German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska (1 Viewer)

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Sorry about any dissapointments everyone:oops:

As for their effectiveness I believe the truth is a bit of both.
The attack on the Wurtzberg Radar was a definate success. It had a millitary aim and achieved it as well as waking the Germans up.

The SOE missions had a large measure of success that proved of great assistance in the war and tied the Germans down. Not all of them but a good many. They also gave good intel as to developments for example, parts of the V2 were smuggled back long before they started firing them at the UK.

No doubt a good few were mainly for propaganda and morale benefits but these shouldn't be ignored.

German forces in Europe couldn't have been that happy knowing that the British were moving men and materials in and out of the continent almost at will.
Look at it the other way. Just after the fall of France the whole of the UK was at best very jumpy about an invasion, as worst close to panic. If the Germans had launched a few hit raids, the impact may well have been mainly on the morale of the population, but what an impact it might have been.
 
Parsifal,

Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini.

It wasn't Just the spies Soren. The following is an example of how poor, some would say inept, Strategic Intelligence played a large part in the failure of the war in Russia.

It was pretty much just the spies Glider. The intel blunder you just mentioned happened for the Allies as-well and wasn't an uncommon mistake in war.

However the Brandenburgers remained effective till the end, carrying out hundreds of successful operations, and along with the JagdVerbände were the best trained troops on the planet, recieving three times the training of the men enlisted by the Wehrmacht, which already recieved three times the training of any Allied soldier. However one must note also that not all Brandenburgers were as well trained as the elite core, as allot of foreigners were drafted, such as turks etc etc.


Btw, I'm thinking about buying this book: Axis History Factbook: Review - Brandenburg Division

Sounds like a very good book.
 
In the desert, the operations of the LRDG had an enormous impact on the outcome. From a force that in totasl never amounted to more than about 250 men, the unit was responsible for the destruction of over 500 men, the capture of Kufra (a strategic town in southern Libya, that provided the only link to IEA) the destruction of many tens of thousands of tons of supplies. It tied down about 5 divisions of troops on rear area security, and very nearly succeeded in bagging Rommel himself at one point. Not bad for a force that was the mapower equivalent of about 4 aircraft,
 
The LRDG mostly fought against the Italians though Parsifal, and their most successful operations were against the Italians.

As for them being close to bagging Rommel, hardly.
 
I never had a problem with the SS commandoes, or even with the Abwehr special forces units. the failure of the German special forces was at its command levels, and with co-ordination. It also suffered in its espionage efforts which are largely a failure


Agreed. I have some interesting detailed thoughts on the German SOE operations, I will post them this weekend, a little busy now. However I will post them with the caveat, the intelligence and command would be the Achillies heel of the operations. The German's over confidence in Enigma and the unreliability of Canaris would have the potential to mess up the whole operation. That being said, there are some very interesting possibilities that have not yet been considered
 
It was pretty much just the spies Glider. The intel blunder you just mentioned happened for the Allies as-well and wasn't an uncommon mistake in war.

Soren
I take it you can find something to support your statement. Missing 160 divisions is a little careless in particular as the British, Japanese, Finns and Japanese had closer figures and they were not going to war with Russia.
I have a number of other examples and this is but one.

Be fair, I did offer you the choice of types of intelligence and you didn't make one, so I am giving a fair example of each.

If you wish I can give more on this topic.

Your choice
 
Freebird, why not consider a German attack on the Panama Canal?

Knocking that out for a few weeks or more WOULD have an impact on allied naval operations!


That is one of your interesting ideas, and an excellent one. Most attacks against the US would be to influence public opinion affect military planning, with little actual or lasting damage, however there are a few that would have a serious effect. Knocking out the canal would be one, or a frogman style attack on the US Atlantic carriers would have some real consequences.


Do you know how well guarded the canal was prior to Pearl? Could a cargo ship with explosives packed in the bows or something like that work? {Spanish or Portugese flagged presumably}

Considering the amount of explosives used at St. Naziere {on the drydock gates} by the British commandos, I don't think a couple of torpedoes would do, would they?

I would think that a cargo ship approaching at dusk or something like that would be more workable than trying to land commandos to attack from land
 
Soren
I take it you can find something to support your statement. Missing 160 divisions is a little careless in particular as the British, Japanese, Finns and Japanese had closer figures and they were not going to war with Russia.
I have a number of other examples and this is but one.

Be fair, I did offer you the choice of types of intelligence and you didn't make one, so I am giving a fair example of each.

If you wish I can give more on this topic.

Your choice

Actually Glider, the Allies had more than a little luck on this one. According to Brooke, while in France in 1940 some of Monty's troops {his division} captured an almost complete "TO E" for the German army, listing the strengths deployments of about 90% of the German divisions. After this intelligence coup, the British were from then on fairly well aware of German deployments.

Luckily for the Allies the Germans never got hold of the British strengths in 1940, they over-estimated the available British troops by 50% - 100%
 
Actually Glider, the Allies had more than a little luck on this one. According to Brooke, while in France in 1940 some of Monty's troops {his division} captured an almost complete "TO E" for the German army, listing the strengths deployments of about 90% of the German divisions. After this intelligence coup, the British were from then on fairly well aware of German deployments.

Luckily for the Allies the Germans never got hold of the British strengths in 1940, they over-estimated the available British troops by 50% - 100%

Interesting but the first point was a gift that the British were able to aquire and use. What would be interesting is to compare the reality with what the British security estimates were then we would be able to understand the accuracy of those estimates.

The second point is another example the Germans getting it very wrong.
 
Sorry about any dissapointments everyone:oops:

Oh well never mind I will just keep watching "The Needle" :)

As for their effectiveness I believe the truth is a bit of both.
The attack on the Wurtzberg Radar was a definate success. It had a millitary aim and achieved it as well as waking the Germans up.

Sorry I wouldn't know about its compossition, so I might forward that a Mossie could have done the job as well?

The SOE missions had a large measure of success that proved of great assistance in the war and tied the Germans down. Not all of them but a good many. They also gave good intel as to developments for example, parts of the V2 were smuggled back long before they started firing them at the UK.

Indeed a great job, but where is the benefit? it never enabled Britan to build one themselves or to do anything against it.

No doubt a good few were mainly for propaganda and morale benefits but these shouldn't be ignored.

IIRC Rommel almost had it, if that "giant guard" hadn't been in between the doors.

German forces in Europe couldn't have been that happy knowing that the British were moving men and materials in and out of the continent almost at will.

AFAIK even before or after Dieppe, the garrison strenght in France remained unchanged. It was just that the existing garrison units were deployed differently

Look at it the other way. Just after the fall of France the whole of the UK was at best very jumpy about an invasion, as worst close to panic. If the Germans had launched a few hit raids, the impact may well have been mainly on the morale of the population, but what an impact it might have been.

Agree, but since there was no follow up possibility - Sealion was just propaganda IMO - it would not have contributed or changed anything.

IMO the British realized that they didn't have much in regards to their conventional forces and as such had no choice but to come up with some sort of additional support - so the Commando idea to me sounds good - It just seems overrated to me, but I think this is more due to movies and book authors looking for some "big $$ topic" rather then the British Army itsself making it look so fantastic and acctually permitting details.

In the DSO in which I served last, the "KSK" is a part of it. The Bundeswehr itsself is not creating a nimbus or aura around this unit. Acctual missions are classified and not known to anyone. Those who participated are trained and possess a selected character that ensures secrecy. And yet all over the internet and bookstores and even movies this unit is highlighted as if the authors would have been members, and novelist ideas and stories are placed on the market.

Off course there are a lot of "ex" members, which IMO have a tendency to fantasis or exagerate on the topic and hide the fact that even within the so called elite there is another elite.

Just as the KSK aprox. 1500 men and a "core" of less then 80, and I have never encountered any of these "core" members bragging around and giving details.

So the acctual contribution in fact remains a secret. 8)

Regards
Kruska
 
In the DSO in which I served last, the "KSK" is a part of it. The Bundeswehr itsself is not creating a nimbus or aura around this unit. Acctual missions are classified and not known to anyone. Those who participated are trained and possess a selected character that ensures secrecy. And yet all over the internet and bookstores and even movies this unit is highlighted as if the authors would have been members, and novelist ideas and stories are placed on the market.

Off course there are a lot of "ex" members, which IMO have a tendency to fantasis or exagerate on the topic and hide the fact that even within the so called elite there is another elite.

Just as the KSK aprox. 1500 men and a "core" of less then 80, and I have never encountered any of these "core" members bragging around and giving details.

So the acctual contribution in fact remains a secret.

This is 100% true.
 
As for their effectiveness I believe the truth is a bit of both.
The attack on the Wurtzberg Radar was a definate success. It had a millitary aim and achieved it as well as waking the Germans up.


Sorry I wouldn't know about its compossition, so I might forward that a Mossie could have done the job as well?

Kruska
This attack was a little different. The objective wasn't to destroy the radar, that as you say could have been done in any number of ways.
The objective was to land, take control of the radar, then dismantle the key components and bring them back to the UK. This would give the British scientists a chance to investigate the latest radar developments with the obvious intention of designing countermeasures.
They landed by parachute and withdrew by sea.

The following link may be of interest.
Bruneval

Imagine what the benefit would have been, if Germany had done a similar raid on a British coastal radar site before the BOB.

Regards
David
 
Kruska
This attack was a little different. The objective wasn't to destroy the radar, that as you say could have been done in a number of ways.
The objective was to land, take control of the radar, then dismantle the key components and then bring them back to the UK. This would give the British scientists a chance to investigate the latest radar developments with the obvious intention of designing countermeasures.
They landed by parachute and withdrew by sea.

The following link may be of interest.
Bruneval

Hello Glider,

Well, now that is what I would call an efficient and well executed Commando raid, which -not trying to downplay anything-a selected Luftwaffe paragroup could have done just as well without being called Commandos. Just as they did for Gran Sasso and countless other operations without being highlighted as a special group by the press or towards the public.

The offical Press text was: Mussolini freed by paratroopers under the leadership of the renowned Skorceny. (Actually Scorceny wasn't even involved in the planing nor in leading the action).

German history accounts actually shows that the Germans used Commando Raids all the time, by using regular – most suitable – paratroopers of the Luftwaffe and SS to perform such missions at random without being trained and specialized as an independent pure Commando unit with an aura of elite.

As Soren already pointed out, the standard capability of the German paratroopers or SS was already as sufficient as that of the British Commandos – taking off course the initial 1939/41group and not some Galicia SS or 1023rd Fallschirmjaeger Division. And the name or unit insignia of SS or Fallschirmjaeger already implied superduper and Commando or LRDP.

So again as not to be misunderstood, the SAS or LRDG or Commandos were indeed a highly specialized bunch that was simply more highlighted then the "ordinary" German equivalents. Who could be identified not by a special unit insignia or name but by Frontkampfspange, Nahkampfabzeichen or Panzervernichtungsabzeichen. Frontcombat clasp, close quarter combat clasp and Tankkill ribbons and some Ritterkreuz.

The Brandenburger unit was actually established in order for the Wehrmacht to have their own elite in contra to Hermann and Heinrich's command. .

Regards
Kruska

thanks for the link.
 
Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini

The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit

The LRDG mostly fought against the Italians though Parsifal, and their most successful operations were against the Italians.

Unless you have very specific evidence to the contrary, i dont think this is true.

Most attacks were against supply columns or depots, or airfields. The airfields attacked were a mix of italian controlled, and german controlled. and the truck convoys were again a mixture of german, italian, and italian-german. Increasingly however the logistic services were being run by the germans, because the italians were increasingly being relegated to the sidelines as 1942 wore on.

Some source material i have read suggest the attacks were roughly in the order of 60% against the italians, and 40% against the germans. Beyond that i cannot be any more specific. if you have better material, I would like to see it, but i do not think you can dismiss the attacks as just being against the italians, just because they were rear area attacks


As for them being close to bagging Rommel, hardly.

It was a complete balls up, thats true, but more because of just bad luck than bad planning. The stuff up incidentally arose because of an SAS stuff up, fromm memory. The fact that the mission could be seriously considered is a pretty good snapshot as to the effectiveness of the British Special forces by that time.
 
Brandenburgers, FallschirmJägers AND members of the JagdVerbände all participated in the rescue of Mussolini

The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit

Hello parsifal,

Mussolini, Not quite: the Jadverbaende SS were only instituted in September 1944 and in Oktober 1944 the Div. Brandenburg (formerly an independent Wehrmacht unit) was incorporated into the SS Jagdverbaende. These Jagdverbaende however were primarily towards anti partisan duties and not really considered in the term of a British Commando Unit.

The Fallschirmjaeger never had Jagdverbaende. Only the SS Fall. 600 was also integrated into the SS JV.

Regards
Kruska
 
Hello parsifal,

Mussolini, Not quite: the Jadverbaende SS were only instituted in September 1944 and in Oktober 1944 the Div. Brandenburg (formerly an independent Wehrmacht unit) was incorporated into the SS Jagdverbaende. These Jagdverbaende however were primarily towards anti partisan duties and not really considered in the term of a British Commando Unit.

The Fallschirmjaeger never had Jagdverbaende. Only the SS Fall. 600 was also integrated into the SS JV.

Regards
Kruska

Hi Kruska, are you suggesting that the SS did not form commando units until the latter part of 1944? If so, I will have to disagree, the SS beagn forming its first commando units from the latter part of 1942, which included Skorzeny.

However, because my German is not good, i may have mislabelled them. If that is the case, then i stand corrected.

The SS commandos undertook many special ops, including anti-partisan, but for once i agree with soren, they undertook a whole range of special operations from 1943 onwards. The brandenburgers, on the other hand, as a unit really effectively became (mostly) an elite Infantry organization from 1943 on. The WERE mostly employed in anti-partisan operations. i expect that a good proportion of Brandenburger personnel transferred to the SS commando unit(s) after 1943, but dont actually know for sure.
 
The brandenburgers did not serve as a brandenburger unit AFAIK. They were under the control, and serving as members of the JGDV.....i am not as sure about the FJ units however, i think they were an identifieable separate unit

Members of the Brandenburg Div. did take part in the rescue, they might have been assigned to either the FJ or JV unit. As for the FallschirmJägers, they were there as-well and accounted for most of the men participating in the operation. The rescue of Mussolini was joint operation between the FallschirmJägers JagdVerbände, with members of the Brandenburger Div. participating as-well.
 
Unless you have very specific evidence to the contrary, i dont think this is true.

Most attacks were against supply columns or depots, or airfields. The airfields attacked were a mix of italian controlled, and german controlled. and the truck convoys were again a mixture of german, italian, and italian-german. Increasingly however the logistic services were being run by the germans, because the italians were increasingly being relegated to the sidelines as 1942 wore on.

Some source material i have read suggest the attacks were roughly in the order of 60% against the italians, and 40% against the germans. Beyond that i cannot be any more specific. if you have better material, I would like to see it, but i do not think you can dismiss the attacks as just being against the italians, just because they were rear area attacks

Parsifal, take a look at their most successful raids, they were all against the Italians. They did run into the Germans a number of times, but when they did they didn't enjoy too much success.

It was a complete balls up, thats true, but more because of just bad luck than bad planning. The stuff up incidentally arose because of an SAS stuff up, fromm memory. The fact that the mission could be seriously considered is a pretty good snapshot as to the effectiveness of the British Special forces by that time.

It wasn't going to happen Parsifal, not by a long shot.
 
Soren

Actually, we are both wrong. The LRDG was at its best when it was not attacking or being attacked directly.


The most successful raids by the LRDG did not involve combat at all. Usually if the LRDG was engaged in combat, it was a sign they were in trouble. The most important missions by the LRDG were recon related, their survey work that allowed the British to outflank the germans time and again, in areas that had not been mapped properly, and the road watch on the Via Balbia, which observed both German and italian forces. their acts of sabotage were usually not against defended targets, makes a nonsense of this assertion that their targets were somehow exclusively German.

I suggest that you read the book, The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-1943 by JW Gordon. On those occasions that there were brushes with Axis forces, there are about as many instances of firefights with germans as there were with Italians. Often the enemy consisted of Italian AND german units. Keep in mind that if the LRDG patrol got into a fight, it was in trouble anyway. That is not the way special forces were intended to operate, Axis or Allied (there were some exceptions to this, most notably the Chindits, but these were a specialized combat unit anyway, and not a special force as such).

The LRDG was primarily a recon and sabotage unit, with occasional direct attacks on airfields , and supply dumps (but even here the idea was not to raise the alarm by direct attacks, the most successful missions were those when the damage began to happen after the LRDG had effected its extraction..... One of its favourite tactics was the mining of roads and runways. So I just cannot see how we can say that the primary targets are Italian. The primary targets were the Axis communications, and recon, and axis logistics networks. On those occasions where firefights occurred, there are just as many instances of fights with germans as there are fights with Italians. And there were just as many losses suffered to the italins by the LRDG as there were suffered by the Germans (ie just as many LRDG were lost to the germans as there were to the Italians).

Moreover, in their efforts to emulate the LRDG, it was the italians who appeared to show a greater understanding of how to put it all together when compared to those of the germans. The operations of their "Sahariano Company" showed signs of promise more advanced than that of the germans, whose efforts and concepts were not nearly as well developed in this specialized field. The one big exception I can think of to that, was the special operation mounted by the Abwehr group headed by the hungarian Count Laszlo Almasi, which in 1942 managed to get two Abwehr agents into Cairo, for Intelligence gathering purposes. But even here, the success was pyrhhic....the agents turned within a very short space of time.
 

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