Korean War....

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

My American Grandfather who landed on Omaha Beach in WW2 also fought in the Korean War as well. I wish he was still alive today so that I could talk to him about his experiences.

[Lucky13]

U.S. Marines engaged in street fighting during the liberation of Seoul, circa late September 1950.
Note M-1 rifles and Browning Automatic Rifles carried by the Marines, dead Koreans in the street, and M-4 "Sherman" tanks in the distance.


Deck Launch -- Visible rings of vapor encircle a Corsair fighter as it turns up prior to being launched from the USS Boxer for a strike against communist targets in Korea. Hovering to the stern of the aircraft carrier, the every-present helicopter plane guard stands by to assist if any emergency arises.
Planes are Vought F4U-4s. Helicopter is a Sikorski HO3S.


An Attack Squadron 65 (VA-65) AD-2 "Skyraider" taxies forward on the flight deck in May 1951.


Grumman F9F Panther Is fueled by crewmen on the flight deck of USS Boxer (CV-21)


Aviation Ordnanceman Airmen J.V. Lykins and D.F. Jenkins move two truck loads of bombs onto the bomb elevator ready for the six-deck journey to the flight deck to be loaded on waiting aircraft. Over 100 tons of ammunition are loaded and flown from USS Princeton each operational day.
The inscription over the elevator door reads: "Maximum Load 5500 lbs".


Members of the carrier's Ordnance Department pose with decorated 2000-pound bombs, 9 March 1951.
Messages painted on the bombs are: "Greetings from PhilCee"; "Happy Easter"; and "Listen! To This One it will Kill you". Among the planes parked in the background are F4U-4Bs of Fighter Squadron 113 (VF-113).


250-pound bombs being loaded under the wings of a Douglas AD Skyraider of Attack Squadron 65, during operations on the 21 May 1951. A cart of 5-inch rockets and a second cart of 250-pound bombs are also present.


Ordnancemen attach 250-pound bombs to the wing of a Vought F4U-4B Corsair, during operations on 21 May 1951. Note use of the bomb rack and plane's flap hinge as foot stands. Plane in the right background is an Attack Squadron 65 (VA-65) AD-2 Skyraider (Bureau Number 12231, with Landing Signal Officer stripes on its tail.


Ordnancemen loading rockets beneath the port wing of a Fighter Squadron 64 (VF-64) F4U-4B Corsair, during operations on 21 May 1951. Note different types of rocket warheads, and details of carts used to transport the rockets.


Vought F4U-4 Corsair (Bureau No. 81712), of Fighter Squadron 791 (VF-791) makes vapor rings with its propeller as it takes off from USS Boxer (CV-21) for a Korean War air strike on 6 July 1951. Note small bombs under the plane's wings and flight deck distance markings. The "Corsair" is just passing the 500-foot point.


Crewmen participate in a snowball fight, while clearing snow from the carrier's flight deck during operations early 1951. Photo is dated 8 May 1951, but Valley Forge ended her second Korean War deployment in late March of that year. Planes parked on deck are F4U-4 "Corsair" fighters. That at left, with rockets on its wing, is Bureau # 81150.


Seated in the after cockpit of a Douglas AD-4N Skyraider attack plane, on board USS Philippine Sea (CV-47), during the filming of motion picture footage used in John Ford's "This is Korea", on 27 January 1951. Note: camera; flight gear and inflatable life vest worn by LCdr. Armistead; and paper bag containing a strong admonition encouraging its use by those afflicted with airsickness.

[Gnomey]

Excellent posts Lucky very interesting read (and nice pictures).

[Lucky13]

Battle of Pusan Perimeter

The Battle of Pusan Perimeter was fought in August and September of 1950 between United Nations Command forces combined with South Korean forces and the forces of North Korea. The U.N. and Republic of Korea forces held Pusan until the Inchon landing, then launched a counter-attack, defeating the North.


July 1950

After the initial defeats of the ROK and U.S. forces at Seoul, Osan and Taejon, the remaining ROK and U.S. forces began consolidating and reorganizing what was left of their units and equipment around the southern port city of Pusan.

The 24th Division would soon share the defense of South Korea with the rebuilt Republic of Korea Army (ROK or ROKA) and two newly arrived U.S. Army divisions, the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. On July 24, the ROK Army reorganized itself into two corps and five divisions. The ROK I Corps controlled the 8th Infantry Division and Capital Divisions, while the ROK II Corps controlled the 1st Division and 6th Infantry Division. A reconstituted ROK 3rd Division was placed under direct ROK Army control. The ROK II Corps headquarters was at Hamch’ang with its 1st and 6th Divisions on line from west to east, and the I Corps headquarters was at Sangju with the 8th and Capital Divisions on line from west to east. The 3rd Division operated on the east coast of South Korea. Large numbers of recruits and replacements had entered the ROK Army, which had regained its prewar strength of about 95,000. The U.S. 25th Division, with its three regiments—24th, 27th, and 35th—commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, arrived during July 10-15, 1950 at Pusan. General Walker ordered the 25th to bolster ROK defenses of the central mountain corridors. The 1st Cavalry Division, with its three regiments—5th, 7th, and 8th—sailed from Japan and landed at P’ohang-dong north of Pusan during July 15-22. The unit assumed responsibility for blocking the enemy along the main Taejon-Taegu corridor. In late July both the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division withdrew steadily in the face of aggressive North Korean attacks. On July 29, General Walker, with the support of General MacArthur, issued what the press called a "stand or die" order to the Eighth Army. Walker emphasized that the retreating must stop. The Eighth Army had been trading space for time and was running out of space.

One of the major problems of the retreat was the volume of refugees moving through Eighth Army lines. Their numbers were greater during July and August 1950 than at any other time in the war. During the middle two weeks of July about 380,000 refugees crossed into ROK-held territory. The North Koreans often exploited the situation by launching attacks that began with herding groups of refugees across minefields and then following up with tanks and infantry. The North Koreans also infiltrated U.S. Army lines by wearing the traditional white civilian clothing and joining groups of refugees, thus enabling them to commit a variety of surprise attacks on American soldiers. The commanders of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions attempted unsuccessfully to control the volume of refugees and enemy infiltration by searching displaced civilians and limiting the times and routes available for their movements. In late July General Walker, with the cooperation of ROK authorities, set explicit rules for the organized removal of refugees to the rear by the ROK National Police. By the end of July the ROK government had established fifty-eight refugee camps, most of them in the Taegu-Pusan area, to care for the homeless. But even with these efforts, refugees continued to hamper the movement of U.S. and ROK troops throughout the battlefield.

As the Eighth Army neared a natural defensive position along the Naktong River, the North Koreans accelerated their efforts to cut off elements of that army. After the fall of Seoul in late June the North Korean 6th Division had crossed the Han River and rapidly moved south over the western coastal roadnet. Eighth Army intelligence lost track of the 6th. The only UN forces situated at the time southwest of the Taejon-Taegu-Pusan highway were a few hundred ROK 7th Division survivors along with some scattered ROK marines and local police. On July 21, General Walker learned that a North Korean unit, presumed to be the North Korean 4th Division, was operating in the southwest area. Walker ordered the 24th Division, despite its deficiencies in manpower and equipment after the loss of Taejon, to serve as a blocking force in the area from Chinju in deep south central Korea northward to Kumch’on. Two battalions of the 29th Infantry, then stationed on Okinawa, and the ROK 17th Regiment would reinforce the 24th Division. On July 23, the North Korean 4th Division moved south from Taejon with the intent of supporting the 6th Division in an envelopment of the United Nations’ left flank and driving to Pusan. The 4th pushed as far as the Anui-Koch’ang area, about fifty miles southwest of Taegu, by the end of July. During July 25–28 the two battalions of the 29th were driven back by elements of the 6th at Hadong, located about twenty-five miles west of Chinju. On July 31 the Eighth Army finally became aware of the 6th Division’s presence after the 6th took Chinju and forced one battalion of the 29th and the 19th Infantry of the 24th Division to withdraw to the east. Eighth Army rushed the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division, which had been in reserve, to reinforce American units in the Chinju-Masan corridor. The 24th and 25th Divisions, aided by the ROK 17th Regiment, finally managed to slow the progress of the North Korean 4th and 6th Divisions at what would become the southernmost sector of the Pusan Perimeter. By August 3, U.S. and ROK units had averted the immediate threat of a North Korean drive all the way to Pusan.


August 1950

On 1 August the Eighth Army issued an operational directive to all UN ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal east of the Naktong River. UN units would then establish main defensive positions behind what was to be called the Pusan Perimeter. The intent was to draw the line on retreating and hold off the NKPA while the U.S. Army could build up its forces and wage a counteroffensive. The Pusan Perimeter assumed by U.S. and ROK forces on August 4 involved a rectangular area about 100 miles from north to south and 50 miles from east to west. The Naktong River formed the western boundary except for the southernmost 15 miles where the Naktong turned eastward after its confluence with the Nam River. The ocean formed the eastern and southern boundaries, while the northern boundary was an irregular line that ran through the mountains from above Waegwan to Yongdok. From the southwest to the northeast the UN line was held by the U.S. 25th and 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Division, and then by the ROK 1st, 6th, 8th, Capital, and 3rd Divisions. From south to northeast the North Korean units positioned opposite the UN units were the 83d Motorized Regiment of the 105th Armored Division and then the 6th, 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 15th, 1st, 13th, 8th, 12th, and 5th Divisions and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment. The 5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii and the phased arrival of the 2nd Infantry Division from the United States augmented U.S. Army forces. A third major reinforcement arrived in Korea on August 2, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, about 4,700 men. UN combat forces at this point actually outnumbered the North Koreans, 92,000 to 70,000.

The North Koreans had four possible avenues of advance leading to Pusan that could result in the defeat of U.S. and ROK forces, and in August they tried them all simultaneously. These approaches went through Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang, through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor, and through Taegu. During the first week of August General Walker decided to launch the first American counterattack of the war in the Chinju-Masan corridor. One of his purposes was to break up a suspected massing of enemy troops near the Taegu area by forcing the diversion of some North Korean units southward. On August 6 the Eighth Army issued the operational directive for the attack by Task Force Kean, named for the 25th Division commander. Task Force Kean consisted of the 25th Division, less the 27th Infantry and a field artillery battalion, with the 5th RCT and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attached. The Army plan of attack required the force to move west from positions then held near Masan, seize the Chinju Pass, and secure the line as far as the Nam River. Task Force Kean launched its strike on August 7 but ran head-on into one being delivered simultaneously by the North Korean 6th Division. After a week of heavy fighting, neither Kean’s troops nor their opponents had made any appreciable progress. Even so, the Eighth Army had launched its first offensive in Korea and successfully halted an assault by an enemy division.

[Lucky13]

Seven air miles north of the point where the Naktong River turns east and the Nam River enters it, the Naktong curves westward opposite Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop. This loop became known to the American troops as the Naktong Bulge during the bitter fighting there in August and September. On August 6 the North Korean 4th Division crossed the Naktong at Ohang with the intent of driving to Yongsan located about ten miles to the east. The 24th Division defended that sector and the 24th commander, Major General John H. Church, who had succeeded General Dean as division commander, placed the defense of the Naktong Bulge under Task Force Hill. Task Force Hill consisted of the 9th Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division along with the 34th and 19th Infantries and a battalion of the 21st Infantry of the 24th Division. Despite the efforts of Task Force Hill, by 11 August the 4th Division had penetrated to the vicinity of Yongsan. General Walker then added to the fray the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division, the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

General Church led the coordinated attack of Army and Marine Corps troops against the North Koreans that began on August 17. By the eighteenth the American forces had decisively defeated the 4th Division, which had lost half its original strength of about 7,000 men.

Located about twenty miles south of P’ohang-dong on the east coast, Kyongju was an important rail and highway center situated within the Taegu–P’ohang-dong–Pusan triangle inside the Pusan Perimeter. The capture of P’ohang-dong and the nearby Yonil Airfield, used by the Far East Air Force, would open a natural and essentially undefended corridor for the NKPA to move directly south through Kyongju to Pusan. General Walker had only lightly fortified the east coast corridor because the enemy threat was more immediate on the western perimeter, and he doubted that the North Koreans could mount a major successful drive through the trackless mountains. In early August the enemy almost proved Walker wrong when three North Korean divisions—the 5th, 8th, and 12th—and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment mounted strong attacks against the ROK defenders. By 12 August the North Koreans had pressed to P’ohang-dong and also threatened Yonil Airfield. The North Korean 5th Division cut off the ROK 3d Division above P’ohang-dong, and the 3d Division had to be evacuated by sea to positions farther south. General Walker reinforced the ROK units in the area with elements of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. By 17 August ROK units and the 2d Division had managed to check the enemy drive at P’ohang-dong. A primary factor in stopping the North Koreans was logistics, as they had outrun their supply line during the difficult trek southward through the mountains.



The natural corridor of the Naktong Valley from Sangju to Taegu presented another principal axis of attack for the NKPA. The sizable NKPA forces assembled in an arc around Taegu in early August from south to north consisted of the 10th, 3d, 15th, 13th, and 1st Divisions and elements of the 105th Armored Division. Opposite the North Korean divisions were the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 6th Divisions of the ROK II Corps. The North Koreans crossed the Naktong River in several places within the arc around Taegu during the second week of August. When several enemy artillery shells landed in Taegu on August 18, President Syngman Rhee ordered movement of the Korean provincial government, then in Taegu, to Pusan. The North Korean 1st and 13th Divisions posed the primary threat as they pressed toward Taegu by overland routes from the north and northwest. General Walker moved up the 23d and 27th Infantries, both fresh from defensive action in the Naktong Bulge, to reinforce the ROK 1st Division, which confronted the North Korean 1st and 3d Divisions in its sector. Although the North Korean 1st Division pushed to within nine miles of Taegu, the combined efforts of the ROK 1st Division and the U.S. 23d and 27th Infantries frustrated enemy efforts to penetrate to Taegu.

Even though the North Korean People’s Army had seriously threatened the United States and ROK Armies within the Pusan Perimeter during August 1950, the defenders both successfully resisted the enemy attacks and continued the buildup of forces for a counteroffensive. The Far East Air Force had established air supremacy over the North Koreans early in the war and continued to influence the outcome of battles by multiple sorties in close support of ground troops, 4,635 in July and 7,397 in August. By late August there were more than 500 American medium tanks within the Pusan Perimeter. The tanks in tank battalions were equally divided between M26 Pershings and M4A3 Shermans, except for one battalion that had the newer M46 Pattons. On September 1, the United Nations Command had a strength of 180,000 in Korea: 92,000 were South Koreans and the balance were Americans and the 1,600-man British 27th Infantry Brigade. In August the North Koreans continued the plan and tactics begun at the Han River in early July with a frontal holding attack, envelopment of the flank, and infiltration to the rear. When the Eighth Army stabilized the line at the Pusan Perimeter, these tactics no longer worked and success could come only by frontal attack, penetration, and immediate exploitation. Generals MacArthur and Walker countered with classical principles of defense—interior lines of communications, superior artillery firepower, and a strong air force. By September 1, the North Koreans had assembled a 98,000-man army for a massive offensive against the Pusan Perimeter. However, they experienced substantial problems: a third of their ranks manned by forcibly conscripted and untrained South Koreans, a major shortage of small arms, and only enough rations for one or sometimes two meals a day.

[Lucky13]

September 1950



In early September as during August, General Walker faced dangerous situations in essentially the same places along the Pusan Perimeter: in the east at P’ohang-dong to include a potential severing of the corridor between Taegu and P’ohang-dong, north of Taegu where the enemy made disturbing gains, at the Naktong Bulge, and in the Masan area in the extreme south. Also as he had during the fighting in August, Walker continued his masterful tactics of shifting his forces from one threatened enemy penetration to another. In early September the ROK 3d, Capital, 8th, and 6th Divisions held the line farthest to the east against the North Korean 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions. Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, newly appointed deputy commander, Eighth Army, assumed command of American units in the eastern sector and employed the 21st Infantry of the U.S. 24th Division and other supporting units to bolster the ROK divisions. On 7 September General Church replaced Coulter as American commander in the eastern sector after General Walker ordered the entire 24th to reinforce the ROK divisions. A combination of ground fighting, predominantly by the South Koreans, along with American close air support and naval gunfire from offshore inflicted serious losses on the North Korean divisions. The North Korean 1st, 3d, and 13th Divisions pressed the attack north of Taegu against the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, which prompted Walker on 5 September to move the main Eighth Army headquarters from Taegu to Pusan. The 1st Cavalry Division essentially checked the thrusts of the North Koreans north of Taegu, but fighting continued there into mid-September.

At the end of August the North Korean People’s Army also planned a crushing blow against the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. The North Korean 6th Division would attack through Haman, Masan, and capture Kimhae, fifteen miles west of Pusan. The 7th Division was to strike north of the Masan highway, wheel left to the Naktong River, and wait for the 6th Division on its right and the 9th on its left and then resume the attack toward Pusan. The 25th Division held the southernmost sector that ran from the confluence of the Naktong and Nam Rivers to the southern coast, while the 2d Division was positioned in the area across the Naktong River north of the 25th. The North Korean 9th Division faced the 2d Division at the Naktong Bulge and had the mission of capturing the towns of Miryang and Samnangjin, thereby cutting off the Eighth Army route of withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan. During the first week of September the 9th Division penetrated the Naktong Bulge as far east as Yongsan, but a counterattack by the 2d Division together with the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade pushed back the 9th almost to the Naktong River. The 2d Division’s 23d Infantry beat back the North Korean 2d Division six miles north of Yongsan at Changnyong. At the same time the 6th and 7th Divisions mounted strong attacks against the 25th Division. Despite enemy penetrations into the sectors of the 25th’s regiments—the 35th Infantry’s sector west of Ch’irwon and the 24th Infantry’s sector near Haman that was effectively stopped by the 27th Infantry—the 25th Division repelled the NKPA’s offensive in the south. The Naktong River line held, and the Pusan Perimeter was secure.


Analysis

Within the space of a few months in 1950, the United States had taken the big leap from attaching no strategic importance to Korea to active involvement there in a major armed conflict. Its active Army of 591,000 had been focused on Soviet intentions in western Europe and occupation duty in Europe and the Far East. The four divisions under MacArthur’s Far East Command in Japan were performing primarily occupation duties, and their actual readiness level for conventional combat was even lower than their marginal statistical ratings indicated. Each of MacArthur’s divisions was about 7,000 men short of its authorized strength of 18,900, and none of them had received any new equipment since World War II. MacArthur had not fully supported development of the ROK Army, and in 1948 he had suggested merely expanding the ROK Constabulary. When the ROK minister of defense in 1949 requested M26 Pershing tanks from America, the KMAG argued that the Korean terrain and roads would not allow tank operations, a clearly inaccurate prediction of the Soviet T34 tank’s performance in South Korea during the war’s early stages. When USAFIK withdrew from South Korea in 1949, it did transfer to the ROK Army individual weapons and equipment sufficient for 50,000 men, but these small arms were incapable of repelling enemy armored attacks.

America failed to anticipate the North Korean invasion, and KMAG erred in concluding that the ROK Army could withstand an invasion if it happened. Nevertheless, when the attack came the United States decided to intervene on behalf of South Korea. President Truman authorized air and naval support early in the conflict and the progressive introduction of ground troops. The defeat of Task Force Smith underscored the importance of adequate prewar training along with armored and air support in combat operations. Further, MacArthur underestimated the skill and determination of the North Koreans but recognized his error when he concluded that more than four U.S. divisions were needed to defeat the enemy. The combined efforts of the U.S. and ROK Armies led by General Walker, complemented by air and naval superiority, slowed the southward drive of the North Koreans and ended in a difficult but successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The fighting was intense as reflected in American casualties to mid-September 1950—4,599 battle deaths, 12,058 wounded, 401 reported captured, and 2,107 reported missing in action. The bitter weeks of retreat and death would soon change, however, with MacArthur’s "hammer against the anvil": the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter coupled with the landing at Inch’on by the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division during the third week of September.

[Lucky13]

Battle of Pakchon

The Battle of Pakchon was a battle in the Korean War between the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade and an unknown number of Chinese and North Korean troops. The battle took place around the small village of Pakchon and around the Taeryoung River. The engagement is konwn to Australian historians as the Battle of the Apple Orchard.


Background

Once the Eighth Army had crossed the 38th Parallel and was driving on Pyongyang General MacArthur was determined to cut off the fleeing North Korean armies before they reached the Yalu River and sanctuary. Even while Pyongyang was being invested he inserted 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team (187 RCT) by parachute at the two critical junction points 35 miles north of the city at Sukchon. Headquarters 187 RCT and the 1st and 3rd Battalions (1/187 RCT & 3/187 RCT) jumped into two drop zones at Sukchon. Both sites dominated the road and rail approaches to the Chongchon River which was 30 miles further north.


The Airborne Attack

Headquarters 187 RCT, 1/187 RCT and 3/187 RCT landed about 1400 hours 20 October 1950 at Drop Zone WILLIAM, south east of Sukchon. 1/187 RCT quickly secured Sukchon and established a road block north of the town. 3/187 RCT established a defensive position astride the road and the railway about two miles south of the town. At 1420 hours, 2/187 RCT landed near Sunchon, 17 miles to the east and linked up successfully with 6 ROK Division. The 187 RCT had come to fight; the first air drop brought 6 X 105 mm howitzers and 1125 rounds of ammunition which was reinforced next day by a further 12 X 105 mm howitzers and 4 X 90 mm anti-aircraft guns. Nearly 600 tons of ammunition and other supplies were delivered during the operation.[2]

At this time the bulk of the North Koreans had crossed or were in the act of crossing the Chongchon and so evaded the noose.[2]

However, the 239 North Korean Regiment (239 NK), the last formation out of Pyongyang, had taken up a rear guard position on the best defensive ground between Pyongyang and the Chongchon River. The 2500 strong Regiment was astride the road and the railway just north of Yongyu and Op'a-ri. They deployed a battalion in each locality which were three miles apart.[2]

At 0900 hours, 21 October, 1950, 3/187 RCT started two combat teams south, 1 Company towards Op'a-ri along the railway and K Company along the road towards Yongyu. At 1300 hours 1 Company reached Op'a-ri where it was heavily attacked by an estimated enemy battalion supported by 120 mm mortars and 40 mm guns. In a battle lasting two and a half hours, two Platoons of 1 Company were overrun and the company withdrew west with 90 men missing. The enemy did not follow up and withdrew to defensive positions on the high ground near Op'a-ri. K Company also encountered an estimated enemy battalion just north of Yongyu which, after a sharp contact, withdrew south and east of the town. K Company continued on to Hill 163 just north of the town and into the town itself.

With the United Nations (UN) forces driving into Pyongyang, the two attacks on 239 NK from the north put them in a dangerously exposed position. The North Korean reaction was fierce. At midnight they launched the first of three attacks which forced K Company to withdraw from Hill 163 and the town. At 0400 hours and again at 0545 hours, 22 October, 1950, they launched further strong attacks on the Battalion Command Post 3/187 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and L Company, both located one mile north of Hill 163. Despite suffering heavy losses in those attacks, at 0600 hours 239 NK launched 300 men against L Company and 450 men against Headquarters Company. By daylight 22 October 1950, 3/187 RCT was only just holding and the seriously depleted 239 NK must have been close to exhaustion.


27 British Commonwealth Brigade

At noon, 21 October, 1950, 24 United States Division, with the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade leading, crossed the Taedong River at Pyongyang and headed north. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in the van and by nightfall the Brigade halted on the outskirts of Yongyu, 21 miles north of Pyongyang. A patrol from the Argyll's entered the town and made contact with elements of 3/187 Regimental Combat Team.

239 North Koreans' midnight attack on Yongyu came from the general direction of the road running south-west of the town. The Argyll's met the fringe of the attack and beat it off. The attack on 3/187 RCT was stronger and the enemy succeeded in entering the town before breaking off and moving away at 0300 hours.

Next day the Australians of 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment were to take the lead in the advance, C Company was to be the leading company. The orders given in the early evening stressed the urgency to link up with the US Airborne. The company was not to be distracted at Yongyu, they were to press as quickly as possible as the Argylls continued to clear the town. The noises of the Airborne battles to the north were now very close and could be heard clearly throughout the night. There was no doubting the morrow would bring battle.

C Company RAR was the only company to remain largely intact as the battalion hastily absorbed reinforcements from the rest of the regiment and K Force and came to strength. The newest 3 RAR company had been formed in late 1949, early 1950 from the young men who joined the Regular Army after World War 11. By the standards of the other companies C Company was very young and unblooded. Much of the banter within the Battalion was directed at them. The K Force arrivals ; older, confident and all with 2nd AIF experience , tended to make fun of the young regulars and their inexperience. Good humoured as it was, when it continued once the battalion commenced operations the young regulars became all the more determined to show their mettle. For C Company was a well trained sub unit and, unlike the other sub units still shaking down, was a cohesive team.

The Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and senior soldiers were experienced, competent leaders who had raised and trained the Company. As an unexpected luxury, a handful of K Force reinforcements joined the C Company during the advance and took it over strength; a state never to be attained again by any unit in the campaign.

Whereas the Platoon commanders were young and inexperienced, all from the 1948 graduating class from Royal Military College - Duntroon, the Company Commander, who arrived only weeks before the battalion sailed, was a vastly experienced battle leader.

Captain Archer P. Denness had commanded a company at El Alamein, through the Islands and subsequently in the early days of the occupation of Japan. High principled, he neither smoked, drank or swore. "Arch" Denness was accustomed to command; woe betide anyone of his officers or NCO's who were in any way derelict in the exercise of their duties or any soldier who was profane within earshot. In the short time that he had been in command he had quickly established his stamp on the company ; nobody was in any doubt that only the highest standards were expected by "Armour Piercing Archie" as the soldiers soon christened him. Above all, his insistence on timeliness had got through to every soldier and stood C Company in good stead through the long day of its baptism of fire.

At 0700 hours, 22 October, 1950, C Company drove off, 7 Platoon leading on tanks of D Company, US 89th Tank Battalion followed by the rest of the company in US troop carrying vehicles. Not quite knowing what to expect the company drove carefully through the Argyll's and the scattered firing into the eerily deserted town. Yongyu was quite large ; leaving it and getting into open country again was like entering sunshine from darkness. Nobody spoke much in the ten minutes or so the trip took and all were relieved to be back in the country.

[Lucky13]

The Apple Orchard

At 0900 hours (9 am) and a mile north of Yongyu, C Company came under fire from the apple orchard on the slopes of Hill 163 in YD 2354 (map grid location). Very quickly it became apparent that C Company had driven into the North Koreans who were in the process of forming up to attack the Americans. Enemy on the fringe of the battlefield flushed from camouflaged positions started to bob up every where. The Commanding Officer (CO) Lieutenant Colonel Green, traveling well forward as was his want, was more quickly to the scene and much more involved than he would have appreciated. His quick informal orders group proceeded with Regimental Policemen engaging interlopers within yards of the assembled group. He did not have a lot of information. There was no contact with the American Airborne who were believed to be located nearby. Without precise locations he was unable to use any indirect weapons in the battle and this concerned him throughout the engagement. In this confusing scene his ability showed. The urgent need for link up dictated his decision. He chose to try and bounce C Company, largely on their own.

Orders concluded, the CO looked at the scene of battle all around him and rather wryly suggested to "Arch" Denness, he had better get on with it quickly.

The scene was made for Arch Denness and C Company were more than able to match his mood. Quietly determined to be successful in their first battle, constrained by the underlying excitement, there was some nervous conversation as weapons, ammunition and equipment were checked and formations settled. At 0930 hours (9.30 am), 22 October, 1950, 8 Platoon (Lieutenant C.M. "Mousey" Townsend) and 7 Platoon (Lieutenant R.F. "Rob" Morison), attacked the high ground east of the road. 9 Platoon (Lieutenant D.M. "Dave" Butler) was in reserve and held the road and the flank to the north.


The Assault

The attacking platoons went in hard, uphill through the apple trees, and their dash was just too much for those in their path. Many of the enemy jumped out of their pits to engage the gallant young Australians and exposed themselves to the relentless surge of the attackers. Although considerably outnumbered, 7 and 8 Platoons pressed their attacks fiercely, impressing all those in a position to observe. The young soldiers were, if anything, over eager to get into their first fight, but the apple trees were in full leaf and visibility was a real problem. Control was difficult and the last thing wanted in the first engagement was a man shot by one of his mates. The NCO's and the senior soldiers were absolutely splendid and quickly got the neophytes through the momentary confusions which everyone experiences in their first battle. With so many enemy present there was a considerable threat of some remaining hidden and firing at the backs of the Australians as they passed. The platoons pushed on and in a stride were through to the vital ground. Even a bunker which threatened 8 Platoon provided only a momentary delay as the young men grenaded it as if on a training exercise and pressed forward.

C Company's sudden arrival, even though it must have been expected to some extent, and the speed with which the North Korean outposts were brushed aside, had completely surprised the enemy. They were caught with all their attention directed north to a final frenzied effort to break out past the American forces. The CO's decision to pass 3 RAR through Yongyu so quickly and bounce the enemy aside was bold and brilliant. Thereafter the enemy were incapable of presenting organised resistance to the vigorous thrust from the south. Nonetheless there were many determined individuals who opposed the Australians every step of the way. So much so by 1000 hours the CO was forced to commit D Company to clear the area to the west of the road.

Within C Company, as soon as success had been assured, the energetic Denness ordered us (9 Platoon) to push forward along the road. 7 and 8 Platoons continued with their consolidation. From the high ground they were able to engage the enemy to the north and east throughout the morning.

Shortly after, about 1000 hours, we came onto a cart and a badly wounded horse which effectively blocked the road. Under heavy fire, the road block was cleared and the platoon was able to move using the waist deep storm water drains on either side of the road for fire protection. The road led out of the heavily treed area and into an extensive open area, mostly paddy field, which proved to be the disputed area between the North Koreans and the Americans. It was in this area it seemed the North Koreans were forming up for the final attack against the Americans.

From then on 9 Platoon had to move forward under almost continuous fire and would have suffered heavy casualties but for the protection of the storm drains. Initially the platoon only attracted the attention of the enemy close to the road. Most of the enemy appeared to be focused north but their attention gradually shifted to the Australians.

Further down the road the enemy started to engage from greater ranges, our platoon pressed on although unable to effectively suppress the enemy long range fire. Fortunately the road was built up and the we were able to dominate significant areas which enabled us to keep moving. At this point 7 Platoon were ordered back to the road down the ridge to the west to clean out pockets of enemy who were engaging us (9 Platoon) at long range and the tanks were sent forward to 9 Platoon. Denness's reaction was timely as 9 Platoon was deep into the enemy area.

It was a scene of continuous confusion. Many of the enemy clearly had enough. Any lull in the firing would bring more and more of them forward to surrender despite a hard core fighting on.The appearance of the tanks tilted the balance. They brought fire down on positions some distance from the road and slowly the enemy became aware of the futility of continuing. 9 Platoon was able to move and link up with the American Headquarters shortly after noon.


Link up

It was a delighted Arch Denness who reported to the Commander of the American troops C Company 3 RAR had arrived. He had every reason to be exhilarated. His company had met with every challenge and it was already clear that they had been involved in a significant victory. Later 3 RAR reported approximately 150 enemy had been killed, 239 wounded and 200 captured as a result of its action at a cost of seven wounded. The operations in Sukchon/Sunchon had achieved much more. The Americans (187 RCT) claimed, at a cost of 46 jump casualties and 65 battle casualties, it had captured 3818 North Korean prisoners, killed 805 enemy and wounded 681.

It would be difficult to describe a more chaotic battlefield. Despite the many casualties the Americans and C Company 3 RAR had inflicted, who lay where they fell, there were still several hundreds of the enemy in and around the battlefield. North Korea paid a very heavy price in the battles north of Yongyu. There were, for example 69 enemy bodies counted in the storm water drains alone which 9 Platoon had moved. They had fallen in the overnight battles. The enemy dead lay much heavier in the open ground in front of the American Airborne positions.

There followed a period where enemy prisoners were rounded up on that tragic battlefield and there was momentary contact between the Americans and C Company. Strangely, the two units kept well apart. The Americans, 3 Battalion 187 Regimental Combat Team had obviously suffered heavily and were overjoyed to be relieved but were suspicious of the Australians. Some of them took the Australians, because of their strange garb and heavy overcoats to be Russian which led to momentary difficulty. The C Company soldiers quietly sat down in small groups and ate their lunch, unmoved by all else that was going on around them.

With link up complete, re-deployment for the continuation of the advance commenced. Within the Commonwealth Brigade, 1 Battalion Miiddlesex Regiment passed through and assumed the lead in the drive towards the Yalu River. The Americans reassembled and drove north to Sukchon to rejoin their regiment which returned to Pyongyang by the other route. On cue with the departure of the Americans, the press arrived and it was their sudden appearance to report the first battle of the Royal Australian Regiment which underscored the nature of the stunning success. All enjoyed the fuss the press made of us and the excitement of having our photographs taken.


Clearing West of the Road

It was all brought to a sharp conclusion as the battalion re-deployed and 9 Platoon was directed to clear west of the road past where the contact had begun in the morning. This patrol took the Platoon right through the paddy fields which, though well clear, were still in full view of the road now being freely used. Many of the enemy had fled to the west and were hidden, principally in rice stooks, and 9 Platoon had to flush them out. Some wanted to fight it out and were dealt with, but the bag of prisoners increased. The scene of Australian soldiers in extended line pushing on through the open areas captured the imagination of observers on the road. The Brigade Commander was later quoted;

"I saw a marvelous sight. An Australian Platoon lined up in a paddy field and walked through it as though they were driving snipe. The soldiers, when they saw a pile of straw, kicked it and out would bolt a North Korean. Up with a rifle, down with a North Korean, and the Australians thoroughly enjoyed it."

9 Platoon got back to the new company position just on dusk. It had been a long day.

[Lucky13]

FIRST MARINE TANKS BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF TURKISH BRIGADE - A 1st Marine Division tank crew member is careful not to let the hatch door slam against his tank, as he climbs out to inspect his tank after received three harmless 76 Howitzer hits.


A .50-caliber machine gun crew of the 2d Infantry Division covers the advance of American tanks, somewhere in Korea, 13 August 1950.


Troops from Battery D, 865th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, manning a multiple .50-caliber gun emplacement, fire on Communist led North Korean Forces in a burning village near P'Ohang-dong, on 20 August 1950.


An infantryman of the 2d Infantry Division fires a .30-cal. machine gun during the American attack on Yongsan on 2 September 1950


Cpl. Eliso Cramer of Hebbronville, Texas, a member of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, pulls the lanyard of the howitzer to demonstrate the send off of the 100,000th round fired by the Battalion since they have been in Korea. 31 March 1951


An aid man of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, hits the dirt and rolls into a foxhole in response to the call of "medic" from a wounded rifleman's buddy, during action of the 2d Infantry Division against the Chinese Communist Forces along the fighting front on 2 August 1951.


A tank of Company C, 72d Tank Battalion, U.S. 2d Infantry Division, waiting their turn to fire on Hill 773, as a 155-mm howitzer "Long Tom", 96th Field Artillery Battalion, fires on the hill near Yang-gu, on 2 Aug 1951.


Two mortar crews of the Heavy Mortar Co., 38th Regiment, U.S. 2d Infantry Division, fire their 4.2 mortars at Communist positions on Hill 773 near Yanggu, on 13 Aug 1951.


A rifle team of the 9th RCT, 2d U.S. Infantry Division, firing on a Communist position on 5 Sep 1951.


The strategic hill nicknamed "Bloody Ridge" owing to the costly casualties suffered by both sides as elements of the 2d Infantry Division closed in to take it.


A squad from the 3d Platoon, Company F, 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d U.S. Infantry Division, moves out from bunker positions on patrol duty at Kumgangsan, on 1 Jan 1952.


PFC Lewis E. Canie, left, 30 calibre machine gunner with Company G, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d U.S. Infantry Division, and PFC Bernard E. Wisch, assistant gunner, keep sharp lookout for signs of the Communist forces from their hillside post along the fighting front on 10 Mar 1952.


A Republic of Korea soldier wounded on "Old Baldy" is treated by Pfc. J. Cleveringa of Sioux Center, Iowa, (right) a medic of the 2d Infantry Division, at a blocking position below "Old Baldy" on 1 August 1952.


Litter bearers slosh along a rain soaked roadway as they evacuate a wounded soldier of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, from "Old Baldy," to a forward aid station, as the battle for the possession of the strategic position rages on 1 August 1952.


Pvt Eulogio Santiago-Figueroa, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d U.S. Infantry Division, who was wounded by fragments from a 102-mm Communist shell which was dropped during the celebration of the first mass on "Old Baldy," is carried by litter to a jeep for transfer to the 38th Infantry Regiment Collecting Station and further evacuation to the 8055th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital on 29 Aug 1952.

[Lucky13]

M4A3E8 "Sherman" Tank of Company B, 72nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, fires its 76mm gun at enemy bunkers on "Napalm Ridge", in support of the 8th ROK Division, on 11 May 1952. Note the prepared firing position, with ammunition cases piled at left, and sandbags piled on the tank hull's rear upper surfaces.


Men of the 8th Eng Bn, 1st Cav Div put logs under weakened support of a bridge near Yangzi, to prevent its collapse until a tank retriever can arrive and remove the M-4 tank on 28 Jan 1951.


A tank of the last UN Forces units in Seoul evacuated the city, withdrawing across the Han River on the remaining pontoon bridge which will be demolished as soon as they have passed. 4 Jan 1951.


Tank of the 24th ID is loaded on pontoon barge at the Naktong River to be transported across, during offensive by US troops against the Communist-led North Korean forces in that area. 20 Sep 1950


A long line of jeeps waiting to be ferried across the Kumho-gang River cause a traffic jam on the way to the front. 16 Sep 1950.


Interrupted in their task of building a raft at the Han River front by Chinese Communist fire, these men of the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion, I Corps, return fire from behind a protecting bulldozer. 7 Mar 1951.


Engineers carry an aluminum half-pontoon , weighing 1,740 pounds, to the water at a raft-building site. 8 Nov 1952.


Engineers drill in solid granite to widen a road to be used as a cut-off route. 21 Jul 1951.


Suspended over mountainside by ropes, men of Co. "C", 1343rd Eng. Combat Bn, 8th Army, drill holes for TNT, as they rebuild road caved in during heavy rainfall. 20 Jul 1951.


A demolition squad of Company A, 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, place dynamite under the tracks of a burned out tank, under the supervision of the recovery platoon of C, 89th Tank Battalion, 25th Infantry Division. 14 Oct 1951.


An anti-tank mine crew starts checking for other possible mines after an M-4 tank of the 32nd RCT, U.S. 7th In Div (in background) was disabled when it hit an anti-tank mine on this road on 28 Feb 1951.


Men of the 2nd Platoon, B Co 10th Engineer Battalion check a tank for booby-traps and the area for mines. 8 Oct 1951.


Engineers use a rope to pull a booby-trapped tree off the road in the Techen-ni Area, Korea. Attached to the tree was a Russian-type heat grenade that failed to explode. 14 Apr 1951.


A member of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade throws a hand grenade into a cave to force Communist-led North Korean soldiers out. 16 Sep 1950.


Men of the 77th Engineer Combat Company blast at Communist troops taking cover in caves imbedded along steep banks of the Hantan River. 11 Apr 1951.

[Lucky13]

Tank Action at Chongju

Following the capture of Pyongyang, the enemy's capital city, in October 1950, the left-flank unit of Eighth Army hurried north to fulfill the long-range mission of reaching the Yalu River and the end of the war. This force was built around the British 27 Commonwealth Brigade which, at the time, consisted of a battalion from the Royal Australian Regiment, a battalion from the Argyle and Sutherland Regiment, and a battalion from the Middlesex Regiment. Since these infantry battalions were without supporting arms or services of their own, Eighth Army attached to the brigade U.S. artillery units, engineers, and the 89th Medium Tank Battalion. This combined force, commanded by Brig. B. A. Coad of the British Army, was under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division, but worked as a separate task force at a considerable distance from, and without physical contact with, that division or other friendly units.

Starting early on the morning of 22 October l950, the task force resumed its advance from Pyongyang north. Usually the infantrymen rode on the tanks or in trucks near the end of the column that stretched for two and a half to three miles. A platoon of tanks led. Nothing unusual happened until near noon of the second day, when the task force engaged a large but disorganized enemy unit at the town of Sukchon. There was no trouble the third day as the column crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju and Anju, but at Pakchon, to the north, the bridge across the Taenyong River was destroyed, and there was a two-day delay before the column headed west toward Chongju. North Koreans offered some resistance to the river crossing at Pakchon and, more significant, there was a sudden stiffening of enemy activity. As a result, the brigade commander concluded that the days of "rolling" were over. When the advance began again at 0800 on 28 October it was with greater caution. Lead companies investigated all likely enemy positions instead of leaving them to the follow-up units, and the column therefore moved only fifteen miles during the day.

Again on the morning of 29 October the task force resumed its march westward. The day's objective was Chongju. The Royal Australian battalion and Company D, 89th Medium Tank Battalion, led the column. The infantrymen dismounted frequently to screen suspected high ground to the flanks, and the tank battalion's liaison plane patrolled the area well ahead of the column. The liaison pilot (Lt. James T. Dickson) stopped the column several times during the morning while fighter planes made strikes against enemy tanks. About noon, as the head of the column neared the top of a high hill, Lieutenant Dickson sent a radio message to the tankers warning them of enemy tanks dug in and camouflaged on each side of a narrow pass where the road cut through a low hill. This position was at the top of the ridge ahead, beyond a narrow strip of paddy fields and about two and a half miles away over a winding and narrow road. Proceeding slowly, the leading platoon of tanks went down to the bottom of the hill to the east edge of the valley. There Lieutenant Dickson dropped a message advising them to hold up temporarily because of the enemy tanks.

After a delay of a few minutes, the tank battalion commander (Lt. Col. Welborn G. Dolvin) and the Australian infantry battalion commander arrived at the head of the column. While they were planning the next move, Lieutenant Dickson spotted what he believed to be a camouflaged tank position on the reverse slope of a low hill just beyond the next ridge ahead. The fighter planes were busy with another target, so he radioed the tankers to ask them to place indirect fire in the area. The platoon of tanks that was second in line, led by Lt. Francis G. Nordstrom, opened fire from its position on top of the hill. Nordstrom did not expect to hit anything but, after firing about ten rounds, with Lieutenant Dickson adjusting the fire, smoke started to rise from the camouflaged position. It was heavy, black smoke such as that made by burning gasoline. Lieutenant Dickson called off the