German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Hi soren

Again you haven't even been following attention.

Spies would be set off a week or two prior to the attack to monitor and find the proper landing area along with automated weather radio stations.

And as for your suggested 10 days of looking through a telescope to see wether the coast is clear, that's just completely ridiculous Parsifal, with or without spies doing all the preliminary work. And then on top of that you're suggesting that it takes NINE days to get the 25 men out of the boat, into rafts and head for shore ??? Parsifal how did you ever come up with that ?


The spies would help, except that in 1941 they were totally compromised in both Britain and the US. If it was a member of a diplomatic staff, it would need to be restricted to the coast of the US alone. Given that the spy network will have send their report via Ultra, or the diplomatic code, the risks of being caught outright are extremely high. Germany could not rely on its communications being secure by late 1941.

Converselt, this is pretty much waht happened in Pearl Harbour. The US failed to act on information they had gleaned from their MAGIC intercepts, against the japanese, so i guess it is possible, to obtain the information.

However, this information would need to be sent several weeks in advance, whereas the Intercepts relating to the PH attack were only a few days or hours old. The US counterintelligence system and command structure proved incapable of moving quickly enough to react to the PH operation, but it may well have been a different ballgame if they had had weeks or months to consider the Intel. And it would need information that was sent weeks or months by your imaginary spy to allow the mission planners back in Germany the time to assess the data, and come up with a solution

I have already made some comments about the poor nature of German Intel and this was even more pronounced in the West, and reasonably secure in the US as well. So no, you cannot rely on a ground truthing recon prior to the landing if you even want to get ashore.

Moreover the spy cannot undertake an underwater survey to determine the distance from the shore that the landing needs to take place, the nature of the currents, the presence of drift ice, etc etc. This will need to be obtained by survey undertaken by the assault boat(s) on the day, and this can take a lot of time. All of the landings in Europe took an enormous amount of survey work and months or years of Intelligence gathering in order to execute (none of which was ever detected by the Abwehr, why, because they were incompetent).

So it is not just a case of getting into your little rubber boats and paddling ashore Soren. You can do that whilst playing in the bathroom....There is a great deal of work to be done, before undertaking a mission of this kind. Oh, and telescopes are for the 18th century and observatories. In the 20th century the U-Boats used Periscopes whilst submerged, and binoculars whilst surfaced


The only one making silly proposals here is you Parsifal, and you're ignorance to the fact that hundreds of boats were on patrols lasting months just proves that.

Ever heard of milkcows ??


Ah yes I have. Apart from the fact that a "Milk Cow" is something you might find in a dairy, the first "Milch Cow" (U-459) was not ready for service until
1-4-42, fully 5 months after you would need it

Again you demonstrate your complete lack of knowledge on the subject of German U-boats and how they operated.

Im not the one calling on technology not available in 1941, with references to Type Ds (not available until the end of 1942) and Type XIVs (not available until the middle of 1942). I do not lay claim to being an expert on Geman U-Boats, but I know more than the average sucker, plus I have access to resources that can be considered expert in this field

Let me ask you again: Have you ever heard of Milkcows Parsifal ? Ever wondered how German subs were able to patrol the US Canadian coasts for weeks, attack and then return all the way home again ??

Ive already given you a reply about the non-availability of Milch Cows in 1941. The germans did manage to extend the endurance of their subs, only by accepting the absolute minimum of habitability standards. The Type IX was designed for about a 20-25 day endurance, the Type VII was even less. Wartime experiences did show that these design endurances could be exceeded. I believe that the longest Pre-'42 cruise by a Type VII was 26 days. In the case of Hardegens cruise, which I posted previously, he was out of port from 23 December, to 2 February, a total of 41 days, but he was only able to stay on station for 8 days. Thats an average passage time, incidentally of 16.5 days, more than enough time to cook your commandoes collective gooses

Fact is what I'm suggesting doesn't even come close to exceeding either the space or endurance parameters of the suggested boats.

So again Parsifal, study the subject before making blanket statements about it.


err, yes it does, because you are trying to use technologies that were not available to the U-Boat arm at the projected time....

You've got to be kidding me man! You're just desperately grasping for straws now Parsifal! You obviously don't know what sarcasm or figure of speach is!

Parsifal when I say: Used as bedrooms by the crew it is the same as when saying: The men used the three as a toilet or "The men used their rifles as clobs"

But then ofcourse comes to the scene an extreme nitpicker and starts ranting: "Rifles certainly aint clubs! They're firearms!"[/
I]

Err no it isnt, all it demonstrates is that you dont really have much knowledge on U-Boats, and all thing nautical. I would not normally be so precise, but I know how you like to get things exactly right for other subjects, so why not in this case???


Give me a break!



I'll give you a break when yoou do the same courtesy for others
 
someone has raised the possibility of using Italian Chariots from a German submarine. There are a number of problems with that idea.

Very interesting post Parsifal, thanks for the info about the Maille's.

First, Parsifal you have great posts but could you please not leave your replys inside the "quotations". You can't "quote" another "quote", so it makes it difficult to reply point by point. If you want to reply by bold paragraphs between the quoted segments, either insert {QUOTE} {/QUOTE} with square brackets around each segment you are quoting, or else just eliminate the {QUOTE} {/QUOTE} and put your comments in bold between segmants of the other.

Soren doesnt know anything about the size or terrain for Alaska and Northern Canada.

Therefore we should concentrate on these potential spy teams for deployment on the eastern seaboard, maybe even Gulf Coast.

Syscom you are 100% correct about Alaska, it would be almost impossible and very pointless.

Soren I don't think the idea of Germany attacking Alaska would be of any use at all. It would take a few extra months to get there, and the results would be almost worthless, Alaska is too far away for people to take much notice.

With the more limited range of German boats, they would be best employed on the US Eastern seaboard, or on the US Gulf Coast, as Syscom points out.

there is a way for a commando raid to be launched against the US, but it does not involve U-Boats.

Instead of basically killing your people by cramming them into a naval verion of the "Black Hole Of calcutta", why not just send your people to spain where they would then be embarked on a "neutral" merchantman. A lot easier, with a lot more space in it.....sure there is a risk that the ship might get pulled over by customs, or the neutrality patrols...you might use the commadoes as make believe crew, and just hope that all the hardware you are packing is not detected, but at least this approach is feasible. The germans used that approach in Norway, and whilst a US adventure is, IMO infintely more difficult thana little jump across the Kattegat, at least you have a plausible base of operations and means of transport, instead of trying to make something that is unworkable, work

An good idea Parsifal, I mentioned that on the earlier commando thread. Most of the hardware could be seen as "legitimate" if it is mortars, MG's, etc, going to Vichy or Spanish overseas colonies. I don't think the British had restrictions on outgiong munitions from Europe did they? At this point in the war the British were very worried about Spanish Vichy neutrality, so would not want to provoke them.

Another option would be for the cargo freighter to carry some supplies mundane weapon, pass through the British "picket" blockade line, then {about 2 or 3 days out} rendezvous with
a U=boat to pick up the commandos a some specialized equipment. That way the journey by sub would be only a few days, not weeks. There wouldn't be many patrols on the western half of the Atlantic, and the commandos could pose as crew, as you say.

Soren I think Glider is right about the difficulty, I don't think inflatable boats would be the best method. {uloaded from subs}

For a German commando attack on the US I think a cargo freighter would be the best transport. Since the Brandenburgers would be attacking targets in the US East Coast, they could send the equipment by cargo ship, of neutral flag {Vichy or Spanish} Then if the ship was stopped by the Royal Navy the cargo would appear to be munitions being sent to re-supply some of the colonies. There was no embargo on outbound arms, only inboud to Germany, IIRC.

The German equipment could be painted with instructions in French - {insertez le bombe ici :D } Somewhere past the British blockade patrol the commando team could be put aboard the freighter from a U-boat or two. The freighter could either land at night in some small port, or else the equipment could be transferred to a longboat or cutter. Either way there should be some fifth-column agents ready with trucks to take them off at the port or pier. Another good option would be to transfer the cargo to a fishing boat, as a ship of this type would not be suspicious if unloading cargo in the middle of the night.

The appearence of a cargo freighter would not raise any suspicions, whereas if anyone noticed the U-boat unloading cargo at night then the whole cover would be blown
 
Parsifal I'm not the one out of his element here, you are, and your belief that Milk Cows first became available in 42 demonstrates that very well. Fact is that the "milk cows" (Type XIV) were commisioned starting in 1941, a whole year before the time of the operation!

Also your claim that German intel was a laughing stock is ridiculous and completely untrue, and therefore it is no wonder you can't support your claim.

The Abwehr was very proffessional and demonstrated this throughout the war, the problem however was they were a SINGLE agency and they had nearly no foreign agencies to co-operate with. This meant it was very hard to gather intel and that they had to infiltrate other agencies by themselves. This was completely unlike Allied intelligence agencies which had contacts in nearly every country invaded by the Germans, all which were happily willing to help out seeing their country had been aggressively invaded.

The point is that the Abwehr had allot more to deal with than any Allied agency as they had nearly no contacts to rely on for any information needed, meaning they themselves had to infiltrate enemy agencies.


And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught or even suspected. The cover was only broken when one sold off the others (A former American), giving himself up to the Police after having talked to an old school friend.
 
And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught .
I'm interested in the spies in Canada aside from the weather station in unpopulated Labrador I'm not aware of any others
 
Here you go: uboat.net - U-boat Operations

Again the spy turned himself in to the native authorities.

That the Abwehr was able carry out several successful landings of spies in America right up until late 44, and that none of them were caught, only demonstrates the very high skill and effectiveness of the Abwehr and its presonnel. Abwehr agents were very well trained, perhaps better than any other in the world, which is the sole reason that so many were able to accomplish their missions despite being in enemy territory without any contacts.
 
Here you go: uboat.net - U-boat Operations

Again the spy turned himself in to the native authorities.

That the Abwehr was able carry out several successful landings of spies in America right up until late 44, and that none of them were caught, only demonstrates the very high skill and effectiveness of the Abwehr and its presonnel. Abwehr agents were very well trained, perhaps better than any other in the world, which is the sole reason that so many were able to accomplish their missions despite being in enemy territory without any contacts.
what missions did they do I've never heard of any successful ones in North America as far as I know they all turned turtle. But the pastorious mission was intended to blow up the power plants in Niagara. but as for being accomplished I would say the opposite and they were inept getting busted for using out of date currency does not sound competent
 
Parsifal I'm not the one out of his element here, you are, and your belief that Milk Cows first became available in 42 demonstrates that very well. Fact is that the "milk cows" (Type XIV) were commisioned starting in 1941, a whole year before the time of the operation!


U-459 was the first Milch cow, she was commissioned late November 1941, but had not yet worked up. she was not declared ready for operations until late April 1942.

I assume you are planning this operation December 1941, so unless you are planning it for late '42, in which case your chances for success are zero, it is very relevant that the Milch Cows are not ready.

Also your claim that German intel was a laughing stock is ridiculous and completely untrue, and therefore it is no wonder you can't support your claim.

But the evidence is there...the systemic failures of the abwehr spy rings, the inability of the abwehr to prevent covert operations within occupied europe to any great extent, the repeated and serious breaches in security within Germany itself, as high as the senior management of OKH. What proof do you need??

The Abwehr was very proffessional and demonstrated this throughout the war, the problem however was they were a SINGLE agency and they had nearly no foreign agencies to co-operate with. This meant it was very hard to gather intel and that they had to infiltrate other agencies by themselves. This was completely unlike Allied intelligence agencies which had contacts in nearly every country invaded by the Germans, all which were happily willing to help out seeing their country had been aggressively invaded.

Trouble is, however, that the abwehr was not the only agency operating. There was, to my knowlege also the SD and the Intelligence arm of OKW that eventually came under Gehlens control. These other agencies really did produce some good results 9particulalry Gehlens efforts on the east front)Abwehr operations were increasingly narrowed to countering the allied efforts, and in this regard they were an abject failure. this was even recognized within Germany, because the Abwehr was basically taken over in 1943 by the SD. So your assertion that it was an organization with multiople responsibilities is not true, and your argument that it was a professional body (implying that it was doing its job well0 is also not true. By any measure it was not doing its job properly. It was in fact materially contributing to germany's defeat.

The point is that the Abwehr had allot more to deal with than any Allied agency as they had nearly no contacts to rely on for any information needed, meaning they themselves had to infiltrate enemy agencies.

As above, Abwehr operations were mostly related to counterintelligence of the western allies. By comparison, the US and British agencies were dealing with operations against Germany, Japan, Italy, and even the russians (the last named efforts were not that successful, otherwise they would have revealed the Philby connection. By comparison to the Abwehrs pathetic efforts, the Allied achievments are legion.....

And as for the German spies set off in America, they wouldn't be caught before the operation, that's nearly 100% sure. Just look at what happened on nearly all the landings undertaken in Canada the US, the spies managed to land and go all the way to New York without getting caught or even suspected. The cover was only broken when one sold off the others (A former American), giving himself up to the Police after having talked to an old school friend

My understanding is that the rings operating in the US were known at least by the british, and were being tagged and tailed to see what contacts and operations they were up to. This was occurring from mid'41. I am sure the Americans and canadians of this forum can answer better than I
 
Trouble is, however, that the abwehr was not the only agency operating.

Which I have neither claimed it was. And you're so terrorfyingly missing the entire point. You see as I've been trying to tell you the Allies had plenty of foreign contacts some of them being freedom fighters, partizans etc etc.. the Abwehr didn't have this luxury, THE reason they were rounded up in the UK - unless you're going to claim that there were nazi underground freedom fighters in Britain the US ;)

My understanding is that the rings operating in the US were known at least by the british, and were being tagged and tailed to see what contacts and operations they were up to. This was occurring from mid'41.

That is complete and utter bollocks however. The British knew nothing of the German agents in America, nothing.

U-459 was the first Milch cow, she was commissioned late November 1941, but had not yet worked up. she was not declared ready for operations until late April 1942.

Wrong. She was 100% ready by Nov 41, her crew just had to be trained for their coming jobs, refueling resupplying subs in the Atlantic, and in March this was done.

I assume you are planning this operation December 1941, so unless you are planning it for late '42, in which case your chances for success are zero, it is very relevant that the Milch Cows are not ready.

Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42.
 
what missions did they do I've never heard of any successful ones in North America as far as I know they all turned turtle. But the pastorious mission was intended to blow up the power plants in Niagara. but as for being accomplished I would say the opposite and they were inept getting busted for using out of date currency does not sound competent

What mission are you talking about ?

Anyhow the spies were landed successfully and no'one suspected a thing, which is the point. It was only when someone sold the others out that the cover was blown in nearly every incident. The other times they just turned themselves in.

Knowing this we can quite safely conclude that spies could be landed two weeks prior to the attack to establish the best landing area without any fear of being detected by the native authorities.


_________________________________________


Freebird,

The merchant idea is another possibility which I won't deny succeeding. However how will you get 25 men with equipment weapons past the dock inspectors ? You'd need trucks to hide it all in, and all your men must be able to speak either fluently english or Spanish, otherwise there's a great risk of getting caught.

Now if they could load all the equipment into trucks onboard the merchant vessel then they could perhaps just drive straight out with the men equipment in the back. But again what about the inspectors, how do you get past these ?
 
Can somebody explain how you even get a German sub anywhere near Alaska? By train across Central America? That in itself would defeat the operation IMHO.
 
Which I have neither claimed it was. And you're so terrorfyingly missing the entire point. You see as I've been trying to tell you the Allies had plenty of foreign contacts some of them being freedom fighters, partizans etc etc.. the Abwehr didn't have this luxury, THE reason they were rounded up in the UK - unless you're going to claim that there were nazi underground freedom fighters in Britain the US ;)


Your right, the allies had plenty of foreign contacts, but do you think this advantage just happened. The British (and the allies) were far more adept than Germany at cultivating these "middle men" than the germans....why might that be??? I would suggest that part of the reason for that was because of the gross incompetence of the Abwehr


That is complete and utter bollocks however. The British knew nothing of the German agents in America, nothing.

Ah sorry, but they did, mostly because the German communications system was completely compromised by 1941. I can find the proof for this if you want, but it will take some time. And given your revised mission time of mid '42, it is most definately true, therewere no uncompromised operatives working in either the US or Canada in Mid 1942

Wrong. She was 100% ready by Nov 41, her crew just had to be trained for their coming jobs, refueling resupplying subs in the Atlantic, and in March this was done.

Here are the patrol details from the U-Boat Net, which i know you have been accessing, but choosing to ignore for some reason

15 Nov, 1941 - 31 Mar, 1942 4. Flottille (training)
1 Apr, 1942 - 31 Oct, 1942 10. Flottille (front boat)
1 Nov, 1942 - 24 Jul, 1943 12. Flottille (front boat

Now, if you are looking, you can see that she was engaged in training until 31 March 1942. However, because of faults in her systems she did not actually depart for her first frontline operation until 1 May, even though she had been nominally allocated to front line operations on 1 April 1942.

You are quoting commissioning dates. What you are not realizing is that commissioning does not mean ready. in order for a vessel to be ready, it must "work up", which involves testing of the systems, and the rtraining of the crew. Because the U-459 was a new type, it took a long time for her to be ready. Infact she was not ready until mid to late April, at the earliest

Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42

Well thats interesting, because up to now you have been hinting that the operation was to occur whilst the US was at peace or just after, seems now the mission parameters have changed. is this because you have finally realized that the toys needed wernt available at the time you originally indicated??? But thats still okay, now your mission is proposed at a time just as the allies are starting to regain the initiative in ASW, have more than 5000 aircraft based in the continental US, most of whom are available for ASW work, the german communication system is completely compromised, ther are definately no spies operating in the US by that stage, and there are over 60000 LDV (coastwatchers) working in the US alone. In addition to the the US army has nearly completed the training on the first wave mobilzation, giving it access to about 40 divs by then, all of them in the continental US. So rather than enhancing your chances by changing your scenario, you have made the chances even worse
 
This is an extract from a report from the ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence)

Source: "German Espionage and Sabotage Against the United States" O.N.I. Review [Office of Naval Intelligence] 1, no.3 (Jan. 1946): 33-38. [declassified, formerly "confidential"].



Reasons for Failure of the German Intelligence Services

In conclusion one may speculate as to the reasons why the German intelligence services failed to produce results more in keeping with the effort expended. The first reason seems to be over-organization, with conflicts and duplication between the Abwehr and R.S.H.A. and within the two organizations themselves. The Abwehr was further handicapped by bureaucracy, lack of initiative, and corruption on the part of many of its officers, who were lukewarm Nazis at best and regarded a berth in the Abwehr as an opportunity to avoid service on the Russian front. By contrast the R. S. H. A. tended to be aggressive and imaginative, but it suffered from lack of experience and inability to evaluate information objectively. The personnel of both services was poorly chosen. The comment has often been made by Allied counterintelligence agencies that most German agents were of low grade and quality. The fault appears to have been with the initial recruiting and not with the training, although this was sometimes superficial.

Of course in spite of these weaknesses, the constant attention of the Allied agencies was required to prevent the Germans from getting information which might have been of immense value to them. Our experience showed that passive security measures, while essential, are not enough. There must be constant active counter-intelligence, in the form of both research and field work and a coordination of the two, directed toward increasing our knowledge of the enemy's intelligence organization, methods, capabilities and personnel.

On the matter of the 8 sabeteurs dropped by U-Boat, the relevant FBI report on the matter makes the following observations

Source: Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[This handout provided by the FBI, was revised by the FBI in March 1984, and retyped in July 1993. It was subsequently digitized with information added in brackets, and a note at the end by the Naval Historical Center.]

Shortly after midnight on the morning of June 13, 1942, four men landed on a beach near Amagansett, Long Island, New York, from a German submarine, clad in German uniforms and bringing ashore enough explosives, primers, and incendiaries to support an expected two-year career in the sabotage of American defense-related production. On June 17, 1942, a similar group landed on Ponte Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville, Florida, equipped for a similar career of industrial disruption.

The purpose of the invasions was to strike a major blow for Germany by bringing the violence of war to our home ground through destruction of America's ability to manufacture vital equipment and supplies and transport them to the battlegrounds of Europe; to strike fear into the American civilian population, and diminish the resolve of the United States to overcome our enemies.

By June 27, 1942, all eight saboteurs had been arrested without having accomplished one act of destruction. Tried before a Military Commission, they were found guilty. One was sentenced to life imprisonment, another to thirty years, and six received the death penalty, which was carried out within a few days.

The magnitude of the euphoric expectation of the Nazi war machine may be judged by the fact that, in addition to the large amount of material brought ashore by the saboteurs, they were given $175,200 in United States currency to finance their activities. On apprehension, a total of $174,588 was recovered by the FBI -- the only positive accomplishment of eight trained saboteurs in those two weeks was the expenditure of $612 for clothing, meals, lodging, and travel, as well as a bribe of $260.

So shaken was the German intelligence service that no similar sabotage attempt was ever made again. The German naval high command did not again allow a valuable submarine to be risked for a sabotage operation.



So, how do you like them apples
 
That's a 1946 report of the mission I already mentioned, and ofcourse it doesn't mention how they were caught, god forbid that the Americans didn't notice them! :rolleyes:

But how great of you to get such a truly unbiased report, cause we all know that by this time the Americans certainly weren't gloating with self confidence :rolleyes:

Oh and btw, the claim that the operation was such a failure that the German intelligence service were so shaken that no sabotage missions were ever attempted again is to no surprise false. In 1944 atleast two similar operations I know of were initiated, and two agents went to New York, where again one had second thoughts and turned himself in and sold out the other.
 
Ah sorry, but they did, mostly because the German communications system was completely compromised by 1941. I can find the proof for this if you want, but it will take some time.

No you can't Parsifal. Why ? Because from Feb 42 till late Nov 42 the Enigma was fully kryptic. Hence why the operation should ideally take place at this time.


And given your revised mission time of mid '42, it is most definately true, therewere no uncompromised operatives working in either the US or Canada in Mid 1942

Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.

You are quoting commissioning dates. What you are not realizing is that commissioning does not mean ready. in order for a vessel to be ready, it must "work up", which involves testing of the systems, and the rtraining of the crew. Because the U-459 was a new type, it took a long time for her to be ready. Infact she was not ready until mid to late April, at the earliest

Wrong once again. When the boat was commisioned it functioned perfectly. Like I said the period 15. April 1941 till 24. April 1942 was spent training the crew. Nothing was wrong with U-459.

Well thats interesting, because up to now you have been hinting that the operation was to occur whilst the US was at peace or just after, seems now the mission parameters have changed.

Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42.
 
Oh almost forgot to mention that hundreds of Uboats went on patrols lasting for months, U-217 was for example made two 90+ day patrols.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back