The Atlantic Fleet in the Pacific after Pearl..

[ChuckW]

I'd like to throw this to the group:

What might have happened if after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt 'gave in to' a "Japan First!" faction and ordered the Atlantic Fleet ( via the Panama Canal ) to join up with the remnants of the Pacific Fleet and ".. Take the fight to the Japanese Homeland.." via Midway and the Philippines?

[syscom3]

Since the Yorktown and Hornet were sent to the Pacific right away, that only leaves one carrier to send there. The Wasp. It would be an interesting scenario to see the Wasp join in at Coral Sea or Midway.

For the Battleships, having them available at the start of the numerous surface engaements around Guadalcanal in Aug 1942, might have forced the IJN into comitting more of their BB's into the fight at a sooner date.

The impact in the ETO would have been minimal. I dont think Operation Torch would have been delayed because of the lack of an American carrier or battleship.

[plan_D]

I think the carrier support was required for Operation Torch, not so much the battleship support. The carrier aviation provided an excellent service in the defence of the landing forces. I believe the air battles have been described in great detail by R.Leonard somewhere on the site.

[syscom3]

I wonder what would have changed the near term course of the war. Having the wasp at Coral Sea might have meant the damaging of the IJN carriers in which they dont play a role at guadalcanal untill late 1942. Or the addition of the Wasp to the Battle of Midway where it might have put up enough air cover to protect the Yorktown from damage.

I dont think the Torch landings would have been held up because the Wasp wasnt available. The allies might have lost some ships, but not enough to stop the invasion.

[plan_D]

I wouldn't be too keen on an amphibious landing without some kind of air support. And I think most Generals would agree with me. Unopposed the Vichy air force would have done a lot of damage to the invasion flotilla. True enough it might have gone through anyway but the losses suffered could have easily been avoided with air support.

[delcyros]

...plus the secondary backup via BB coastal bombardments. The avaiability of US BB in the north cape in 42 and 43 resulted in more tactical possibilities for the covering task forces also. Torch would have been possible also. However, the effect of air bombardements (Casablanca 42!) against harbours would have been even more serious than it already was. That are no good news.

[MP-Willow]

The Atlantic fleet moving would have given the German U-boats a great target. That said I am not shure any of the long rage boats would have been ready but if a battle group is moving throught the cannal that is a very tempting target. As shown in the USN wargames before the war and IJN plans to disable the cannal.

As for more ships in the PTO, we still were trying to get organized, to have more might have helped in the Coral Sea, but it would have been better if we could have been better at night actions.

[syscom3]

Did you know the first surface night action in the PTO, the USN was a clear victor?

Battle of Balikpapan , January 24, 1942

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/ba...balikpapan.htm

[MP-Willow]

NO, I did not know that, but overall the night was not our friend. Even when the P-61 was deployed, maybe that is why we now seem to covet the night so much.

Plan_D I love your pic of the GAU_8A, where did you find it?

[syscom3]

Actually, once we had a good radar, we did not fear the night.

[syscom3]

Actually, once we had a good radar, we did not fear the night.

[plan_D]

On that ...there...thin-ter-net.

[delcyros]

One thing which should frighten USN was the good torpedo quality of the japanese in comparison with the exceptional worse of US ones...
But You are right, Radar helps a lot for nightbattles.

[MP-Willow]

true, the USN seemed to have enemic and skidish torps. I would not want to be in one of the subs fiering duds then getting depth chared for it. Not plesant!

[syscom3]

Whats amazing is the sub fleet identified and fixed by themselves the three main flaws of the torpedo. And they had to do it themselves AFTER repeatedly asking the Beaureu of Ordinance the problems they had.

It is not a good story for the USN about this, nd the only good coming from it is its a case study for the Army, Air Force and Navy to pay attention to the soldiers in the field about reported weapons problems.

But there was another problem with the US sub force (and surface fleet)..... many ships were skippered by cautious peacetime indoctrinated officers who sometimes were more concerned about losing their ship than fighting a battle. Not cowardice, but simple overcaution. More than one sub skipper was removed early in the war because they refused to take acceptable risks.