Best World war two warships?

[syscom3]

Of all the US "fast" Battleships, only the USS Washington was involved in a classic gun duel at sea.

All the other actions the BB's were in were for shore bombardment and air defense roles.

[ToughOmbre]

Del, one of the most important factors you fail to mention is fire control. The following is from the Imperial Japanese Navy website and it talks about fire control better than I ever could.

"Then there's the fact that all radar fire-control is not created equal. Radar operating at meter or decimeter wavelengths is useful for ranging, but lacks the angular accuracy necessary for training. In practical terms, this means that a decimetric set can develop a range solution via radar, but must rely on an optical director to supply training information for the battery. This hybrid fire-control solution is, of course, limited by the quality of the optics available, and also by the visual horizon (which is closer than the radar horizon), and weather conditions. Only with the advent of 10cm and (later) 3cm wavelength sets was true 'blindfire' radar fire-control achievable, wherein the firing ship need never come into visual range of the opposing vessel. The Germans, Japanese, and Italians never developed sets of this capability (both the Japanese (despite its 10cm wavelength) and German sets were usable for fire control against a battleship-sized target only out to a range of about 27,000 yards.) The bottom line is, then, that the Allied vessels, and particularly Iowa and South Dakota, would enjoy an enormous advantage in gunfire control over their adversaries. She would have the ability to lob shells over the visual horizon, and would also perform better in complete darkness or adverse weather conditions.

The final adjusted rating also reflects the fact that American FC systems employed by far the most advanced stable vertical elements in the world. In practical terms, this meant that American vessels could keep a solution on a target even when performing radical maneuvers. In 1945 test, an American battleship (the North Carolina) was able to maintain a constant solution even when performing back to back high-speed 450-degree turns, followed by back-to-back 100-degree turns. This was a much better performance than other contemporary systems, and gave U.S. battleships a major tactical advantage, in that they could both shoot and maneuver, whereas their opponents could only do one or the other."

TO

[comiso90]

<<TO --- I typed all this crap and u beat me to it by a couple minutes!..Dont forget damage control too!>>

Thanks for breaking that down delycros. For the sake of discussion lets assume daylight action...

All the facts you state (very interesting) assume 2 things:

The NJ and Yam have equal accuracy and equal damage control

I have read that U.S. fire control and damage control were second to none.

I think no U.S. B.B. Skipper in his right mind would attempt to take on the Yam or Mus one on one... but in the confusion of battle with subs, destroyers and aircraft all adding to the mix, it's not unthinkable that a NJ class (or two) could close with the Japanese monsters.

Assuming that there were no catastrophic HMS Hood-like explosions, I believe that the U.S ships would land more critical hits and better manage any damage...

what are your thoughts on Japanese fire control and damage control?

There is no doubt that the Japanese ships had a longer reach and bigger knock out blow... but u gotta land a punch and take a punch too!

[WARSPITER]

Interesting information on these ships. Thank you. Just a couple of things for perspective;

One post mentions the number of actions for various battle ships but there are a few missing. I don't know if anti aircraft fire counts as actions though as there must have been a lot of battle ships going through those kind of attacks fairly frequently. It's good to see HMS Warspite getting a mention though as that ship was in a lot of actions during the second world war as well as being at Jutland in the first.

Another thing I didn't know about was the apparent electrical problem with the South Dakota. How many ships had different problems which refused to be found?
The Warspite is again a good example here. She was prone to sticking when on full rudder. This happened at Jutland and she circled a smaller British ship several times until the rudder decided it was alright to move again. The crew of the other ship presented Warspite with gifts of alcohol etc for taking the fire of the German ships at the time and selflessly putting Warspite in harms way to protect one of their own. I don't know if anyone from Warspite ever told them the truth but I bet they accepted the drinks. Warspite did the same thing a couple of times in WWII and the problem was never found. Apparently her four sister ships of the class never had this happen.

Does anyone know of these types of problems with other ships?

By the way, I am not saying the Warspite was the best Battleship of the war but she probably should have been preserved as she was heavily involved.

My vote would have to go to the American IOWA class as they were well built, fast, and well armed. from what I have read these ships were also very reliable, a definite requirement for long term operations in war.

[delcyros]

HMS Warspite does not belong to the group of modern BB´s represented in the list above, altough she initially was part of the fast wing concept, perhaps the earliest approach of an fast battleship. Warspite perhaps gave the best returns in terms of utilization of any battleship ever put on the seas.

The problems with her steering gear was a more severe design fault. The steering gear was modifed but basically overtaken from the preceeding Iron Duke class, altough the Queen Elizabeths should be a good 3-4 Kts faster (with almost TWICE the load on the steering gear if full rudder is applied at flank speed). Therefore, the steering gear tended to jam under full rudder, flank speed conditions (two weeks prior to Jutland, HMS Barham experienced the same rudder jam at high speed maneuvering off Scapa Flow, the issue indeed is a class wide aspect)

The radar FC issues put forward by TO are aspects but not as decisive as can be read on the website he quotes from. Radar is upgradable. So You have to be very careful to compare ships states in their same period with each other.
The best german radar set in use on a naval ship f.e. was operating on the 6 cm wavelength (Prinz Eugen). No german BB got these sets as they were inoperable by 1945. Comparing Tirpitz 1943 outfit with Iowas by mid 1945 is leading us nowhere, seriously...
Yamato´s FC was excellent, able to deliver tight patterns precisely. The Gambier Bay reports do make this clear. Yamatos nightoptics and training for nightfighting were arguably the best. Her radar was not. Radar is only ONE PART IN FIRECONTROLL, which includes optical or electromagnetic datacollection, ballistic computing, interior ballistics, gun dispersion, salvo patterns at ranges, angle of descent (the higher the shorter the area at which a shell might still hit a target), time of flight (the longer the higher the probability that an enemy ship may evade the shell, esspeccially at long range). But to understand for what radar is an advantage one should previously investigate how firecontroll solutions are obtained in a naval battle:

Predicting a target’s future position is a daunting task. This is exactly why weapons in the post war era went to guided weapons. Brad Fisher thinks one of the big misunderstandings with the gunnery problem is that it isn’t the target’s velocity per se, it’s the error in the calculated track and the attendant errors in range and bearing rate that are the primary causes for MPI errors. To get an accurate track you need not only accurate data but also a high data rate so that you reduce any lag in the track.
With the advent of continuous radar ranges (from 1938 in german sets and 1940 in british sets onwards), a proficient rangekeeper operator could track a target to with 2 degrees and 2kts. This translates to a range rate error of 19yds/minute and a bearing rate error of 67yds/minute (the latter assumes a broadside target). The problem is that early radars had discrimination problems as well as limited performance and slow rate of data transmission- early radar operators passed ranges to plot/TS via voice circuits (The first battleship to have integrated radar into it´s main firecontroll computer was Bismarck, and this was done late in 1940 by the AVKS with improvising means). This had two negative effects; one is that there is an obvious lag of several to tens of seconds in the reception of said ranges while the second is that there is a larger lag in waiting for the plotting of ranges and the extraction of the observed range rate.
With continuous ranges transmitted to plot – but not into the computer itself – went a long way to alleviate those two problems. Now ranges from the radar can be directly observed by the computer operator via a range indicator right next to the computer. He can “drive in” ranges as necessary and he can compare and any instant the observed range from the range indicator to the range as generated by the computer. If the two are in agreement in range and rate of movement, then the solution is good. If they two values become unsynchronized, then the target has changed course/speed and he needs to update his track. This process is much faster than that with early radars, to say nothing of optical ranges, and was further improved upon with automatic range input into the computers and range aided tracking.
Of course, radar tracking is not always a panacea. Long time of flight (TOF) couple with aggressive maneuvering could reduce effectiveness of fire considerably. A large factor in this is the target’s maneuverability and the tactical situation. Often in WWII most gunnery actions were generally small unit actions with smaller, more fluid formations. Few were with “traditional” column formations (battle line). Battle of River Plate is a prime example and was a very difficult gunnery problem for both sides so I do not think that the overall hit percentages are terribly surprising. Challenges were still seen even into late 1943 when FC reached maturity, where targets were difficult to hit not because of track lag but often because the inability to spot effectively as targets were either out of spotting range or the conditions weren’t favorable for blind fire (usually because the particular radar wasn’t capable of doing so)

The US Navy deployed four types of fire control radar in 1941: CXAS-1/FA/Mark 1, FB/Mark 2, FC/Mark 3, and FD/Mark 4. BuShips, which made search radars used the letter designations; BuOrd, which made fire control radars used the Mark system. Thus, fire control radars had two designations - BuShips and BuOrd - and they appear to be used interchangably in the literature. Depends on how pedantic you want to be, I guess - both Stern and Howeth use the BuShips terminology.

FA went into production in June of 1941. Howeth indicates that the USN purchased 10 CXAS-1/FA sets, all earmarked for cruisers - one on Witchita, the remaining nine on light cruisers. FA was a very crude gunnery radar. The operator was required to swing the antenna back and forth manually while watching the oscilloscope, during which time he estimated the range. The FA radar performed satisfactorily when operating at peak performance, but this performance was difficult to maintain because of the relatively short life (about 75 hours) of the oscillator tubes.

In October 1941, FC was first installed in the fleet, aboard Philadelphia. As had been planned for in the Model FB, the control console and indicators were remotely located in the directors. An additional 10 FC sets were produced and installed on ships before December 7, 1941 - Saratoga got two of them. FD was designed as an anti-aircraft fire control radar, very similar to FC, but with the radar arrays stacked vertically instead of horizontally. This installation was completed prior to 22 September and on that date the Roe put to sea. Delivery of production equipment did not begin until December 1941.
CXAM was very unreliable and tended to refuse detecting ships while operating at high speed or on any any seastate larger than 3 (Lexington and Saratoga reported this). Lexington took RCA technicians with her for a gunnery shoot in October, 1941. The CXAM was out of action by the fifth 8" salvo - vibration jarred loose tubes and soldier connections. The CXAM was also a casualty on the 2nd day - gunnery knocked the power leads loose. Cracks and short circuits were also noted in the oscillator valves. These sets continued to have frequent breakdowns.
Lexington & Saratoga were the first US capital ships to have these FC radar sets. Saratoga's Mark 3 installation was very early compared to when most ships got Mark 3 - she appears to be the first capital ship to receive gunnery fire control radar. It is quite possible that Saratoga would not have recieved her FC radars as early as she did if she carried 8 16" instead of 8 8". The US Navy was putting it's available fire control radars on it's screen first and the capital ships second.
Thus, unless the fight is late in December 1941 and the USN decides to give Saratoga her historical priority on FC sets, I don't expect either ship to have gunnery control radar at all - nor do I expect their surface search sets to be functional much into the engagement. Quite frankly, the main gunnery aid in 1941 will be her spotter planes, if she can launch them.
By 1942 the BB already has lost it´s importance to the CV.

BTW, the US with latewar, blindfire radar FC did not succeeded to hit a freely moving, enemy target at any distance larger than 23.000 yards. (Nowaki incident)
Scharnhorst & Warspite with optical FC succeeded to hit a freely moving target at 26.000 yards+ each, representing the longest ever gunfire hits!

Good radar is great to reduce some interrelated errors in range and bearing, thus enhancing the firing solution. But radar cannot be operated in vacuum. AntiRadar-shells were to be tested in ww2 UK and Germany and radar FC did not improved hitting probabilities per se on long range engagements. The way how they were operated is much more important.

A classic example is how both battleships thought they were hitting Sendai’s group with their main battery during the first phase of action. Recall that the Mk 3 radar’s – upon which they were relying for spotting – have low resolution in range and bearing. From practice reports it’s clear that radar spots from these sets are inaccurate and salvos spotted as straddles aren’t. This is a product of the poor range resolution ± 400yds. So with that in mind I have no doubt that based on radar information they thought they were hitting even though they weren’t.

P.S.: many thanks to Bill Jurens, Brad Fisher & Tiornu

best regards,

[renrich]

Comis, I have to respectfully disagree with you. I believe that any USN commander of an Iowa class BB would take on a Yamato class one v one in a New York minute. I believe, for instance Ching Lee would think he was fulfilling the dream of a lifetime to have that encounter and I believe no American BB skipper would avoid that match. The Japanese damage control at least early in the war was very poor.

[delcyros]

I agree, Renrich.

It was part of the US doctrine to use BB´s. And we shouldn´t forget that by this time everybody except estimated Yamato to be equipped with 16" guns. This was "known" by US skippers. Even had they recognized the true size of Yamato, I doubt that they wouldn´t take on her. Even DD skippers took on Yamato off Samar! And they did very successfully, I would like to add (2 jap. cruisers lost).

I wouldn´t put Iowa personally as the best ww2 battleship, this has to be Yamato with it´s superior protection and firepower, hands down. The Iowa class instead is the worlds finest ever battlecruiser, balancing speed with firepower and staying power for the expanse of displacement (very comparable to how HMS Hood, another excellent design balanced it´s combat aspects in the 20´s).

[comiso90]

Originally Posted by renrich

Comis, I have to respectfully disagree with you. I believe that any USN commander of an Iowa class BB would take on a Yamato class one v one in a New York minute. I believe, for instance Ching Lee would think he was fulfilling the dream of a lifetime to have that encounter and I believe no American BB skipper would avoid that match. The Japanese damage control at least early in the war was very poor.

I'm sure any US commander would want to but by that time in the war, It was obvious that air power was a better tool. I think, given a choice, the BB skipper would avoid direct contact... I wouldn't be surprise if the US admirals ordered the BB skippers to avoid a surface action. Let the planes do the dirty work. The battleship guns are needed for beach assaults!

Now lets say that all that stood between the beaches of Okinawa and the Yamato was a NJ class BB... No doubt the the US BB would do whatever it could to stop the Yamato... LONG LIVE TAFFY 3!...

[renrich]

Comis, I believe that the US BB commanders, including Halsey were foaming at the mouth to come to within gun range of the Japanese BBs. I am sure that Oldendorf was most appreciative of his opportunity at Surigao Strait and there probably was some trash talk going on later between the crews of the old BBs and the fast BBs. It would have been good strategy to take out the Jap heavies with air but those guys commanding the fast BBs, I am sure, were hopeful of testing their mettle against the behemoths. By the way, I can't find my reference, but I am sure that I read that the Iowa class were designed to withstand 18 inch weapons. Whether they would have withstood that is another question.

[comiso90]

It would have been very interesting.... I'm sure the BB crews were tired of excavating real estate with their 16 inchers.

[renrich]

Yes, not very exciting or valorous to have finally become the CO of a fast BB and spend all your time either acting as a AA battery or digging up sand on the beaches.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by renrich

Yes, not very exciting or valorous to have finally become the CO of a fast BB and spend all your time either acting as a AA battery or digging up sand on the beaches.

Digressing a little the old WW1 Battleship Iron Duke which had been used as a training ship and had most of her guns removed, was disguised as a KGV class warship, stuffed with AA guns and used as a decoy/floating AA battery on some convoys in the Med.
Saw a photo once and the disguise was pretty good

[WARSPITER]

Thaks for the info on the steering problems with the Queen Elizabeth class. Warspite must have been a little more prone than the rest as she managed to have that fault when under tow as well.

I also didn't know about the Iron Duke being used in the Med. thanks.

This is off the subject a bit ( actually a lot ), but can anyone help with how far a Napoleonic ship of the line could turn into the wind in one go? In our games system we use 1/1200th scale ships and most rules allow two points per move with the wind and one into the wind. That seems right to me but there is some argument for allowing a two point turn (45deg) into the wind. I think this would have been a recipe for rigging damage on those ships from what I have read.

Since I don't have Lord Nelsons' email I hoppe someone here may be able to help.

[Messy1]

Here is a interesting website I have come across in my searches across the web. Chuch Hawks is the owner of the site. I think he has a ton of good info, and also some interesting stories.

NAVAL, AVIATION AND MILITARY HISTORY: Warships, Aircraft, and Military topics

[kool kitty89]

The Bismark could have used a decent complement of catapult-launched defence a/c, and maby a short fligh-deck. It wouldn't take an advanced a/c to down a Stringbag, so a very short deck with obsolecesent a/c with STOL could be used.

The Bismark was supposedly capable of carrying 4x Ar 196, but these only had a single MG 15 in a defensive position, though the land-based version had a cowl-mounted MG 17 and 2x wing-mounted MG FF.

If a short flight deck had been included, fighters like the Ar 197 (or others originally designed for the Zeplin with STOL capabillities) would have been adequate for defence aganst Swordfish. Perhaps navy Bf 109T's could be used, but catapult launching would be the only option, and recovery on a short flight deck would be difficult. (though it could work, as long as the arrestor hook engaged, otherwise.... crash!)


Though with all that the Germans would have been better off building carriers to use in the anti-shipping role. Fitted with 109T's and suitable torpedo bombers and maby somthing like a carrier based Stuka, the RN would be in for some trouble. Though this hay hve led to more decent fighters beeing used earlier in the RN as well. (ie Sea Hurricanes and maby Gloster's F.5/34 design). Though a Sea Gladiator could take on an Ar 197 and most torpedo- and dive-bommbers, the Fulmar was almost no good as a fighter, and neither craft could handel a 109.