Which was more important to war Malta vs Guadalcanal

[syscom3]

Parsifal, your comments about Guadalcanal .... I'll just say they're so far out in left field, you're among a small insignificant minority to have that view.

But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.

Consider that the more supplies you need to transport, means the more support troops you need, and the more supplies you need to bring along just to support them. And consider the fuel requirement for the supply troops has to be a round trip number. Its an exponential increase in the tonnage needed to support both the tooth and the tail. The allies learned that lesson in Sept/Oct 1944 in France!

So I don't really see a significant increase in power for the AK unless it is just defending Tunisia.

[parsifal]

I came out with the disparaging remarks about Guadacanal because it was just one of the battles of attrition being undertaken at that time against the Japanese. There were similar battles being fought in China, Burma, New Guinea, and under the oceans of the japanese empire, as well as the mining and sabotage efforts throughout Southeast asia, by groups like Sparrowforce and the Darwin Wing that were having every bit as debilitating effect as Guadacanal (well, more or less.....).

Much is made about the attrition that the Japanese air forces suffered over Guadacanal in that five months of fighting. My understanding is that about 1000 aircrew were lost in the battle, along with about 20 destroyers, and some capital ships, and about 20000 men were lost, mostly to disease (I cannot check the details right now). This sounds impressive, and certainly the most serious of the losses, the losses to the Destroyers, were not repeated by anyone else. However, the Japanese losses in aircrew on a monthly basis had been nosediving since well before Guadacanal (read Yamamotos report to the Chief Of Staff in May 1942....already he was complaining about the losses being suffered. I am not saying these attritional losses were not important. What I am saying is that guadacanal was not the key to that attrition.....if US efforts had been put into the mainland of New Guinea, for example, along a single axis instead of following this dumbars* strategy cooked up by the Joint Chiefs to satisfy the competing egos of Macarthur on the one hand, and Uncle Ernie on the other. The old adage of splitting your forces would seem to apply in this case, and for that reason i see Guadacanal as not being the pivotal point leading to victory your populist American histories paint them to be. rather, i see it as a stark example of the failure of the Allied command system to contain and unify its command structures and keep the personailies of its leadership under control....

Consider this, if guadacanal had not occurred, the Japanese would have carried forward in an attempt to undertake their "Fijian" strategy. The Americans. The next step in their advance was espiritu santo, as I recall. If 1st marine Div had been held back in waiting for that event, the result would have been the same....if the Japanese had been allowed to advance to Noumea, the slaughter would have been even greater.

Bottom line is that guadacanal was not that important as a place, or a battle, because there were a dozen other "guadacanals" waiting to happen if the japanese pressed on with their plans. to me Guadacanal represents a failure in the allied leadership, but particualrly the American leadership, because it was more to do with competing egos than complimentary or optimal strategy.

Compare that with Malta...Not only was Malta the only geographical place in the Med where such a strategy of Interdiction could be implemented, if the strategy was not implemented, the Allies were likley to be overwhelmed in the Theatre, with who knows what consequences

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.

Malta not only strangled the supply in quantity, but also in quality. Ultra enabled the British to concentrate on the convoys or individual ships that made the biggest difference - they did not just strike ships at random, but could take out a large proportion of the high-value targets in well-aimed blows.

This gave the attacks conducted from Malta an impact much greater than what one would assume from the plain tonnage figures.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by syscom3

But for Malta, remember the logistics strain on fighting armored warfare in the desert. Just because you can get 50% more supplies to Tunisia, doesn't necessarily mean a significant amount can get to the AK that was out on the eastern fringes of the theater.

Consider that the more supplies you need to transport, means the more support troops you need, and the more supplies you need to bring along just to support them. And consider the fuel requirement for the supply troops has to be a round trip number. Its an exponential increase in the tonnage needed to support both the tooth and the tail. The allies learned that lesson in Sept/Oct 1944 in France!

In the end it would still degrade the AK capability, even far out in Egypt. Think about. 50% less supplies is still 50% less supplies.

Would you rather have more or less supplies?

[renrich]

Very few oil fields in North Africa at that time. In fact, not that much production in the Middle East. Most of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from US. The Germans best chance for enhancing their oil supplies was in the southern part of the Soviet Union. I don't believe that those issues lessen the importance of Malta, the unsinkable aircraft carrier. I doubt the US Navy or Marines or IJN thought the Guadalcanal Campaign was overrated. It was a cesspool for both sides.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by DerAdlerIstGelandet

In the end it would still degrade the AK capability, even far out in Egypt. Think about. 50% less supplies is still 50% less supplies.

Would you rather have more or less supplies?

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

[syscom3]

I came out with the disparaging remarks about Guadacanal because it was just one of the battles of attrition being undertaken at that time against the Japanese. There were similar battles being fought in China, Burma, New Guinea, and under the oceans of the japanese empire, as well as the mining and sabotage efforts throughout Southeast asia, by groups like Sparrowforce and the Darwin Wing that were having every bit as debilitating effect as Guadacanal

The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces.

CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.

NG wore down the IJA, but not the IJN. Plus it wasnt untill middle 1943 that the 5th AF began to make its force felt in the SW Pacific.

Darwin was in the periphery, contributing little in the scheme of things.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

Why coudn't it?

[Amsel]

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Amsel

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat

Originally Posted by pbfoot

The Axis were loosing 50% of their Afrika Corps supplies to Malta based aircraft thats a whole lot of capability .

And even more to the subs & DD's based on Malta

Originally Posted by syscom3

That is a lot. But did it really impact the AK's ability to fight way out in Egypt?

It had a huge impact, the British basically strangled the Axis supply line in NA. By summer 1942, the British aircraft in the Med were deliberatly looking for Axis oilers because they knew how important it was.

Originally Posted by syscom3

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

Yes. Malta was the key to holding North Africa

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

Without the pressure on the Axis supply lines from Malta they could have brought supplies to ports farther in, to Bengazhi or Tobruk, both in German control in summer '42

Originally Posted by renrich

Very few oil fields in North Africa at that time. In fact, not that much production in the Middle East. Most of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from US.

Most of the petroleum used in Western Europe came from the US. The primary supply for the Desert Army & for Russia were the MidEast oilfields, from the refinery at Abadan. The Allies didn't have enough ships to send oil around the Cape from the USA. There were also 2 pipelines going from the Persian Gulf through Jordan, to the Med in Palestine

[Marcel]

Originally Posted by Amsel

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

Hmm, yeah, maybe for you Americans, then...

[Juha]

Hello Syscom
Afrika Korps main supply harbours were Tripoli and Benghazi. Tunisia didn't play a role before Torch, Vichy French didn't like Italians. Land transport was a problem, that was why Tobruk with its rather limited harbour capacity was so important. The lost supply had very significant impact on Rommel's operations at times, was it the number of AFVs anf other vehicles or the amount of fuel available.

Juha

[renrich]

Just to put it in perspective, my reference shows that six sevenths of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from the US.

[syscom3]

If what Juha says is correct, then allied ships and aircraft based in Egypt could have done just as good a job of hitting axis ships off of Cyrenica as the ones based on Malta.

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by syscom3

The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces.

CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.

NG wore down the IJA, but not the IJN. Plus it wasnt untill middle 1943 that the 5th AF began to make its force felt in the SW Pacific.

Darwin was in the periphery, contributing little in the scheme of things.

I would clarify that a little by saying the key to defeating Japan lay solely in eating up her slender reserves, whether they be the tying down of field formations so as to avert a concentration of effort at the decisive point, the destruction of oil production facilities, the loss of merchant shipping, the destruction of aircrew and aircraft, or the sinking of frontline ships. Sinking the frontline ships was, incidentally the least important aspect of winning the war against Japan. She was defeated because her merchant marines were decimated, because she could not concentrate on any one theatre with her ground forces, and because she lost control of the air. The loss of efficiency in her navy, industry and the loss of ships outright all came about as a result of that.

Your justification and dismissal of places like the CBI and NG only makes sense from an American perspective. Americans are notoriously bad at grasping the concept of the indirect approach, and the position and opinions you are adopting are a classic microcosm of that. CBI and NG were important because , in the case of the former they sucked out vital ground troops, attrited air assets, and soaked up vital supply. NG was important because it was here that the bulk of the Japanese land forces were tied down and defeated (and in any event your assertion that naval forces of the IJN were not being attritioned on this front is patently incorrect anyway, most notably losses occurred at Milne Bay, off Buna, and later, with the assistance of your 5th Air Force, in the Bismarck Sea ). Meanwhile, from as early as March 1942, increasing pressure was being applied to the Japanese air assets in Rabaul, by mixed formations of RAAF and 5AF formations, that prevented them from ever bringing their full force of air units to bear on the SoPac forces . Intreresting that you refer to NG as a sideshow, since it occupied the attentions of more than 60% of the allied ground AND air forces in the SWPA/SoPac until the latter part of 1943 (Australia contributing something more than 500000 troops to the theatre to approximately 150000 US). The Japanese forces on Guadacanal never exceeded 20000, yet by the end of 1942 the Australians, and Eichelbergers formations were engaging twice that number . In the Darwin TO, the US and Australian formations were tying down more than 550 A/C at any given moment, from August 1942 on (and incidentally were contributing far more in shipping losses to the Japanese through the aerial mining camapigns throughout SE Asia). if the Japanese had had the opportunity to concentrate these forces off Guadacanal as well as the air formations they were forced to divert to the NG front, the outcome on Guadacanal would have been different.

Luckily for all of us, and despite all the innefficiencies in their armies, the KMT and CCP in China managed to tie up 37 of the 52 Divs available to the Japanese (and proportions remained more or less like that as the numbers of Divs increased. Without the CBI, China would have folded, and instead of 20000 men of the IJA, you would have faced 200000 on places like Guadacanal. Sure they would have starved, but this was never an issue for the IJA.

And certainly, Macarthur would not agree with you. Macs great contribution to military strategy was his understanding of attritional warfare, and the importance of the indirect approach. His island hopping and bypassing of japanese strongpoints is testament that at the end he understood how to defeat the Japanese...isolate them, then go round the.. but isolating them was achieved by a combination of naval supremacy, tonnage warfare, air suppression, and tying down of reserves. without all of these ingredients 9and more, your victory would not have been possible. guadacanal was a part of that, an important part, but it was not the pivotal point in the whole equation in which all other aspects are un-important.