Which side would you fly for?.......

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I have to agree with Njaco here. That was a pretty below the belt comment. The Brits did not quite fighting. They just switched tactics and lets face it what broke the Germans back was the non stop bombing by day and night.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Njaco

Drgn I don't exactly know what you mean "by a war the RAF chose to quit"? The RAF didn't quit, just switched priorities as per Casablanca. Granted, they realized with their resources they were getting hit badly during the day and they stopped daylight attcks but with the entrance of the US, the two forces spilt their time.

Maybe coincidence, maybe not that this decision to cease daylight operations came about the same time as US came onboard but I don't think they quit at all. In fact if it wasn't for the British fooling around with the P-51 it might not have progressed much farther or wouldn't have entered combat so quickly with a new engine to be decisive.

and what do you mean by easier to fight? I'm sure the Jagdflieger would disagree with you on that point.

OK - let's debate it.

The RAF quit flying daylight raids to Germany in 1940 before the US was in the war. The GAF quit daylight bombing on Britain in 1940 ~sept for the same reasons. They a.) didn't have escort fighters capable of defending the bombers over the target, and b.) they didn't have a strategic bomber heavily armed enough to even think they could bomb long range undefended.

We will concede that the USAAF found themselves in same situation - but unlike the RAF and LW and USSR, developed escort fighters capable of defeating the LW over their own back yard in daylight.

They both quit daylight bombing over Germany and Britain loooong before we came into the war. Secondly, the back of the Luftwaffe's ability to defend their homeland in daylight was broken between January 1944 and June depending on the historian you want to believe. But the RAF was not engaged in that struggle over Germany - it was the USAAF and the Mustang and the Lightning that were escorting 8th, 12th and 15th AF over Germany during that period and in May and June the P-47s finally got the range to engage deep into Germany.


The fighter force that accomplished that ranged from 150 in January to 300 in April (combined 51s and 38s) and their effectives over target were often 1/2 of the ones that started engines for the mission because of mechanical teething problems. And that was all there was to cover 3 Air Divisions (8th AF) over all the targets attacked deep into Germany - so there were NEVER more than two Fighter wings to meet any German attack - of up to 300 fighters for exampe over Munich on 24 April, 1944


Your comment about Brits mating the Merlin is correct but irrrelevant to what actually happened so what is your point? I am NOT Denigrating the RAF, nor am I downgrading the LW. But it is curious why the Germans seem to always look to numbers as the prime reason for their defeats or studiously avoid giving American fighter pilots their due respect

I am wondering out loud why the Luftwaffe pilots thought that the "second" (or third - maybe they ranked us behind USSR) best pilots brutalized them over Berlin and Schweinfurt and Brunswick and Munich, when they ALWAYS outnumbered the Mustangs and Lightnings over the target.

If our pilots were so dismal, why didn't the Luftwaffe destroy an entire fighter Group when they had the advantage? or at least 10? Go back and look at the records and count on the fingers of one hand how many times the 8th AF FC had a Group lose more than 5 fighters air to air on an escort mission. (Not gonna count the 4th FG on D-Day or 18 August or 353rd on 10 June- when they were low strafing and got clobbered from behind and above.)

Remember we are talking about the 8th AF starting with one operational Mustang and three Lightning groups by end of January 1944 versus more than 400 single engine Me109s and Fw190s available to escort the Ju88s and the Me110/210/410s in their attacks agianst the B-17s and B-24s. The other 200 s/e fighters were based in Holland and France and available to tangle with RAF and 8th and 9th AF P-47 groups doing Penetration and Withdrawl support - but not going past Dummer Lake.

The RAF did a superb job of engaging JG26 and JG2 over France and the lowlands but this was not where the big battles were fought, nor where the Luftwaffe lost 1200 fighter pilots in 3 months

By "easier to fight" I was referring to Night Raids by RAF who did not have an effective 'night escort' capability. The German air force was taking very heavy tolls of RAF Lancasters at Night all the way into April 45 - when the 8th stopped losing big numbers in the April/May timeframe 1944 (Before you get upset with that comment - I do know that July 7, Sept 11-12, Sept 27 and Nove 26 were days in which one or two wings of B-17s/B-24s got mauled by a German force that over whelmed the escorts at the point of attack or evaded them altogether)

The average air to air ratio for the Mustang groups of German a/c shot down versus Mustangs shot down by German Fighters was arond 8 to 1. I'm not counting flak losses, or mechanicqal losses. I am using Kent Miller's Fighter Units and Pilots of 8th AF as the basis for study and I will publish these numbers in my new book).

So, if the USAAF was second or third best against the LW, what does that say about the LW pilots? and what were to corresponding ratios of LW vs RAF in fighter to fighter battles over Europe? They better be awesome in RAF favor to merit the downgrade of the US pilot in the same theatre.

BTW, the best air to air ratio of any USAAF fighter group was the 56th FG in P-47s with 12:1 and the worst was 1:1 with the 55thFG (or 20th - I have to check) before they switched from P-38's to 51's.

Regards,

Bill

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yes but to say the RAF quit that is wrong in my opinion. The RAF did what they had to do. They switched tactics and did fine in there night bombing. They did not quit...

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by DerAdlerIstGelandet

Yes but to say the RAF quit that is wrong in my opinion. The RAF did what they had to do. They switched tactics and did fine in there night bombing. They did not quit...

No, the RAF did not lay down (another definition of quit) Neither did the Germans. What they did is a.) recognize that they were going to lose more than they could afford and b.) hope that the new tactics would yield the hoped for results.

The RAF actually switched back to increasing daylight raids in 1945 when they realized they were losing more at night than they stood to lose in daylight - at a time when USAAF and RAF had overwhelming air superiority.

So, let me rephrase.

The RAF chose to 'go in another direction' and told us we were 'silly' to attempt to do something neither they nor the Germans could make work. Those 'dumb colonials'..sigh.

Unlike both we had the will and the means to take the losses, learn, adapt and improvise - and make it work. We 'didn't take another direction' when our losses were prohibitive - we found a way to do it.

Further, it is rare that you hear admiration and respect from the Euro side for the job the 8th, 12th and 15th AF achieved in both the hard times and the good times - it always seems that America prevailed because of numbers, not valor, not intelligence, not skill. In short we were too dumb to listen to our betters and somehow managed to pull it off. Luck and wealth - that what its all about... This is the theme that will get me engaged in any thread

Once again - I want to be clear about the simple fact that I have nothing but the greatest respect for the RAF and Luftwaffe. Period. Just wondering if it is ever bi-directional?

Regards,

Bill

PS - I tried to understand why you both thought I implied the RAF 'quit' - That comment was very specific about the only thing the RAF 'quit' and specifically noted Daylight Strategic Bombing - I made no slur on their manhood or ability and certainly did not intend that meaning and would apologise if you took that as my meaning.

Can we agree that 'choose to go another way' is a better choice of words?

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I have answered you in a pm and I think it is cleared up...

[lesofprimus]

German replacement fighter pilots were basically in an accelerated training program from the beginnings of 1944.... By autumn, the average replacement pilot had about 150 hours, verses over 400 for the American jocks....

Thats not fair, even by todays standards, let alone back in 1944.... Crump and Dortenmann, as well as Weib knew this all to well and went to General of Fighters to complain about this, and in the end, were so disgusted with the training at Sagan that they were beside themselves...

Another thing that we seem to be getting away from, and Bill, u seem to be the most staunch on it, is the whole "The LW was NOT outnumbered"... If the LW put up 300 fighters and the 8th only put up 160 escorts, all these planes did not fly into the same area, nor did they stay in this huge formation of 300 planes to sweep in and destroy everything in sight....

There are many instances that Bill and Erich and myself, as well as others here, that know that many many times, individual Staffel were separated from the group and then bounced by an outnumbering forces of Mustangos... 30 vs 13 is called being outnumbered, and is usually followed by several black smoking holes in the German countryside....

Yea, it didnt happen all the time, but by the way things are starting to sound around here, it seems as though its being called a myth, and thats just not fu*kin right... It did happen, and most of us know it did, and it happened more than any of us will ever know...

There were many instances also where the LW outnumbered the Americans, and thats where the superior training came into play, as u are certainly aware of Bill.... During the mid point of 44, there was a good bit of fuel for the fighter units in combat, but the training facilities were constantly being rationed less and less fuel per pilot...

Point of the matter is this... Under-trained pilots with sometimes extremely poor leadership, as well as horrendous ground vectoring, lead to many situations where the 109s and 190s were severely outnumbered in a certain given area of airspace... There may have been less American escorts in Southern Germany or Northern France at that very moment, compared to what the LW had in the sky, but over the town of Heidelberg or Falaise in Normandy, a fighter sweep of 40 Mustangs bounces a wayward Staffel of 16 109s, and the rest as they say is history....

[pbfoot]

I had little chat with a LW experten last week and he stated " You'd come out the top of the clouds and there would be aircraft thousands of aircraft all trying to kill you most times we were outnumbered 10 -1 "

[drgondog]

Dan - I am not disputing anything you say except I would pinpoint that the bulk of the eperienced pilots went down between Jan and May 1944... and that the replacement pilots with lower time were staring in that timeframe and accelerating in April because so many went down in the first four months of 44.

Nor am I disputing that the LW didn't always have local superiority during those four to five months because they didn't put them all up to blunt just one thrust.

But because so few fighter wings were spread so thin relative to the Target support for three bomb divisions it was very rare for more than one Fighter Group to be up against whatever concentration the LW threw at them in that region of sky. I hate to say this Dan, but do the math on what was available to cover 30-35 Bomb wings past Dummer Lake (~ 47 bingo time then) and then ask yourself "If more than one Group was in position to bounce a German force - how did they know "where and when" to be? and what were they uncovering to get another group in the fight.

As to Pbfoots recollection of a conversation "about thousands coming down at you" - with due respect to the LW pilot there weren't thousands or hundreds or 50's in the local area you were climbing in - not in Jan-May 1944.

Additionally that might have happened occasionally during bad weather when the LW didn't scramble in time (rare) to get an altitude advantage over the inbound bomber stream, but by and large and particularly in those first months when the Target escort was small (relatively speaking) to the available strike force the LW controllers and shadow ships were looking for the 'uncovered spot'

One Fighter group would ordinarily covering a space of 10-20 miles all by its lonesome. There were 15 Fighter Wings at peak to cover 45 bomber wings in 8th AF and it was much less coverage during the first four months of 1944.

So we can agree that we have a different perspective about the numbers of USAAF fighters available to take on the 450+ s/e fighters over German as well as the twins, and we can have a different perspective about the quality - but the German records show a lot of experienced pilots and squadrons being transferred from Russain front to Germany in late 1943 and I don't believe that bunch was heavily populated by the 150 hour replacement pilots.

If someone wishes to challenge my numbers, get different historical sources - for both the 8th AF TO&E for Mustang and Lightning Groups as well as the Luftflotte strengths?

Then tell me how the outnumbered few wings of those 51 and 38 groups were steered and directed to ambush, in 'great' numbers, the few german Fighters that contested the space while the rest of the available German force were unmolested?

On its best day in those four or five months the 8th AF would have 48 escorts over the target (of 5 or six different targets in different locations) for any given two or three bomb wings over 20 miles and most of the time the effectives were closer to 35.

If a REALLY big force with the huge numers attacked in one volume of space you might get a second wing engaging and this happened more frequently as the 8th transitioned to 51s and the 47s got the range to go to Berlin and back

Your point that 30 might bounce 13 is of course correct - and vice versa. But even if a group were at full strength it was rare that all three squadrons engaged - not if they were doing their job correctly.

The Good (responsible) ones tried to keep sections in place to cover the vacuum as they released one section after another to engage. If you saw a group that frequently engaged everybody you hadda ask 'what about covering the bombers'?? I have opinions about one or two that had that reputation but I don't comment on the specifics. For one thing I wasn't there.

But Dan - most of the people that comment on overwhelming numbers of fighters in the 8th AF in 1944 overlook the point that most of that Fighter force had to turn back near Bremen, Hannover, Frankfurt line while the 51s picked up the Penetration and Target Support from there all the way to Munich or Berlin or Posnan - or thereabouts.

The LW wasn't stupid - they withdrew much of their force (except JG2 and JG26) from France and the Lowlands and put JG1, 3, 5, 11, 27, 53, 54, 300, 301, 302 into Germany in the first months of 44... and those had Fw190s that could Fight - not the A8/R2 deathtraps de jour from July forward. Each one of the Jagds in January had 9+ staffeln with 10-12 effectives so each was the equivalent of perhaps two Mustang groups if the entire Jagd went maximum effort. Some of the above did not have a full compliment and some were split between Germany and other fronts (like JG5, JG53, JG54,JG301, JG302), etc

In addition the other side of the equation is that the long range escort focused first on the Zerstorer and NJG units with the firepower - that was another 374+ t/e ships available to attack those 31 bomb wings.. the math says the few long range fighter wings could be challenged at any point on the route by very large chunks of the available 374 t/e plus 479 s/e fighters.

The Germans couldn't concentrate 'em all but the fighters couldn't cover evrybody and had far fewer to respond to skill German controllers... who knew where they wanted to be and our guys had exactly one place where they were assigned to be.

The net is that I agree most of your points 100% - and leave room for common agreement on the rest.

I think as I look your post over again that our prime difference in point of view is the relative quality of the Luftwaffe Fighter arm in Luft3 and Luft Reich in January 1944. So I will repeat what I believe (about German relative strength) and what I know - 8th AF precise strength on January 1, 1944

I believe top to bottom that the Germans had far more experience and equivalent Fighter log time on 1 January than all of 8th FC and way more than the 354th and 357FG which were within two weeks and 6 weeks of being the first Mustang Target Support forces.. and that the 20th was in ops for 3 whole days,while the 55th had been flying for two whole months in their ratty engine blowing 38s.

Over the following four months till the end of April, 1944 the 4th/355th then the 352nd would join the Target escort force with buggy Mustangs and the 364th FG would come on ops in March. Then the 339th on 30 April, the 359th and 361st got their 51s in May, along with Robin Olds and 38s for the 479th.

January 1 ------> two P-38 groups operational
February 1------> " plus one 51 group
March 1---------> " plus 3 51 groups operational
April 1-----------> three P-38 groups plus four 51 groups operational
May 1-----------> three P-38 groups plus six 51 groups operational

....to escort 27 Bomb wings on January 1 and 31 Bomb wings deep into Germany on 1 May... three Long range fighter groups per Air Division, three Fighter groups to cover 10+ bomb wings of 40-45 bombers each stretched out for 30 miles over the target. That is May 1

On March 6 it was 5 fighter wings to cover 30 bomb wings to Berlin.. just less than two per 10 bomb wing column over 30+ miles

Tell me that this is an overwhelming force or had more than enough combat experience and log time to offset German forces but help me understand your point of view as to why I am wrong?


I won't goof around on this subject with people that I have already debated with - if my math and logic ain't right why embarass myself with the ones that have better facts than me?

Warm Regards,

Bill

[drgondog]

Dan/Chris - another footnote to the discussions about air battles in the ETO. You may know more about this subject and just skip to the end

It occured to me that a lot of people on this forum think of the air battles over Germany as large formations of USAAF fighters picking on small formations of German fighters the same way every day.

The tactics and distributions of squadrons, flights and sections were very different depending on whether you were flying a Freelance Fighter Sweep or a Ramrod escorting bombers or were flying an Area Patrol down low under Beachy Head Control.

In the Sweep, the squadrons were untethered and more likely to fly a relatively compact formation strung out 600-1000+ yards. The formation would just as likely be line abreast in 'flight units' for each squadron and eschelon up and down to avoid m/a and collisions. Each squadron would be in trail with room between each. This formation is much better suited to every body having a chance to engage when a LW formation was spotted - and no requirement to leave anybody behind to escort bombers.

In the Ramrod, the three squadrons would be strung front to back and each squadron likesly to be broken up into sections of two flights each - essing one above the other to cover high and rear- above the bombers. Typically one squadron may be out in front and about 1-2 thousand feet above the lead box of bombers. There would usually be the high middle squadron somewhat higher, relatively, above the High Bomber squadrons ot give a little more buffer from high attacks and also have more energy to dive and help out the other two in a fight.. same sections, same 'essing' - then the other squadron would be in trail. Variation would be lead high, one aft qtr and side, both high on each side.

On the Area Partol - rare for the Group to be together - too many in close area, low to ground is trouble so squadrons would often be broken up with different assignements in different places. This would likely be more of a tactical spread with one set of eyes looking ahead and another high and behind. They would have an assigned target to bomb and strafe or were under Beachy Head or Type 16 Control

This scenario is where the LW scored biggest during Normandy campaign, catching our fighters from above and behind with minimum manuever room where the Fw190 and 109 could really perform against the 47 and 51. This is a scenario where the Allies (not just 8th FC) may get caught at a significant disadvantage numerically, altitude and performance wise.

The reason I bring this up is that during the Sweep - the 8th AF Group in this role is the most likely to a.) have a numerical advantage and b.) have an altitude advantage because they were c.) out in front where the LW would be logically trying to form up. This is where your 30-13 analogy really rings true!

During the Escort the usual mode was for LW staffeln to engage from higher altitudes. They would sent a couple of flights through and hope everybody would miss the 50 more 10,000 feet higher. The reaction would be to send a section to climb and engage the first batch if seen, or send a section after the divers or sit tight.

If the attackers found a weak spot and concentrated then usually only one squadron would be close enough to engage at same altitude before the attackers split S and waved 'bye' - so it was rare for more than parts of a squadron to engage at any one time - but over the course of 30-40 minutes there may be five or six smaller unit engagements in which flights and sections are engaged while another squadron may hear a lot but see notthing because of cloud cover, contrails in wrong place, etc

In these scenarios it was far more likely for the LW to have both a local numerical superiority and and altitude advantage, and if steered correctly a significant critical mass.

This is another topic I won't bore you with again but it is core to my other beliefs regarding the nature of the air war over daylight Germany Jan1 -May1, 1944.

Regards,

Bill

[pbfoot]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Dan -

As to Pbfoots recollection of a conversation "about thousands coming down at you" - with due respect to the LW pilot there weren't thousands or hundreds or 50's in the local area you were climbing in - not in Jan-May 1944.

Regards,

Bill

Don't **** me now .....it was an the mans impression and I believe he is somewhat of a better pilot then most

[drgondog]

I am not denigrating his memory. I had the very same discussion with Rall, Krupinski and Galland, along with quite a few other American Aces back in 85(?) Fighter Aces Reunion at Champlin Museum.

I have studied this specific subject and analyzed till I was blue in the face by the time I asked this question. I asked a lot of questions of the fighter pilot community I grew up with and was comfortable with presnting the subject to Toliver first as he was close to Galland and I didn't want to offend anyone with the 'question'.

When pressed, to a man the three agreed the points I made about the relative weakness of Mustang units early to mid 1944.

I wish Toliver was alive as he was in that conversation and for that matter if anyone has a contact point with Rall, I could possibly steer him to remember this subject.

BTW - the real answer is not question of numerical superiority - it was that Goering basically ordered the LW to attack the bombers and ignore the fighters - which each of the three well knew was stupid and just cut well honed aggression out of a great fighter arm.

Pb - don't take my word or logic or data - just work it out yourself. Do the math on the numbers. Look at the long range mission, the assignments and the resources available to bomb beyond coverage of P-47s.

Paint a mental picture of 30 bomb wings/10 bomb wings per division - each Division heading to a different target region of Germany or all in one direction to same target but an hour long procession..

In the case of march 6, 1944, imagine a 100 mile line with each Bomb Group/wing occupying 2000+ feet wide and 3000 feet deep in a two+ mile long volume of rarified air and position each of the 3 Mustang Groups and two Lightning groups available on March 6, 1944 to cover 6 Wings each. So perhaps 48 fighters to see, react and meet the LW within a 15-20 mile block?

Optimal formation flying and control of space between each wing - no screw ups or lagging formations

Assume the Germans want to punish the bombers but not tangle with the fighters.

Assume the germans have close to 800 s/e and t/e fighters that they can distribute as they choose...but maybe only put up half theri force

Assume the 5 Fighter groups have no aborts and they put 48 fighters each into their assigned place.. so 240 versus 400.

Demonstrate to me (or ignore me and just please yourself) how the USAAF Fighter Groups achieves parity consistently, much less any numerical advantage?

I can illustrate as many times as you wish where smaller forces of fighters are attacking larger forces of German fighters in both Encounter Reports and mission histories. You will see same but opposite in LW reports.

Do the math and get your own conclusion - I'm comfortable with mine but I am equally comfortable that you believe what you believe about this subject based on multiple inputs.

Regards,

Bill

[pbfoot]

OK but what was the servicability rate of the various LW units remembering that many were double and triple tasked with both night and day duties American units were never shy of equipment and had spare aircraft ready in case one or several had snags also take into consideration the work with the 9th AF certainly the A20s 25s and 26s went out the same days as part of comprehensive strategy these were also escorted probably by the RAF/RCAF . How the fighters were vectored in by the GCI guys and how many was a guessing game how many LW aircraft actually saw the targets they were vectored in on . Meanwhile the 51's etc were in a concentrated area not attacking piecemeal

[drgondog]

PB - the numbers I gave you are for the 1 May 1944 Order of Battle for the Luftflotte Reich - solely s/e and t/e fighters based in Germany - excluding JG2 and JG3. The 439 s/e (Me109s and Fw190s only) figure was the number in service - the 'auhtorized' count was much higer. The data can be found in Doctor Alfred Price's "The Luftwaffe Data book" published 1977. The data for Luftflotte 3 and Luftflotte Reich are found pg 92 -125.

Luft Reich was the force available to resist daylight and night attacks on Germany. Luft 3 was based in France and Netherlands and Belgium and available to attack RAF and USAAF inbound and outbound to Germany

In addition to the s/e fighters ZG 1, 26 and 76 had an additional 67 210 1nd 410s - way down from their Jan 1 levels. But these were all targeted to B-17s and B-24s penetrating Germany beyond the range p-47s. This number does not include the extra 300+ NJG units which did night and day defense - your 'double duty' fighters.

You closed with "Meanwhile the 51's etc were in a concentrated area not attacking piecemeal"

What did you mean by that?

There were three P-51 wings on March 6 and six Mustang wings at the end of May, 1944 covering 32 Bomb wings penetrating deep into Germany. Just how did they manage to be in a 'concentrated area' where they enjoyed numerical superiority.

No B-26s or A-20s or B-26s or B-25s or P-47s to dilute the Luftwaffe Reich's attention deep into Germany - only the 8th and occasionally the 12th and 15th down south where Luft2 and Lw Kdo Sud Ost were available to assist from the South.

So how did the three Mustang groups in march and six in May manage to 'concentrate themselves' to cover 100 miles of bomb wings? Pick your technique, and tell us how 8th AF directed Mustangs from one formation to another so they could concentrate.

Regards,

Bill

Bill

[pbfoot]

Sorry I have not spent years reading numbers but I have spent years reading and listening. Your theory is good if no other unit on the Allied side is flying I do believe the RAF, RAAf ,RNZAF,RCAF also flew on the same days as the USAAF they didn't stop flying in awe of the USAAF. Do you really think the LW dropped everything else on their plate just to attack the USAAF. Think about it coastal strikes ,day rangers ,gardening etc these "auxilliary units" also had a hand in diverting the LW.
on a quick search I found this

"The terrible pressure on the fighter force culminated in the five-month period between January and May of 1944. The Luftwaffe was already in serious trouble at the beginning of the year. On 31 December 1943 the Luftwaffe had 2395 single-engine pilots in combat squadrons deployed throughout Europe. Of these pilots only 1495 were fully operational (62 percent), 291 were partially combat-ready (12 percent), and 691 were not operationally ready under any circumstances (26 percent). This force lost no less than 2262 fighter pilots in the next five months—close to 100 percent of the number reporting for duty at the turn of the year.27 In a conference with Herman Göring in mid-May, General Adolf Galland admitted that Luftflotte Reich (responsible for air defense over northern Germany) had lost 38 percent of its fighter pilots in April, while Luftflotte 3 (responsible for air defense over France and southern Germany) had lost 24 percent of its fighter pilots.28

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . ."

[drgondog]

PB - I failed to make myself clear. Yes the RAF, RNZAF, RCAF, 8th AF P-47 groups, 9th AF P-47 groups ALL stopped flying east of Bremen and Frankfurt - simply because they don't make it back before running out of fuel.

What I gave you in the context of 2 Lightning and three Mustang groups is ALL there were to contest the Germans over Berlin, Munich, Brunswick, Ruhland, Leipzig, etc

Back to your figures for "38% Lost in Lufflotte Reich" ----> mostly due to the 8th AF bombers and those few mangy USAAF fighters that had the range to go deep (see above). Stick with Luftflotte Reich and stick to the maximum number of P-38 and P-51 Groups available between Jan 1 and May 1 1944.

That was the Daylight Battle for Air over Germany.

That was ALL the Allied fighters avialable to go to Berlin, Munich, Brunswick and beyond. Every single one was in those few groups. Not one RAF day fighter. Not one RNAF, RAAF, RCAF or 8th/9th AF P-47... just the 3 to six between 1/1 and 5/1/44. Period.

That is the point I am painfully, but not very clearly, trying to make.

Regards,

Bill

PS - EVERYBODY got a piece of Lflotte 3 because everybody could go to France, Belgium and Holland. RAF/9th/8th AF Fighter Groups.. but L3 was only about 1/5 size of LReich