How Rundstedt could've repulsed the Allied invasion in 44

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 11:33 AM

In the end, there really was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the Normandy invasion. They could have complicated things but not stop it. As long as the allies held naval and air superiority, the battle for Normandy was never in doubt.

evangilder · 01-18-2006, 12:00 PM

Agreed, the only real difference would have been the cost in lives.

Hunter368 · 01-18-2006, 12:12 PM

very true

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 12:24 PM

Erich, any information you have, even if its a "what if" or slightly off topic, please post it. It gets us to think about things too.

Erich · 01-18-2006, 12:26 PM

I will say it again had the nf performed the Ferne-nacht there would have been no air superiority over Normandie and Naval ? what protection could the Allies have come up without airfields to fly from ?

I'm getting carried away here so I will now stop.............maybe

Hunter368 · 01-18-2006, 12:39 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Erich

I will say it again had the nf performed the Ferne-nacht there would have been no air superiority over Normandie and Naval ? what protection could the Allies have come up without airfields to fly from ?

I'm getting carried away here so I will now stop.............maybe

They would of had to come up with a viable nf force, between the UK and USA I think they would of been able to modify current planes as a stop gap and then developed other models faster as the need for them heightened. If we are playing the big what if game here Eric do you agree that is also possible. Germany could not match plane for plane or even pilot for pilot with UK & USA. Germany would had the lead for a while until the allies were able to catch up and over take them. In 41-42-43 German would have had the upper hand, but as of 44-45 German could not shot down enough UK USA Russian planes on all fronts to halt the waves of planes. German plane production was being massively out produced at this time.

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 12:48 PM

The only flaw I see in your reasoning is the RAF and AAF wouldnt retaliate in kind. If the Luftwaffe night attacks were serious, you would see a lot more RAF night time counter measures. I would venture to say the RAF would have their own night intruders over the German airfields.

Airfields were always difficult to knock out, and the Luftwaffe could not seriously impede operations. Just too many airfields too take care of.

I will grant you that the night intruders could have effected the RAF strategy to certein degree by forcing them to be far more cautious in coming in to land. But to say they could have any effect on daytime operations is stretching it a bit. The AAF airfields would have been laid out with more revetments, greater aircraft dispersal and under cover and probably more engineer units to fill in bomb craters.

Just as you said in other threads how the sturm fighters could devestate the B17 and B24's "heavy bombers" with their cannons, the P47's with their 8 .50's would have an easier time against the Luftwaffe "medium bombers".

Erich · 01-18-2006, 12:54 PM

it is questionable I would agree, but the central and southern airfields where the RAF/US were bases would of have been blasted early on from 41-43, the US could not take part with the fighters and bombers it had unless it tried to formaulte plans with Ireland and the northern section of England. would of the bombers and fighters had the fuel reserves to make a two way trip/over to Germany and then back in early 43. probably not. the same results for the RAF, implanting northern fields or could they. the Ju 88C series had plenty of fuel to cover all of England and the environs for the time it was allocated.

any time anyone wants to reverse the scenario and get us back on track, but I feel this is all part of the long range: Normandie was conquered via defeating the day time Luftwaffe by overpowering it, and that is because of superior knowledge of the land, airfelds and Luftwaffe strengths that was only built up after the Luftw. nf intruder program came to an abrupt standstill.

I do apoligize for hijacking this thread but it got me thinking, the Luftw intruder program has never been seriously looked at, and covered in books so scantily that 90 % of those interested in the air war have never heard of it.

v/r E time for a

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 01:14 PM

I dont see the AAF as being strong enough to influence events untill spring 1943. Untill then, it would be a RAF/Luftwaffe fight.

Remember that throughout the later part of 1942, a good part of the AAF groups were going to North Africa.

From what Ive been able to gather, the real fight for the sky didnt begin untill the 1st quarter of 1944 where the 8th AF was finally able to bring the fight deep into Germany. Up till then, the Luftwaffe would only be able to create a nuisance and not do any lasting damage.

The logistical buildup to the Normandy invasion didnt begin in earnest untill late 1943 so the Luftwaffe would have to be in strength and capable of sustained operations to wreck the ports and depots.

Erich · 01-18-2006, 01:23 PM

sys:

the US bomber initiative almost came to a halt after the disaster at Schweinfurt/Regensburg in summer-fall of 1943. It was going through serious growth periods with an ever present thought of not futhering the heavy bomber campagin during the day even with P-47 escorts. the Luftwaffe was bringing it on the US heavies in ever increasing numbers with terrible casualties on both sides.

I repeat the Luftw. intruder program would of negated a pre Normandie buildup on the English coast and everything would of been a shambles.

It is also of note with the disaster of operation Tiger / April 44, the LST sinkings and damages with loss of US sailors how much emphasis was put on bombing out Cherbourg and Le Harve ports housing S-booten, which when thought out were pretty much inconsquential to overall scope of things. but a huge threat they were in the Allied supreme minds

wmaxt · 01-18-2006, 05:16 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Erich

sys:

the US bomber initiative almost came to a halt after the disaster at Schweinfurt/Regensburg in summer-fall of 1943. It was going through serious growth periods with an ever present thought of not futhering the heavy bomber campagin during the day even with P-47 escorts. the Luftwaffe was bringing it on the US heavies in ever increasing numbers with terrible casualties on both sides.

I repeat the Luftw. intruder program would of negated a pre Normandie buildup on the English coast and everything would of been a shambles.

Until the P-47 with enough fuel and paddle prop the P-47 was limited in its effectiveness. The P-47 escorts at that time, could only go, roughly, to the German border and so were never a serious asset in the long range missions like Schweinfurt/Regensberg.

As for the intruder program, I think the AAF would have moved a few miles further from the coast, beyond the effective range of the intruders. The P-38s were always based at places like Kings Cliff 80 miles or more from the coast. It would have been inconvienient but nothing else.

A major issue was the Germans never had adequate recon on the ground or in the air or they would have been much more formidible - the D-Day buildup is a case in point.

wmaxt

Udet · 01-18-2006, 07:05 PM

While my books and printings on this particular issue are somewhat covered by dust, I recall the essay of an officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel (Podpolkovnik) of the present-day Russian army who is the elder brother of one my best friends.

In his paper, he stated that in fact, Germany had the ground forces to smash the allied invasion. The interference of the OKW and Hitler is a fundamental aspect covered, and in fact, played an essential role in letting the allies form the beachhead.

Not that I recall this with all due accuracy, but it is commented the strenght of the main armored divisions of the Heer in France during those days:

(i) Panzer Lehr (nearly 180 Panzers and some 40 self-propelled artillery)
(ii) 21 Pz. Div. (nearly 100 Panzers)
(iii) 12 SS. Pz. Div. (nearly 170 panzers).

All three VERY powerful units and if i recall correctly, they were the ones closer to the main landing beaches of the allies on June 6th. But when we talk about being an extremely powerful unit, the Panzer Lehr takes the gold medal.

(Not included in my comment are other panzer units, such as the 116 Pz. Div. and several other SS.Pz. units; those who were there on June 6th, as well as those who arrived in the days and weeks that followed)

Refitted and mechanized. He stated that only those three divisions had 450 panzers (!). Such force, he stated somewhere in his paper, would have brought havoc and massive destruction if deployed in the eastern front, against the massed T-34 units...how was it possible they failed to destroy the allied beach head?

The force that has just landed and is trying to form and hold a beachhead is a very fragile lifeform. The fact it might enjoy massive naval and air support goes secondary. If the enemy bursts out attempting to exterminate it, you might want to hold your naval and air support or accept killing your own in high numbers.

Also I recall another interesting fact the guy covered, and that I do not recall seeing on any other publication:

the fact that the allied airborne units dropped during the June 5/6 night, no matter how many paratroopers were landed, did not have the power to achieve anything that significant. By the wat, their landing was a mess, too disperse.

Place the Panzer formations closer to beach areas, annihilate everything that moves there, then you will have the time to look back and go after the paratroopers, they end dead, as POWs or joining the thugs of the French resistance.

Of course, his paper is way more custimozed and comprehensive than this brief comment.

The point is, I agree Germany, although overstretched and overburdened -and overbled-, had the resources to smash the allies in the west in June 1944.[/u]

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 07:12 PM

The allied battleships could begin shelling the Panzers long before they came close to the beachheads. Then the cruisers would join in, and finally the destroyers.

Not counting the aircraft I might add.

A concentrated thrust by the panzers would mean they would be grouped together for fast destruction.

Udet · 01-18-2006, 07:27 PM

Mr. Syscome:

pardon me?

What about advancing at night? Or if it would be necessary to march in daylight, they had camouflage and the French landscape which offered plenty of hideout.

It is recorded, German losses of AFVs to allied planes were minimum during the entire campaign. Other than significant delays in the arrival of German units to critical points of the front, which is already a juicit gain, allied air power achieved little.

syscom3 · 01-18-2006, 08:13 PM

Its a proven fact that guns can be fired at night.

Plus a liberal use of starshells to brighten things up for the aircraft.

If its one thing the allies excelled at was indirect fire. All they had to do was tell one of the battleships that a bunch of tanks are located at a certein coordinate, then blamo....... a few salvo's from the 14" guns and no more target.