Wich was the worst nation in the war?

[parsifal]

Soren

You insinuated in your previous posts that the Germans were unstoppable. One way of interpreting that rubbish is to label it aryan supremicist. I did not label you a racist. It insinuate that the Germans are a master race to which all others, but particualrly the untermenschen slavics, have no chances. I see that as the racist overtone. i just put the label on the issue. I did not call you a racist, but if you want to draw the conclusion from that, then so be it

[parsifal]

The Germans suffered enormous difficulties in just getting where they needed to get.

[Soren]

I never said they were unstoppable Parsifal, that is again just your interpretation of what I said. If the Germans were unstoppable then they would've won the war, they didn't.

However by 1942 it took the disasterous decision made by Hitler not to send winterclothing to stop the German army, had Hitler not made this decision the German army would've captured Stalingrad and soon after the caucasus region. After that it should be pretty obvious what the outcome would be.

The blunder commited by Hitler gave the Soviets new hope and also showed them that the Germans COULD be stopped, which heightened the moral quite abit and gave new fighting strenght to the red army.

[parsifal]

The Germans suffered enormous difficulties in just getting where they needed to get. For example, some mention was made previously about poor decisions made by Hitler that led to the derailing of the 1941 offensive. Certainlly Hitler was no Napoleon, and he made a lot of mistakes, but not all of the failure of the '41 campaign can be laid at his feet. A popular myth is the decision to send guderains armour south after Smolensk. In fact the decision was made because of reports received from Von Bock, and others about a number of problems at the front. The Infantry had suffered badly during Smolensk, and was down to about 40% rifle strength. It needed time to recover, according to Von Bock, and backed up by Halder (read his diary). The wheeled transport in the Infantry formations wheeled transport, which contained the majority of the French trucks being used by the Wehrmacht was in a porr state of repair, meaning that the distance from the railheads and the overall mobility of the infantry had been reduced markedly since the start of the campaign. The railheads were stuck at Minsk, and would take 6 weeks to advance to Smolensk, the front asa at the end of July. There was nothing anybody could do about that, because the initial planning had envisaged a full soviet collapse by the time of the fall of Minsk. There were simply not the raw materials available to increase the rate of repair after the railheads had reached Minsk. Nor was there the engineering support to make it go faaster. Bock requested, and got, six weeks, in which to refit the Infantry of AGC.

The armour of the Heersgruppe was in relatively good condition. OKH was worried about the activities of isolated Soviet elements in the pripet, and also the lagging progress of AGS who had been held up by a combination of stiffer than expected Soviet resistance, and some localised flooding of the Dnieper. On trecommendation that it was better to do something, rather than nothing, again from OKH, Hitler opted to try and kill two birds with the one stone, by assisting the progress of AGS by shifting the MLA of the armour from Moscow, to Kiev. OKH had durther advised that whilst 2nd abnd 3rd Panzer Gruppes might be able to push onto Moscow, given the weak resistance now in front of AGC following Smolensk, there were strong resrves being readied behind Moscow and a strong likelihood that the German armour would be encircled, and /or suffer enormous casualties. Faced with assessment that were being presented to him at the time, it is hard not agree with Hitlers decision not to divert the armour.

This is just one example of the litany of circumstances that make the argument that the germans could "take out" the Russians a total furphy, at least in the single summer campaign. OKHs original assessment that it would take at least two summers, and probably three, and that was on the basis of weak Soviet resistance. as it happened, Soviet resistance was anything but weak

[Soren]

Parsifal you fail to note that the Germans, despite the complete lack of wintercloths actually managed to capture over 90% of Stalingrad.

And despite allot of men freezing to death, the lack of wintercloths had made sure that over 65 percent of Army Group Center had been ut of the fight just trying to survive the winter. Had the winter clothes been sent the Germans would've had another 600,000 men in the fight and the ones already in the fight would now not have to battle bitter cold, highly increasing their combat effectiveness.

[kool kitty89]

Soren, on the scorched earth tactics, what of parsifal's statement:

when the Caucasian oilfields were captured, in 1942, a German engineering assessment estimated that it would take more than two years of intensive effort, occupying more than half the daily train movements available to Army Group South at the time, to return the oilfields to a very minimal level of production.

[Soren]

KK,

This problem would be mostly solved with the capture of Stalingrad. However under the conditions when Stalingrad was still not captured it would've put great strain on the logistics.

I'd like to hear more about this German engineering assessment though.

[syscom3]

And still the French found a way to be more pathetic.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Parsifal you need to watch yourself. Using such words can be a harsh accusation. I have my differences with Soren and believe he his blinded by his uber bias toward everything German, but he is no Nazi nor does he hold such views.

Soren - As another member told you in your thread with Bill, the way you post can leave it to interpretation, leading some people to believe you are just that.

[parsifal]

There are two sources, one primary, one secondary. Primary source is "The Luftwaffes Defeat In The East 1942-3", Joel S Hayward, Kansas University Press 1998. In that book the Dr Schlicht of the Mineralol Brigade is cited as reporting to georg thomas that it would take at least six months just to achieve a monthly return of 4000 cubic meters, and that only 2 of the hundreds of wells captured could be expected to return to production within that period. in Dr Schlichts view, it would be at least 2 years before production was restored , and that would require the substantial movement of specialist equipment and railroad construction and pipelin construction equipment.

In October (I think), the Inspector East of the Deutsches Reichsbahn (State Railways) reported that the amount of equipment needed to undertake the repairs would occupy a very large proportion of the current railway capacity allocated to AGS (I cant be any more specific than that because my research computer, which contains the report is unavailable) to the extent of something like 50% of current allocations.

The proof is in the pudding. The oilfields were captured in August, and were still burning until the end of October. Production was never restored, and their loss in the following March never even entered the OKHs thinking, asa it struggled to save 1st panzer Army and 17th Army, from the Caucasus. Germany never extracted any benefit from the capture of these straegic assets, which was a source of bitter disppointment to the Axis leadership ( I refer you again to Halders Diary, and also Ciano's Diary)

[parsifal]

Adler

It was ill considered I agree. However, for the record this is the quote which led to the reaction. To me it is highly infalmmatory and false, and in a way insulting to the Germans who fought and died on the Ostfront. People can judge for themselves as to whether Sorens post is inflammatory or not

The time it took the Germans to be at the very gates of the city Moscow only serves to illustrate how easily Germany could've won if it hadn't been for Hitler's disasterous decision not to send his troops wintercloths. This idiotic decision by Hitler completely stalled the offensive and hundreds of thousands German soldiers froze to death, and the ones who managed to survive had their combat effectiveness drastically reduced as they both had to fight the cold and Soviets at the same time. That was the break the Soviets had been looking for.

[parsifal]

Soren

Sorry for the Nazi slur, but I agree with Adler, this sort of thing can be avoided if you make your posts a bit clearer. That is all I want to say on this issue.

Now, if you want to get back to the discussion, I dont think it was so much Hitlers decisio (although there is evidence that he did withold some winter clothing). This apparently stupid decision needs to be balanced against the absolutley dire supply situation that the Germans found themselves in late 1941. I remember reading somewhere thta Von Bock advised that he needed something like 32 trains per day just to keep AGC in basic supply. From memory, in November they were receiving something like 7 or 8 trains per day. The winter clothing was stuck in Warsaw (I think) with OKH (not Hitler) forced to make difficult choices as to what was shipped to the front, and what was not. They chose to send ammunition and fuel mostly, in an attempt to keep the offensive going. If they had sent the clothing, the offensive would still have stalled, because the ammunition and fuel would not have been available.

The Germans could not attempt to move these winter clothing before that, again because only the bare minimum of supplies were getting through, and because the distribution system from the railheads was so hardpressed as a result of the massive losses in whelled transport (the French and foreign stocks mostly, which accounted for something like 30-40% of availabe parks) By late Otober the Germans were also beginning to slaughter their horse, something they could not afford to do, but were forced to do. Coupled with the very high losses suffered by the Horse transport in November, the Germans situation became almost impossible.

I dont fully blame Hitler for this decision, partly it was the result of decisions by OKH (or at least recommendations), and partly because of the logistic problems that continued to mount throughout the late summer and early autumn

[Soren]

Parsifal,

Like I said the lack of winterclothes is all to blame for the failure to capture Stalingrad, the numbers speak for themselves really.

Note that:

1.) ~200,000 German soldiers froze to death
2.) ~600,000 men of Army Group center weren't fighting because of the cold but were resting outside the city trying to survive the winter.
3.) The ones actually in the city fighting had to fight both the cold AND the soviets.

And note that despite the above the Germans managed to capture over 90% of the city.

So don't you figure that an extra 800,000 or so troops would've made a difference ??

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Soren

Parsifal,

Like I said the lack of winterclothes is all to blame for the failure to capture Stalingrad, the numbers speak for themselves really.

Note that:

1.) ~200,000 German soldiers froze to death
2.) ~600,000 men of Army Group center weren't fighting because of the cold but were resting outside the city trying to survive the winter.
3.) The ones actually in the city fighting had to fight both the cold AND the soviets.

And note that despite the above the Germans managed to capture over 90% of the city.

So don't you figure that an extra 800,000 or so troops would've made a difference ??

OK Soren what time are you referring to exactly? AFAIK, the initial attack was Nov 19 when the Soviet offensives began, and it was not the bitter cold that would come in Dec. The problem on Nov 19 was not that they were half frozen, but that the German lines were over-extended and OKW was not aware of the Soviet buildup. If the Germans had proper clothes for the bitter winter that was coming I can see them extricating their army, but I don't think they could have taken Stalingrad.

Do you have details of the temperature from Nov 19 -25, the critical time of the initial encirclement?

[parsifal]

Hi Soren

You are referring to Stalingrad, which was a battle fought in 1942. I was referring to the '41 campaign mostly.

It is true that winter clothes were not issued to the men fighting in side of Stalingrad, because Hitler wanted to make the troops fight harder (and capture the city before the winter). As far as I know the rest of the front had been issued with winter clothes in time for the winter 42-43. You make reference to Army Group Centre, which had nothing directly to do with 6th Army. The men of Army Group Centre were adequately supplied with winter clothing in 1942. in 1941 they were not, for the reasons I have given in previous posts.
The men of AGC were fully occupied in defensive positions adjacent to Moscow. that had been the situation since the Spring of 1942. This force was in no condition to fight offensively and was at full stretch just trying to face off the opposing Soviet forces in front of Moscow. They had been stripped of most of their transport, and in many case, the divisions had been reduced from a 9 battalion, 3 regiment configuration, to just a 4 battalion, 2 regiment configuration. I am not sure of the exact number, but 600000 would be roughly correct. Facing this number was in excess of 3 million Soviet defenders, far better trained and better equipped, and far better led than they had been in 1941. about 20% of the forces had reached Guard status, which according to contemporary assesments were very nearly the equal of German line Infantry formations, in terms of combat ability. A post war study by the US military assessed the each German soldier in 1941 as being the equivalent of 2.31 Soviet soldiers. By the winter of 1942-3, this advantage had fallen to 1.61:1, with Guard units being rated at 1.34:1. German Pz troops maintained a much better advantage in open warfare.


Whilst there were over 200000 men trapped in the Stalingrad pocket, only 90000 of them were German combat troops. There were 40000 Rumanians included in that total

I must confess, I am still confused by your post. You refer to the capture of Stalingrad in the one breath, and then to AGC in the next, as if AGC were the defenders just outside the city. But this is not the case at all.
6th Army was under the command of Army Group South, or Army Group Don, depending on the precise time period. There were no significant combat elements behind Stalingrad. The other major combat formations (except for the inneffectual satellite armies) were 1st Panzer and elements of 4th Panzer, and 17th Army, all located to the south (elements of 4th Panzer were in the city I believe). to the north, the first substantial German forces were under the command of 2nd army but these were located north of Voronezh. There were elements of 11th Army around sevastopol, but these formations were still recovering from the mauling they had received in the assault on that city-fortress in June. can you clarify please whether you are talking about 1941 or 1942(late), and whether you are talking about Stalingrad, or Moscow, or both?