Best plan for Argentina in Falklands War (2 Viewers)

[Admiral Beez]

Assuming that you're crazy enough to take on Britain in 1982, and keeping to the original dates and available ships, aircraft, kit, etc, what was the best plan for Argentina to prepare to meet the British task force?

I'll allow for four assumptions on Argentina's part. First, it's recognized that Britain will not cave on the Falklands without a fight, so a sizeable military response to retake the islands is assumed. Second, it's recognized that Britain has a special relationship with the US that may result in Washington providing weapons, intelligence and diplomatic aid to Britain while using its influence in the UN, NATO and LATAM region to block the same to Argentina. Third, Argentina understands that PM Margaret Thatcher is a tough political opponent who won't back down unless thoroughly beaten. And lastly, not withstanding all the above, that RAF or FAA air strikes against civilian targets in Argentina are unlikely, but are possible against military targets.

With these four assumptions, Argentina would be mad to proceed to take the Falklands, but dictatorships do crazy things when pushed, so off we go. Having taken the Falklands on 2 April 1982, what should Argentina do to best counter the coming British response? For example, given assumption four, the Argentine Air Force could move more fighters to the south.

 

[SaparotRob]

The first thing to do would have the Argentine Air Force involved in the planning from the get go.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The first thing to do would have the Air Force involved in the planning from the get go.

IIRC, one of the issues was that the invasion was originally to take place later, but domestic disturbances forced Galtieri to act sooner. Nevertheless, with the four assumptions above, especially #1, I think we can also assume greater pre-planning across the Argentine military. This time Argentina knows they've poked a bear.

 

[EwenS]

Most of the Argentinian Air Force was based in the northern part of the country along with their maintenance facilities. Mobile squadrons had to be formed in early April to control those serviceable aircraft being sent south. Broadly they deployed south in the first part of April those combat aircraft that were operational with some support equipment, but deeper maintenance seems to have needed to be carried out at home bases.

For example they had 34 single seat and 3 two seat Daggers, with the latter needed for training new pilots. 7 were in deep maintenance or trials programmes. That left 27. On 5 April their support equipment went south, followed by 12 Daggers the next day. 4 went U/S on that journey causing a change of plans on deployment. Of the 15 left at Tandil, the home base, most were U/S. By the end of the war 26 of the 27 single seaters available at the start had flown combat sorties with 6 being lost.

There were 16 single seat Mirage IIIEA and a single twin seat IIIDA. And of those 9 could only fire the ineffective R530 missile and as a result only flew operationally twice. The remaining 7 single seaters could fire the R550 Magic, but these, despite having been ordered in 1980, only arrived on 15 April with work required to fit them and train the pilots. The twin seater and 4 single seaters were retained for the defence of Buenos Aires but only 3 seem to have been serviceable at any one time. During April 9 single seaters were deployed south.

There were also not very many bases in the south of the country. So with more warning serviceability might have been improved. Not sure how much since they already had a month to prepare and redeploy. (The TF didn't arrive in the exclusion zone until 1 May 1982).

There is another thing to consider. If mass movement of aircraft south had taken place ahead of the invasion, then it would have been picked up by the Chileans with the possibility of heightened tensions with them.

Beagle conflict - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Snautzer01]

Britain in 1982

Was far from stable or in a financial position the start a war. It was realley a f-upp place with strong sides opossing each other. Thatcher always liked to play dirty and never had to good of the country in mind. She was for a part of the people, by far for everybody. And it showed.
Her game was nearly up when this golden opportunity gave her a lease of life back. It was not for the good of the country nor for the locals Could have gone political but this was a far better way to lenghten her reign.
Falklands were a publicity war not a moral righteous one.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Was far from stable or in a financial position the start a war. It was realley a f-upp place with strong sides opossing each other.

We emigrated in 1976. As a lad newly arrived in Canada I was surprised that half of my school seemed to be Brits. Clearly many Brits had given up on the place, even before Thatcher.

Invisible Immigrants

Despite being one of the largest immigrant groups contributing to the development of modern Canada, the story of the English has been all but untold. In Invisible Immigrants, Barber and Watson document the experiences of English-born immigrants who chose to come to Canada during England’s last...

uofmpress.ca

 

[Snautzer01]

 

[z42]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUlj48Rvp1c

As far as the topic itself, IDK. Magically get hold of more Exocets? If they could knock out one of the British carriers that could have put UK operations in jeopardy?

 

[Admiral Beez]

As far as the topic itself, IDK. Magically get hold of more Exocets? If they could knock out one of the British carriers that could have put UK operations in jeopardy?

A plan to knock out the carriers would be possible, with the Exocets already on hand. Results are of course not guaranteed.

Were Argentina's land-based Exocets able to be air launched?

 

[EwenS]

A plan to knock out the carriers would be possible, with the Exocets already on hand. Results are of course not guaranteed.

Were Argentina's land-based Exocets able to be air launched?

Although both are called "Exocet" the MM38 SSM and the AM39 ASM are very different animals.

The AM39 was shorter (4.7m v 5.2m) and lighter (655kg v 735kg). Weight was important since usually a single missile was carried balanced by a fuel filled drop tank.

The MM38 was propelled out of its launcher box by its rocket motor. The AM39 is designed to fall free of its carrier aircraft before the rocket ignites to avoid damaging the carrier aircraft and it doesn't fire until the actual speed is below flight speed. Hence the need for a pop-up from sea level before launch.

The AM39 was also designed for a much harsher environment than that of a nice sealed MM38 launcher box. It has to cope with changes of temperature, humidity, pressure, vibrations, sea salt as well as the accelerations involved in take off and landing, especially from a catapult before it reaches the launch point.

The missile must also be fed with targeting data - distance, azimuth and heading. Only when within 12, 8 or 5km from the target will it switch on its own radar to search for the target. So the systems for producing that data are very different as between ship and aircraft. On the Super Etendard those systems displaced the cannon.

What the Argentinians did succeed in doing was adapting MM38 launcher boxes to a trailer mount and supplying them with targeting data from one of their ground radars. It was missiles from such a mount that were used to target HMS Glamorgan on 12 June 1982.

So no, it wouldn't have been possible to convert MM38 for air launch.