Thanks Wayne. Here is coming new article
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Article No.46
Attacking the U.S. military airfields of Iwo-jima (1 of 3)
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Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi
After the Battle of Iwo-jima(Feb-Mar 1945), the U.S.military had improved those old Japanese Kita(meaning the North), Motoyama and Chidori airfields and began to use them for emergency landing and refueling B29 bombers which were carrying out air-raids on the Japanese mainland.
As a result, more bombs were loadable to them and, from early April 1945, long-range P51 fighters were also beginning to be deployed on Iwo-jima as an escort fighter.
B29s had not been able to carry out daytime raids until they were escorted by P51s. Because P51 had more powerful air combat capability than carrier-based F6F, B29 was able to concentrate on targeting better than before and had improved accuracy of bombings. On the other hand, P51s, beside escort missions, carried out their own local bombings as well as gun fires across their enemy country. The suburbs of urban areas were also not safe places for us any longer.
In early April, the base commander gathered all the members of the base.
(He always tried to let all the members, including even a private, know all necessary informations about the ongoing operation and mission).
Outline of the order he had received from the headquarters was explained as follows.
"The Defense Forces Headquarters are to create an attack plan against the occupied airfields of Iwo-jima as a joint IJA-IJN operation. I have been ordered to join the work as a strategic planning staff by our headquarters earlier.
This was because our special efforts for early grasping the enemy flight routes and intercepting the communications of their aircrafts etc as other teams cannot carry out have been highly evaluated. This is the request by our headquarters saying 'We request you and your team to participate this operation'.
Not so many staff officers in the headquarters, except Commander and a few personnel, know our team's secret missions very well. If there is anything we need to let them understand in particular, say it now."
Sergeant-major addressed his opinion,
"We are not informed of the outline of operation plan and what type of aircraft will be used yet but I think the Navy's heavy bombers will be more suitable than our Army's. I'm afraid that our pilots are not so familiar with a guess-flight which relys on a compass on the ocean.
Also, here are two major problems.
The biggest one is our mutual code books are different.
Accordingly, under the present circumstances that we have no sufficient time to integrate them at all, we need such able telegraph operators who can send and receive as fast as a hundred twenty letters of the Morse code in raw text for a minute.
At that speed, it will be too fast for a U.S.military radio soldier to catch them perfectly even if it is a raw text.
The other is our Army is adopting different numeric coordinates from the Navy. We must think how to solve and unify them. That's all."
In case of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force today, I heard that an excellent pilot is requested nothing but to concentrate on the superior air-combat skills. He is not being bothered with such technical differences among the forces anymore. In the former military, technical issues were not consistent.
Chief of Communication Room suggested,
"P51s being deployed on Iwo-jima are estimated more than fifty. If we may adopt a head-on attack, our heavy bombers, even if they are escorted by their fighters, will easily fall a victim to the P51s and unable to obtain the performances we expect with no doubt.
Accordingly, if our bombers takeoff to sally shortly after the P51s takeoff for their air-raids on our mainland and we reach the airspace of 150 degrees East longitude & 30 degrees North latitude where the U.S.military patrol is relatively low and also
take the ultra-low-altitude flight, avoiding the enemy radars, toward Iwo-jima and DO carry out bombings against those targets of runways, communication facilities, fuel storage tanks plus remaining P51s under maintenance if any at once,
Homing P51s after mission and B29s under emergency if any will be placed in the state of no landing.
Flight range of a P51 is nominally 2,100miles. Provided the round distance between Tokyo and Iwo-jima is 1,600miles and their duration of flight above our mainland is about sixty minutes, they are to fly as distant as about 1,900miles.
When they sally, they are fully armed with the maximum bullets and bombs. This means they are fuelled with the minimum gallons to cover the round course plus two hours or so flight at most.
Homing P51s will be unable not only to land the island but to fly further to Saipan or Guam which are located more than 600miles away. They will have no choice but ditch on the sea or land by the parachute abandoning the plane.
Even if all the U.S.fleets around Iwo Jima were mobilized for the rescue of those pilots, the probability they can save would be less than fifty percent.
The supplement of new aircrafts will be easy but, when we take it consideration that a military needs five years at least to train the new expert pilots, I think we can give them a big blow.
In any case, if we do not perform the operational examination completely with the Navy in advance, this operation will be resulted in failure. That is all." Then added, "In addition, we can identify easily which the radio communication comes from, B29 or P51, when they have transmitted the wave soon after each take-off."
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Base Commander concluded,
"Everybody's opinions are very useful. I will try to reflect them fully in the operation meeting at the headquarters. Thanks guys. Remember we make this matter a secret treatment. That's all."
The suggestion by the chief of communication room sounded as if a thief tactics. However, if we should take the honest head-on attack against the island, only the vain damages were expected. This was a peculiar tactics but convinced us.
By the way, when the chief had been campaigning at the southern front of the Pacific, the U.S.military had also been developing the operation like this.
Points were to grasp the precise period when P51s took off and to judge their exact numbers from their A3 radio communications. This was extremely important. If our count on their take-offs were not close to all the aircrafts on the island, furious resistance by the U.S.fighters would be expected then there.
Another point was interception by the carrier-based fighters was also expected if enemy carriers were deployed in the neighboring waters of Iwo-jima. Our stay in the sky above the island had to be limited within forty to fifty minutes at longest. Otherwise, the carrier-based planes would chase to attack us.
Specialists at the headquarters would make up tactical details anyway but I was excited too much to sleep that night.
/End of Article No.46
Story to be continued to No.47
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