German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska (2 Viewers)

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"The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44."

Soren
in 42 one of two groups landing to USA was seen by a Coast Guardsman, that's 50%. The 2 agents which landed in 44 were seen IIRC after they got some 500y from the beach. One problem of landing in sparcely populated area is, if seen by locals they easily think that something strange is happening. So also in this case. Police was noticed and hunt was on but the agents had got a lift to nearest station and police lost their trail even if they strongly suspected that the agents had went to NY.

So contrary to your claim the odds were that US would notice a landing.

Juha
 
Did you miss all the other landings Juha ?

Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.
 
Did you miss all the other landings Juha ?

Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.

Soren
This sounds like another of your unsupported statements. How many is many? and what have you got to support this statement.

In case you have forgotten you still have to support the following statements
1) Your statement that the USSR got most of their intel from the western allies
2) That the Germans had many sucessful operations
3) That the Germans always turned themselves in
and now 4) That many landings were made.
 
The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.

As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.
 
The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.

As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.
they landed and screwed up in every one obviously the selection of operatives standards were very low . That must be considered to a failure of intelligence command
 
Soren
In U.boat.net I found only the 2 in 42 and the one in 44 which I mentioned, plus one in which the U-boat was sunk on the way to USA, the agent survived and probably landed on USA but as a prisoner, IMHO that could not be counted as a successful landing, You seem to disagree but frankly I cannot see rationality of that. What else? I checked the 44 Maine landing, the story was more complicated than I remembered and agents were lucky and got to NY but even if local police dismissed the agents sightings as buglars sightings the FBI put on hunt when the U-boat U-1230 sunk the Canadian ship Cornwallis on 3 Dec and learned the sighting of the 2 agents whose trail had began from a beach. But FBI only checked bus/coach connections but the agents had got a taxi drive to nearest station.

Juha

PS And your claim that the USSR got most of their intel from the western allies is rather ridiculous, they were capable to do a good intelligence gathering by themselves.
 
The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

WRONG!!! To this day the source of the Lucy rings information sources remains classified. There is SOME evidence to suggest it, but like all the other theories, it can't cover all the bases.

The latest, and best theory is that there was a combination of sources. It appears that the Soviet mole(s) at Bletchley gave initial indications to Stavkha, but the final compilation of the German OOB, and operational plans came from the yet to be identified mole in OKH.

It is simply not true that the Soviets obtained their information from the British. The British NEVER willingly shared Enigma Decrypts with the Soviets. What they MAY have done is provide pointers for the Soviets to follow on the well known and most sophisticated spy networks in Europe at the time, which happened to be controled by the Soviets
 
The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.
I believe that this has been dealt with by Parsifal

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.
Personally I make that two not hundreds.
Its always been a question in my mind as to why the Germans didn't do more special forces raids. For instance I am not aware of any against the UK despite only being 25 miles away and wide open for attack for the first 18-24 months. They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers.
As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.
A large number did turn themselves in but by no means all as I have mentioned and given examples of before. The important thing is that the achieved NOTHING, hardly a success.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.
Again your understanding of Many and mine differ. British secret services made many landings of special operatives in Europe literally hundreds. LRDPG made many incursions behind German/Italian lines.

That said, you did reply and its only fair that I fulfill my part of the debate ie Russian/German intelligence

German Intelligence Gathering (Using Spies)
The Germans were very poor at this making basic easily avoidable mistakes that cost nearly all their spies their lives. For example
1) False papers were prepared but the various stamps that were used were well made with crisp edges, Russian ones were blurred.
2) The staples used were made of metal that didn't rust, Russian ones did and it was an instant give away.
3) Badges were sewn on incorrectly and the stiching was too precise
4) They used ex POW's who were only to keen the offer their help to get out of the POW camps and promptly gave themselves up once behind the lines. The NKVD shot them anyway but only after debriefing them.

I will post more items later but I did give you the choice af Strategic, Tactical and Economic examples so if you have a preference, just let me know.
 
They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers

That is just downright wrong Glider. The Brandenburger commandos were perhaps the best trained spec ops soldiers in the world, being trained by the FallschirmJäger, GebirgsJäger, Panzergrenadiers, Pioniers, Wehrmacht Luftwaffe. And yes, they did carry out hundreds of successful operations, two of them being mentioned above. The number of successful operations in the east are so numerous that it would take several pages to cover them all.

Furthermore the GebirgsJägers FallschirmJägers both recieved better more specialized training than the Rangers.

Yous should read "The Brandenbuger Commandos" by Franz Kurowski.
 
The Brandenburger commandos were perhaps the best trained spec ops soldiers in the world, being trained by the FallschirmJäger, GebirgsJäger, Panzergrenadiers, Pioniers, Wehrmacht Luftwaffe. And yes, they did carry out hundreds of successful operations, two of them being mentioned above. The number of successful operations in the east are so numerous that it would take several pages to cover them all.

Furthermore the GebirgsJägers FallschirmJägers both recieved better more specialized training than the Rangers.

Yous should read "The Brandenbuger Commandos" by Franz Kurowski./
QUOTE]

Err, thats a pretty big claim..... just for starters read about the achievements of the LRDGs in the Desert. Then we can move onto to Commando Brigades if you like, and finally the SOE Saboteurs that tied down scores of German Divisions allover Europe, but with some especially noteworthy operations, like the destruction of the heavy water plants in Norway, and the destruction of the Lorient drydocks, etc, etc.

There is no denying that the Brandenburgers were outstanding, but the overwhelming majority of their operations were relatively short ranged penetrations of enemy controlled territory.

The "Brandenburgers, incidentally finished the war (from 1943 on) as regular line Infantry, so evidently their own high command did not think all that much of them.

In North africa, where four companies were sent to assist Rommel, their efforts were unimpressive.

The unit used captured British vehicles to operate behind enemy lines in raids and reconnaissance missions, mirroring the actions of the British LRDG. Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel disapproved of the Brandenburgers, but after he saw the damage being inflicted by the LRDG and Stirling's SAS, he realised their value and accepted their unorthodox methods. The unit was charged with disrupting British supply lines, but it was difficult to resupply them or provide transportation, so most men were either killed or captured.

This rather dismal effort stands in stark contrast to the mainly New Zealander manned LRDGs who were a constant thorn in the Axis behinds, and coming from men who for the most part were not supermen, but dairy farmers for the most part!!!!!

This is not to say that the brandenburgers did not undertake a lot of tactically successful missions. the Maikop infiltration is perhaps the best known, along with their infiltration to India, and of course the operations in neutral Holland. However, even here it (Maikop) the efforts amounted to nothing, since Maikop after its capture was found to be so thoroughly demolished that it was estimated by the "Oil Brigades" to take more than two years to restore its production to anything like "normal", and then only if more than half the trains allocated to AGS were used for non-military purposes.

Against the british, with the exception of the Operation Bajadere (operations in Afghanistan, Iran and India), the Brandenburgers were not very succesful against the British, or the Americans (although I am less certain about the US).

By late 1942, the Brandenburger unit was mostly concentrated in the Balkans, where it was basically used as an elite Infantry regiment, hardly a ringing endorsement of its special operations credentials.

The majority of Brandenburgers that survived the war found their way to organizations like the french Foreign Legion, and other mercenary organizations
 
Franz Kurowski is rated on the googlebooks "good read" reviews page as having a rating of just 3.7 out of 20. He is described as "innaccurate, biased, and poorly written" in several reviews. Other sites review his work quite highly, though without being specific. His background is as a serving member of the wehrmacht. one might suspect he has an agenda, other than to present the facts in an unbiased fashion.
 
Parsifal,

The Brandenburgers were disbanded in 1944, not 1943, and it wasn't because the high command didn't think highly of them, they were considered to be amongst the creme de la creme of the German army, it was simply because they were part of the Abwehr which by then was known to be behind an assasination attempt on Hitler that they were disbanded. Canaris and several other high ranking men within the Abwehr were arrested and executed. The Brandenburgers however, although disbanded, just joined other specialized units within the army, such as the JagdVerbände, another equally well trained spec ops unit within the German army.

As for the SAS LRDG's, they did well, but for a good reason, they had the support they needed.

Also remember that if the plan isn't good, then it really doesn't matter how good your men are. And I really can't express enough how true that is!

Franz Kurowski is rated on the googlebooks "good read" reviews page as having a rating of just 3.7 out of 20. He is described as "innaccurate, biased, and poorly written" in several reviews. Other sites review his work quite highly, though without being specific. His background is as a serving member of the wehrmacht. one might suspect he has an agenda, other than to present the facts in an unbiased fashion.

:rolleyes:

How about you read the book before you make such statements Parsifal ?? It's completely pointless otherwise.

But if you don't like it then you can read Spearheads book Brandenburgers - The Third Reich's Special Forces by Ian Westwell. A great book.
 
The Brandenburgers were disbanded in 1944, not 1943, and it wasn't because the high command didn't think highly of them, they were considered to be amongst the creme de la creme of the German army, it was simply because they were part of the Abwehr which by then was known to be behind an assasination attempt on Hitler that they were disbanded. Canaris and several other high ranking men within the Abwehr were arrested and executed. The Brandenburgers however, although disbanded, just joined other specialized units within the army, such as the JagdVerbände, another equally well trained spec ops unit within the German army.

I didnt mention that they were "disbanded" in 1943. In fact AFAIK, they were never actually disbanded, they just came under the control of the SD.

However, as specialist commandos they had pretty much had their day by the end of 1942. By late 1942, the majority of the Brandenburg regiment was being used as elite infantry and plugging gaps in the German lines, principally in yugoslavia. In February 1943, the Brandenburgers were pulled out of the line and moved back to Germany. The Regiment was being expanded again, this time to become Division Brandenburg, this expansion hardly suggests a lack of support. the "lack of support" was relating to the Abwehr control, who had generally proven such incompetent commanders of such an elite force. The division was to be formed by four regiments. One regiment was returned to the Eastern front, to resume duties as a fire brigade, One battalion was sent to Med front to continue harassing the Allies in the Mediterranean. The remainder of the division was sent to the Balkans, to engage in anti-Partisan operations


As for the SAS LRDG's, they did well, but for a good reason, they had the support they needed.

They were no more supported than the Brandenburgers. The only difference is that the people controlling them, with the priceless advantage of ULTRA, were able to achieve measurable results, and were clearly being provided with superior leadership, as evidenced by their measure of operational success. The british army as a whole, however, looked down on these "private armies". There were a significant number of british officers who worked hard to have them closed down. However inspirational leaders such as Wingate (of the Chindits), and Bagnold (of LRDG fame) along with the Stirling (of the SAS) were the difference between the British efforts and German. The other huge difference was co-ordination, whereas the various German special forces really were run more or less as "private armies" those in the British Army were always controlled from a central point. It was always intended that they were controlled centrally (I say intended, because it sometimes did not work out that way)

Also remember that if the plan isn't good, then it really doesn't matter how good your men are. And I really can't express enough how true that is!

For once we agree!!! But this failure was not limited to just the germans. The british were just as good at stuffing things up....just look at Dieppe


How about you read the book before you make such statements Parsifal ?? It's completely pointless otherwise.

But if you don't like it then you can read Spearheads book Brandenburgers - The Third Reich's Special Forces by Ian Westwell. A great book


I will read your sources, but all I want from you is that you assess things properly, and in a balanced way. I know that you have a lot of knowledge, but you often present it in such a cockeyed and biased way as to damage the credibility of the discussion. When you are on the money, you demand absolute precision, when you are not, you appear to want to allow the debate standards to drop, and allow "the multitude of sins" to cover dangerous generalizations. This originally quoted source does have its supporters, and overall may be worth looking at, but it is not "the bible" because it cannot establish it credentials as being totally unbiased
 
In my previous posting I mentioned some examples showing the poor preparation of German SPies before being sent to Russia. This applied across the board with similar examples on the spies sent to the USA. In one case the spy was challenged as soon as he went into a tailors store as the cut of his coat was foreign, but he was able to talk his way out of that.

I thought a note on Economic Warfare might balance this up. In the conflict with Russia, German Economic Intelligence was very good.
Using the interrogation of POW's Germany was able to build up a list of the key factories in Russia and get an initial estimate of their production. By using this information and combining it with intercepted reports on the amount of power used in these factories they were able to estimate the increase in production.
This information was double checked by taking the manufacturers plates off the bottom of destroyed T34 tanks and by sophisticated statistical techniques arrive at final numbers.
The results were impressive, T34 production estimates were within 9% of actual and total lend lease aid to Russia was within 0.6% of actual.

Interesting aside. The intelligence teams were able to authorise leave for every plate taken off the bottom of a T34, they were flooded with them.
 
Aah, now I see where we get off each other.

German spies weren't the most successful, agreed, but only in achieving mainly sabotage missions and for the reasons Glider Parsifal pointed out.

I was looking at the Abwehr as a whole, where the Brandenburgers launched hundreds of successful opeartion until the end of the war, esp. in the east but also against the western allies.

You guys should really read Spearheads book, it's very good!
 
It wasn't Just the spies Soren. The following is an example of how poor, some would say inept, Strategic Intelligence played a large part in the failure of the war in Russia.

When Germany planned the attack on Russia the Abwher estimated the Russian Army as having 200 divisions.
On the day the attack was launched the estimate had gone up to 226 divisions in Eastern Russia. Thats bad enough but by the 51st Day of the attack, the Germans had identified 360 Divisions in Eastern Russia, getting close to 80% more than the Germans had planned for.

Franz Halder, Head of the General Staff admitted that they had totally understimated the Soviet forces from the planning stages.
 
Gonna stick my head out again for a bit.

What units rescued Mussolini and participated in Wacht am Rhein?

The "Brandenburgers, incidentally finished the war (from 1943 on) as regular line Infantry, so evidently their own high command did not think all that much of them.

I'm not sure that this is a true representation of events. Towards the end, all units were collapsing just to shore up front-line units. Even SS Leibstandarte was conscripting foreigners and non-aryans to its ranks.
 
Gonna stick my head out again for a bit.

What units rescued Mussolini and participated in Wacht am Rhein?



I'm not sure that this is a true representation of events. Towards the end, all units were collapsing just to shore up front-line units. Even SS Leibstandarte was conscripting foreigners and non-aryans to its ranks.

SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte was the SS commando unit. which in the early part of the war was the sole province of the German military's Abwehr. Members of SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte participated both in the rescue of Mussolini and covert operations during the Battle of the Bulge. There appears to be a number of Paras involved as well. But the unit, and Skorzeny were not abwehr, and were not members of the brandenbuirger regiment

After his successful and daring commando raid to rescue Italian dictator Benitio Mussolini, SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny became commander of the Waffen-SS covert operations units. However, Hitler and Himmler had him off doing all sorts of special missions (mostly political) that he lost lost touch with his agents/troops and did not oversee their administration properly . Consequently, the activity, status and morale of the units under his command suffered.


The main headquarters for all the the SS-Jägerverband units was Fuehrungs Stab Friedenthal, with a strength of 700 men.In April 1945 FS "Freidenthal" became "Schutz Korps Alpenland" - a 250 man scratch feldjäerkorps for the Alpine Redoubt.

COMPOSITION
3 rifle companies
1 heavy weapons company
4 foreign volunteer companies
total compliment: 600 men; many from Freidenthal unit, but supposedly some W-SS probationers and Heer volunteers
In addition, each Jäverbände unit formed replacement "jadgeinsatz" - organized by nationality.

1942: RSHA VI-F (Reich Security Office/Foreign Intelligence/ Foreign Intelligence Technical Assistence Dept. ) forms the "SS Sonder Lehrgang 'Orienburg'" - 70 NCO's and 30 enlisted men under SS-Hauptsturmscharführer Vessem. The organization's instigates several covert operations including "Einsatz Franz" - an attempt to instigate an insurgency in Iran. Unit changes its name to "Sonder Lehrgang zbV Friedenthal"


June 1943: Waffen-SS begin to recruit men for a covert operations unit, possible transfers from Sonder Lehrgang zbV Friedenthal

August 1943: Aug 5: The first Waffen-SS commando unit, SS-Sonderverbünde z.b.V. Friedenthal offically formed, although recruitment efforts may have begun in June.

September 1943: Sept 5: Some unit members, including commander SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, participate in the daring glider-borne rescue of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, held captive at the Gran Sasso lodge.

October 1943: 1st. company sent on antipartisan operations in Croatia


February 1944: 3rd company formed with Flemish/Dutch personnel; 1 2nd companies sent to Kurmark for 6 week tour of duty on the Eastern front.

April 1944: Apr 17: unit redesignated "SS-Jäger-Bataillon 502;" company of foreign conscripts added to unit?

July 1944: Conspiracy of German Army officers attempt to assassinate Hitler but fail. Skorzeny is instrumental in putting down the coup, holding the berlin HQ building for over 36hours.

August 1944: Unit placed on alert south of Berlin, due to the bomb plot.

September 1944: unit (dissolved?) renamed SS-JägerVerbände-Mitte
Sept 10: Hitler summons SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny to discuss plans for a Hungarian coup.

October 1944: Oct 13: Skorzeny travels to Budapest under the alias "Dr. Wolff"; meets with SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski to discuss coup. Von dem Bach wants to pulverize the Hungarian government center, Castle Hill, with a huge "Big Bertha" type gun, but Skorzeny favors a more delicate operation.
Oct 15/16: participates in Operation Panzerfaust along with SS-Fallschirmj·ger Abteilung 500
Supported by 40 King Tiger tanks of Heer Schwere Panzer Abtleitung 503, the unit attacks Castle Hill.
November 1944: unit renamed "SS-Jagdverband Mitte"?

December 1944: Unit becomes part of the 150 Panzer Brigade for a special commando mission during the Operation Wacht am Rhein.


January - February 1945: Heavy defensive fighting, Schmeldt, Germany, against the Soviet Army.

March 1945: March 31: unit strength: 250

April 1945: sent to "Alpine Redoubt" (the mountainous area of Austria where a supposed Nazi "last stand" was to occur; Remnants surrender Linz.

I never had a problem with the SS commandoes, or even with the Abwehr special forces units. the failure of the German special forces was at its command levels, and with co-ordination. It also suffered in its espionage efforts which are largely a failure
SOURCES:
After The Battle #40: Budapest - Winston G. Ramsey - Battle of Britian Prints International Ltd. - 1983

Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS - Antonio Munoz - Axis Europa Books - 1991

Forgotten Legions Addenda - Antonio Munoz - Axis Europa Books - 2000?

Hungary 1944-45: The Forgotten Tragedy - Perry Pierik - Aspekt - 1998
 
Its always been a question in my mind as to why the Germans didn't do more special forces raids. For instance I am not aware of any against the UK despite only being 25 miles away and wide open for attack for the first 18-24 months. They didn't have anything like the LRDPG or SAS/SBS. They had mountain troops but not on the scale of the Commando's or Rangers.

:shock: :shock: You...mea..n ttthat..The Eagle has Landed...iiis..just aaa..movie??? :cry:

I read in a non German Book (Sorry can't remember the title – but could have been in the Book Desert Fox) that in summation British Commando raids had a very good impact on the moral of the people, but in relation of work and money spend these "spectacular" raids did not pay off – and none of them had any decisive impact on any strategic operation.

Has this been or could this be verified by any additional soures?


Regards
Kruska
 

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