Use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF during BOB (1 Viewer)

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Thank you. I assume this is maintenance level 3 stuff? Sounds like it anyways. Were they modified at the airfields or returned to repair center/assembling factories for these mods?

I think you can safely assume there wasn't much effort required, i.e. pulling the control valve, drilling two holes, then replacing the valve – not a big deal. Mods were done on station at time of conversion in March 1940, see ORB excerpts above.
 
Basically a modified boost control cut-out and new spark plugs.

This work was done on station at the time units were converting in March 1940
Mike
wasn't this the work more in line with Rolls-Royce's work on water injection than the implementation of 100 octane fuel? The two ventures were roughly concurrent in the pursuit of combat engine performance.
 
David Ross suggests that the various mods such as 100 octane conversion, constant speed airscrews, two step rudder, pedals, and IFF were done by the ground crew. I think he's got it about right.

603-ross-pg125.jpg


Somewhat off topic but adding to Ross's list, the ground crew also installed pilot armour before the Battle of Britain, see : http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no609-armour.jpg
 
Hi Colin: I see you have Spitfire the History :)

The only instance, that presently comes to mind, when water injection was used on Merlin engines, outside of testing, was with the P-51H equipped with V-1650-9 where 90" Hg was obtained using 115/145 with water injection. Maybe there are others but my memory fails me.

The ORBs shown above simply state that the aircraft were converted to 100 octane. A.P.1590B/J.2-W dated 20 March 1940 states quite explicitly that the boost control cut-out must be modified to operate at + 12 lb/sq.in and that 100 octane fuel must be used.

Mike
wasn't this the work more in line with Rolls-Royce's work on water injection than the implementation of 100 octane fuel? The two ventures were roughly concurrent in the pursuit of combat engine performance.
 
Hi Colin: I see you have Spitfire the History :)

The only instance, that presently comes to mind, when water injection was used on Merlin engines, outside of testing
It's a first-class reference although I know for a fact that my copy is out of date; the Mk IX in the Belgian Air Museum is no longer extant, it burned (along with the rest of the museum, if I recall).

You're right, it didn't get out of testing, Rolls-Royce intended to fit a Merlin II into a Hurricane along with a de Havilland High Speed propeller but the programme was discontinued, although it doesn't make a big point of telling us why.
 
Just one point, three RAF squadrons were using 100 octane in 1937, what aircraft types would be likely to be using it that early?

Hi Colin:
It looks to me to me that these three squadrons were using 100 octane fuel in 1937: 90 Squadron flying Blenheims, 98 Squadron flying Hawker Hinds, and 201 squadron flying Saro Londons.

100oct-37-38.jpg


Of interest to your story line; Duxford, Debden, Northholt and Digby received 100 octane in 1938:

Duxford: No. 19 in Spitfire I, No. 66 in Gloster Gauntlet II
Debden: No. 85 No. 87 in Hawker Hurricane
Northholt: No. 111 in Hawker Hurricane
North Weald: No. 56 151 in Hurricane
Digby: No. 46 in Gaunlet II No. 73 in Hurricane

100oct-6dec38.jpg


Regarding 100 octane stocks see:

100octane-annexure-2april40.jpg


100octane-29oct40.jpg


100oct-stocks-39-40.jpg


Regarding 100 octane consumption during the Battle of Britain see the following:

100oct-consumption-bob.jpg
 
Pardon my ignorance in this, but isnt the difference between 87 and 100 Octane the difference between "standard" and "super" grade petrol. If so, it would simply be amatter of adjusting the ignition timing and possibly the intake and fuel mixture for the engines. Backyard mechanics were doing that to Morris, Zephyr, VW and all manner of car engines throughout the '50s and '60s
 
Pardon my ignorance in this, but isnt the difference between 87 and 100 Octane the difference between "standard" and "super" grade petrol. If so, it would simply be a matter of adjusting the ignition timing and possibly the intake and fuel mixture for the engines. Backyard mechanics were doing that to Morris, Zephyr, VW and all manner of car engines throughout the '50s and '60s
I don't think your view is borne out of ignorance
my own views as an auto-engine building hobbyist is that you take advantage of higher-RON fuel by advancing the ignition timing, I refrained from comment in case it's not that simple for the aero-engine.
Merlins didn't have distributors to advance the timing with, they had magnetos which, if I recall, is a cross between a distributor and an HT coil; absolutely no idea if you can alter the advance using that.

That new lad from Salisbury might know, he actually re-builds WWII aero engines.
 
Now unfortunately my originally intented reply was taken by this board's engine, and I don't intend to re-type the whole thing again, so please pardon me for being brief.

For a start you need to research the decisions made on the 7th, 8th and 9th Meetings of the Air Ministry's Oil Co-ordinating Policy Committee on 18th May, 29th June and 10th August 1940, respectively. These can be found in AVIA 10/282 at the Public Records Office, Kew. I believe this source is cited in my original article, which you should not selectively quote to support a thesis which it explictly contradicts.

First, thank you for giving us your references. About a month ago, Glider made an offer that he, being more closely situated to Kew than the rest of us, would try to find that paper, but I haven't heard of him about it ever since, and not sure if he attempted or succeeded in it.

Now, as for your thesis, it seems to be refuting the notion that the use of 100 octane fuel was made available by US.

And I believe I have quoted the part of your work which notes that as of 1939, 16 fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons were intended to be supplied with 100 octane fuel. You should also not rely on Glider's 'summaries' of my arguements, as they are not my arguements, but Glider's own arguements presenting my position as strawman arguements.

As for the 18th May meeting, it does seem to have two salient points.

a, The position of the Oil Committee was 'made clear' to Fighter Command, which does sound like, given the circumstantial evidence (see later), that Fighter Command's wishes for 100 octane fuel were not completely fulfilled.

b, It also notes that 100 octane fuel was supplied to 'Squadrons concerned', ie. selected Squadrons, and not all.

As for the 10th August meeting, it does note that they intended to use 100 octane fuel for all operational aircraft of all Commands; from the actual rate of fuel consumption by type of fuel, it is also clear that this remained a plan and did not materialize.

Ie. In June - August, a monthly avarage of 10 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 26 000 tons of other grades; in September 1940, 14 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 23 000 tons of other grades. In October, its 17 000 tons vs 18 000 tons. In November, its still 15 000 vs 13 000 tons.

Quite clearly, the majority of operational RAF aircraft were using 87 octane during the period, despite the plans made on 10th August.

I don't think we are in disagreement about that RAF fighters which were deployed to Stations that were supplied with 100 octane were taking advantage of the fuel. The dilemma and uncertainty that surrounds the issue is that to what extent 100 octane fuel was used during the Battle by RAF fighters, and not wheter it was used at all or not.

However, if your thesis is that 100 octane was the only kind of fuel used by Fighter Command during the Battle, I must note that at this point, this thesis would lack the sufficient evidence, and is contradicted by contemporary RAF fighter manuals which note both 87 and 100 octane fuel use, German reports that indicate that captured Spitfires and Hurricans were found fuelled with 87 octane fuel, and the generic lack of positive evidence to the positive claim, and also documentary evidence, that will be listed below.

In any case, the relevant file for that letter (PRO AIR 2/2434) should contain the rather interesting observation for some readers, made on 25 August 1938, that the RAF planned to supply 100 octane to all Spitfire and Hurricane bases.

As you noted, the August 1938 was a pre-war plan that was over-ridden by a series of subsequent planning decisions, first the March 1939 decision which revised and limited the number of Squadrons effected to 16 + 2 effective in September 1940, and as you noted, this was brought forward to early 1940. I do not see how its nature was any different than the March 1939 plan that replaced it.

However it remains unclear wheter there were more Squadrons effected than the original 16 + 2. Do you have perhaps information regarding the number of Stations / Squadrons that were actually supplied with 100 octane fuel?

Now in return I'd like to know what evidence you have which demonstrates that operational squadrons in Fighter Command (and particularly 11 Group) after May 1940 were not using 100 octane fuel routinely. I am particularly interested in learning the source of your statement that -

... it seems that there is evidence in May 1940 decision was made to stop existing conversion on the basis of the uncertainity of the supplies, and that around 1/4 of the Squadrons were supplied with this kind of fuel during most of the Battle.

- as this is appears to be contradicted by the decisions in the sources I have just cited.

Certainly. A couple of years ago an Australian researcher shared his findings about the matter with some of us during a related discussion.

He came across a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, when he was researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. He noted that the reason why it was included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

He summarized the contents of the addendum as the follows (salient points highlighted by me):


"Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940."


It certainly does seem to be connected to your papers in Kew, in particular the position of the Oil Committee that was 'made clear' to Fighter Command in the SIXTH meeting, in May 1940.
 
GavinB
You should be aware that this is the paper Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War that Kurfurst has been asked to supply a number of times which he has failed to do so. You should also be aware that the Australain War Archives when asked for a copy of this paper could not find it, and neither had they heard of it. The following is the reply from the AWA
Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference At the time Kurfurst was asking Wikipedia to change their entry to reflect his belief in the lack of 100 Octane fuel to the RAF in the BOB. As Kurfurst was the one pressing Wikipedia to change he is the one referred to as the original writer. It should be noted that this he failed to do, despite his claim to have a link to the document that worked.

In Kurfursts defence he has given me the links which he insists work for him, but didn't work for me but when I asked him to send me a copy he went silent.

Re my summaries of Kurfursts position they are dead accurate. A good example being his insistance that the March 1939 plan only allowed for the 18 squadrons which he maintains. The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.

It will also be noticed that according to Kurfurst it was a lack of supply the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time his emphasis. However as we know there was no lack of supply.
 
This paper seems to be at odds regarding the amount of 100 octane fuel issued between July and 10th October, noted as being 22 000 tons by Wood and Dempster, which is also referenced on your site.

Just a thought Kurfurst that you mentioned first in a previous exchange. Issued at 22,000 tons is not the same as consumed. We know that stocks had to be in place before the squadrons were able to use the fuel.
This statement seems to be based on the premise that issued to the distribution stations is the same as consumed by the squadrons, which is not the case.
 
GavinB
You should be aware that this is the paper Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War that Kurfurst has been asked to supply a number of times which he has failed to do so.

Glider has been given the exact source and a link to the discussion where this was discussed. Besides it was made clear that it was not me who did the research but by an Australian fellow. He claims the link was 'broken', and repeats the same story about having been 'asked' to 'provide' the material that was clear to him that was researched by somebody else.

The link however works for me and appearantly, for everyone else... odd, isn't it? :rolleyes:

You should also be aware that the Australain War Archives when asked for a copy of this paper could not find it, and neither had they heard of it.

I would like to see the email and the name of the contact person you have contacted, and the full contents of the this alleged email correspondence... Your story simply stinks and it is quite simply made up IMHO. I doubt you have even attempted to contact the Australian archieves.
I am thinking you are making up a story to dismiss the evidence that disproves your wishful claims, that you have so far failed to support with any evidence.

In Kurfursts defence he has given me the links which he insists work for him, but didn't work for me but when I asked him to send me a copy he went silent.

Well you have been told SEVERAL times it was an Australian fellow who researched the document. So why are you asking me for copies?
You have been told SEVERAL times how to contact him. So why are you still keep telling the story about me going silent etc?

About a month ago you have told us that you will research the relevant documentation in the National Archieves in Kew. Ever since we haven't heard from you. It appears that either you were not even attempting it, or you have found it, and the reason you are silent about is because it disproves your own position.

Re my summaries of Kurfursts position they are dead accurate.

No, you were misrepresenting it in a set of strawmen arguments, also somehow you 'forgot' to include several of the evidence I have pointed out.

A good example being his insistance that the March 1939 plan only allowed for the 18 squadrons which he maintains. The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.

I would like to see the document, to see whether it supports your position or not. Besides earlier you have been denying that the document even exists, you were denying that it effected Blenheim Squadrons, so I do wonder, why are your position changing so often?

It will also be noticed that according to Kurfurst it was a lack of supply the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time his emphasis. However as we know there was no lack of supply.

No, not 'according to Kurfurst', as you were told dozens of times.
According to Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War from February 1941.

Well 'we' know that the RAF supply of 100 octane fuel was only 220 000 tons as of the spring 1940 and that the fuel had to be imported from overseas, and the shipments were uncertain. 'We' also know that the target for reserves was set at 800 000 tons, which means in effect they had but 1/4 the reserves they required.
 
Kurfurst
As you are well aware the previous response from the AWA
Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference was from an editor at Wikipedia as at the time you were trying to get them to amend the entry for the BOB aircraft entry.

However I had asked myself and this morning had a reply which is copied below.
PS I accept your apology for accusing me of making it up, telling a story that stinks, probably not contacting the AWA and making up a story to dismiss the evidence that disproves my wishful claims.

Australian War Memorial Research Centre
ReQuest

Response to your question with Question #: RCIS20344


Your question is:
I am trying to find a copy of the following Document which I have been told is held in your archives.

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War

The first question is of course do you have a copy of this document and secondly if you do what is the process to try and obtain a copy.


Our response is:
Dear David,

Thank you for your enquiry to the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial.

I have searched our books database (which includes journals), RecordSearch (which is the National Archives of Australia's search engine for our Official Records) and our general search field in the hope that your text may be picked up as a reference in an online article without success.

Do you have any more information about the record? Is it a journal article or a monograph? If you can think of any other identifying markers, please email our Publishing and Digitised team at pub&[email protected] A curator will search again for you.

I'm sorry I couldn't help you.

Kind regards,


I am sure you agree that it is incumbant on the person making the claim to support that claim.
So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed. Clearly this paper is a dead end at this stage and without it, you have no case.
 
Clearly this paper is a dead end at this stage and without it, you have no case.

Clearly somebody already found it and made notes of it. There is no doubt about the credibility of the person either, neither does he have an unhealthy interest in proving it either way.

That you have not given exact reference to the paper and they cannot find it is no particular wonder. You need to have the exact reference to the paper in order to find it, or do the research yourself.

I also note that you are particularly quiet about your earlier claim:

'The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.'


So I must ask: did you made that up?

I am sure you agree that it is incumbant on the person making the claim to support that claim.

Certainly. You have made a claim in your first posts:

... Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940.

So please produce the documents which show that FC 'fully' converted.
So far you have produced nothing that would positively support this thesis.

So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed.
 
I thought that there was areasonable body of evidence already presented.

Does anyone know what these references to "other threads" is about. There is obviously a deeper argument going on here......
 
Clearly somebody already found it and made notes of it. There is no doubt about the credibility of the person either, neither does he have an unhealthy interest in proving it either way.
I would say that there is every reason to doubt the person as the mystery Australian was asked to supply a copy of the paper in the original thread and guess what he didn't.

That you have not given exact reference to the paper and they cannot find it is no particular wonder. You need to have the exact reference to the paper in order to find it, or do the research yourself.
Your the one who claims to have a working link, if you will not give the paper then give me the reference.
By the way you have little regard if they can only trace papers with a thread

I also note that you are particularly quiet about your earlier claim:

'The March 1939 paper did mention 18 squadrons but also allowed for the number to be varied depending on the availability of the fuel.'


So I must ask: did you made that up?
As you can see, no I didn't,



So until you support your statement with something substantial the matter is closed.

Priceless
 

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So, it was 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 twin engined bomber Squadrons that were scheduled for conversion to 100 octane fuel. They aimed for 800 000 tons of reserve of 100 octane fuel... they had what - 220 000 tons in reserve by spring 1940?

Its at odds with your claim that all of Fighter Command's Squadrons converted, isn't it?
Do you have any evidence if this decision was later revised by a later decision and more Squadrons were to be involved?
Given that they had but 1/4 of the fuel reserves they aimed at, it appears to be unlikely.

It agrees well with the contents of the Australian paper though. Sixteen Squadrons would be about 1/4 of Fighter Command. Also the lack of what they considered sufficient reserves (800k tons) is also evidenced.
 
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