commanded by Fletcher to follow through and attack the IJN invasion fleet. If they had been audacious and struck swiftly, they could have decimated the IJN invasion fleet, relieved Wake and given the IJN a serious setback and bloody nose. My uncle was in one of the ships in that TF and never understood the reason for turning back.

[Trautloft]

i go with Dunkirk. At that time,that stage of war,i believe it could make the British fall.
If they advance immadiately,concentrate all of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to cause heavy losses to the weakening RAF and RN ,not letting time to regroup,recover and prepare and start a 'Blitz-D-Day' aka Operation Seelöwe,the Invasion of Britain seems more as possible

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by renrich

A blunder which did not have huge consequences(unless you were one of Wake's defenders) was the failure of the Task Force commanded by Fletcher to follow through and attack the IJN invasion fleet. If they had been audacious and struck swiftly, they could have decimated the IJN invasion fleet, relieved Wake and given the IJN a serious setback and bloody nose. My uncle was in one of the ships in that TF and never understood the reason for turning back.

At that month of the war in the Pacific, noone wanted to needlessly expose the carriers to attack.

[plan_D]

The Bloody Shambles series was written by Christopher Shores - don't miss his other works; he has an excellent three volume series on the 2nd TAF and the airforces over the Balkans.

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by syscom3

At that month of the war in the Pacific, noone wanted to needlessly expose the carriers to attack.

The Admiral in charge of the Task Force (I think it was a guy named Pye or something like that) never got another fleet command. He was sent home, most likely quietly.

While the arguement of not wanting to expose the carriers is a good one, it didn't cut it with the guys who were in charge. Pye had a chance to fight, to inflict damage against an enemy that didn't know he was coming and he folded up. Like Hooker at the Wilderness, it came down to the character of the man. He didn't have it.

Hooker later admited it. I don't know if Pye ever did. But he probably knew.

All that being said, I don't know if was really that big of a deal. The battle that would've come out of it probably would've looked like Coral Sea and not a later, better organized battle like Eastern Solomans or Phillipine Sea. Nobody really knew what they were doing in the first Carrier battle. They figured it out fast (as evidenced by Midway), but the first one was all over the place. A lot more punches were thrown than landed. By the time Phillipine Sea came around in '44, everybody knew what they were doing and most strikes had a good chance of making contact.

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by plan_D

The Bloody Shambles series was written by Christopher Shores - don't miss his other works; he has an excellent three volume series on the 2nd TAF and the airforces over the Balkans.

Thanks for the info. Going on my reading list. Read the first series and they were worth it.

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by Bernhart

Not sure this could be considered a milatary blunder but Hitler taking over operations all by his lonesome has got to be a huge mistake.

Good point. It was a blunder. At one point, Hitler was reporting to himself as Army Commander to Chief of Staff to Head of State. In short, he took out the top three spots in the Chain of Command and made them all under his control.

If the Democratic nations of the world ever go to war again like they did in the 40s, we should keep in mind the lessons learned of fighting against a Meglomaniac (AKA, Akmadenijad or Chavez). These guys have to be "the one" at all times and that leads them to a ton of mistakes. Mistakes they never admit. So the mistakes never get fixed.

It is a very useful advantage.

[renrich]

Pye was the commander of the Battle Force when Pearl was attacked. The TF commander that was to relieve Wake was Frank Jack Fletcher and they were very close to Wake(less than a days sail, I think) with an over whelming force when Fletcher got cold feet and retreated. Pye commanded nothing after PH and Fletcher went on to be overall commander of the US forces at Midway although Spruance made most of the critical decisions. I am not sure but Fletcher was relieved from command later.

[timshatz]

Actually, we're both wrong. Got this from Wikipedia (often wrong but never in doubt?):

"[edit] Task Force 14
The projected U.S. relief attempt by Admiral Wilson Brown’s Task Force 14 (TF-14) consisted of fleet carriers Saratoga and Lexington, the fleet oiler USNS Neches, the seaplane tender Tangier, the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, and ten destroyers. The convoy carried the 4th Marine Coastal Defense Battalion, the VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with F2A “Brewster Buffalo” fighters, along with 9,000 five-inch (127 mm) rounds, 12,000 three-inch (76.2 mm) rounds, and 3,000,000 .50 cal. (12.7 mm) rounds as well as a large amount of ammunition for mortars and other battalion small arms.

On December 22 at 21:00, the task force received controversial orders signed by Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the Acting Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, to return to Pearl Harbor for fear of losses, so no naval battle took place. After Wake Island and Midway-in which Pye ordered his Battleships to sortie but never fought the enemy- Pye never commanded forces in battle again."


Here's the link:

Battle of Wake Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[Njaco]

If the Democratic nations of the world ever go to war again like they did in the 40s, we should keep in mind the lessons learned of fighting against a Meglomaniac (AKA, Akmadenijad or Chavez). These guys have to be "the one" at all times and that leads them to a ton of mistakes. Mistakes they never admit. So the mistakes never get fixed.

We still are, its alittle different in that each and every soldier in the field and in high command are Meglomaniacs. We just have to figure out their mistakes and capitalize on them. And that might be their interpetation of their religion is a mistake.

Correction: Just read where you clarified it as "Democratic" nations. I just take back all that nonsense I just blathered!

[renrich]

tim, it appears that wikipedia may be in error, I suspect not for the first time. According to Lundstrom in "The First Team" the commander of TF 14, the Wake relief force was R Adm Frank Jack Fletcher in Astoria. He also cites Samuel Eliot Morison for taking Fletcher to task for not being more aggressive which must be where I got my notions about the mission. Lundstrom does not agree with Morison. I would tend to go with Lundstrom as I do not know of any writer who has better researched the action in the Pacific. Brown commanded TF 11 which was to attack Jaluit in the Marshalls.

[timshatz]

Pye was in overall charge of the mission, not Fletcher. He was the guy who called a halt to the run for Wake. Here are couple of exerts from American Heritage Magazine. First, a description of Pye and his taking command from Kimmel on the 15th of December:

"Pye was a careful officer. Nimitz, the kindest and most gently spoken of great war admirals, once described him as a “great brain but no guts.” In an operation where other men saw opportunity, Pye was the sort of man who naturally saw difficulties. In looking over the operational plans of the departed Kimmel, Pye saw difficulties aplenty. In a single gambler’s toss Kimmel, who had lost much of the Pacific Fleet in one afternoon, was sending the rest of it piecemeal into waters that the Navy did not control to engage an enemy whose position and strength he did not know. No, Pye didn’t like the plan at all. Prudently he ordered Admiral Brown’s Lexington to turn north away from the Marshalls to give Fletcher closer support. "


Second, the situation that lead to the recall orders:

"There was not much doubt in Pye’s mind any longer. He had never liked the plan in the first place, and Cunningham’s message indicated it was too late to relieve Wake anyway. But should he let the Saratoga force sail on and engage whatever enemy could be found? Pye didn’t like that idea much either. A captain sailing into a sea battle ought to have some idea what he was getting into, but as one staff officer commented, “we had no more idea than a billy goat” what was going on at Wake. Pye radioed Fletcher, telling him to break off and return to port.

Fletcher was 425 miles from Wake when he got Pye’s message. His task force had already suffered several frustrating delays. Had Fletcher made straight for Wake, he probably would have arrived about the same time as Kajioka, but not wanting to steam into battle with half-empty destroyers, he had paused to refuel. The refueling was snafu from the start. Seven oil hoses ruptured, and a number of towlines parted in the rolling seas. In ten hours only four destroyers were filled while the fleet actually drifted farther away from Wake. During the voyage Pye sent Fletcher a series of conflicting dispatches, each more cautionary than the previous one. It is likely Fletcher was glad to finally get a direct, explicit order from Pearl Harbor. He complied swiftly."

Lastly, the situation onboard the ships when Pye's order came through.

"The American people did not know a fleet had been ordered to Wake until much later, so there was no public reaction to the withdrawal. But within the Navy and Marine Corps, the reaction was immediate and bitter. Officers on the Saratoga, some of them weeping, pleaded with Fletcher to put Nelson’s blind eye to the telescope and sail on in spite of orders. The talk became so heated that Admiral Fitch left the bridge of his own ship because he did not want officially to hear his officers speaking in terms that were close to mutinous, particularly when they expressed sentiments he agreed with. One officer aboard the Enterprise scribbled furiously in an unofficial log, “It’s the war between two yellow races.”

The incident marred Fletcher’s long and honorable naval career. He was frequently referred to thereafter as “Fueling Jack Fletcher” and chastised for lack of resoluteness in combat. In fairness Admiral Fletcher did not win the Medal of Honor because he was squeamish about fighting, and to divide one’s forces in the face of a numerically superior enemy, as he was to do five months later at the Battle of Midway, is not the mark of a timid admiral. The worst that can be said about Fletcher is that he was not Nelson."

The entire article can be read here:

AmericanHeritage.com / THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

[syscom3]

Its easy for us to be armchair admirals on this one, since we have 65 years of facts to dwell on.

But put yourself in Pye's shoes..... only the four carriers were what was left of the striking power of the USN. Sometimes prudency is the better part of valor.

Pye was right in withdrawing his forces untill the USN and USMC were reorganized to reflect the realities of the war in the Pacific.

[mkloby]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Its easy for us to be armchair admirals on this one, since we have 65 years of facts to dwell on.

Good call. Everyone seems to forget that, as you have all these cubicle commandos ripping apart decisions that a military leader made. Military decisions are always made with incomplete intelligence, and very often it is the delay of action, or inaction, that can prove most disastrous.

[lucanus]

My 2 cents says the lack of offense by the French in 1940...Their
tanks could have decimated the panzers if the French command
had not been in the Rear...I sometimes think that at any point
prior to Sept 1939, if the powers that were had showed a little
backbone towards the Lil Corporal, he would have backed down.

+ 8 cents:
I read somewhere that Hilter's Army Commanders had wanted him to
wait 5 years to begin his onslaught...And that if he had done so
he would have still caught most of the world with their proverbial
trousers down....Going what was that (as a german jets zoomed
overhead)

Anyone out there ever wonder what the Marines on the Canal
felt like when the Navy sailed away....?