This Day in the Battle of Britain

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(7 September 1940 continued....)

It took Duxford's "Big Wing" twenty minutes to gain formation. This had been the first time that the "Big Wing" had officially been involved in large scale operational combat with 11 Group. It was Bader's plan, that his wing of thirty-six fighter planes should be scrambled early and meet the Germans in advance of the Maidstone area, with the purpose of disrupting the German bombers. Once the bombers had been forced to scatter, it would then make it easier for the fighters of 11 Group to attack. The length of time that it took the "Big Wing" to gain formation, was again by far too long. They had to climb to a height of 20,000 feet to put them in an advantageous position. The outcome was that they were attacked by Bf 109s while still climbing, and because of this, they could not make contact with the German bombers at their vectored position near Maidstone. They did however manage to make contact with a German formation over the Thames Estuary and again their results were more than favorable.

From the French coast, the huge armada of German bombers flew in a direct line across the Channel towards the Kent coast, just as they had done on previous occasions. The flight pattern used was also the same as had been done previously, and it was this that had Fighter Command fooled as they were to believe that the airfields were again to be attacked. But on reaching the English coastline, many formations broke into smaller groups, and at their varying altitudes changed direction, criss crossing the flight paths of the formations below them. One group, flew almost north-west, then once over the Guildford area turned north flying over Windsor and Maidenhead, then making a circle around the city of London, headed towards their target of the dock area and industrial borough of West Ham. One large formation started to head towards the west of London, while another turned to the north-east as if to go up the east coast of Essex and Suffolk. The first formation consisting of eighty bombers in three flights with heavy fighter escort, made its way up the Thames River towards London at 1700 hours. Two other groups, once over the coast near Beachy Head turned north as if to make towards the coast of Essex, but once over the Thames close to the Isle of Sheppy, turned west following the River Thames until they reached the London docks and West Ham. Another group took the direct line and from the coast of Kent flew directly towards the east end of London. For the Luftwaffe, it was a well thought out plan. They succeeded in confusing Fighter Command who had no idea that the Luftwaffe target was London's dockland area and the industrial and heavily populated east end.

RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) made some inroads to the north of Rochester, but the first load of bombs had already been unleashed on the oil storage tanks at Thameshaven which was still burning from the raid the previous day. There was little chance that they could get near to the bombers as they were outnumbered by ten to one by the Bf 109 escorts. The Hurricanes of RAF No.249 Sqd suffered badly at the hands of the Bf 109s over Maidstone and lost six aircraft. Park wanted to know where the Duxford wing had got to and remarked that they should have intercepted the German bombers in the vicinity of Rochford and Maidstone, where the addition of thirty-six fighters could have assisted RAF No.501 Sqd and RAF No.249 Sqd and made more of an impact on splitting up the bomber formation. The Heinkels and Dorniers with their escort of Bf 109s and Bf 110s continued the path along the Thames although many of the escorts had to turn back because of their fuel situation, and some of the bombers had turned back after unleashing their bombs on Thameshaven. But as many as 230 continued on towards London with no British fighters there to infiltrate or stop their progress.

With the Spitfires and Hurricanes kept busy on the fringes of their flight path, the German bombers flew at a much higher altitude than normal escaping the bursting shells from the anti aircraft fire down below. The bombers flew towards London as if in a great procession, with different formations flying at different levels. While this huge formation continued its course along the Thames, the other large formation that was approaching from the south was intercepted by RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) over Dartford in Kent and slightly to the south-east of London. The mixture of Dorniers and Heinkels was again protected by their Bf 109 escorts. The RAF No.609 Sqd squadron leader positioned his squadron to attack when suddenly the bombers changed direction, ready for their attack on the dockland area of London. The coordinated attack by RAF No.609 Sqd was now off guard. It appeared that Fighter Command was not going to gain the upper hand. There were just far too many bombers and escorts. RAF No.609 Sqd managed to destroy two Dorniers, two Bf 110s and a Bf 109 and surprisingly without loss to themselves.

The vast mixture of Dornier Do17s, Heinkel He 111s and Junkers Ju 88s first dropped their bombs with great accuracy on Woolwich Arsenal on the south side of the River Thames and the entrance to London's dockland. Helmut Staal, in the leading flight of bombers of II./KG 76, reported,
"It had been an easy flight up from the Thames Estuary and along the Thames. There was no opposition and we felt that we had the whole sky to ourselves, we were at 5.000 feet. The docks at Woolwich stood out almost as if beckoning for us to release our bombload. Through the glass canopy I could see tall cranes and the long square shape of the three main docks, I lined them up carefully, and as I pressed the release button I looked elsewhere at the huge mass of buildings and warehouses below then just caught a glimpse of the sticks of bombs as they kinked from side to side as they fell towards earth."
The huge factory of Harland and Woolfe suffered almost total destruction, and the munitions factory at Woolwich was also hit. Here the shells for the Army were manufactured, and with just one hit the gunpowder storage bins erupted causing great sheets of flame to rise hundreds of feet into the air. Another wave of bombers rained their bomb loads down on the Royal docks at North Woolwich. Queen Victoria dock, King George V dock, Royal Albert dock and many backwaters blazed from end to end. Large ships that had brought in supplies were hit and themselves were on fire. Other important docks at Millwall, Wapping right up to St Katherine's dock near Tower Bridge were ablaze. Some forty miles of warehouses along the Thames had been hit and were a blazing fury. Many people had to be evacuated by boat. "Send all the pumps you've got," pleaded one fire officer, "the whole bloody world's on fire." One of the problems facing the fire-fighters was that the level of the Thames had fallen in the dry summer and they had difficulty in getting their pumps to work.

But it was not just the docks themselves that suffered this unforeseen onslaught. The heavily populated area of London's east end was regarded as the poorer side of the city. These were the battling workers, the slums, a different class of people that resided to the south and to the west of London. West Ham, Silvertown, Canning Town, East Ham, Poplar, Stratford, Wapping and Whitechapel all became enveloped in a blazing fury. Factories and terraced houses were destroyed. The fire brigades in all the suburbs were fighting a losing battle that was to continue on for another four hours as wave after wave of German bombers came over and dropped, instantaneous, incendiaries.
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(7 September 1940 continued......)

Finally realizing that London was the target, RAF Fighter Command scrambled a few fighter squadrons and intercepted the bombers as they returned to France, mauling the withdrawing attackers especially the escorting Bf 110s who were at their maximum range and were forced to withdraw from the combat as quickly as possible. If it was to be any advantage to Fighter Command, while the bombers were over the east end of London, their Bf 109 escorts had long since made the return trip back to their bases because of the fuel situation. This was to be one of the longest and busiest days so far for the pilots. Time and time again they had to return back to base for refueling and rearming. Two, three, four even maybe five sorties in one day. But as the bombers turned back and headed for home, the Spitfires and Hurricanes tore into the defenseless and unescorted bombers.

RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn had left Northolt with 11 Hurricanes, heading towards Essex. They were to rendezvous with RAF No. 1 Squadron which took off first. F/Lt. Forbes took the Squadron to 24,000 ft. and got into position above and partially up sun, waiting for a formation of about 40 Do 17s with Bf 109s. RAF No. 1 attacked first and then F/Lt. Forbes led the Squadron in an attack on the Bomber's quarter head on out of the sun. RAF No. 303 claimed 10 Do17s and 3 Bf109s destroyed and 2 Do17s and 2 Bf109s probable while losing P/O. Daszewski wounded and taken to Waldershire Hospital Selstead,.

But while seven RAF Squadrons fired on the first wave of bombers leaving London, more German bombers approached the city and dropped their loads. Between 1745 hours and 1810 hours, wave after wave of German aircraft attacked the city. Although, Spitfires and Hurricanes were dispatched as each flight was detected and intercepted, enough bombers reached their targets and dropped their loads that by evening, the East End docks were in flames. Bombs had fallen on the areas of Poplar, Woolwich, Limehouse, Tottenham, Barking and Croydon, causing heavy destruction and numerous fires.

Leigh-Mallory's "Big Wing" that had missed the interception of the incoming bombers, managed to attack the first wave after they had dropped their bombload and headed for home. All squadrons were still airborne even as light started to fade and eventually Fighter Command had to be content in letting the bombers return unmolested in the dark.

But all was not finished. At 20:22 hours, as many of the attacking bombers were returning home, another wave was crossing the Kent coast at Beachy Head. They could hardly be seen against the night sky, and what a target they would have been if Fighter Command had an effective night fighter squadron available, as this formation did not have the protection of a Bf 109 escort. The flames from the dock areas burned through the night, lighting the way for Hugo Sperle's Luftflotte 3 bomber formations onto the city in the first of a coordinated Luftwaffe day and night attack. Because of a possibility of collision during the night, Luftflotte 3 sent those units that were not engaged during the day, in continuous single aircraft flights, all following the same route over London. The fires allowed the bombers to achieve an almost 90% accuracy when 333 tons of explosive and 13,000 incendiaries were dropped on the city throughout the evening. The bombing continued well into the night, in fact, the total bombing lasted for seven hours. The last bomber dropped its load at 0430 hours.

On hearing about the destruction, Göring, so pleased with himself, immediately telegraphed his wife Emmy and told her that "....the English have had enough". He also broadcast on German radio to the German people, that this being the first blow while he had been in charge of the battle, over half of London now lay in ruins and that he had struck a serious blow...straight at the enemy's heart. "London is in flames!" he bellowed. The Berlin press and propaganda machine stated that the attack on London was a reprisal attack for the British bombing of Berlin. They stated that the air raids on London of the 7th/8th September was a great success and that the British people would now be frightened into submission now that the glorious Luftwaffe not only caused a great firestorm from the city to the edge of the Thames Estuary, but during the afternoon an already depleted British Air Force was overcome by the might of the Luftwaffe.

So began the Night Blitz. Every night, except for one single night, for the next seventy-six nights, London experienced raids of from sixty to 260 German bombers each evening, causing more destruction and damage.

Losses: Luftwaffe 41: Fighter Command 26.

By the end of the combined attack, the Luftwaffe had lost forty-one aircraft including sixteen Bf 109s with eleven of the pilots becoming Prisoners of War, including Oblt. Hans Krug of 4./JG 26 with nine victories and Ofw. Gotthard Goltzsche of 1./JG 77. Several were missing in action like Ofw. Fritz Ströhlein of 2./JG 51 with five victories and Uffz. Willi Melchert from 5./JG 2. But the RAF also lost pilots when twenty-eight fighters were shot down during the battle with thirteen pilots killed or missing. Several Experten added to their scores including Kommodore Major Mölders, when he downed a Spitfire over London. Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 reached twenty-five kills with the destruction of a Spitfire and Major Hannes Trautloft of Stab./JG 54 reached seven kills with a Hurricane shot down over Maidstone. Double kill claims were awarded to Ofw. Georg Schott of 2.(J)/LG 2, Uffz. Günther Seeger of 3./JG 2, Ofw. Max Buchholz of 1./JG 3, Lt. Helmut Meckel of 1./JG 3, Lt. Heinz Ebeling of 9./JG 26, Oblt. Hermann Staiger of 7./JG 51 and Oblt. Wilhelm Hobein of 5./ZG 76. Ofw. Erich Rudorffer of 2./JG 2 was awarded the destruction of three Spitfires over the Thames Estuary. After 147 combat missions over England, Ofw. Heinrich Hoffmann of 3./JG 51 claimed his first victory, when he shot down a RAF Spitfire fighter.

The British were surprised and disheartened by the day's activities. The Luftwaffe had succeeded in heavily attacking London with little interference from Fighter Command. Part of this was because of a new tactic ordered by Reichsmarschall Göring that the Jagdwaffe would now stay with the bombers as protection. With almost double and sometimes triple the number of fighters over bombers, the RAF had a hard time getting to the bombers. But this tactic also reduced the effectiveness of the German fighter and many pilots hated this order. As the Staffelkapitän of 2./JG 26, Fritz Losigkeit, stated;
" When we escorted the first sorties against London, it rained Spitfires and Hurricanes. Because the bombers flew quite slowly, we constantly had to dance backwards and forwards in order to stay with them. If they made a sharp left or right turn, we broke away and had to get back to the bombers because the English fighters immediately went for the gaps."
But the tactic worked for now as London burned. It had proved to be, the largest bombing raid ever made against a British city and claimed the lives of 448 civilians and a further 1,337 were seriously injured as rows of houses, buildings and warehouses collapsed into the inferno. Mr Albert Ernest Dolphin (b. 1896), a porter, died when he flung himself under a falling wall, saving the life of a nurse trapped after a bomb hit the South-Eastern Hospital, New Cross. (George Cross)

GERMANY: One of the largest flying boats ever built, the Blohm and Voss BV 222 'Wiking' prototype was first flown. Piloted by Flugkapitaen Helmut Rodig, the six engined aircraft was also destined to be one of the largest flying boats to become operational during the war. Soon after the test flights, the flying boat was fitted with enlarged doors for transport duties with the Luftwaffe.

WESTERN FRONT: After undergoing night-fighter training and spending a short spell at the Erprobungsstelle Rechlin, Oblt. Gordon Gollob, ex-Staffelkapitän of 3./ZG 76, was transferred to II./JG 3 based on the Channel front.

Hptm. Max Dobislav was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 27 in place of Hptm. Joachim Schlichting. Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 was transferred to the 9 Staffel of JG 2.

Oblt. Helmut Lent was appointed Staffelkapitän of 6./NJG 1, based at Deelen in Holland. Initially he could not come to terms with the different techniques required for night fighting.
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8 September 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM
: The last of the German bombers left London and headed for home hoping to cross the Channel before the first light of day emerged. With the exception of the hour just before 2000 hours, London had been subjected to nearly twelve hours of continuous bombing.

As the first light of 8 September started to break through, the picture of the experiences of the late afternoon bombing and the continued onslaught throughout the night began to emerge. The East End probably suffered the worst, but serious damage was done to areas south of the River Thames as well as the outer city areas between Aldgate and Ludgate Hill. Fires were still raging in bond stores and the dock areas around North Woolwich. Nothing escaped the tons of bombs and incendiaries that were dropped. The Royal Albert Dock, Queen Victoria Dock and King George V Dock were burning infernos, ships were damaged and the industrial areas of Custom House, Silvertown and Canning Town were still burning fiercely as raw materials added fuel to the timbers and structure of the many buildings. On the other side of the road, homes were demolished and others so badly damaged that they became uninhabitable. The damage went as far inland as Barking, East Ham, West Ham and Bethnal Green, areas that were highly populated and classed as residential. South of the Thames, the situation was almost as bad, and what made this worse, was the fact that most of the south side was residential until reaching Deptford. Again, as north of the Thames, houses were demolished, others became unrecognizable as walls and roofs lay in shambles in back gardens and in roadways.

The huge pall of smoke bellowing from the warehouses and docks could be seen for miles. Fires raged right up to London's Tower Bridge where the St. Katherine's Dock which lies almost adjacent was engulfed in flame. The area of Wapping where hundreds of bond stores and shipwright stores were built on top of each other separated only by a network of narrow streets, was ablaze. Firemen and ambulance men had a terrible time in this area as many of the streets had been blocked by fallen brick walls and burst water mains. Whole streets had been destroyed and many other houses demolished. But the people of East London gathered their possessions together and piled them into perambulators and carried on with their usual amazing spirit. To many Londoners' this had been the first time that they had really experienced the effects of saturation bombing. After almost twelve hours of non-stop continuous bombing, the people emerged from shelters, basements and underground stations, wherever they thought that may have been safe. Many had heard on the radio overnight that "German Military forces have been reported to have landed on the south coast of England....." and many were afraid to emerge. But on the early morning news broadcasts it was confirmed that no enemy paratroop sightings had been made, nor had any German ships or barges crossed the Channel during the night and that it was perfectly safe with no need to confine oneself into an air raid shelter. But for those at Fighter Command, and at the sector and satellite stations, today was to be just 'another day at the office'.

Much of the morning was quiet with several Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights off Start Point, Portland, East Anglia and the Estuary, the Isle of Wight and Beachy Head. The only action of any significance was a Spitfire claimed shot down at 09:40 hours. The claim was denied to the fighter pilot, one Fhr. Hans-Joachim Marseille of 1.(J)/LG 2.

The main Luftwaffe raid of the day was a formation of about 100 aircraft sent to attack the airfields around Kent and Essex. At around 11:30 hours, the formation of about twenty Do17 bombers with thirty Bf 109s of JG 2 and JG 53 as escort crossed the coast near Deal as it headed on a north-westerly course. RAF No.41 Sqd. (Spitfires), already on routine patrol, were vectored towards the Dover area, while RAF No.46 Sqd. (Hurricanes), RAF No.222 Sqd. (Spitfires) and RAF No.605 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were scrambled to intercept. RAF No.41 Sqd. was first on the scene as the formation began crossing the coast at Deal. The Spitfires dived in to attack the bombers but the Bf 109s were soon onto them and they were forced to engage combat with the Bf 109s while the bomber formation continued across Kent. One of the Bf 109s took a hit but did not crash. One Spitfire was seen to leave a trail of smoke, and disappeared from the scene.

RAF No.41 Sqd. were hopelessly outnumbered fighting the Bf 109s on their own, but were relieved when RAF No.46 Sqd. arrived followed soon after by RAF No.605 Sqd. One of the Hurricanes of RAF No.46 Sqd. was damaged by a Bf 109 and was forced to break off and return to base. Within minutes while over the Isle of Sheppy another Hurricane of RAF No.46 Sqd. was shot down, the pilot managed to bale out but was dead when found by wardens, his aircraft having crashed at Bearsted. One of the Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqd. became involved with a Bf 109 over Tunbridge and took heavy cannon fire. The British pilot managed to bale out and the aircraft crashed and exploded in flames at Trottiscliffe. The Bf 109s swept in again, and in quick succession claimed two more Hurricanes of RAF No.46 Sqd.

Although badly mauled, RAF No. 46 Sqd. kept up the attack, and together with RAF No. 222 Sqd. and RAF No. 605 Sqd. chased one of the Bf 109s and shot it down near Sevenoaks while two Hurricanes moved in and finally brought down one of the Do17s over Maidstone. Forcing the scattered Dorniers inland, many came under attack by AA gunfire in which two more of the bombers were brought down, both near Maidstone. The bomber formations failed to reach their target which was to be London, and were turned back. Some bombs were dropped in Kent, particularly in rural areas near Dartford where a fire broke out at a station. At West Malling a large number of bombs were apparently directed at the Aerodrome at 1234 hours. In the neighborhood telephones, water and gas services, 50 houses and the Southern Railway line were damaged and road A20 was blocked. Detling was bombed at 1300 hours. Otherwise little serious damage was caused and casualties were small.

Lost in the dogfights was Oblt. Hans Kunert of 8./JG 53 who was killed in the action. He had nine victories against the Allies. But several pilots claimed kills against the RAF including three Hurricanes by Oblt. Helmut Wick of 6./JG 2 whose score now stood at twenty-eight victories. Oblt. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2 reached fifteen kills with a Hurricane destroyed and Oblt. Ignaz Prestele of 2./JG 53, Oblt. Franz Götz of 7./JG 53 and Lt. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 each added a Hurricane to their scoreboard.
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(8 september 1940 continued......)

The second attack was on a smaller scale, and commencing at 1930 hours, was directed to the London area. It appeared to be the prelude to the night operations. The air raid sirens sounded again in London as bombers from Luftflotte 3 including Do17s, He 111s and Ju 88s crossed the Coast between Beachy Head and Shoreham. It was now almost dark, too late for Fighter Command to do anything about it. Again, as it was on the previous night all the bombers were loaded with high explosive bombs, delayed action bombs and incendiaries. Londoners were subjected to the steady, dull drone of the engines of some 250 bombers overhead, then, the drone was broken by the sudden shrill whistling sound as sticks of bombs came down, the whistle getting louder as the bombs got to a few hundred feet above them.

Luftwaffe raids continued to penetrate the London area from dusk onwards in a steady stream, originating from Cherbourg. As nighttime arrived, a large formation of bombers, He 111's, Ju 88's and Do17's, approached the Thames area at altitude, giving away their target of London and once more bombs rained down on the docklands and surrounding areas throughout the night claiming the lives of hundreds of people. There were continuously about five raids in the area. There was a lull about 0100 hours, but by 0200 hours activity had increased, with about twenty raids in the South Eastern counties, including the London area. Many of the warehouses along the Thames again became targets, and buildings that were still burning were re-stoked. The inferno was to light up once again, with hundreds of fires, many joining together to become one. The damage was to be more widespread on this night as bombers targeted more inland residential areas, while others again went for railway stations and city buildings. Major fires were reported in several districts including - Commercial Road East, Twickenham (a timber yard), Borough High Street (next to a Gunpowder Factory), Surrey Commercial Docks, Greenwich, Wandsworth (Vacuum Oil Co) and at Wimbledon Station (train fired). Also hit were County Hall, London Hospital, St Thomas' Hospital, the London Fire Brigade Station (Whitechapel), LMS Junction at East Ham and a public shelter at Islington. Every Metropolitan borough and 60 local authority areas reported bomb damage, large fires overtaking Berger Paints in Homerton, Madame Tussauds and Baker Street. Three hospitals were hit, Fulham Power Station was set on fire and many bombs dropped indiscriminately fell close to the Thames. Major incidents occurred at Acton, Leyton, Poplar and at Broad Street Station. the Embankment was flooded at Chelsea.

The casualty rate on this night totaled 412 people dead with 747 injured. Compared to the previous night, that was more people killed, but the injured list was much lighter. At Victoria Station a train was hit and the driver killed. All the tracks were blocked between London Bridge and New Cross. No trains were run between Waterloo and Clapham Junction, all due to the presence of unexploded bombs.

Losses: Luftwaffe 25 : Fighter Command 6.

The Luftwaffe lost twenty-five aircraft damaged or destroyed, including one He 111 from KG 55 that crashed on the return flight at Villacoublay airfield, France due to damage from anti-aircraft fire, thirty pilots and aircrew killed or missing and seven wounded. 5./KG 27 were assigned to a night nuisance raid on Liverpool. Taking off from Brest shortly before 23.00 hours, a He 111P-2 failed to lift off the runway, struck obstacles at the end of its run, crashed and burned. Fw. Heinz Klempien (FF) and Gefr. Kurt Bengeser (BO) were killed and Gefr. Willi Hey (BS) was injured.

For Fighter Command the afternoon period was quiet, with no activity at all. Personnel at all of the aerodromes were now working in far more pleasant circumstances to repair damaged airfields. It had been two whole days, and not one of Fighter Commands aerodromes had suffered any enemy attack. It was just what Air Vice Marshal Keith Park (Commander of 11 Group) wanted. Airfield damage had been repaired, damaged buildings were being made habitable and aircraft were either being repaired or undergoing minor servicing thus building up squadron strength which in Park's view would be . . .
" Göring's greatest mistake, and one that would cost him the Battle of Britain."
The Luftwaffe was losing the initiative.
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According to Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin:

August 25 - 31
Hurricanes - 54 (+9 imported from Canada)
Spitfires - 37
Total - 100

September 1 - 7
Hurricanes - 54
Spitfires - 36
Total - 90

16 Hurricanes were sent abroad between 25 Aug and 7 Sept.

Edit: corrected the numbers, had the wrong weeks down first time.
 
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Thanks Hop. Anybody know if any of these were used for the shipping to Malta? Operation Hurry and Operation Coat? Might have reduced the number.

duh. I guess thats the ones sent abroad.
 
Thanks Hop.

Looks like the Spit production was 5 per day. The RAF would have at sit out a couple of weeks just to bring its Spifire totals up to an acceptable level.
 
9 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM
: Besides an early morning attack on a trawler, 25 miles east of Lowestoft, the Luftwaffe was inactive for the first part of the day. It was now obvious to Dowding and Park that the Luftwaffe was going to leave the 11 Group aerodromes alone. Already damaged airfields were just about back to a reasonable sort of order, the personnel that had been toiling both night and day busily rebuilding to make all airfields fully operational again could ease off a little. Aircraft and supplies had been replenished and although Fighter Command was nowhere yet back to full strength, they were a lot stronger than they were just seven days ago. Again, no German formations were detected during the morning or the early and mid afternoon sessions.

Luftwaffe tactics when targeting the aerodromes, commenced generally with a morning attack - with the last few days, when the aerodromes had been left alone, there had been no early morning attacks. It seemed that bombing raids on London were forming a pattern of commencing a few hours after midday. Park issued the order that Hornchurch, Biggin Hill and Kenley push some of their squadrons forward to their satelite stations.

Apart from patrols in Calais/Boulogne area, there was little German activity until 1605 hours when the formations began to mass in the Calais/Boulogne area. From 1655 hours on, an attack of some 300 aircraft on the South East crossed the Coast between North Foreland and Cover. A number of Bf 109s this time were slightly ahead of the main bomber force, obviously hoping that they would draw British fighters into the air. Air Vice Marshal Keith Park instructed that the advance party of Bf 109s were to be left alone. With the German bombers following a similar course as they did just two days previous, it seemed obvious that the target was again London. Park exclaimed to his controllers;
"When will they ever learn.....same time, same course and the same target I would say."
Twenty-four Squadrons of British fighters were detailed to this attack, inflicting heavy casualties.

RAF No. 66 Sqd.(Spitfires) and RAF No. 92 Squadron (Spitfires) were ordered to patrol over South London keeping both aerodromes within sight. RAF No.222 Sqd. (Spitfires), RAF No. 253 Sqd. (Hurricanes) and RAF No.605 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were to cover the northern section of Kent, while later RAF No. 303 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were ordered to patrol from Tonbridge to Folkestone. From Tangmere, RAF No.607 Sqd. (Hurricanes) were ordered towards Guildford to cover the area over Surrey as far as Biggin Hill.

Finally from 12 Group Duxford released RAF No.19 Sqdn (Spitfires), RAF No.242 Sqdn (Hurricanes) and RAF No.310 (Czech) Sqdn (Hurricanes) and they were vectored to a point between Hornchurch and North Weald and at 20,000 feet provided close protection in the absence of the 11 Group fighters. Again Bader was to ignore orders. the late afternoon sun would be setting in the west by the time they would be near London, and he wanted to make any attack with the sun behind him so he ordered the squadrons to the west of London and climb to 22,000 feet.

RAF No.607 Sqdn Tangmere (Hurricanes) were one of the first British squadrons to make contact. A leading formation of He 111s and Do17s with a Bf 109 escort from JG 3 and JG 26 were just to the east of Guildford heading towards Weybridge and Brooklands. The Hurricanes lined up the formation and went in before the escorts could get down at them. Coming in just in time was RAF No.605 Sqdn who also commenced an attack on the bombers. One Do17 was brought down by RAF No.607 Sqdn, but one of the Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqdn collided with a He 111, shearing off a portion of the wing while taking evasive action in trying to avoid gunfire from both the RAF No.607 Sqdn Hurricanes, the bombers and Bf 109s. The Heinkel crashed at Alton in Hampshire. Sadly No. 607 squadron had suffered six aircraft lost on their first day in action. Another Hurricane of RAF No.605 was hit by crossfire and the pilot baled out safely.

Twelve Hurricanes of RAF No.303 (Polish) Sqdrn were scrambled and led by F/Lt. Kent. Victories over Bf 109s were claimed by Zumbach and Frantisek, while a Bf 110 was shot down by F/Lt. Kent. Sgt. Frantisek also claimed a kill over a He 111, but it was awarded as a 'probable' (the Heinkel actually made it back to base, with two crew members killed and one wounded). Sgt. Wunsche was shot down and he baled out, while Sgt. Frantisek crash-landed, uninjured - his Hurricane totally destroyed.

Up to 1730 hours the main trend was towards the Estuary and South London, though one raid of about thirty-five aircraft penetrated to Central London. This bomber formation was approaching London from the east when they were intercepted by RAF No.222 Sqdn and RAF No.242 Sqdn. The German formation consisted of Do17s and Bf 110s with Bf 109 escorts from JG 27, JG 53 and JG 54. RAF No.222 Sqdn made their attack and claimed a damaged Do 17 but P/O Tim Vigors was attacked by Bf 109s, found his engine shattered by cannon fire and was forced to crash land his aircraft. Although RAF No.19 Sqd. had been scattered, by now they had reformed and were joined by RAF No.310 (Czech) Sqdn and the 'Big Wing' was now in place and about to show how thirty-three fighter aircraft could cause havoc amongst the Germans. Sqn. Ldr. Bader led the 'Duxford Wing' in the battles over Kent and Surrey with Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron and Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 242 and 310 (Czech) Squadrons where they engaged the Do17s and Bf110s. Between them, they were to claim twenty-one German aircraft destroyed with many others damaged and a few claimed as probables. If Bader had adhered to orders, they would have been flying helplessly around North Weald and Hornchurch which neither was attacked. AVM Park would have lodged an official complaint for the Duxford Wing disobeying orders, but in light of its success, no complaint was ever lodged.

While the combat action by the 'Big Wing' over South London was still in progress, most of the British squadrons were still in the air scattering the German bomber formations from Thames Haven to West London. By now the sky was once again full of contrails as the aerial battles raged for around 90 minutes and had involved nearly 300 German aircraft along with Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 242, 253, 303, 310, 605 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 41, 66, 92, 222, 602 and 611 Squadrons. RAF No. 92 Sqdrn lost three Spitfires in a battle over its Biggin Hill base. But the great significance of the day was that very few bombers got through to their targets.
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(9 September 1940 continued....)

Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park had more time to assess the situation and give the British greater time to intercept the Germans. AVM Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command were that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organization than the tattered remnants of a defeated defense as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may order the formation to disengage. This order was given by the German High Command.

Adhering to the instruction from Gruppe Headquarters to "Break off task if fighter opposition is too strong" the German raid was aborted. Many bombers instead dropped their loads over the countryside, causing little damage. Some bombs were dropped in the London suburbs south of the River. Bombs were also dropped in Kent, notably at Canterbury. Casualties were few. The remnant of the German formations made the most of their retreat back across the Channel and although Fighter Command did sustain a number of losses, it could only be claimed as being not only a tactical victory for the RAF but a morale boosting one as well.

The Luftwaffe lost twenty-eight aircraft for the day while the RAF had lost nineteen fighters. JG 27 was among the hardest hit with Uffz. Karl Born of 7./JG 27 killed in action and the Gruppe-Adjutant Oblt. Günther Bode of Stab I./JG 27 and Oblt. Erwin Daig, the Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 27, both forced down and taken prisoner. Oblt. Bode's Bf 109 was hit in the radiator on the first pass by Spitfires near London. He turned for home but the engine overheated and he made a forced landing near Mayfield. Oblt. Daig was attacked by Spitfires at 20,000 feet and hit in his fuel and engine cooling system. He made a forced landing at Charity Farm near Parham. Both Messerschmitts were used as displays by the British for several months. Uffz. Heinrich Höhnisch of 1./JG 53 was also shot down and made a prisoner of war.

But the victors of the battle were many for the German side. Though there was much overclaiming on both sides, the Luftwaffe gave credit to several notable Jagdflieger. Kommodore Major Werner Mölders of Stab./JG 51 got his thirty-fifth victory over the RAF when he downed another Spitfire over London. The Kommodore's brother, Oblt. Viktor Mölders of 2./JG 51 got a Spitfire for his eighth victory. Oblt. Gerhard Schöpfel of 9./JG 26 shot down three Spitfires from RAF No 92 Squadron over the Thames Estuary. Double victories were credited to Lt. Eberhard Bock of 3./JG 3, Oblt. Erich Woitke of 6./JG 3, Oblt. Jakob Stoll of 9./JG 53, Lt. Hans Götz of 1./JG 54 and Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Joppien of 1./JG 51. Also getting credit for kills were Major Dr. Erich Mix of Stab III./JG 2, Hptm. Günther Lützow of Stab./JG 3, Oblt. Willy Stange of 8./JG 3, Oblt. Wolfgang Redlich of 1./JG 27, Oblt. Erbo Graf von Kageneck of 8./JG 27, Lt. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 and Oblt. Hans-Ekkehard Bob of 9./JG 54.

The after dark attacks continued. What Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 had failed to do during the day, Sperle's Luftflotte 3 succeeded at night. The usual stream of raids started to come out of Cherbourg and the Somme about 2000 hours, crossing the coast between Isle of Wight and Dungeness, all proceeding to the London area, where again four to five raids of 250 bombers were maintained for most of the period. Fires were burning around St Paul's and buildings on both sides of Ludgate Hill were ablaze. Major fires were reported in Barbican, Cheapside to Cannon Street (where a building collapsed), Bow, Blackwall and Southwark. The area around the Guildhall and the Bank of England suffered considerably, while a women's hospital suffered many casualties when it was hit. In the East End bombs again fell on the dockland area and a number of nearby residential houses were destroyed including a school which was being used as a temporary shelter to homeless families. Altogether, over 400 people were killed on this night's attacks and 1,400 people were injured. The toll was steadily mounting.

From about 0230 hours the method of approach changed and Luftwaffe activity increased. Raids had by this time practically ceased to come out of the French Coast and were replaced by a larger series of raids from the Dutch Islands via the Thames Estuary into the London area, homing over Dungeness. Soon after 0430 hours the last raids were leaving the London area and by 0455 hours the country was clear of German raids.

German aircraft visited the areas of Birmingham, Liverpool, Derby and Nottingham about midnight. Bombers of I./KG 27 took off from Tours, France and raided the city of Liverpool but no major damage was reported. The Lancashire Steel Corporation's Works were hit and a Blast Furnace damaged.

It was not known at the time, but this was to be the commencement of a fifty-seven day long onslaught by the German bombers on London. They were determined to crush the city and its people.

WESTERN FRONT: The OKL issued a report for 9 September:
"The maintaining of the attack against London is intended to take place by day through Luftflotte 2 with strong fighter and destroyer units; by night Luftflotte 3 will carry out attacks with the object of destroying harbor areas, the supply and power sources of the city. The city is divided into two target areas, the eastern part of London is target A with its widely stretched out harbor installations. Target area B is the west of London, which contains the power supplies and the provision installations of the city. Along with this major attack on London the destruction raids will be carried on as much as possible against many sectors of the armament industry and harbor areas in England in their previous scope."
Oblt. Helmut Wick was promoted to Hauptmann and appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 2. Hptm Franz-Heinz Lange took over as Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 77 when Hptm Karl Hentschel transferred out.

GERMANY: Press sources report that all Berlin householders have received printed instructions urging them to stay at home and retire early to enable them to sleep for several hours before midnight. They are asked to set their alarm clocks for midnight and to remain dressed.
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10 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM
: Low cloud and periods of heavy rain over Northern Europe stopped any form of Luftwaffe air activity and any operations planned against England had to be canceled. For Fighter Command the day was nothing but a rest day and pilots and command leaders were trying to work out as to why Germany had decided to turn its attacks against London. If an invasion was Germany's highest priority, why the decision to bomb London? For an invasion to be successful, Germany would have to knock out as many military establishments as possible. As ACM Keith Park stated after the war,
"The decision to bomb London was Germany's greatest mistake, in those first few days of September our airfields were a shambles, pilot and aircraft strength was still at an all time low. By switching tactics and concentrating on London he will give us the time we need to strengthen our forces."
Of the attacks of the previous nights, some newspapers made comparisons to the blitzkrieg attacks on a number of towns and cities in northern Europe, and many of the Londoner's abbreviated the name and called the attacks on their city as "The Blitz" and from then on, the name stuck.

For most of the morning there were occasional reconnaissance raids along the South and East Anglian coasts. Small scale attacks were on Portsmouth, Tangmere, Poling and West Malling. At 1230 hours one Dornier crossed the coast near Hastings, penetrated to Central London, and flew out East near Clacton. Two raids, of which one was a Ju 88 flying along Norfolk Coast, flew from Yarmouth to Harwich, and a further raid attacked Yarmouth. Fighter Command decided to leave them alone.

Bomber Command sent RAF No.248 Squadron (Blenheims) on a mission to Norway but this had to be aborted because of deteriorating weather conditions over the North Sea. A flight from RAF No.236 Squadron St Eval (Blenheims) was placed on escort duty for the steamship 'Scillonian' and the mission was successfully completed.

With cloud cover persisting during the late afternoon, British radar picked up various single aircraft coming across the Channel from 1700 hours onwards. With Fighter Command again not responding, a number of attacks were made by the Luftwaffe. A couple of lone bombers ventured into 10 Group territory and made some nuisance drops.

At 1605 hours Tangmere reported that it had come under machine-gun strafing along the tarmac from a Bf 110 or Do17. Another lone raider attacked West Malling again but caused no serious damage. Bombs were dropped on the Aerodrome at 1732 hours; a slight fire resulted and there was one casualty to personnel. Nearby Portsmouth was attacked by single Do17s. Bombs were dropped at a few places, mostly on the coast, in the South East of England. Damage was done to the Southern Railway's Electricity sub-station at Newhaven. The Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 along with the long-range fighters of ZG 26 attacked the Supermarine aircraft plant at Woolston.

RAF No.72 Squadron (Spitfires) was one of the few squadrons scrambled and attacked one of the roaming Do 215s and one was brought down, although one of the Spitfires was hit by return gunfire from the bomber and had to make a forced landing at Etchingham (Kent). Just after 1800 hours, a small German formation crossed the coast near Dungeness and targeted Biggin Hill aerodrome, but were intercepted by British fighters and one of the Dorniers of 9./KG 76 was shot down and the mission aborted. Another Spitfire Squadron, RAF No. 602, based at Westhampnett suffered the loss of 3 aircraft trying to land at Tangmere after the raid had dispersed at about 2000 hours. This was due to inexperienced pilots trying to land in fading light at dusk.

By nightfall, the Luftwaffe was again targeting London and this time they were making full use of the cloud cover. Also taking advantage of the weather, attacks were made on industrial areas of South Wales and on the Lancashire area of Merseyside. London was though, the main target where over 150 bombers pounded the city once again. The major damage in the London area caused by bombs during the night, were St Katherine's Dock where a raging fire was out of control, at Islington, in the City (Golden Lane and Aldgate Avenue) at Shadwell where East End Maternity Hospital was set on fire, a major fire on Cable Street, at London Docks (2 large warehouses on fire), at Milwall (Hydraulic Mains burst), in the Mile End Road, a major fire at Durrell's Timber Yard, at Paddington, St Marylebone and Bayswater Road. At Brentwood over 1,000 incendiary bombs were dropped and serious fires were started at a Convent and a Woolworth's Store. At 2220 hours three He 111s of II./KG 27 raided the city of Bristol again.

WESTERN FRONT: Reichsmarschall Göring ordered that if the weather situation prevented large-scale operations against London, then surprise daylight attacks by individual bomber aircraft were also to be made on targets associated with the British aircraft industry. These were to be undertaken by crews specially selected for their skill and experience, and were only to be flown in low cloud and often appalling conditions in an attempt to prevent interception by RAF fighters. The missions became known to the Luftwaffe crews as 'Pirateneinsatze' or Pirate Attacks. Epr.Gr 210 and ZG 26, with about ninety aircraft, were temporarily transferred to Luftflotte 3 to carry on these raids.

But RAF Bomber Command also took advantage of the weather conditions. Seventeen Whitleys attacked the Pottsdamer railway station at Berlin causing considerable damage, then went on to attack the Bremen dock area while a Blenheim squadron attacked the important bomber aerodrome at Eindhoven. Eight Heinkel He111 bombers were destroyed, two were badly damaged and another was damaged when it crashed into craters upon landing later.

GrossAdmiral Erich Raeder commented in a report;
"There is no sign of the defeat of the enemy's Air Force over southern England or the Channel areas."
The N.B.B.S., the radio station in pay of the Germans issued an appeal:
"We ask our compatriots to join us in a last effort to secure peace."

Hptm. Heinz Fischer was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./KG 1 in place of Major Willibald Fanelsa who was lost on 27 August 1940.

During the late stage of the battle the Regia Aeronautica was instructed to establish a force in Belgium to assist in operations against the British. Formed by the transfer of existing units, Corpo Aereo Italiano (CAI) came into being, under the aegis of 1a Squadra Aerea di Milano. Generale sa (Air Marshal) Rino Corso-Fougier was made Air Officer Commanding. He was reputed to be a brilliant officer and pilot, but his only recent war experience was the short lived campaign when Italy invaded the south of France. There where three Stormi (roughly a RAF Wing). Two of these were bombers and were the striking force, self-protection being provided by the fighter Stormo. With the transport element (twelve Caproni 133Ts, one Savoia-Marchetti S.75, with nine Ca164s for communications) a force of some two hundred aircraft. After the arrival of the force in Belgium Field Marshal Kesselring presented Generale Corso-Fougier with a Fiesler Storch for his personal use. Apart from the military aircraft a Ju52/3m I-BIZI was loaned by the Ala Littorio as courier between Force headquarters and the Stato Maggiore in Rome. Zone of operations allocated to the Italians was bounded by the parallels 53oN and 01oE. The worthwhile targets were along the coast between the Thames and Harwich including the estuaries of the Orwell and Stour. The Regia Aeronautica's aircraft had been most advanced in the period 1937/1938, but there had been insufficient development from that time. As an example only three G.50bis were fitted with radios and all G.50bis lacked adequate instruments for instrumental navigation. The absolute lack of instrumental flying training for the crews limited the fighters to only daylight patrols and bomber escort missions.
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11 September 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM
: This was the day that Hitler had planned to invade Britain. But in reality, Germany was no where nearer ready for an invasion than they were three or four weeks previous. Britain's coastal defenses still stood firm along the southern and eastern coastlines, naval ports and other small seaports that were being used by the Royal Navy along the southern coast of England were still intact and most of Britain's Civil Defense forces were just waiting for the word that would put them into action. On top of this, RAF Bomber Command had been continually bombing ports from Calais to Boulogne and along the Dutch coast destroying many of the barges that were to be used in "Unternehmen Seelöwe".

RAF Fighter Command was now on standby. The sector controllers had received notification that the Germans had changed tactics from two or three separate attacks during the course of the day, to mass raids of 300 to 400 aircraft that were coming across the Channel in two waves in quick succession. They were not to place too many squadrons to intercept the first wave, and that enough aircraft had to be held back to intercept the second wave which so far had proven to be larger in number than the first. Spitfires were to concentrate on the German fighters that were at higher altitude while the Hurricanes were to attack the bombers and close fighter escort. With the two German waves, generally only fifteen minutes apart, AVM Keith Park ordered that those British squadrons brought to 'readiness' first were to attack the first wave and their escorts. The squadrons available and at "Readiness fifteen minutes" were to attack the second wave.

The morning period was just as quiet as previous mornings of the last four days, and it appeared that things were to take the usual practice of large formations of bombers coming over at about 1700 hours. It was a fine morning, not as warm as many other mornings but pleasant, and many British pilots just lazed around outside their dispersal's doing what they had usually done. Some read old newspapers or magazines, many tried to write letters home while the rest fell asleep taking full advantage of the lull in activities. But after lunch, their afternoon 'siesta' was interrupted by radar detection of a large build-up from Calais to Ostend. The Luftwaffe was to come early today.

At 1445 hours most of the British radar stations along the Kent coast detected and followed the course patterns of a number of German formations that were building up from Calais along to Ostend. The largest of these crossed the coast near Ramsgate. Two large formations of one hundred and fifty bombers each making a total of three hundred in total, escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s headed towards the Thames Estuary and the River Thames. One formation crossed between Ramsgate and Deal while the other was further out over the sea. Again, British squadrons from 11 Group and 12 Group 'Duxford Wing' were scrambled. New to the coming battle were squadrons from 10 Group who would deal with the impending operations over Southampton and Portsmouth.

RCAF No.1 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) along with RAF No.222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) and 238 Squadron Middle Wallop (Hurricanes) were in action over central Kent, 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 46 Squadron Stapleford (Hurricanes), Spitfires of 72 Squadron Croydon, 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 266 Squadron Wittering (Spitfires) were involved in heavy combat action spread over the Thames Estuary. 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires), 74 Squadron Coltishall (Spitfires) and 266 Squadron had been brought down as usual from 12 Group to protect Hornchurch and North Weald and all of them became involved in action over southern and eastern areas of London. RAF No. 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires) covered a large area between the Thames Estuary and the Channel while 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) gave cover to the Channel areas over Dover and Folkestone. Other squadrons airborne were 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes), 303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 605 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes).

Over 300 German aircraft were in the two separate formations and both covered by their Bf 109 escorts flying at higher altitude had crossed the coast between Deal and Foreness then turned 45 degrees over the Thames Estuary and followed the usual pattern of using the River Thames as their flight path. Of these, thirty Luftwaffe aircraft penetrated to Central London but a split, however, turned and flew towards Brooklands. These thirty planes were intercepted by four British Squadrons. Over the Estuary between Herne Bay, Shoeburyness, Gravesend and Tilbury a huge melee of high altitude dogfights developed creating long twisting spirals of vapor trails. Many of the bombers continued on towards London escorted mainly by Bf 110s, the Bf 109s being contained by British fighters. But time was on the side of the RAF fighters, as the 109s were now at the critical stage of their fuel supply. Several of the escorting fighters from JG 2, JG 51, JG 53, JG 54 and LG 2 started to return early and left much of the bombers of KG 1 and KG 26 without an escort.

The leading German bombers had now been spotted by the British fighters from 12 Group. At 23,000 feet, the Spitfires and Hurricanes could now attack with the required height advantage. Leigh-Mallory's 'Big Wing' now contained RAF No. 19 Sqd, RAF No.74 Sqd, RAF No.266 Sqd and RAF No.611 Sqd. Between London and Gravesend the Germans were flying in waves of tight formations of Dorniers, Heinkels (KG 1 and KG 26) and Junkers 88s, with some protecting fighters. Bf 110s were behind the bombers and a formidable force of Bf 109s behind them at about 24,000 feet. It had been arranged that the two Spitfire squadrons in the lead (composite RAF Nos.19 and 266 and RAF No. 611 Sqd) were to attack the fighter escort, while RAF No. 74 Sqd went at the bombers. As RAF No.74 Sqd. went for the force of Junkers 88s, they met German fighters diving on them, but the British fighters continued on to the Junkers. Leigh-Mallory's 'Big Wing' would deal with the Messerschmitts. Eight aircraft of RAF No. 19 Sqd. and six of RAF No.266 Sqd. were leading the Wing. They dived in line astern for a head-on attack on the leading Heinkel 111s and their screening Messerschmitt 110s and Bf 109s. After this first insurgence, 'Red 1', Sqn Ldr B.E. Lane, broke off to port and saw the enemy turning south-east over Sittingbourne in Kent. He went for the nearer of two 110s, blowing bits off its starboard engine and then setting it alight. The other Me 110 opened its throttle and left. RAF No. 19 'Red 1' tried for the Heinkels and saw some flames emerging jaggedly from one, but nothing more. Several bombers were shot down in the attack. A Spitfire from the defending forces was also hit and force landed in Kent. Hptm. Ernst Wiggers of 2./JG 51 was shot down and killed.

In the same melee, the British RAF No. 19 'Green Section' did not have the best of luck. F/O L.A. Haines flying 'Green 1' climbed to attack some forty Bf 110s at a higher altitude than the Heinkels. As usual they went into a defensive circle, but F/O Lane decided to go straight into one of them. As he did so, a Bf 109 came down on him and the Spitfire was hit in both mainplanes and was forced to crash land his aircraft. 'Green 2' was F/O F. Dolezal and he took aim at one of the Bf 109s, and as it went into a slow dive belching black smoke Dolezal followed it down but was hit by a descending Bf 109 and its gunfire ripped open the side of the Spitfire and the pilot sustained injuries in the knee and leg. He managed to get the aircraft back to base and land safely.

12 Hurricanes of RAF No. 303 (Polish) Sqdrn had left Northolt and intercepted the enemy raid along with No. 229 Squadron over the Horsham area. The Squadron was at the same level as the bombers and wheeled in to attack the rear as they were a little late. The Polish pilots tried with some success to penetrate the fighter defence and the following enemy casualties were inflicted. F/Lt. Forbes, leading the Squadron claimed 2 Do 215 destroyed and F/O. Henneberg claimed 1 He 111 and 1 Bf109, destroyed. P/O. Zumbach had 1 Bf109 destroyed, F/O. Lokuciewski added 1 Do 215 and 1 Bf109 destroyed and F/Lt Paszkiewicz claimed 1 Bf110 destroyed, Sgt. Szaposznikow shor down 2 Bf110s, Sgt. Brzozowski, 2 He 111s destroyed and Sgt. Wojtowicz claimed 2 Bf109s destroyed. Some of the pilots chased the raiders right over the coast and the formation was broken up.

Port Victoria on the Isle of Grain was attacked and only 36 bombers proceeded to bomb the capital. The bombers that eluded the British fighters dropped their loads onto the dock areas of London again. Warehouses and sheds were set on fire and heavy damage done at the Surrey Commercial Docks as a result of the attack with high explosive and Incendiary bombs. A public shelter was hit in Lewisham High Street where 100 casualties resulted, and 50 people were buried by rubble when Deptford Central Hall was hit.The Woolwich Arsenal was hit as well as much of the dockland areas again. Finsbury, Holborn, Bermondsey and Central London were hit. But this attack on London was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. A formation of He 111s from KG 26 were bombing the northern areas of London, notably Paddington, Finsbury and Islington when they were intercepted by Hurricanes and Spitfires from RAF No.249 Sqd. (Hurricanes), RAF No.609 Sqd. (Spitfires) and RAF No.41 Sqd. (Spitfires). The fighters broke up the formations who tried desperately to evade the deadly Spitfires while the Hurricanes kept the Bf 110 escort at bay and who were fighting desperately for their own survival. Eight Heinkels were shot down in this battle, while twelve more limped back towards home nursing burning aircraft, smoking engines and air conditioned cockpits.
 
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(11 September 1940 continued.......)
In the meantime, two heavily escorted Luftflotte 3 formations from Cherbourg and Seine Bay were heading towards Southampton and Portsmouth and 10 Group released squadrons from Tangmere, Westhampnett and a flight from Middle Wallop. Most of the British fighters intercepted the Germans off the coast at Selsey Bill and an intense combat ensued. The Bf 109s of JG 27 and the Bf 110s of ZG 76 managed to destroy some of the defending Hurricane and Spitfire fighters. Some of the bombers managed to get through the fighter defense and both the towns of Portsmouth and Southampton received bomb damage. Eight Bf110s dive-bombed the Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft works at Eastleigh, Southampton killing 28 and injuring 70 when a shelter was hit. The bombers also made a dive-bombing attack on Eastleigh Naval Air Station at about 1613 hours without causing any damage. But most of the formations and their escorts were scattered and were forced to turn back.

Geoffrey Wellum was just over 18 years old when he went into combat with No. 92 Squadron for the first time on 11th September:
I glance round at the ten brave little Spitfires and a strengthened resolve flows into me. Well, there's not many of us but we'll knock **** out of some of you, at least for as long as we can.....It's absolutely breathtaking. Not long to go now. Brian's voice is in my earphones. 'Gannic from leader. OK boys, in we go. A good first burst and away. Watch for 109s.' Voices over the R/T. Urgency. '109s above the first lot coming round to six o'clock, 3,000 feet above.' 'Six more at four o'clock high.' 'I see them, they're starting to come down, here they come, watch 'em, Blue Section. Break into them, Blue, break starboard, break, break for Christ's sake.'....My target, concentrate, the target. Looking at him through the sight, getting larger much too quickly, concentrate, hold him steady, that's it, hold it … be still my heart, be still. Sight on, still on, steady . . . fire NOW! I press the gun button and all hell is let loose; my guns make a noise like tearing calico.

One hour after these battles several small raids appeared over Kent. The Dover balloons were attacked and single aircraft headed to Colerne, Kenley, Detling and Eastchurch but in no case was the damage severe or the casualties heavy. One formation dive-bombed the convoy "Peewit" between Margate and Dover with an escort from JG 26. In the melee over the convoy several fighters, particularly from III./JG 26 found themselves over Kent and engaged with RAF fighters. Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26 downed his nineteenth aircraft when he destroyed a Spitfire east of Ashford at 1925 hours. Five minutes later Lt. Gustav Sprick of 8./JG 26 claimed a Hurricane near Canterbury for his seventeenth kill. Three other pilots from 8./JG 26 also claimed kills. The convoy escort 'Atherstone' was disabled in the attack.

As the 'Schlageter' pilots headed for home they encountered a British Coastal Command formation of Blenheims returning from a raid on Calais. In an effort by the British to disrupt the German invasion plans, the RAF tried to destroy the invasion preparations on the coast of France. Twelve Fleet Air Arm Albacore torpedo bombers with an escort of Blenheim fighters from Coastal Command No. 235 Squadron were sent to bomb invasion shipping in the Calais harbor. Intercepted by the fighters from III./JG 26, one of the Blenheims was shot down by Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 26, for his twentieth victory. When he returned to base, he was awarded the Ritterkreuz. Fighters from III./JG 53 and 1./JG 52 also intercepted the Blenheims and shot down several planes. Oblt. Günther Büsgen of 1./JG 52 destroyed two of the British planes for a score of four victories as did Oblt. Walter Fiel of 8./JG 53 who also reached a score of four kills.

Again London was pounded by night bombing from 2100 hours until 0430 hours the following morning, and still the RAF had no answer to these night attacks. Hundreds of searchlights picked out the invading bombers but it all seemed in a lost cause because of the high altitudes that they were flying at. London's dockland was again hit as well as parts of Central London and Buckingham Palace sustained damage and gave reason for the Queen (now the Queen Mother) to state . . .
"....now the palace has been bombed, I feel now that I can look at the people of the East End straight in the eye".
The Stab of KG 55 lost a He 111 after it crash landed at Villacoublay returning from the raid on London.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 25; RAF, 29.

In all, it had not been the best of days to either side. RAF Fighter Command would have to be commended for the effort that they put in defense, but it came at a price. For the first time, Fighter Command casualties exceeded that of the Luftwaffe. Many of the bombers managed to get through with London again suffering considerable damage. Luftwaffe combat losses for the day totaled twenty-one, and another six force landed. KG 26 was the worst hit, with eight He111s shot down. Of these losses, only four were Bf 109s, although a fifth crashed as a result of a midair collision over France. Collisions were not that unusual; four Ju 87s were lost to this cause on a training mission. Six Spitfires and nineteen Hurricanes were lost and a further six fighters crash landed. Twelve pilots were killed and four severely injured. This was an exchange rate that Fighter Command could not afford.

Many Jagdflieger added to their scoreboards in the battles up the Thames and over Kent. The two most notable being Major Werner Mölders of Stab./JG 51 who downed a Spitfire south-east of London and Major Adolf Galland of Stab./JG 26 who claimed a Hurricane north-west of Dungeness. Double kills were awarded to Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2.(J)/LG 2 (21 kills total), Ofw. Siegfried Schnell of 4./JG 2 (12 kills) and Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Joppien of 1./JG 51 (19 kills). Credits for destroying British aircraft were given to Oblt. Hans Hahn of 4./JG 2 (16 kills), Uffz. Kurt Bühligen of 6./JG 2 (2 kills), Hptm. Eduard Neumann of Stab I./JG 27 (3 kills), Oblt. Gerhard Homuth of 3./JG 27 (14 kills), Oblt. Gustav Rödel of 4./JG 27 (12 kills), Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 (24 kills), Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53 (6 kills), Oblt. Kurt Brändle of 4./JG 53 (4 kills), Oblt. Hubertus von Bonin of Stab I./JG 54 (9 kills), Oblt. Wilhelm Herget of 6./ZG 76 and Oblt. Hans-Joachim Jabs of 6./ZG 76.

WESTERN FRONT: II/NJG 1 was redesignated I/NJG 2.
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12 September 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM
: The air war of the last week or so had developed into a rather dull sort of plan. It did not matter what the weather conditions were, the days were relatively quiet and to many of the once exhausted British fighter pilots, they found time to relax and enjoy time amongst themselves as longer gaps between sorties developed. Each afternoon, as if trying to keep to a weekly timetable, formations of German aircraft would show up on the CRT screen at the coastal radar stations generally around 1400 or 1500 hours and it was time to repeat the performance of the previous day. The next three days were to prove no different. The weather was not the best for combat, conditions being as unpredictable as ever, but at this time of the year it was only to be expected that unsettled conditions would prevail as the summer had just about passed and the often wet and dull days of autumn would be coming in.

The threat of invasion was still a high priority with the British War Office but as on many other occasions, the Luftwaffe had failed to follow up after the main attack. Why, they thought, throw everything at us as they did on 7 September and fail to continue. The leaders in all the various departments knew that Britain was still managing to hold out, with the Luftwaffe turning its attention to London itself gave Fighter Command the breathing space it so badly needed. By 12 September most of the airfields were back to at least 85% fully operational with the exception of maybe Biggin Hill.

The morning period was virtually a non-event as far as combat action was concerned. British Radar reported that a number of lone aircraft were well offshore both over the Channel and the North Sea. Fighter Command decided to leave these aircraft alone as they were reconnaissance patrols and not doing any harm. Warmwell dispatched just one section of Spitfires to intercept a lone Ju 88 out from Swanage, but it made full use of the low cloud and disappeared. Another German patrol was sighted and Hurricanes of RAF No. 151 Squadron were scrambled from Digby with one Ju 88 destroyed and another damaged off the Humber Estuary. About midday three small raids dropped bombs on the radar station at Fairlight - although without doing any real damage. Chased as far as Cap Gris Nez one Do 215 was destroyed by RAF No 605 Sqd. and RAF No 603 Sqd. damaged one Do17 over Beachy Head. At 1251 hours three high explosive bombs were dropped on Harrogate and near the Majestic Hotel. Mains were damaged, a house nearby was demolished, and fifteen casualties resulted. At 1440 hours, six high explosive bombs and some Incendiary bombs were dropped on Hastings and wrecked two houses and badly damaged three others. The German aircraft was reported to have machine-gunned those who were engaged in the rescue work. Later in the afternoon Ju88's made another small raid over Hampshire and Wiltshire before being intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Squadron St Eval (Hurricanes) scrambled from Middle Wallop. It can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.

One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S.Dewar of RAF No. 213 Squadron who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems that his Hurricane V7306 had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was straffed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.

The bombers of III./KG 51 and I./KG 54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then it was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers before often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murky conditions including only three He 111s of III./KG 27 who dropped bombs on Liverpool. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a high explosive delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Paul's Cathedral. Two officers who defused the bomb, Lt. R.Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personel to receive the George Cross for their actions. One high explosive bomb fell near Wavertree Station during the night, and two houses were wrecked. Many other bombs were dropped in the Liverpool area but little damage was done. The greater number of raids left the French Coast between 2100 and 2200 hours, after which there was a gradual decrease in activity until about 0330 hours. All raids had finally withdrawn by 0415 hours.

One German aircraft was reported shot down by AA guns in North London, another Luftwaffe casualty was claimed by the Balloon Barrage at Newport (Monmouthshire) and a third German aircraft was reported to have been badly damaged by AA guns in the West Country and was last seen flying very low over the sea. The night attacks appeared to have been quite ineffective, and apart from some damage to road and rail communications, no target of major importance was hit.

Luftwaffe losses: 13 RAF Losses: 2
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13 September 1940 Friday
"I SHALL NOT LEAVE!"
UNITED KINGDOM
: No sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods in all areas. Many of the German commanders were pushing for an exact date for "Unternehmen Seelöwe" to commence. Already the weather seemed to be closing in and with these deteriorating conditions it appeared that any chance of a successful invasion might be out of the question if Hitler could not make up his mind. Already, the date previously set for 11 September had been postponed, and Hitler had said that he favored 24 September as the most likely date, but if conditions continued as they are, it would be an impossibility for the barges to cross the Channel should the expected winds that were prevalent at this time of the year accompany the heavy cloud and rain squalls.

Throughout the day Luftwaffe bombing activity was concentrated on the London area, and on the counties of Essex, Surrey, Kent and Sussex where damage was spread over a wide area, without being in any case severe. From 0730 hours, a number of raids, mostly by single aircraft, crossed the Coast between Hastings and Beachy Head and penetrated to the Thames Estuary and London area. Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending the aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the British. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an aluminum factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred.

At 0650 hours, a Focke-Wolfe 200 of I./KG 40 was detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the Germans had penetrated this area and proof that Ireland was not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship S.S. 'Longfort' just off Copeland Light at Belfast and also submitted a motor vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage.

Small raids did occur during the morning period until about 1130 hours when a raid of He111s crossed the Kent coast and split towards their targets around Kent and Sussex. One of the bombers was intercepted and shot down by a Hurricane of RAF No. 501 Squadron, scrambled from Kenley and piloted by Sgt. James "Ginger" Lacey, before he too was shot down. Sgt. Lacey managed to bale out and landed safely on a farm in Kent.

It had not been a good day for the Luftwaffe. Although only a small number of aircraft were destroyed, there was no real reason that, under the circumstances they need not have made any missions at all. The first aircraft lost was at 1330 hours while on a raid to South Wales when a He111 hit the cables of a barrage balloon and crashed in the town of Newport. A number of British fighter squadrons had been scrambled after reports came through that radar had picked up German aircraft, and that the general direction was London. Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 238, 501 and 607 Squadrons, were scrambled from Middle Wallop, Kenley and Tangmere, and intercepted a raid by Ju88s, about 1530 hours over Wiltshire, before the bombers could turn back to France. Using the cloud to their advantage, it did appear that the targets were either Biggin Hill, Kenley or Croydon. One of the squadrons scrambled intercepted a small force of He 111 bombers over Maidstone and attacked. Most of the bombers decided to abort but not before one of the Heinkels was shot down. A He 111 of 2./KG 1 was badly damaged during another mission over England and it crashed on landing back at its home airfield. One He 111 of KG 55 crashed on German soil after a bombing mission, due to serious damage cause by AA gunfire and an attack made by a British fighter.

At the same time, another small raid of Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3 was centered on Tangmere. One enemy bomber was shot down by RAF No.609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). Another Ju 88 was badly damaged and crashed into the ground on landing at its home base. Again, the raid was aborted and no damage was sustained on the Tangmere aerodrome. As well as these aircraft destroyed and two others that crashed on English soil, twenty German aircrew were killed.

Two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defenses and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked. At 11:10 hours the building was straddled by a stick of six bombs dropped by the low-flying aircraft. It would go down in history as the day the Luftwaffe came closest to claiming the ultimate trophy – the life of George VI. The Queen Mother was "battling" to remove an errant eyelash from the King's eye, when they heard the "unmistakable whirr-whirr of a German plane" and then the "scream of a bomb". The blast showered them with broken glass.
"It all happened so quickly that we had only time to look foolishly at each other when the scream hurtled past us and exploded with a tremendous crash in the quadrangle,"
she wrote later. Some of the servants were injured as one bomb crashed through a glass roof and another pulverised the palace chapel. Hours later, after lunching in their air-raid shelter, she and the King were visiting West Ham in London's East End. She wrote:
"I felt as if I was walking in a dead city... all the houses evacuated, and yet through the broken windows one saw all the poor little possessions, photographs, beds, just as they were left."
The bombing, along with the royal family's refusal to flee Britain against Foreign Office advice, was to win the King and Queen affection and fellow-feeling across the country. The Queen declared:
"The children will not leave unless I do. I shall not leave unless their father does, and the king will not leave the country in any circumstances, whatever."
At West Ham the Ravenshill School where homeless were being accommodated was hit mid-morning and 50 casualties resulted.

During the night, bombs again fell on the London area, Westminster, Battersea, Mitcham, Clapham Junction, Wembley and Hammersmith being chiefly affected. Bombs also fell during the night in districts of Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Essex and Cambridgeshire, where little damage was done and in Cardiff, where a cold storage plant was gutted by fire, and other industrial damage caused. At 2140 hours high explosive bombs fell near the Town Hall at Mitcham, a result of which the London Road was closed to traffic. Victoria Street at Westminster was blocked by debris caused by an high explosive bomb at 2200 hours. By 0130 hours, activity had practically ceased, but at 0200 hours a second wave originating from the Dutch Islands approached London from the North-east, having crossed the Coast between Clacton and Harwich. At 0030 hours, the Cardiff Pure Ice and Cold Storage Plant was hit by high explosive bombs and gutted by the fire that resulted. Curran's Works were also hit but only slightly damaged and bombs also fell in the Docks area partially demolishing the Albion Box Works.

Luftwaffe activity continued over London and North of the Thames Estuary until 0525 hours when all the raids finally withdrew with a total of 105 bombers having flown the Channel in the bad weather during the night. Although only five night fighter sorties were flown, Flg Off M.J. Herrick in ZK-A of RAF No. 25 Squadron managed to bring down a He-111H 5J+BL of 3./KG 4 near North Weald. Another was shot down by AA gunfire near Hendon.

RAF Losses: 3 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 1 pilot and 1 aircrew of a Blenheim were killed. Luftwaffe Losses: 10 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 13 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 5 wounded.

Oblt. Hermann Crone was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./KG 1 in place of Major Ludwog Maier who was lost on 5 September 1940.

GERMANY: A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organized prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readiness. He said;
"Soon,we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready." "But,our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital."
The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined the preparations of any forthcoming invasion. The commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt were the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer. There were no fresh orders and he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.
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14 September 1940 Saturday
GERMANY
: In Berlin, Hitler called a rush conference ordering all his naval, air force and army commanders-in-chiefs to attend. This time, he made little mention on the bombing of London of the last seven days. Instead, he presented to them his plans for the all-out invasion of Britain. At last, "Unternehmen Seelöwe" looked as though it was all systems go. The Führer was excited and full of eagerness, but nothing was said that was not already known.....except the exact date of any planned invasion.

Hitler pointed out that the naval preparations for "Unternehmen Seelöwe" were now almost complete. By mid-September the Germans had assembled about 1,000 assorted invasion craft in the Channel ports, with some 600 more in the Scheldt.
"All our barges are now in place, and we have more held in reserve along river banks,"
he said which was borne out by one of the British Observer Groups which had the day previous seen up to ten large German transport ships tow a number of barges from Calais to Cape Griz Nez. Spitfires of the PRU had also flown over the Belgian and Dutch coasts and had also reported and photographed the collection of barges. RAF bombing crippled about 12 per cent of this armada though what remained was still sufficient for the first stage of invasion as planned. But there again, based on the PRU intelligence, Bomber Command had bombed many of the barge installations at an average of every second night, so what was Hitler trying to pull when he said that "All our barges are in place." Maybe he forgot to add that at least one third of them were submerged at their moorings. The French coast was now so well lit up by burning barges that it had become known as "Blackpool Front" to the RAF bomber pilots.

"If we plan now.....the invasion date can be set for one week from now, given that we need five days of good weather to achieve the desired results."
Hitler then went on to state that in the preparation we must make sure that the Luftwaffe has complete air superiority over the Channel and over southern England. But again, a remark that had been heard before, when issuing the order to Göring prior to 'Alder Tag', "Before any invasion can be mounted against England, we must first destroy the RAF both in the air and on the ground." This was the whole concept of the task given to Göring to eliminate the British Royal Air Force.

It was finally deferred until the 24th, which meant that a final decision should have been made on 14 September (ten days notice was the German Navy's very reasonable stipulation). Finally, the on again, off again "Unternehmen Seelöwe" was at last given as 17 September, which should have been 19 September if Hitler estimated that it would take five days of preparation. Orders were given for a full scale attack to be made prior to the lead up of the invasion, and again this was placed in the hands of Reichsmarschall Göring. An alternative date, as was mentioned earlier by the Führer could be given as 27 September. He had been misled again by Göring, himself in turn misled by the Luftwaffe's faulty Intelligence.

It was not so much the evidence that was at fault but rather the ability to interpret it correctly. The 9th had shown that Fighter Command was still very much a force to be reckoned with; the 11th and 14th, however, spoke with equivocal voices. On each of these days Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses were equal, though this was not appreciated by the Air Ministry at the time. On the 14th, particularly, to the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.

UNITED KINGDOM: Again no sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods and a chance of thunderstorms in all areas. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain would give way to lighter higher cloud during the day, but the chance of showers would persist.

The Germans did what they could in an attempt to jam the British radar with electronic interference. A few aircraft managed to cross the Channel on weather reconnaissance missions. At 1000 hours, a He 111 flew over North-east Kent and towards South London and was eventually shot down. Some of the coastal resorts in the vicinity of Eastbourne and Brighton were bombed by one or two raiders. At Brighton twenty-one high explosive bombs and some incendiaries fell in the Old Borough, and some of these hit a cinema causing 35 deaths and many injuries. A small formation was detected over Selsey Bill and one German aircraft was reported to have been shot down. Others probed the areas of South London and bombs fell on residential areas of Croydon and Mitcham killing over fifty people.

Between 1520 and 1545 hours, the Coast was crossed between Deal and Dungeness by German aircraft in three formations. In the first, 150 Luftwaffe aircraft operated, some of which penetrated the Inner Artillery Zone and attacked London via the Estuary. In the second attack, about 100 aircraft were involved and the Inner Artillery Zone was again penetrated from the South-east through Kent. Bf 109s from JG 26, JG 77, JG 51 and JG 54 escorted Do17s, He 111s and Ju 88s bombers and a mini aerial combat session developed within 30 minutes. Some twenty-two RAF fighters squadrons from 11 Group and five from 12 Group were scrambled to intercept the raids. Vectored to the Thames Estuary were RAF No. 41 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.222 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and 1 RCAF Sqd (Hurricanes). Vectored to the Kent coast near Deal were RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.229 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes). Gladiators of RAF No. 247 Sqd, scrambled from Roborough managed to intercept the raiders off the Sussex coast.

Again, as was becoming a common occurrence, people along the coastal stretches from Folkestone, round 'Hell Corner' to Margate saw the twisting and snaking black dots against the grey overcast with many cheering if they recognized a German plane spiral down into the sea. Most of the action took place over the Estuary or over north Kent near Maidstone by the time that the British fighters made contact with the German bombers. Even though the raids were small by previous standards, there were more Bf 109s than usual indicating that the Luftwaffe was trying to draw as many fighters in the air as possible. A number of Do17s were shot down but also quite a few Bf 109s also suffered. I./KGr.606 was to suffer most when two Dorniers were classed as write offs, while two others were damaged. Stab./KG 55 lost another He 111 shot down in the sea off Sussex by a fighter from RAF No. 72 Sqd. One crewmember, Fw. Josef Geiger was able to crawl into a dingy and spent the next three days in the water before being picked up by the Seeotdienst. JG 26 claimed five fighters for the loss of the Gruppe-Adjutant of I./JG 26, Oblt. Kurt Dähne, when his Messerschmitt collided with a Hurricane from No.253 Sqd. A pilot from 9./JG 26 force landed his plane at St Inglevert after the battle, his plane written off. Fw. Heinz Ettler of 1./JG 77 was shot down over Detling and taken prisoner. Uffz. Valentin Blazejewski of 6 (S)./LG 2 fired on a Spitfire on his way home from escorting the bombers and was immediately attacked and hit from behind by another Spitfire. Bailing out over Ashford he spent the rest of the war as a prisoner.
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(14 September 1940 continued.....)

For Fighter Command, RAF No.73 Sqd was to suffer the most after losing three aircraft and with four others damaged but repairable. Only one pilot was killed. There were casualties amongst other RAF squadrons. Two Hurricanes of No.253 Sqd. and No.601 Sqd. were shot down but no details are known except the pilot of the Hurricane of No.601 Sqd. was listed as missing. The Hurricane of No.253 Sqd. was shot down near Faversham, Kent. A Spitfire from RAF No.222 Sqd, badly damaged in combat with the escorting Luftwaffe fighters, crashed attempting to land and killed the pilot.

Twenty-five claims were made by the fighters of Luftflotte 2 and 3, even though the true losses to Fighter Command were twelve destroyed and nine damaged. Over South-west London the Kommodore of JG 51, Major Werner Mölders, downed a Spitfire, his thirty-seventh victory. Major Adolf Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26 also destroyed a Hurricane near London for his thirty-first victory. Other claims were made by Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51, who downed two Spitfires to reach twenty-six victories, Uffz. Rudolf Meixner of 3./JG 77 who claimed two Hurricanes to three kills and Hptm. Dietrich Hrabak of Stab II./JG 54 who destroyed a Hurricane south-east of London for his ninth victory.

Damage to London was minimal where bombs were dropped in Camberwell, Lambeth and in Battersea, where a gasometer was hit and slight damage was done to the Power Station. In Lambeth, Camberwell New Road was blocked by flooding from a burst water main, and the LCC Main Sewer was damaged, as a result of high explosive bombs. The Southern Railway Bridge between Victoria and Clapham Junction was penetrated by an high explosive bomb; a hit was also registered on the Battersea Power Station but only minor damage was caused.

A second attack commenced at 1810 hours, and seven formations of between twelve and thirty aircraft successively crossed the coast at Dover and Lympne until 1835 hours. The objectives were Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Northolt and London. In the last case the attack was made from the South-west. All aircraft were detected at between 17,000 and 20,000 feet. Many of Fighter Command's squadrons had only been back a short while after the afternoon raids when they were scrambled again. The German formations were intercepted just as they crossed the southern coastline and a running battle took place as far as London, but many of the raiders had turned back before their destination was reached. As the last raid had dispersed, Bf109s of JG 26 swept low across Kent and were intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 46 Squadron, scrambled from Stapleford and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 41 and 92 Squadrons, from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, over the Maidstone area. Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7./JG 26 and Hptm. Rolf Pingel, the Gruppenkommandeur of Stab I./JG 26, both added a Hurricane to their scoreboard - the twentieth for Oblt. Müncheberg and the fifteenth for Hptm. Pingel. Upon reaching their bases both Jagdflieger were awarded the Ritterkreuz even though Hptm. Pingel hadn't reached the required twenty kills.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 14; RAF, 14. The final score of aircraft lost was fourteen each, but six RAF pilots were saved to fly again while several Jagdflieger were captured and made POWs.

At night Luftwaffe activity was slight in spite of favorable weather conditions. Between 2000 and 2200 hours, several small raids flew erratic courses over Sussex and Kent and penetrated to London and North of the Thames Estuary. One raid of six aircraft approached from the North Sea to Cromer and flew North-west. This raid split and sections penetrated to the North Midlands. Between 2200 and 0100 hours, raids of single aircraft were plotted in the Thames Estuary, some approached London and others penetrating into Essex. About three raids crossed the coast between the Wash and the Humber. Bombs were dropped in many districts in the Southern half of England, but the night raids were on a small scale and no serious damage or casualties was reported. Four high explosive bombs were dropped on the Sports Field near the Officers' Mess at Cottesmore. By 0400 hours London was clear.

A Hurricane from RAF No.43 Squadron based at Usworth airfield in Durham got caught in his leader's slipstream and made a heavy landing at base. Pilot Officer C.K. Gray was unable to correct fully owing to arm injuries sustained on 26th August 1940. The aircraft was damaged but repairable.

RAF No. 302 'City of Poznan' (Hurricane) Squadron based at Leconfield were moved to Duxford as part of the 'Big Wing', led by the indomitable Douglas Bader.
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Good stuff again Chris. I notice, however, that the Hurricanes lost are shown as being from 610 Squadron. This squadron flew Spitfires at the time, with the well-publicised codes of DW.
Perhaps it should read 601 (County of London) Squadron, Aux.A.F. , who did fly Hurricanes at the time ?
 

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