Could the Kriegsmarine & IJN neutralize the US War Effort with a combined attack?

[syscom3]

Freebird, the aircraft capacity of the Japanese carriers you quoted, is of the design specs from the mid 1930's. The actual capacity of the carriers in 1942 (with larger sized aircraft as compared to the mid 30's) at Midway were:
Kaga: 72, Soryu: 57, Hiryu: 59, Akagi: 63. Light Carriers were : Zuiho: 18, Ryujo: 30, Junyo: 33.

As for your submarines, while its probable that they could have all 60 or so subs active at the start, maintaining full strength over a period of months would be very hard to do. even 2/3rds strength only leaves you with 40 or so subs, covering an immense area of the world. And that doesn't account for force reductions due to ships being damaged, sunk or in transit.

Saying you will put your subs near the major ports leaves you vulnerable to counter attack by ASW. Even if your subs are not sunk outright by ASW attack, just being forced away from a ship or convoy is success.

As for attacking deep into the central pacific, just what would you really accomplish? You have to do lasting and irrepairable damage to knock Samoa, Playmra, Johnston or Fiji out of the war. And that takes lots of aircraft and multiple raids. In addition, Your carriers would need to be massed into a task force to accomplish anything of military value, thus putting a strain on the fleet supply.

And as events proved in Guadalcanal and New Guinea, the P39's and P40's (that the AAF had available in Hawaii and the line islands in 1942) were adequate against IJN aircraft at the low altitudes, where they would have to fight. Attrition would cripple your air groups in a hurry.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by renrich

I must be missing something here. Are we saying that the US carriers were sunk at PH also?

Yes, I put a hypothetical forward if the US had lost 3 carriers at Pearl.

Originally Posted by syscom3

Freebird, the aircraft capacity of the Japanese carriers you quoted, is of the design specs from the mid 1930's. The actual capacity of the carriers in 1942 (with larger sized aircraft as compared to the mid 30's) at Midway were:
Kaga: 72, Soryu: 57, Hiryu: 59, Akagi: 63. Light Carriers were : Zuiho: 18, Ryujo: 30, Junyo: 33.

Where did you get your figures from?

I used HazeGray, almost all of the figures listed were from 1939-1940, not mid 30's.

World Aircraft Carriers List: Japanese Aircraft Carriers

Both of the Shokaku class are listed as 84 aircraft (max), both completed in 1941.

Both Kaga & Akagi had an initial capacity of 60, with 90 or 91 aircraft max after reconstruction, Kaga's reconstruction completed in 1935, Akagi's in the Sept of '38.

Soryu & Hiryu are listed as 71 & 73 aircraft max, with Soryu first in commision beginning 1938, Hiryu completed summer 1939.

Zuiho & Shoho are listed as carrying 30 aircraft, with Zuiho in service Dec 1940, Shoho Jan '42.

So all of the stats are Fall '38 or later, except for the Kaga. The Nakajima "Kate" B5N1 was in service on Japanese carriers starting 1937-1938, while before the "Val" D3A (47' wingspan, 33.5' length) they used the B4Y1 (50' x 33') and the Aichi D1A (37' x 30.5') but the D1A was a biplane, I don't think it had folding wings.

In any event, the 6 carriers were more than enought to do the job at Pearl.

As for your submarines, while its probable that they could have all 60 or so subs active at the start, maintaining full strength over a period of months would be very hard to do. even 2/3rds strength only leaves you with 40 or so subs, covering an immense area of the world. And that doesn't account for force reductions due to ships being damaged, sunk or in transit.

I agree, the Japanese would have to put building subs as a priority, to replace losses after the first few months. It does not take very many subs & sinkings to force the Allies into a much more cautious shipping policy in the Pacific, which will hamper the Sout Pacific build-up.

Saying you will put your subs near the major ports leaves you vulnerable to counter attack by ASW. Even if your subs are not sunk outright by ASW attack, just being forced away from a ship or convoy is success.

Yes you are correct, but the ASW capability in the first 4 - 6 months is negligable, even after that it is very limited for the first year or so. The German U-boats used this tactic to lurk outside US East coast ports, yet the none were sunk off the US East Coast until April 1942, and the convoys were not instituted until May, where in the Atlantic the US had some very effective assistance of well trained British/Canadian ASW crews. US Naval Command had some expectation that they would have to defend against U-boats (in the lead up to war 1940-1941), whereas there was virtually no preparation in the Pacific against Japanese subs.

As for attacking deep into the central pacific, just what would you really accomplish? You have to do lasting and irrepairable damage to knock Samoa, Playmra, Johnston or Fiji out of the war. And that takes lots of aircraft and multiple raids. In addition, Your carriers would need to be massed into a task force to accomplish anything of military value, thus putting a strain on the fleet supply.

I'm not contemplating raids, I think the Japanese could occupy Samoa outright, and establish a squadron or two there. In the fall of 1941 it is defended by a single US Marine defence battalion. I don't think they would attack Fiji, it is a little more strongly defended. The US would still have troops on Johnson & Palmyra.

The point would be to have the US waste months building up to re-occupy Samoa, and to use scarce troop assets to re-inforce US bases in Johnson, Palmyra, Christmas, Midway island etc. The Free French garrison in Tahiti is poorly equipped, I think the Japanese would then only use the air & naval bases, while allowing/helping the Vichy French to re-occupy and defend Tahiti. Remember that the Vichy Army offered minimal if any resistance to Axis forces, yet they stubbornly fought against the Allies in every instance when the Allies attempted to occupy Vichy territory, even when defending against heavy odds. (Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Madegascar, Dakar)

And as events proved in Guadalcanal and New Guinea, the P39's and P40's (that the AAF had available in Hawaii and the line islands in 1942) were adequate against IJN aircraft at the low altitudes, where they would have to fight. Attrition would cripple your air groups in a hurry.

It would take many months for the US to be able to bring planes & troops & supplies to the forward bases to be able to offer resistance. For example, the delays to re-take Samoa & re-establish communications would seriously hamper US & Australian resistance in the Solomons & N. Guinea. With the greater threat from Japanese subs, it would also take a few or many extra months to arrange convoys to bring the vital supplies forward.

[syscom3]

Where did you get your figures from?

From the book "Shattered Sword". The author made use of IJN documents to prove the actual AC stowage was far less than stated figures. The numbers I listed where the figures the carriers had during the Midway operation. The Shokaku and Zuikaku also had a capacity of 70 or so aircraft.

Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway

I agree, the Japanese would have to put building subs as a priority[/b], to replace losses after the first few months. It does not take very many subs & sinkings to force the Allies into a much more cautious shipping policy in the Pacific, which will hamper the South Pacific build-up.

Slow it down in the SW Pacific, but not stop a moderate buildup in the Central Pacific from Hawaii to Samoa.

I'm not contemplating raids, I think the Japanese could occupy Samoa outright, and establish a squadron or two there. In the fall of 1941 it is defended by a single US Marine defence battalion. I don't think they would attack Fiji, it is a little more strongly defended. The US would still have troops on Johnson & Palmyra.

The IJN never had the amphib capability to strike out at long distances. Even if they achieved success's in the Port Moresby invasion, they still couldn't do anything past the Solomon Islands untill fall 1942. In which time, they would be challenged by better equipped allied units which would stop them on the spot.

The point would be to have the US waste months building up to re-occupy Samoa, and to use scarce troop assets to re-inforce US bases in Johnson, Palmyra, Christmas, Midway island etc. The Free French garrison in Tahiti is poorly equipped, I think the Japanese would then only use the air & naval bases, while allowing/helping the Vichy French to re-occupy and defend Tahiti.

Why do you suppose Samoa would fall so quickly? The Wake invasion in 1941 was nearly a disaster for the IJN. In 1/2 year, the US would have gotten enough troops and aircraft to Samoa and surrounding islands to make a hypothetical Japanese attack or invasion a debacle for them. And stop wasting time about French Polynesia. It had no military value and it was way to far away to be invaded let alone supplied by Japan

It would take many months for the US to be able to bring planes & troops & supplies to the forward bases to be able to offer resistance.[/b] For example, the delays to re-take Samoa & re-establish communications would seriously hamper US & Australian resistance in the Solomons & N. Guinea. With the greater threat from Japanese subs, it would also take a few or many extra months to arrange convoys to bring the vital supplies forward.

Why would it take "many months"? The US would still have Pearl as a forward shipyard and base even if the oil tanks were wrecked. Offensive operations deep into the SW pacific could be curtailed, but aggressive patrolling from pearl could still be accomplished. Samoa or Fiji couldn't be threatened untill late 1942 at the minimum. And thats plenty of time to fortify them.

You place far to much credence on Japanese amphib capability (against a defended beach), which usually was dismal even under the best of circumstances.

As for air power, there were several BG's and FG's available to be sent to the various islands to block the Japanese. All Japanese airpower would have to be used from their carriers, all of which all were shown to be vulnerable to allied fighters.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Slow it down {the buildup} in the SW Pacific, but not stop a moderate buildup in the Central Pacific from Hawaii to Samoa.

If the US had lost the carriers at "Pearl" and had the Navy shipyards, bases & fuel supplies destroyed, they would have to use the Naval assets brought from the Atlantic to escort vital supplies to Hawaii for re-building & re-inforcing the island. Next on the list of priorities would be Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnson. Samoa could probably not be helped, any more than Guam.

The IJN never had the amphib capability to strike out at long distances.

WHAT??? Never had amphibious capability? Then how did they capture Wake Island? What was the land force preparing to do at Midway other than a long-distance amphibious operation?

Even if they achieved success's in the Port Moresby invasion, they still couldn't do anything past the Solomon Islands untill fall 1942.

Sorry this is wrong too. What do you mean they couldn't do anything past the Solomons until fall 1942? This is not correct, the Japanese occupied the Gilbert & Ellice Islands (including Tarawa) in late 1941 & early 1942 - these are over 1,000 miles EAST of Guadalcanal in the Solomons. The Japanese could certainly attack Samoa at the same time as Pearl Harbour. It would also be easier than attacking Wake because they could bring troops for a surprise attack directly into the port, just as the Germans did in Norway.

In which time, they would be challenged by better equipped allied units which would stop them on the spot.

What units? The US is short of troops as war breaks out, they will have to use them to protect Hawaii & Midway. Another problem would be the shortage of DD & cruisers to support operations.

Why do you suppose Samoa would fall so quickly? The Wake invasion in 1941 was nearly a disaster for the IJN. In 1/2 year, the US would have gotten enough troops and aircraft to Samoa and surrounding islands to make a hypothetical Japanese attack or invasion a debacle for them.

You don't have 6 months, the Japanese can land in Samoa on day 1. I would expect the battle for Samoa to be similar to Guam, not like Wake. The advantage Wake had (unlike Guam or Samoa) is that Wake was so small there is no place to land except under fire, it's uninhabited so its impossible for a ship making a sneak attack to posing as civilian transport Also the danger of civilian casualties would push the defenders to surrender. (which is what happened on Guam)

HyperWar: History of USMC Operations in WWII, Vol. I: Part II, Chapter 2

And stop wasting time about French Polynesia. It had no military value and it was way to far away to be invaded let alone supplied by Japan

No military value??? If the US doesn't have Samoa the supply line to Australia will run through Tahiti. I would think that would be of considerable value.

Why would it take "many months"? The US would still have Pearl as a forward shipyard and base even if the oil tanks were wrecked.

The Shipyard & repair facilities are destroyed along with the sub base & oil tanks.

Offensive operations deep into the SW pacific could be curtailed, but aggressive patrolling from pearl could still be accomplished. Samoa or Fiji couldn't be threatened untill late 1942 at the minimum. And thats plenty of time to fortify them.

?? What do you base this on? What is going to stop them? Remember that it wil take a couple of weeks at least for the US to bring carriers & support from the Atlantic. The Japanese have naval & ground assets that could be used on day 1.

You place far to much credence on Japanese amphib capability (against a defended beach), which usually was dismal even under the best of circumstances.

Samoa is too large (76 sq. miles) to cover all the beach fronts, there is only 1 battalion defending!! Wake was a different story because it was so small (2.5 sq. miles, and the defenders were prepared & waiting

As for air power, there were several BG's and FG's available to be sent to the various islands to block the Japanese. All Japanese airpower would have to be used from their carriers, all of which all were shown to be vulnerable to allied fighters.

In the first few months the US will be primarily concerned with strengthening the defence of Hawaii, the West Coast & the nearby bases, Johnson, Palmyra & Midway, they won't be able to build up in the South Pacific

The US doesn't have 6 months to prepare a defence of Samoa. The US is very short on troopships, and the sub attacks on shipping will severly curtail movement of supplies. The first priority will be bases close to Hawaii, it will be a many months before they have any capability to re-inforce Samoa. The Chiefs would probably concede Samoa, just as they did Guam.


It would take many months because you can't bring troops & supplies without shipping. After a few months of heavy shipping losses on the West Coast the US Navy would probably do exactly what they did on the East Coast in the summer of 1942, stop sailings and keep the ships in port because they can't protect them. You can't even begin to think about moving troops, supplies & air power to forward bases if you can't safely move shipping.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by freebird

If the US had lost the carriers at "Pearl" and had the Navy shipyards, bases & fuel supplies destroyed, they would have to use the Naval assets brought from the Atlantic to escort vital supplies to Hawaii for re-building & re-inforcing the island. Next on the list of priorities would be Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnson. Samoa could probably not be helped, any more than Guam.

I think that you are relying on a level of damage that was beyond the ability of the IJN to inflict.
As an example, Malta as we all know was pounded on a vast scale over a period of months, using land based bombers that carried a much larger load than the naval bombers could carry. But the dockyard was still able to function to a limited degree, the subs could still operate for the vast majority of the time, the airfields could still operate and the fuel tanks remained in operation.

WHAT??? Never had amphibious capability? Then how did they capture Wake Island? What was the land force preparing to do at Midway other than a long-distance amphibious operation?

The IJN ability to land troops was very limited and a weak spot with few ships. They could and did have some probably for one landing but they couldn't be everywhere. A serious opposition would wreck havoc with their landing forces

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Glider

I think that you are relying on a level of damage that was beyond the ability of the IJN to inflict.
As an example, Malta as we all know was pounded on a vast scale over a period of months, using land based bombers that carried a much larger load than the naval bombers could carry. But the dockyard was still able to function to a limited degree, the subs could still operate for the vast majority of the time, the airfields could still operate and the fuel tanks remained in operation.

Glider the facilities at Malta were hardened to withstand bombing, the ones at Pearl were not. I am hypothesizing if the 3 US Pacific carriers had been caught at Pearl, and the Japanese re-armed & re-fueled their aircraft for a "third wave", & possible fourth. This was advocated by Genda & Fuchida, as the latter reported "many targets remain, shipyards, maintainance facilities, oil tanks, fleet units (DD, CL, CA's).". The first wave returned to the carriers at 10 am, and could have returned as the third wave. Since the carriers would have been out of the way, the Japanese fleet was not in danger.

Pearl Harbor - The Approach- Imperial War Museum

It is possible that some of the targets would be repairable, but the damage would at least require months of work to fix

The IJN ability to land troops was very limited and a weak spot with few ships. They could and did have some probably for one landing but they couldn't be everywhere. A serious opposition would wreck havoc with their landing forces

Yes you are correct in this. The Japanese had some examples to work with, (besides "Taranto" obviously!) The result of the German surprise landings in Bergen, Trondheim, etc. in Norway done with troops hidden in civilian ships was very successful with few casualties, even though the Norweigans had been warned that an attack was likely.

On the other hand, an amphibious attack with navy units against prepared defence (ie. Crete, Oslo) was very costly. I would expect the Japanese to use the "Trojan horse" formula wherever possible, taking as many as possible targets right away, before defence is organized. Of course this is not possible at Wake, because it is not a civilian port, so the defenders assume that any approaching ship is hostile.

In any event, they could have used the troops to land in Samoa instead of Guam. After the air raid to destroy the US aircraft, the defenders in Guam cannot go anywhere & cannot be re-inforced. They could be dealt with later after more important targets are secure

[Glider]

Originally Posted by freebird

Glider the facilities at Malta were hardened to withstand bombing, the ones at Pearl were not. I am hypothesizing if the 3 US Pacific carriers had been caught at Pearl, and the Japanese re-armed & re-fueled their aircraft for a "third wave", & possible fourth. This was advocated by Genda & Fuchida, as the latter reported "many targets remain, shipyards, maintainance facilities, oil tanks, fleet units (DD, CL, CA's).". The first wave returned to the carriers at 10 am, and could have returned as the third wave. Since the carriers would have been out of the way, the Japanese fleet was not in danger.

I still don't think you understand the scale of the attack that Malta had to put up with but first the other facilities. The Harbour cannot be and wasn't hardened, neither were most of the fuel supplies. The airfields were but only to a point, all major maintanence and repairs were off the airfield (a lot of it done in a bus garage).
There was one period ( I do hope I remember this right) where on average 30 tons of bombs, fell on EACH airfield, every day, for three months. This is in addition to all the other targets, we are talking of many thousands of tons of bombs. Despite all this, everything was kept running to some degree. The IJN could have stayed until they dropped every bomb they had, used every drop of fuel and still couldn't come close to this.

The USA bases on Pearl were large and able to help each other. Army bases had sophisticated workshops able to assist and the engineers to do it. Aircraft can be quickly flown in and these would be the key.

It would be to big a nut to crack for the Japanese.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Glider

I still don't think you understand the scale of the attack that Malta had to put up with.

Actually I do, it was an incredible ordeal. Just reading the history of the "Ohio" in Pedestal shows the lengths the British would go to keep the place going. Somebody should give the island a medal or something.

the other facilities. The Harbour cannot be and wasn't hardened, neither were most of the fuel supplies. The airfields were but only to a point, all major maintanence and repairs were off the airfield (a lot of it done in a bus garage).

I should clarify "hardened" meaning that everything possible done to prepare for air attack. The RAF on Malta used every trick in the book, from the bus garage as you mentioned, to camoflaging fuel tanks, the sub base and other facilities. The difference between areas in active combat (like the UK & Malta) with other places that are in a peace time mode is like night and day.

The USA bases on Pearl were large and able to help each other. Army bases had sophisticated workshops able to assist and the engineers to do it.

It would be too big a nut to crack for the Japanese.

I'm not contemplating a total destruction of the Pearl facilities, but considerable damage would be done, which would require more supplies brought by the overstreached shipping assets. The follow-on attacks on Pearl could have taken out the fuel tanks, the maintainance shops for the fleet, the cruisers & destroyers, and probably the sub base as well.

Aircraft can be quickly flown in and these would be the key.

The problem is that with 3 carriers knocked out, the US would have to use 1 or 2 to ferry aircraft to Hawaii, Midway & the other forward bases, which would reduce the number available for the fleet. Any counter-attack by the US on the Japanese would require a large build up of supplies & supporting elements, if the limited shipping is busy bringing fuel to replace that lost in the tanks, supplies & tools to replace those destroyed it means less is available to supply Australia and for the offensives. With an aggressive sub offensive on both coasts finding enough escorts to bring supplies to the South Pacific at the same time would be tough, especially as they are needed to accompany the carriers & capital ships

[syscom3]

Freebird, youre giving the IJn far to much credit for being able to destroy Pearl Harbor and then conquor most of the Pacific Ocean in short order.

Consider the following:
1) While the IJN could damage the naval base, it could hardly be considered to have the capability of destroying it. There werent enough aircraft, and the dive bombers only could carry a 500 pound bomb.

2) "American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave. Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses" .... plus not every fighter and fighter pilot had been knocked out. The time between a 2nd and 3rd strike would have meant the US could put together enough aircraft to inflict damage on the Jpanese 3rd strike.

3) "A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk. The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home"

4) The USN had the resources to rebuild the damaged oil bunkers and refill them within a few months, irregardless of IJN subs.

5) The Japanese light carriers were an odd bunch, and really could not be classified as fleet carriers. The Zuiho and the Ryujo are a case in point. One had elevators to small to handle the val dive bombers, the other didnt have enough speed to allow a fully armed torpedo bomber to take off in light winds. Consider them escort carriers to cover convoys, and not capable for offensive action.

6) The Japanese had to secure the Philipines, Malaya (and Burma),the NEI and Eastern Indian ocean prior to nay offensive action into the SW Pacific.

7) The USN was fully capable of reinforcing Samoa, Fiji and the New Hebrides with enough ground and air units to make a Japanese invasion very costly.

8 ) The fact B17's were present meant the IJN had to move very cautiously outside of their protected area's of the Marshalls and Gilberts.

9) Even if the three carriers at pearl were caught and knocked out of action, the other three carriers would provide plenty of offensive capabilities to blunt or push back any Japanese advances in the central Pacific.

[Soren]

Syscom3,

Freebird is not giving the IJN too much credit at all, you're just giving it too little. As it was the IJN from 41 -42 had the upper hand in capability, it wasn't untill 1943 after repeated setbacks caused by poor tactics & decisions that the IJN lost its upper hand. So in Freebird's scenario the IJN has lots of chances to significantly alter the historic chain of events.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Freebird, youre giving the IJn far to much credit for being able to destroy Pearl Harbor and then conquor most of the Pacific Ocean in short order.

Consider the following:
1) While the IJN could damage the naval base, it could hardly be considered to have the capability of destroying it. There werent enough aircraft, and the dive bombers only could carry a 500 pound bomb.

2) "American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave. Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses" .... plus not every fighter and fighter pilot had been knocked out. The time between a 2nd and 3rd strike would have meant the US could put together enough aircraft to inflict damage on the Japanese 3rd strike.

3) "A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk. The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home"

Syscom, the problem was that they Japanese waited until early afternoon for the search planes to try to find the carriers, if they had been in Pearl that morning the Japanese could have re-armed the first wave as soon as it landed at 10 am, and sent the third wave before the second returned at noon. And while I agree that the "Third wave" might suffer 25 or more planes lost, it would still be worth it.

I think it could work, but I'm not an expert on aircraft so I'll post a poll to see what opinions are.

4) The USN had the resources to rebuild the damaged oil bunkers and refill them within a few months, irregardless of IJN subs.

5) The Japanese light carriers were an odd bunch, and really could not be classified as fleet carriers. The Zuiho and the Ryujo are a case in point. One had elevators to small to handle the val dive bombers, the other didnt have enough speed to allow a fully armed torpedo bomber to take off in light winds. Consider them escort carriers to cover convoys, and not capable for offensive action.

The US certainly would have to rebuild the tanks & repair shops, but the US (and British) were very short on shipping resources, so your re-supply would reduce the amount available to build up in Australia, NZ, etc. The increased Axis sub activity would also mean that your re-supply tankers would have to be escorted, futher draining US naval assets at a time when they are critically short.

Your point about the light carriers is not quite correct, because they did conduct support operations. I didn't contemplate the light carriers for major fleet operations, but for supporting operations in outlying areas, which they did historically. Zuiho & Ryujo performed support operations in the Solomons, China Sea & Indian Oceans. Which carrier did you think was too slow? The Ryujo is listed as capable of 29 knots, Zuiho 28.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Soren

Syscom3,

Freebird is not giving the IJN too much credit at all, you're just giving it too little. As it was the IJN from 41 -42 had the upper hand in capability, it wasn't until 1943 after repeated setbacks caused by poor tactics & decisions that the IJN lost its upper hand. So in Freebird's scenario the IJN has lots of chances to significantly alter the historic chain of events.

Originally Posted by syscom3

Freebird, youre giving the IJn far to much credit for being able to destroy Pearl Harbor and then conquor most of the Pacific Ocean in short order.

Consider the following:

4) The USN had the resources to rebuild the damaged oil bunkers and refill them within a few months, irregardless of IJN subs.

What do you mean irregardless of subs? Will they just keep sending tankers unprotected until some get through? The US does not have enough escorts to bring tankers and support the carriers in 1942. If you mean that they send the Navy to escort oil tankers that would preclude action in the South Pacific

Originally Posted by syscom3

6) The Japanese had to secure the Philipines, Malaya (and Burma),the NEI and Eastern Indian ocean prior to any offensive action into the SW Pacific.

What possible connection is there between the IJA campaign in Burma and the IJN fleet activities in the South Pacific?

Originally Posted by syscom3

7) The USN was fully capable of reinforcing Samoa, Fiji and the New Hebrides with enough ground and air units to make a Japanese invasion very costly.

Actually no, they were not capable at all.

Quoted - Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe

"Sunday Dec 14, 1941. The Navy informed Gen. Marshall that the US Pacific fleet would be unable for SOME MONTHS to participate in offensive actions. The Navy's carriers remained intact but supporting vessels for the carriers were so few in number that great restrictions would have to be placed upon their operation"

You are basing what they "could have done" on 20/20 hindsight on the exact capabilities of the Japanese. At the time there was no way of knowing what the japanese would do, so caution & defense of the USA proper was the #1 concern, not operations in some far-away Pacific location

Originally Posted by syscom3

8 ) The fact B17's were present meant the IJN had to move very cautiously outside of their protected area's of the Marshalls and Gilberts.

Without US carriers to provide any fighter escort the Japanese won't be that concerned about B-17s

Originally Posted by syscom3

9) Even if the three carriers at pearl were caught and knocked out of action, the other three carriers would provide plenty of offensive capabilities to blunt or push back any Japanese advances in the central Pacific.

"Offensive capabilities" in Samoa or New Hebrides is the last thing the Navy is thinking about in the winter of 1941

Quoted - Dwight Eisenhower

In Dec 1941 there was no assurance that the Japanese would not launch a major amphibious assault on Hawaii or possibly even on the mainland, the Navy felt that the carriers should be reserveved for reconnaissance and defence. The garrison in Hawaii was so weak that there was general agreement between the War & Navy departments that Hawaiian air & ground forces should be re-inforced as rapidly as possible and that should take priority over other efforts in the Pacific.

This is how the situation was when the US had all their carriers intact and only a couple of escort vessels damaged at Pearl. In 1941 the USN has about 100 fairly modern destroyers, {+ about 70 older ones decomissioned in reserve that could be used after some overhaul.} If the USN had lost another 25+ destroyers & some cruisers at Pearl in addition to the ones lost in the Fa