Greatest WWII Military Commanders: Updated

[Njaco]

Only after the US entered the war. Before that it was the British and its commonwealths that held the torch in NA.

[parsifal]

so you would agree,before alexander and the 8th army ambled up,eisenhouer was ground forces commander in tunisia.yours,starling


No, Eisenhower was the theatre commander, in command of the overall assets, land, sea, and air. he also had certain authority viz a viz political events, particualrly with respect to negotiating with the Vichy forces, and the free French Forces, and theresistance fighters as well

There are really two phases in the Allied command structure for the north african campaign, with a major re-organization occurring after the defeats at kasserine.

Victory at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers gave the United States Army and its British ally solid toeholds in the western Mediterranean Theater of Operations. But it offered no guarantee of easy access to Italy or southern Europe, or even to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where the British desperately needed assistance to secure Egypt and strategic resources in the Near East. The sudden entrance of American forces during 8-11 November 1942 created an awkward deployment in which two pairs of opposing armies fought in North Africa, one in Tunisia, the other in Libya. Neither Axis nor Allies found any satisfaction in the situation; much fighting remained before either adversary could consider North Africa secure.

At this p[oint, the ground forces commanders were Anderson (in charge of 1st Army), and Fredendall (I think, in charge of US II Corps), later Juin would join, in comand of XIX French Corps

The awkward command structure forced on Eisenhower following the Torch landings contributed significantly to the slow progress of the allis in western africa.

The apparent progress of the allies in the theatre belied a string of muddled operations and stinging reverses. Frustrated and furious, Eisenhower wrote a scathing description of Allied performance in the Tunisia Campaign. To Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall he confided his view that American and British operations had thus far managed to violate every accepted tactical principle of warfare and would be condemned in the military school system for decades to come .

While Eisenhower struggled to contain squabbles on the Allied side, the Germans hit Sidi Bou Zid, ten miles beyond Faid. With over 200 tanks on both sides, a huge, drawn-out battle appeared in the making. But US armor was spread too thin, and the panzers punched through in only one day. An ineffective counterattack the next day and the stunning capture of some 1,400 troops forced the US to undertake a major withdrawal. As the 1st Armored Division fell back, enemy pressure eased. However, on the 16th the Germans resumed their westward push, seizing Sbeitla, twenty-five miles beyond Sidi Bou Zid. Again the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time at Kasserine Pass. Four days of successive defeats cost II Corps dearly. The Americans lost 2,546 missing, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, and 1 antiaircraft battery.

The succession of II Corps defeats did not end with the loss of Sbeitla. Rommel saw the opportunity to keep his battered adversary reeling with a push for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to Algeria. Adding the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his German-Italian Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps on 19 February. By the next afternoon the pass was in Axis hands. Only the valiant stands of individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's progress. As an alarming indication of falling morale, American troops abandoned huge stocks of equipment. In a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities. Concerned that the British Eighth Army might attack from Libya while he was moving west, Rommel turned back to the east.


The conduct of Allied operations in both northern Tunisia in December 1942 and the central mountain ranges in February 1943 forced a total reexamination of Allied organization and plans. In short order General Eisenhower restructured the Allied command and changed key personnel. A new command—the 18th Army Group under British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander—tightened operational control over the combat corps and armies of the three Allied nations. With the British Eighth Army now close enough to the Allied southern flank to affect Axis operations, the three national commands in Tunisia narrowed their battlefronts and shifted north. Because the U.S. II Corps had taken high casualties and lost so much equipment during the February battles, and—in the British view— shown tactical incompetence, the Americans were to play a role auxiliary to the British in the next phase of the campaign. Accordingly, Alexander's staff was primarily British

The Americans received the highest-level personnel change when in early March Eisenhower selected Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to command II Corps. Now the Allies had a field commander who would cause his adversaries genuine concern for his willingness to attempt maneuvers others thought rash. With Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy, Patton set about rebuilding the II Corps into the panzer-killing force he knew it could become. Overlooking no detail—including neckties in the heat of North Africa—Patton pushed his men to fight and dress like the best soldiers in the world. Within days they knew they were led by a commander who would not let them fail

[starling]

when ike wrote his scathing report to marshal about american and british problems,do we know where eisenhowre,s hq was.
the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.
how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling

[Njaco]

Those are questions that I don't know, maybe parsifal or Kruska or others can give you an idea. But as far as Air Forces after NA you can check this site as it gives the US deploment of AF from around the globe. It is a lot of boring reading though.

Index of /~mcgrew/wwii/usaf

BTW love your avatars with Clint!

[parsifal]

when ike wrote his scathing report to marshal about american and british problems,do we know where eisenhowre,s hq was.


His HQ was at Gibraltar, he may have moved it as the campaign wore on. however, it is unlikley, given the very extensive communications, naval and air facilities that he could call on at the bas. I also suspect that the Allies did not want to risk a fifth column pro-vichy attack on Eisenhower in the same vein as Darlans assassination.

the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
I dont think anyone realized at the time the immense difficulties that would present themselves in co-ordinating a multi-national force, across such vast distances

when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.

Alexander was placed in command of 18AG. As the name suggests, it had under its command, 1st and 8th armies. Alexander was in nominal control of the land forces, but the Americans in particualr tended to bypass and go directly to Eisenhower. This created obvious Command & Control problems.


how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling

Not sure, suggest you look at the site provided by NJ

[starling]

so from the beginning of torch,nov 42,until the creation of 18th a/g in feb 43,under the command of alexander,this is 3 months.eisenhower was in command of brit 1st army,american 2 corps and the french,his hq was at gibraltar.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.

[parsifal]

so from the beginning of torch,nov 42,until the creation of 18th a/g in feb 43,under the command of alexander,this is 3 months.eisenhower was in command of brit 1st army,american 2 corps and the french,his hq was at gibraltar.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.


Eisenhower was not the ground forces commander at any stage. He was the theatre commander. In that capacity, he did an excellent job of an exceptionally difficult assignment. And he was acting 100% correctly to work through the higher command in order to make the changes that he did. You make it sound like the letters he was writing were frivolous and pointless. I have not see those letters, but he would have needed the agreement of his boss, Marshall, in order to carry out the administrative changes that he did.

The land forces commander (at the army level) Anderson (with the 1st Army). Montys forces were not placed under Eisenhowers control until after the formation of 18AG. However, the French XIX, under Juin, and the US IICorps , under fredendall, frequantly did not work in well under Anderson, co-ordination seems to have been the ain problem. This was firmly the responsibility of Anderson, but it was simply beyond him. Eisenhower eventually did act, but perhaps he was too slow to do so. But in his defence, there were a lot of other issues to take care of at the time.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by parsifal

so from the beginning of torch,nov 42,until the creation of 18th a/g in feb 43,under the command of alexander,this is 3 months.eisenhower was in command of brit 1st army,american 2 corps and the french,his hq was at gibraltar.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.


Eisenhower was not the ground forces commander at any stage. He was the theatre commander. In that capacity, he did an excellent job of an exceptionally difficult assignment. And he was acting 100% correctly to work through the higher command in order to make the changes that he did. You make it sound like the letters he was writing were frivolous and pointless. I have not see those letters, but he would have needed the agreement of his boss, Marshall, in order to carry out the administrative changes that he did.

The land forces commander (at the army level) Anderson (with the 1st Army). Montys forces were not placed under Eisenhowers control until after the formation of 18AG. However, the French XIX, under Juin, and the US IICorps , under fredendall, frequantly did not work in well under Anderson, co-ordination seems to have been the ain problem. This was firmly the responsibility of Anderson, but it was simply beyond him. Eisenhower eventually did act, but perhaps he was too slow to do so. But in his defence, there were a lot of other issues to take care of at the time.

Good post Parsifal.

Starling, there were a few US commanders that did a poor job - but I don't think Ike falls in that category. He did a good job keeping the lid on all the political problems brewing up in North Africa.

If there had been an un-diplomatic leader there {yes, like Patton or Monty!} the Allies could have easily ended up using 75% of there troops defending their supply lines from hostile & rebellious French, Bedouins etc!

[starling]

i believe rommel attacked 8th army at medanine on 6/3/43.his corps contained primarily the,90 light div,164th div,and 10th,15 and 21st pz div,along with some italian units.
do we know when alexander was given ultra info,which gave him knowledge of date of rommels attack on 8th army.cheers,starling.

[Juha]

I voted for Nimitz for his management of the Pacific War.

Spruance for his ability to rise for the occasion, suddenly from a cruiser commander to carrier fleet commander in eve of decisive battle (Midway) and his handling of that battle. IMHO a cool and analytical leader also very brave IIRC.

Park for his handling of BoB and Malta air battles in 42. Very skillful fighter leader.

von Manstein very good operational mind, very good planner and also very good field commander.

Juha

[JugBR]

rommel should win by 10+ votes diference, of course.

so i voted for zhukov, because the man is a legend on russia and im very interested by the russian history of ww2 ate the moment

[starling]

i believe monty usually ambled behind rommel with 2 divs.at the time of medanine,xxxcorps;51st highland div,7th armd div and 201 guards bde.
anyone else got more info.starling.

[Njaco]

Operation Capri - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The 51st (Highland) Division commanded by Major-General Douglas Wimberley, 7th Armoured Division (General George Erskine) and New Zealand 2nd Division (Bernard Freyberg) of the 8th Army. The open southern flank was covered by the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, which included the Free French Flying Column (FFFC) and the 1e Bataillon d’Infanterie de Marine et du Pacifique.

on the German side - Two German infantry divisions, the 90th Light and 164th Light, and the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (estimated 200 tanks). The Spezia Division of the Italian 1st Army occupied the Mareth Line.