IJA Secret Intelligence Team at Chofu

[Shinpachi]

You are welcome and thanks for your encouragement again, Aaron.

For your knowledge, his Commander Lt. General Lee of 1st Air Force of Army was a member of Korean Lee dynasty at the time.

I hear a lot of IJA soldiers came from Korea and they contributed their military foundation in the postwar.
They are very good at diplomatic negotiation as they have hundreds of war experiences with China in their long history. If they may have any weak point, it would be 'conciliation'.

[GrauGeist]

That's a good looking Katana in the photo you posted, Shinpachi, is that one belonging to your family?

[Shinpachi]

That's a good looking Katana in the photo you posted, Shinpachi, is that one belonging to your family?

The 'Katana' looks very cute but regretly does not belong to my family.
My family's were once burnt in around 1890 by a house fire and now rusted as if an old long kitchen knife

[Wayne Little]

Doing great Shipachi, I second Aaron's comment..thanks for your hard work my friend!

[magnu]

And a big thank you and thumbs up from me

[Shinpachi]

You are welcome Wayne and magnu.

The phrase "General Headquarters Announcement ('Dai-hon-ei happyou' in Japanese)" is used as a metaphor of the lie in Japan today like -
"Ah, Sore wa 'Dai-hon-ei happyou' desuka? (Ah, Is it a lie?)'"

[Shinpachi]

Article No. 114


Preparing for the Final Battles on the Mainland
============================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi


From 12:00 of August 8, we were to inform our squadrons of the war situation by the telegram broadcast under the judgment of the 1st Air Force headquarters, not awaiting for the General Headquarters Announcement.

The contents were not coded but sent by high speed telegram of raw text.
However, as the informations from the headquarters were coming one after another and it made no sense if we did not transfer them immediately, we kept tapping the straight key having no rest.

Some elder First Class Privates who had been in charge of their regular transmission duty were not so familiar with this high speed tapping that we three newcomers Iwaki, Tada and I took charge by shift.

Reading the contents to tap the key, I wondered first why these were so much different from those announced by the General Headquarters before and then dumfounded to have noticed that we had been being cheated. According to the truth -

The first report about the drop of new type bomb on Hiroshima was told Air General Forces in Tokyo by 12th Flight Division of Army in Takahagi of Yamaguchi Prefecture at around 15:00 on August 7, next day of the attack because the damage of our forces in Hiroshima was so serious that the report had been transferred through the 12th Flight Division located about 100km(62.5miles) to the west from Hiroshima to delay one day.

I was astonished to read 'Most of all military facilities and factories were destroyed. The damage of the headquarters of 2nd General Forces are also serious.'

Incidentally, the headquarters of 2nd General Forces were holding about 400 officers and soldiers to control the west area of Japan. Half of them were said killed instantly by the bomb.

The second report on next day, August 8, said
'The damage of Army is serious. About 30% killed. About 30% wounded.'

Tapping the key, I felt unspeakable fear to the power of the bomb that only one B-29 had dropped.


..... to be continued.

[Aaron Brooks Wolters]

Thank you again Shinpachi. Again, very interesting.

[Shinpachi]

Thanks Aaron. Now, the story is going into Nagasaki.


**************************************


..... Tapping the key, I felt unspeakable fear to the power of the bomb that only one B-29 had dropped.


Commander Morita gave us his instruction
"We have no clue where the 2nd Hiroshima would be but do the best to capture their ID transmission of the V600s from Tinian with the thoroughgoing system."

His instruction sounded reasonable but it would not make sense unless the upper echelon judged our flight course information of B-29s appropriately to take an effective action. We could not mention it as we were knowing that Commander himself understood it very well but, I remember, 2nd Lt. Hiraoka was enduring his uncontrollable anger with his lips closed tightly.

To prepare for the final battles on the mainland,
The General Heardquarters was to move to Matsushiro City of Nagano Prefecture and the shelter construction for it was going on there.

Also, another construction of the underground fortress facilities was going on for Air General Forces at Donzurubo of Kashiba City in Nara Prefecture which was located near the border of Nara and Osaka prefectures. There had been a lot of military facilities, so the new headquarters was to integrate them to prepare for the mainland battles though the war has been over before its completion.

Watching a NHK documentary about the place, Donzurubo, on TV recently, I have recalled my coded telegram communication with old Taisho airfield of army in Osaka to tell Lt. General Lee, accompanying General Kawabe and his several staff of Air General Forces, would fly there with escort fighters to inspect the construction progress at Donzurubo.


/End of Article No. 114
This story continues.

[Aaron Brooks Wolters]

Wow! Interesting diagrams and photo. Excellent work again sir. Much appreciated. Thank you.

[Shinpachi]

Thanks, Aaron. I'm translating it with my brains back to 1945

*******************************

Article No. 115


Prevent the 2nd Hiroshima
================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi


I think the war is the means that chose a military solution to gain national interest and is equivalent with the diplomacy. Conversely, the diplomacy is a war that doesn't take military solution.

In case of Japan, however, there was a 'military solution' only from the beginning.
Originally, it could be very political to achieve something as a nation but there was no such view in our General Headquarters at the time. They thought the military affairs had nothing to do with the politics and only the military part was going ahead out of political control.

Also, concerning how to handle information, it was their tradition for the Imperial Japanese Army to make light of it because they seemed thinking it was an act without a belief for them to change operations depending on information time to time.

"Keep fighting" also seemed the supremacy proposition for the General Headquarters in the Pacific War.
Why did not they tell the people the fact 'An atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima' more promptly?
That would have been because 'If told the truth, the people will receive an extreme shock to lose their fighting spirit'. Such situation should not be favorable for the leaders.

In addition, the army and the navy were announcing the brilliant war-results only during the war but, when they had no such brilliant ones, they had to forge a good news for the people to announce. Even the Emperor was not exception to be told.

Now, the strict order "prevent the 2nd Hiroshima" was issued from the Air General Forces through the 1st Air Force headquarters to us. Commander Morita was encouraged by Lt. Colonel Suhara of the headquarters on the phone
"I believe they, the staff of Air General Forces, have understood the importance of judging information appropriately to take an effective action well. According to the Special Intelligence Division of Army, we are already in such situation that the movement of the Soviet Union must be watched carefully too.

The climax would be coming within a couple of days. So, this might be the last chance for you to show your best skills to analyse the flight trend of U.S. planes. Do your best lest there should be any overlookings and regrets."


..... to be continued.

[Aaron Brooks Wolters]

Excellent work Shinpachi.

[Shinpachi]

Thanks again Aaron. Here it goes.

************************************************** ***

.....The climax would be coming within a couple of days. So, this might be the last chance for you to show your best skills to analyse the flight trend of U.S. planes. Do your best lest there should be any overlookings and regrets."


In the night of August 8, we all took all-night duties to search for the trend of B-29s with the 3 sets of radio to tune to the US plane's frequencies. We did not know if they might use the frequencies we guessed but kept tuning patiently.

At around 02:00, 1st Class Private Tada reported
"Just captured a V-code." All of us vigored.
No more signals came in after that but if the first one was aiming for our mainland, it must be a weather plane as a guide.

If so, another B-29 would follow soon and it could be the leader.
When we felt the time progress slow after notifying it to the headquarters, a translation soldier reported
"A US plane took off."

It was before 03:00.

This might be the leader.
After a while, he told us "One more took off."
They took off separately and would join somewhere.
They seemed having closed their radio communication soon, which made us difficult to capture their current position, but 2nd Lt. Hiraoka was hard to imagine and draw their flight routes in his brains.

Then, we captured their communication.
It indicated their location near North latitude 30 degrees with East longitudes 130 degrees.
That was near Yakushima Island, located to the south from Kyusyu.
Their communication was telling us they had joined. Time was before 08:00.

To judge from these flight procedures, it was evident that they were aiming at the 2nd Hiroshima.


..... to be continued.

[Aaron Brooks Wolters]

[Shinpachi]

Hi, Aaron. The Hiroshima/Nagasaki story ends here.
Thanks for reading. Thanks every one too.

************************************************** *****

..... To judge from these flight procedures, it was evident that they were aiming at the 2nd Hiroshima.


Reporting the headquarters what we had known immediately, Commander Morita asked them to tell Air General Forces not to repeat the last bitter experience for Hiroshima.

We heard later that the radar bases of 6th Air Force tried search by their full mobilization but unable to capture the sight of the US planes on the screen.

At the time, the Special Intelligence Division of Army was grasping the following matters
1. Target Committee was established in the U.S.
2. Their target cities were decided.
3. Target city was in order of "Hiroshima", "Kokura", "Niigata" and "Nagasaki".

Therefore, Air General Forces was thinking the next target would be 'Kokura (*located in the northern part of Kyusyu, about 120km=75miles east from Nagasaki)' if a group of B-29s was belonging to the 509th Composite Group in Tinian.'


We captured a radio communication from the first B-29.
It said "Clear sky can be expected above 'Kokura'" for sure.
It was the same tactics for Hiroshima with no doubt.
Problem was the leader's flight route still unknown.

We reported the headquarters
"Kokura is in danger."

According to the analogy by 2nd Lt. Hiraoka
"The leader was waiting for the weather information from the first one and, now, is going into the bombing run aiming at Kokura."

It was reported later that the fighters and the anti-aircraft cannons of 6th Air Force intercepted and opened fire respectively but they failed to find their target. The opponent would have been so well about their flight skill and tactics.

Air-raid alarm was issued over the city of Nagasaki once because a US plane was coming closer but changed to a lower level warning as it had flown away to the east. Then, after a while, the plane suddenly returned to Nagasaki to drop an atomic bomb on the city.
Time was 11:02.

A large amount of smoke generated by the air-raid of the previous night on Yahata City was said flowed in the sky over Kokura to prevent the city from attacking.


/End of Article No. 115