Greatest military blunder of WWII

[Njaco]

I think was being pressured from Washington. Taking Berlin would've been a political maneuvre as well as a military one. Hence the talking heads from DC in his ear.

[renrich]

I believe that a study of the situation in Europe 1944-45 will discover that the strategy adopted by SHAEF was heavily influenced by political considerations. Since the majority of the men and material in Europe were supplied by the US, it was not politically palatable for the UK to have the starring role. When it came to Berlin, it was decided, in order to keep the risk of a confrontation between USSR and US-British forces to a minimum, that the USSR could have the chore of taking Berlin. Roosevelt never considered that the USSR was the menace that Churchill did.

[Soundbreaker Welch?]

But then he did. After the Wussians had half the joint! And Patton then would have done something, but he was fired and car crashed.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by plan_D

....As it happened the British failed to take Caen on the first day but the constant pressure applied did force the Germans to divert its strongest forces to the Caen area allowing a U.S breakthrough as originally planned. But Eisenhower being unimaginative as he was kept his broad-front idea and wanted a British breakthrough which allowed the Germans to hold the entire Allied beach-head. The time held up in the beach-head could have been used capturing port facilities long before they actually did and Caen may not have been so devastated by fruitless attempts on it.

Montgomery was the worst of the allied generals when it came to the appreciation of fluid (mobile) warfare. He was so cautious, he was essentially paralyzed when opportunities arose.

And neither the Brits, Americans or even the Germans appreciated just how deadly the hedgerows were untill the battle began in earnest.

Once again, Ike failed to grasp the idea of strategy during the Ardennes Offensive - opting to push the bulge out of the Allied lines instead of encircling and destroying it. This led to the war dragging on because the German troops managed to escape to set up new lines on the Rhine and further into Germany.

A near collapse of the US army in the center dictated that the bulge be pushed out as soon as possible. And so what if the Germans escaped back into Germany. They were a defeated force incapable of offensive or defensive operations.

And his greatest blunder was not taking Berlin; as Ike could only see two feet in front of his face, he had no idea of the bigger picture. Even Germany saw the Cold War coming, along with Patton, Montgomery and Churchill. If Ike had pushed to Berlin, as they so easily could have done then the political triumph of raising your flag above the enemies capital would have been achieved. This would have brought Stalin and his Soviet cronies down a few pegs as a Stars and Stripes above the Reichstag would have given the U.S the political strength to say they did all the work that won the war; just as the Soviet Union did. It would have also showed military strength to the East and may have eased the Cold War - if not completely eradicating it.

Politics my friend... politics. Then you also seem to forget that Patton was pushing deep into Austria and Checkelslavakia

Ike liked to be strong on all fronts but decisive on none - and that's probably one of the many great blunders of World War II.

History has recorded him as being among the greatest generals of all time. He alone understood the politics behind everything in the ETO and MTO. And it was his strategy's that ended up winning the war in Europe.

[renrich]

I don't believe that Patton was fired near the end of the war but rather before Overlord because of the slapping incident. He died in the auto crash after VE day and there was no question then about war with the USSR.

[plan_D]

I don't think I'm being harsh, Ike's blunders changed the lives of many and the politics of world post-war. There were many blunders in the war and in all wars, giving rise to the maxim "War is won by those who make the least blunders." I was just adding yet another to the long line of blunders waiting to be examined by anyone and everyone.

The politics was the deciding factor to Ikes final decision, I'm well aware but politics could have been brushed aside. And many times British and U.S troops advanced against the will of the suits, rubbed the Soviets the wrong way but it showed them the West weren't all about caution.


"Montgomery was the worst of the allied generals when it came to the appreciation of fluid (mobile) warfare. He was so cautious, he was essentially paralyzed when opportunities arose.

And neither the Brits, Americans or even the Germans appreciated just how deadly the hedgerows were untill the battle began in earnest."

Montgomery was a great strategist, he was a large follower of decisive blows but his preparation was slow to make sure victory was certain. His mistakes were few, but big. His caution was in building enough supplies to maintain an offensive - not during the offensive itself.

Ike wasn't up for decision, Montgomery wanted to hand the baton to the U.S forces during the breakout. He was in command of the U.S forces during that time and aimed for fluid movement in the U.S sector by holding the Germans at Caen.

"A near collapse of the US army in the center dictated that the bulge be pushed out as soon as possible. And so what if the Germans escaped back into Germany. They were a defeated force incapable of offensive or defensive operations."

The U.S Army wasn't in near collapse, in any case even it did the Germans had no reserves. And I'm not sitting here as the only one who knew that because the Allies knew it in 1944. The Germans could have driven all the way to Paris and not achieved anything, Patton and Montgomery knew it. An encirclement of those forces would have eliminated any opposition on the Rhine and brought the war to a conclusion months earlier, with less losses to the Allies and their forces further east.

[renrich]

Obviously, there is truth to your statements about SHAEF's mistakes but it may be that you are not giving enough credence to the political angles. Recently read a book where it was pointed out that, during and after Torch, Roosevelt came and met with Ike and praised him highly and then went back to the US and expressed misgivings in public and to Marshall to the point that Ike thought he was going to be fired. All of this because Roosevelt was playing politics at home and doing the old CYA. Suspect that politics played a big role in the action of commanders and the conduct of the war on all sides and that certainly includes all wars including the one we are in now.

[rogthedodge]

On Montgomery.

He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:

From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by rogthedodge

On Montgomery.

He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:

From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)

It was more of his experiences of WW1 which made him over cautious of taking casualties.

He was a great planner and organizer, but not a field commander. He belonged in London on staff duty.

[rogthedodge]

I was going to add that but it doesn't make him unique. I'm sure some US senior generals had seen combat in WW1?

I don't think you can state with any authority 'it was more' due to WW1 than the realities of his situation (and brief).

I'd agree it was combination of both factors.

Not sure about Monty on the staff - not his forte.

Slim's comments on Monty's time as CIGS were interesting.
On hearing a long list of whinges & problems from Monty when he took over, Slim asked 'And what have you done about it?'. Monty left.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by rogthedodge

On Montgomery.

He had many, many faults but I think he is getting a worse press as time goes on. It's easy to accuse him of caution but there's an important factor to consider:

From late '44 the UK forces could only get smaller so one of his primary aims was to conserve manpower for the future wars ahead (Japan and possibly Russia)

Gawd I hate to agree with you but I do.

The many complaints about US counterparts in 1944 were our 'Tactical' vs 'Bold' Stike concepts. When examined in a cold light 50 years later the Brits had a vision but not the experience of execution because they were always at parity or less against the Germans.

The US had the enthusiasm and the resources but not the experience - we were learning as we went throughout WWII - ditto USSR.

Where the debate and acrimony exist is in the in-fighting exemplified by Patton and Montgomery in a battle for resources and mission - starting in Sicily and continuing through the end of the war.

Fact - Montgomery did not succeeed in two critical commitments - Caen and Operation Market Garden. Patton failed at Metz. Lucas failed at Anzio and Mark Clark was only 'average' in the northward push in Italy - none of the Allied Commanders could touch Kesslering!

Hard to allocate blame to a country or leader - but Eisenhower managed all of them.

Falaise, in retrospect was a Monty failure that had huge consequences later in Operation Market Garden because of all the Wermacht resoruces that escaped.

But while the Brits claimed to have the Grand Plan, it was never successful when they had the resources after 1944. We didn't do any better (nor did the USSR or Germans after 1942) - except that we were awesome in defense as the Bulge proved.. small compensation except that we drained both the Luftwaffe and Wermacht in that battle

[plan_D]

Not all of Eisenhower's mistakes were brought about through politics, the breakout in Normandy and the Germans Ardennes Offensive were non-political events when it came to planning strategy - all the politicians wanted was success at that time.

Almost all the Allied Generals were overly-cautious compared to the Soviet and German Generals. It wasn't a matter of experience in wartime but experience at home; their upbringing in a democratic society led to caution against loss of life. The large influence of the people at home led to caution against loss of life. And that was the largest failure of the Allied war machine; caution. Montgomery was cautious but no more, or less, than most other Allied commanders - he's just more famous.

"Fact - Montgomery did not succeeed in two critical commitments - Caen and Operation Market Garden. Patton failed at Metz. Lucas failed at Anzio and Mark Clark was only 'average' in the northward push in Italy - none of the Allied Commanders could touch Kesslering!"

Montgomery's failure to capture Caen on the first day wasn't a major setback in his strategy for the break-out. Once it was realised by Montgomery that the Germans were blocking him with their best units, the capture of Caen became unimportant. It was Eisenhower that ordered Montgomery to capture Caen, when it would have been wiser to hand the offensive to the U.S forces on the right which would have broke out and swept away the weak German opposition at their front and led to collapse of German forces around Caen to avoid encirclement. If Montgomery was allowed his strategy Caen would have been taken with ease.

Operation Market Garden was a great plan but couldn't have been executed at a worse time. If Montgomery had heeded the warnings his intelligence was giving him, Market Garden would have never happened. But it was his failure and a large one at that, but it was bold and decisive plan that really was quite a fantastic idea.

Patton at Metz was terrible, and tried to push the blame on to his commanders when he was in the wrong all along. The great mobile genius made every mistake Great Britain did with armour in World War I. Splitting the armour up, slowing it down and on top of that trying to be strong on all fronts but inevitably being decisive on none.

Mark Clark was far less than average - another General that let his arrogance get the better of him. He had the perfect oppurtunity to cut off the German forces in Italy and destroy them; Alexander (the best Allied commander, in my opinion) wanted it and saw a great decisive victory in Italy. But Clark thought it appropriate to boost his ego and turned on the completely unimportant Rome, just so he could say he captured it. If he had sent his forces to east to block the Germans, the would have been no German resistance in Italy.

It was almost the exact same blunder Howe made when he captured Philidelphia in the War of Independance instead of marching north toward Saratoga and encircling the rebel army. Which as we all know led to the defeat of the British forces at Saratoga; Mark Clark was lucky that Italy wasn't a deciding factor in the war at that time.

"But while the Brits claimed to have the Grand Plan, it was never successful when they had the resources after 1944. We didn't do any better (nor did the USSR or Germans after 1942) - except that we were awesome in defense as the Bulge proved.. small compensation except that we drained both the Luftwaffe and Wermacht in that battle"

The Grand Plan that the British seemed to have was never executed because of American presence; as we all know it's all politics. The Western Allied actions in North-West Europe were painfully slow and indecisive - we were lucky to be facing an exhausted and withered enemy. And as Eisenhower was in charge, it was his whole campaign blunder. He had Generals under him pushing for action, but the action never came. Which probably led to more loss of life.

The Soviets were decisive and knew how to administer a blow to break-through; they were far better prepared strategically and mentally to face off against the Germans than the Western Allies were in 1944.

But the gold goes to Germany, even after 1942, their fluid defence, striking blows and decisive movements in almost every action throughout the war kept the whole world off balance for five years. Their General Staff was nigh perfection and the whole German war effort was a failing of Hitler, not the men on the ground. Even in the dying days Germany was maintaining its reputation of being the tough nut to crack, the Soviets were suffering mind boggling losses at the hands of movement and the Allies were plodding along at a painfully slow pace - and thrown into panic by the Ardennes Offensive, another failure of Hitler, which was not wanted by the German General Staff.

The Bulge wasn't a great show of defence, the U.S lines were over-run and the German offensive only came to a halt because of resources and reserves were lacking. Had the Germans been well supplied and had reserves in waiting, they probably would have driven to Antwerp. The Ardennes Offensive showed that the Allied staff hadn't read any history books - because if they had they would have learnt to keep a strong defence even in the Ardennes forest for in June 1940 - only four years earlier - Germany had driven armour through the exact same forest to devestating effect. The Wehrmacht was already drained by then, it just needed to be finished off. The Ardennes Offensive gave the Germany Army in the West to us on a plate , but we merely brushed it aside.

[renrich]

The Germans on defense made a lot of chicken salad out of chicken feathers. In some ways their efforts remind me a lot of Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864-65. One would never get a veteran of The T-Patch or 36th Division to say that Clark was anything but way below average in Italy. The 36th was in combat 336 days, 132 days consecutive, had 16, 828 casualties; 13191 WIA, 3131 KIA, 506 died of wounds, the ninth highest # casualties in WW2 of all American divs in WW2, many of them the result reportedly of Clarks poor generalship.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by plan_D

Not all of Eisenhower's mistakes were brought about through politics, the breakout in Normandy and the Germans Ardennes Offensive were non-political events when it came to planning strategy - all the politicians wanted was success at that time.

You could hardly call the Ardennes a 'mistake' on the part of Eisenhower. If so, you can lay it on everyone in the chain of command, failure of Ultra or other intelligence assets. The Germans must receive credit for a bold and carefully concealed plan, optimistic in expectations on part of Hitler.

"Fact - Montgomery did not succeeed in two critical commitments - Caen and Operation Market Garden. Patton failed at Metz. Lucas failed at Anzio and Mark Clark was only 'average' in the northward push in Italy - none of the Allied Commanders could touch Kesslering!"

Montgomery's failure to capture Caen on the first day wasn't a major setback in his strategy for the break-out. Once it was realised by Montgomery that the Germans were blocking him with their best units, the capture of Caen became unimportant. It was Eisenhower that ordered Montgomery to capture Caen, when it would have been wiser to hand the offensive to the U.S forces on the right which would have broke out and swept away the weak German opposition at their front and led to collapse of German forces around Caen to avoid encirclement. If Montgomery was allowed his strategy Caen would have been taken with ease.

Monty absolutely did NOT want to turn the initiative to the American commanders and held fast to the attack on Caen.. if you want to talk politics this is another item to chew on. It might not have been a setback in 'his' strategy' but it sure was to the overall timetable and plan... Caen was never going to be taken 'with ease' and that was expected from beginning

Operation Market Garden was a great plan but couldn't have been executed at a worse time. If Montgomery had heeded the warnings his intelligence was giving him, Market Garden would have never happened. But it was his failure and a large one at that, but it was bold and decisive plan that really was quite a fantastic idea.

Would have been a great idea except for the 10th Panzer that was allowed to escape from Normany, and 'found again' at Arnhem, the single elevated road that would only take one vehicle at a time, that everyone on the Dutch side knew about but Monty wouldn't listen because that ONE salient fact would kill the Plan - it would been 'bold and decisive' without those factors but stupid with them

Patton at Metz was terrible, and tried to push the blame on to his commanders when he was in the wrong all along. The great mobile genius made every mistake Great Britain did with armour in World War I. Splitting the armour up, slowing it down and on top of that trying to be strong on all fronts but inevitably being decisive on none.

You may recall he 'was slowed down' because the fuel priority went to Market Garden and he essentially was Stopped, not slowed down.

But Clark thought it appropriate to boost his ego and turned on the completely unimportant Rome, just so he could say he captured it. If he had sent his forces to east to block the Germans, the would have been no German resistance in Italy.

[b]This is a statement beyond the pale - not about Clark but about 'no German resistance in Italy had he sent his forces east'. East of what? Rome? Explain why that would be the master stroke that somehow eluded Clark, Alexander, etc?

As to cutting off the Germans- didn't Monty have that job in Sicily for the 40,000 that got away? Anzio was supposed to be the magic bullet to 'cut them off' but anything else was brutal mountain to mountain fighting [b]

The Grand Plan that the British seemed to have was never executed because of American presence; as we all know it's all politics. The Western Allied actions in North-West Europe were painfully slow and indecisive - we were lucky to be facing an exhausted and withered enemy. And as Eisenhower was in charge, it was his whole campaign blunder. He had Generals under him pushing for action, but the action never came. Which probably led to more loss of life.

If the Brits had their way we probably wouldn't have invaded France until 1948. Churchill fought us every step of the way and Monty supported his contention that June 1944 was 'too risky'. The entire thrust in Italy and the desire to strike in Balkans was Churchill's grand strategy to prevent USSR from gobbling up Eastern Europe. Eisenhower had the most impossible job possible, trying to keep all the huge egos intact, respond to his CiC and keep the Grand Alliance together - still the successes and failures are at his feet

The Soviets were decisive and knew how to administer a blow to break-through; they were far better prepared strategically and mentally to face off against the Germans than the Western Allies were in 1944.

Agreed on the mental part- human capital was not an issue for Stalin but was for Allies. I seem to have lost out on the strategic brilliance part of the battering ram approach, however?


The Bulge wasn't a great show of defence, the U.S lines were over-run and the German offensive only came to a halt because of resources and reserves were lacking. Had the Germans been well supplied and had reserves in waiting, they probably would have driven to Antwerp. The Ardennes Offensive showed that the Allied staff hadn't read any history books - because if they had they would have learnt to keep a strong defence even in the Ardennes forest for in June 1940 - only four years earlier - Germany had driven armour through the exact same forest to devestating effect. The Wehrmacht was already drained by then, it just needed to be finished off. The Ardennes Offensive gave the Germany Army in the West to us on a plate , but we merely brushed it aside.

The 106th Division was crushed at the point of the spear, brand new and ill equipped in every way. That pretty much sums up the German successes per their objectives and timetable... even with suprise and 3+:1 numerical superiority, huge armor advantage and no Allied airpower for two weeks.

So, defense at Bastogne, St Vith, Stavelot, etc or the Engineer's clever and effective small unit defenses at all the bridges in front of German armor was 'irrelevant' - it was all about 'Germans not well supplied and reserves"? You might note that the Ardennes thrust a. caught the Brits and French by suprise in 1940 and it succeeded in routing the Allies but, b. caught Allies by suprise but the American units stopped them in 1944, and ground them up after the intial gains..

I am curious why you dismiss the 27th, the 101st the 82nd and 3rd Army contributions in 'strong' American defense and lay it all on German lack of planning? Was their failure due to not anticipating a capable defense and requiring more numerical superiority before plan execution? That they didn't put their best equipped and most experienced Panzer forces in play?

[plan_D]

"You could hardly call the Ardennes a 'mistake' on the part of Eisenhower. If so, you can lay it on everyone in the chain of command, failure of Ultra or other intelligence assets. The Germans must receive credit for a bold and carefully concealed plan, optimistic in expectations on part of Hitler.

I didn't blame the Ardennes Offensive on Eisenhower, I said his blunder was his reaction to it i.e not cutting the Germans off, but pushing the bulge out. Everyone in the U.S 1st Army and SHAEF above divisional commander should be blamed for the panic they caused; grown men in high up places left it to the calm and collect divisional and lower commanders to sort out their troubles.

ULTRA could not be blamed for anything; they knew all about the increase in German concentration and warned the Allied staff of it. It was up to the Allied staff (and Eisenhower) to figure out what it might have been for.

"Monty absolutely did NOT want to turn the initiative to the American commanders and held fast to the attack on Caen.. if you want to talk politics this is another item to chew on. It might not have been a setback in 'his' strategy' but it sure was to the overall timetable and plan... Caen was never going to be taken 'with ease' and that was expected from beginning"

That's just plain wrong. Montgomery's plan for the break-out was for British troops to take Caen on the first day and hold the best German units there while the Americans broke out. His planned remained the same even after the failure to take Caen because German units had already diverted their best units to block the British at Caen.

Montgomery was egotistical and since he had complete controll of the Allied ground forces during the break-out (with only Eisenhower above) he didn't mind handing the break-out to the Americans because it would have still been his plan. It was Eisenhower that demanded the capture of Caen which held up the U.S break-out.

"Would have been a great idea except for the 10th Panzer that was allowed to escape from Normany, and 'found again' at Arnhem, the single elevated road that would only take one vehicle at a time, that everyone on the Dutch side knew about but Monty wouldn't listen because that ONE salient fact would kill the Plan - it would been 'bold and decisive' without those factors but stupid with them"

Operation Market Garden would have worked in August; the single road caused problems but did not pose a large threat to the offensive. What destroyed the offensive was the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions that were there; with those two divisions present the attack should have been called off.
The plan itself was bolder and better than anything most other Allied commanders, U.S, British or Canadian could come up with.

"You may recall he 'was slowed down' because the fuel priority went to Market Garden and he essentially was Stopped, not slowed down."

His armour was slowed down by attaching it to the infantry, I'm talking tactical here. Patton made the same mistakes as World War I commanders did, attaching the tanks to infantry and splitting the armour up. His own mistakes had nothing to do with Market Garden.

"This is a statement beyond the pale - not about Clark but about 'no German resistance in Italy had he sent his forces east'. East of what? Rome? Explain why that would be the master stroke that somehow eluded Clark, Alexander, etc?

As to cutting off the Germans- didn't Monty have that job in Sicily for the 40,000 that got away? Anzio was supposed to be the magic bullet to 'cut them off' but anything else was brutal mountain to mountain fighting"

The idea of cutting the Germans off did not elude Alexander; it was a plan that had already been laid in front of the commanders in Italy. The British 8th Army was to move north after Monte Cassino while Clark with the 5th Army, after breaking out of Anzio would move east across Italy cutting the German 10th Armee from the rest of Italy. Instead Clark forced his way north to Rome up the west coast, allowing the Germans to retreat up the east coast with the British 8th in pursuit.

As for the second paragraph, I wasn't aware this was a "play the American commanders off against the British ones,". I'm well aware that Montgomery made his mistakes but that's not something to bring up to try and defend others actions. If you believe that Montgomery made a blunder in Sciliy - how should he have done it?

Plus in all aspects of Allied failure we must remember German excellence which surpassed all other armies in the field.

"If the Brits had their way we probably wouldn't have invaded France until 1948. Churchill fought us every step of the way and Monty supported his contention that June 1944 was 'too risky'. The entire thrust in Italy and the desire to strike in Balkans was Churchill'