German commando attack on the US, Canada & Alaska

[Soren]

For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.

The Abwehr
At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved.

[Soren]

More:

Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war.

[Soren]

As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article: uboat.net - Technical pages - Enigma

[parsifal]

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.


As U-Boat net points out, however, with virtually no success, as nearly all the agents dropped were captured, or surrendered very shortly after the event. The point about the failure being related to its (ie abwehrs) poor choice of operatives is well supported by the source.

It is also not true that articles state that the allies did not know about it. On seversl occasions at least the articles state the exact opposite


[B]The Abwehr
At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved[/b].

Can you give the source of this material please. it does not seem to appear at the link that you have provided, and if it does, completely contradicts all of the other posts made on that site with respect to german special operations in north America.

This article seems to suggest that the germans introduced a device referred to as an Enigma machine. is this the same machine as is referred to as an Enigma machine by the Allies???. If so the material is immediately highly suspect as to its veracity. Why on earth would the germans give the Allies an Enigma machine????

[parsifal]

As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article:

Your right that its a great article, but i suggest you read it agin. it definately does not support the assertion that all of enigma was cryptic for the period specified. It establishes th U_Boat commands cyphers were much more secure for that period, the average time tasken to decipher code being increased from an average of 17 hours, to 442 hours.

Also U-Boat command was but one arm of the armed forces that were using enigma. the other arms of the navy, and the armed forces, and diplomatic services continued to use forms of enigma that were fully compromised by Bletchely park.

That is not to say that the introduction of Shark and the additional rotor was not a problem, it was an enormous problem. but it falls well shy of the statement that you have made, namely that enigma was fully cryptic (implying that all of enigma operations were blinded....they werent)

[parsifal]

Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war


This is still unsourced material, but it just happens that i have seen it before. this hardly supports the notion that the Abwehr was a professional outfit that achieved a high level of competency, or materially aided the german war effort, quite the opposite in fact

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.

The Abwehr
[i]At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

The Abwehr certainly were pretty good at counter intelligence but never got on top of the problem with the exception of the Dutch operations. However I do not agree with the statement that they sabotaged military or Goverments.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

It isn't often that I would disagree with U Boat Net but I do in this case. Germany certainly tried to do this but with little if any success. Its interesting that they say that the Germans had all the plans for American fighters which they didn't, but they don't mention the biggest secret that the Germans did obtain. By 1939 Germany had a complete working example of the Norden Bomb sight which was tested by the Luftwaffe. This was stolen by Hermann W Lang. What is interesting is that he wasn't a spy put in place by Germany but an American citizen with roots in the USA who offerred his services to Germany. This was the pattern for German spies in the USA they achieved nothing with their own spies but people who offered to help did bring some results. However they didn't last long and Lang did nothing more to assist the German war effort.[/quote]

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

More:


Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, .

Would appreciate more on this topic as I don't know of many.

[Soren]

Guys it's not all from Uboat.net, only the special operations part.

Parsifal the article you've seen before is from Wiki.

The other is from Answers, which I found is incorrect after looking through my books. I don't see any mention of German agents infiltrating the US airplane industry at all in any of my books (Has anyone heard about this before?)

Anyway the point I was trying to stress is: The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44.

Remember the purpose of the spies to be landed before our little hypothetical operation aren't supposed to infiltrate any US organization or industry, just provide detailed maps of the target area, pick a landing site and make sure all is clear before the landing. Hence why we can be nearly 100% sure that they wont be compromised, seeing they won't be trying infiltrate any sensitive government area.

[syscom3]

Soren, no doubt the Germans could land spies and commando's anywhere on the eastern seaboard and Gulf seacoasts.

But their capacity to influence the war was zero! There just was to much redundancy and production capacity in the economy and temporary interruptions wouldn't alter the outcome.

But .... I will grant you this. A commando attack on the Panama canal would impact operations to some degree.

[Juha]

"The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44."

Soren
in 42 one of two groups landing to USA was seen by a Coast Guardsman, that's 50%. The 2 agents which landed in 44 were seen IIRC after they got some 500y from the beach. One problem of landing in sparcely populated area is, if seen by locals they easily think that something strange is happening. So also in this case. Police was noticed and hunt was on but the agents had got a lift to nearest station and police lost their trail even if they strongly suspected that the agents had went to NY.

So contrary to your claim the odds were that US would notice a landing.

Juha

[Soren]

Did you miss all the other landings Juha ?

Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

Did you miss all the other landings Juha ?

Many landings were made, not all are described at Uboat.net.

Soren
This sounds like another of your unsupported statements. How many is many? and what have you got to support this statement.

In case you have forgotten you still have to support the following statements
1) Your statement that the USSR got most of their intel from the western allies
2) That the Germans had many sucessful operations
3) That the Germans always turned themselves in
and now 4) That many landings were made.

[Soren]

The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.

As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.

[pbfoot]

Originally Posted by Soren

The soviets for one got their intel on the size of the German forces and when their attacks would take place during the Battle of Kursk from the British.

As for successful German special operations, well do I need to remind you of the rescue of Mussolini ? The capture of Maikop ? etc etc. There are littlerally hundreds of successful operations to mention Glider.

As for the spy landings in the US, go take a look yourself, in all the operations mentioned one of the crew turned himself in and sold out the others.

And many landings were made Glider, two seperate landings of four man team just for operation Pastorius in 1942, one team at Ponte Vedra beach near Jacksonville, and the others at Amagansett in New York.

they landed and screwed up in every one obviously the selection of operatives standards were very low . That must be considered to a failure of intelligence command