Japan and the Soviet Union

[Soren]

If the Japanese helped Germany defeat the USSR then they'd be in a VERY good position to take over the entirety of China, with enough oil to make sure a war in the pacific wasn't needed. So if anything they had every reason to pour their best at the Soviets. Over 2 million reserves could secure the already conquered areas within China.

[Matt308]

Keep it civil, guys. Let's not ruin a good thread.

[Lucky13]

How good were these Russian Subs?

[Soren]

The IJN would take care of the Soviets subs, which weren't much good btw. The best they had was the Stalinet boats, but even they were outdated by 1941.

[parsifal]

I agree with Imalko, it wasnt the terms of refernce for this thread.....however, if we are going to assume that the Japanese are suddenly going to field a regular army bigger than that fielded by the Germans, should we not also consider similar expansions for the the allies, chines or Soviets. The sky is the limit once you start to depart from the known situation. Why couldnt the Chinese be equipped with surplus Russian equipment.....if we assume that then all of a sudden the allies have another 300 divisions to play with....why not assume that lend lease is diverted to the Pacific, in lieu of the US involvement, and field approximately another 30 divs and about 1500 aircraft. The possibilities are endless, and in the end quite silly, from either bias or perspective.

The only way this scenario can be objectively assessed is on the basis of the forces available. Japan did not have the plane or the pilots to fild 500 zeroes.....they didnt even have enough to field 300 and thats in December, not June.

The whole excercise becomes a bit ridiculous if we start introducing fanciful what ifs into the equation. Or if we do, it then becomes necessary to postulate logical quid pro quos for both sides

[proton45]

Originally Posted by parsifal

I agree with Imalko, it wasnt the terms of refernce for this thread.....however, if we are going to assume that the Japanese are suddenly going to field a regular army bigger than that fielded by the Germans, should we not also consider similar expansions for the the allies, chines or Soviets. The sky is the limit once you start to depart from the known situation. Why couldnt the Chinese be equipped with surplus Russian equipment.....if we assume that then all of a sudden the allies have another 300 divisions to play with....why not assume that lend lease is diverted to the Pacific, in lieu of the US involvement, and field approximately another 30 divs and about 1500 aircraft. The possibilities are endless, and in the end quite silly, from either bias or perspective.

The only way this scenario can be objectively assessed is on the basis of the forces available. Japan did not have the plane or the pilots to fild 500 zeroes.....they didnt even have enough to field 300 and thats in December, not June.

The whole excercise becomes a bit ridiculous if we start introducing fanciful what ifs into the equation. Or if we do, it then becomes necessary to postulate logical quid pro quos for both sides

The Chines suffered from poor communication. Many of the troops fighting for the Chinese where led by cooperating "warlords"...if one where too assume that that the "re-enforced"-"re-equipped" Chinese would have been a (more) formidable adversary, one would have to believe that cohesion (coordination) between "generals" was improved too...

Their is reason to believe that the Japanese would have used the same "surprise" tactics they where well know for...if they where able to keep the pressure on the Russian airbases (bombing sorties) they might have been able to keep the Russians on the defensive...in the air anyways.

[Amsel]

The interesting thing about alternative history is that many things could have happened that might not make sense at the present time. After the humiliating defeat of the Japanese on their Lake Baikal campaign they correctly surmised that they could not match the Soviets in artillery, armor and especially logistics. They did change their plans for the invasion of the USSR to reflect this. They knew that a campaign into the Lake Baikal region could not work mainly due to the Trans Siberian railroad being such an excellent way to move man and materials to the region. The Incident at Nomonhan made the Japanese realize that a campaign needed to be shorter and closer to its frontier to succeed. Luckily the linchpin of the entire Eastern Maritime District depended on the Trans-Siberian railway for any resupply due to the terrain of the region as pointed out by Parsifal, it was swampy forest and rugged mountains. The key to the region was Voroshilov, a mere sixty km from the Japanese positions.

The Japanese decided that for the Hachi-Go plan to work they needed 30 divisions to jump off and another10 divisions to continue the plan. They would need to pull 10 divisions from the homeland and another 10 divisions from China to add to the Kwangtung army for the initial phase of attack. And then another 6-7 Divisions from the homeland anda further 3 divisions from China for the next phase. With the campaign being much closer to the sea the IJN could play a huge part in the siege and assault of Vladivostok and the destruction of the Russian navy, airfields and subpens.

The Red Army fielded about 19 rifle divisions, 6 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, a calvary division and about 10 brigades of rifles. Pretty formidable but at a disadvantage because they had to be spread out from Mongolia to the ocean. Under those circumstances the Japanese could choose how and where to attack. They had pretty good intelligence on the fortifications put up to protect the railway and could find a way to seep through the Soviet lines to sever the Trans-Siberin railway and cut off the resupply of the province from the west.

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by Lucky13

How good were these Russian Subs?

Soviet subs were cut to pices in in the Baltic, thats true, mostly from Mines. They were effectively penned in from the beginning of the war, and as a result, had lost 12 boats by December 1941, nearly all of them to mines. In exchange for this they had managed to sinck about 80000 tons of Axis shipping.

However judging Soviet subs by their experiences in the baltic or the Black sea will yield a biased result inmy opinion. In the case of both seas, they are very constricted and shallow (as a swede you would know better than I actually), and mines absolutely massacred them as a result. In the far north, there were nine boats, and during the war they managed to sink about 100000 tons of shipping which is not too bad.

In the Pacific, the seas are neither shallow, nor are the Japanese strong in ASW defence. The actual boats deployed in the pacifc include 12 x Serie I/ II/XI/XIII, 30 x Serie III/V/VBis/X and 16 "S" class (or Serie XVI). These were the Soviet "fleet" types. They also fielded at least 60 of the Type VI "Coastal Boats

The broad characteristics of these boats is not as good as either the German or the Japanese, but compared to the prewar US types (with the very significant exception of the Gatos) were equal to or superior to the US types. There is one exception to this. US Boats later in the war were fitted with radar, which was never used by Soviet Subs

The Serie I/II/XI/XIII had respectively the following general characteristics
Displacement: 1354/1372/1400/1416 tons
Speed: 15.3/8.7, 15/9, 16/10/, 18/10
Dive limit: 300 ft (all)
Dive time (secs)30/30/20/20
Endurance 7500/132@2, 6000/135@3 (Serie II & XI),14000/130@3.5
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 6/2(14), 6/-, (12)(Types II,XI), 6/2(28 )
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with a 100/52 deck gun, a 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
Mines Types II, XI and XIII each carried 20 contact mines as an alternate warload


The Serie III/V/VBis had the following characteristics

Displacement: 704 /708/749/708 tons
Speed: 12.5/8.5, 14/8, 12/7.5, 14/9
Dive limit: 340 ft (all)
Dive time (secs) about 18-25 secs for all (Serie IIwere slower, Serie X were very quick divers) 30/30/20/20
Endurance all, typically, 6-6500/105 @3
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 4/2(10) (all)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with 2 x 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
Mines None


The Series VI (and related) were small coastal boats with the following characteristics

Displacement: 200 to 351 tons
Speed: 15.7/7.8
Dive limit: 260ft (all)
Dive time (secs) Unknown, but quick
Endurance all, typically, 3000/90@2
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 2 or 4 (Bow)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with 1 x 45 mm AA and 1 AAMG
Mines None

The "S" class were the culmination of the prewar building program, and incorporated the following characteristics. They bore a striking resemblance to Type VIIs but larger

Displacement: 1090 tons
Speed: 19/10
Dive limit: 360 ft
Dive time (secs) about 15 secs
Endurance 9500/135@4
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 4/2(12) (all)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns 1x 100 mm, 1 x 45 mm AA and either 1 AAMG
Mines None, carried Deguassing equipment

The earlier types showed poor workmanship and design, these were gradually worked out by the outbreak of the war. The Type Is were particulalry poorly designed. Convesely, the Type XVIs were on par with the German Type VIIs, with additional range, speed and protection (from mines).

In terms of manpower, whereas the Black and Baltic fleets were subjected to the effects of the purges, the Pacific Fleet was largely spared, Further it did not suffer from the manpower comb outs that characterised the European fleets. It is reasonable to expect that the fleet would have performed better than in the west. It certainly performed creditably in 1945, when called upon to organise and execute a number of amphibious assaults in the north, against defe3nded targets

[Amsel]

The Soviets had about 70 subs in the Pacific and they were the number one priority of the IJN to be destroyed, even more important then the bomber airfields, because they would threaten any resupply to the armies fighting on mainland Asia. The Combined Fleet of Japan would try to destroy most of these subs at dock by an airstrike similar to the Pearl Harbor attack. It would be essential to any campaign against the USSR to do so.

[Amsel]

Another interesting bit of information is regarding the make up of a division between the two beligerants. A Red Army division was almost always made up of 20,000 men. The Japanese divisions in the early war always had a reserve division organic to each division to replace casualties. That made a Japanese division roughly twice the size of the typical european style division. Though the organic reserve was made up of second line soldiers, usually older men they helped fill the ranks substantially.

[Glider]

I admit to getting a little confused about the scenario. I can understand that the Japanese are for the purposes of the exercise to launch an attack in co-ordination with Germany in the summer of 1942 and that the USA stay out of the battle. For this to happen we are using the forces and equipment that were in place.

Should we stray from this all the assumptions are distinctly one way.

[Soren]

Crap! Just wrote freaking 3 A4 page worths of stuff and then my internet stopped working so I lost it

To be continued!

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by Amsel

The interesting thing about alternative history is that many things could have happened that might not make sense at the present time. After the humiliating defeat of the Japanese on their Lake Baikal campaign they correctly surmised that they could not match the Soviets in artillery, armor and especially logistics. They did change their plans for the invasion of the USSR to reflect this. They knew that a campaign into the Lake Baikal region could not work mainly due to the Trans Siberian railroad being such an excellent way to move man and materials to the region. The Incident at Nomonhan made the Japanese realize that a campaign needed to be shorter and closer to its frontier to succeed. Luckily the linchpin of the entire Eastern Maritime District depended on the Trans-Siberian railway for any resupply due to the terrain of the region as pointed out by Parsifal, it was swampy forest and rugged mountains. The key to the region was Voroshilov, a mere sixty km from the Japanese positions.

The Japanese decided that for the Hachi-Go plan to work they needed 30 divisions to jump off and another10 divisions to continue the plan. They would need to pull 10 divisions from the homeland and another 10 divisions from China to add to the Kwangtung army for the initial phase of attack. And then another 6-7 Divisions from the homeland anda further 3 divisions from China for the next phase. With the campaign being much closer to the sea the IJN could play a huge part in the siege and assault of Vladivostok and the destruction of the Russian navy, airfields and subpens.

The Red Army fielded about 19 rifle divisions, 6 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, a calvary division and about 10 brigades of rifles. Pretty formidable but at a disadvantage because they had to be spread out from Mongolia to the ocean. Under those circumstances the Japanese could choose how and where to attack. They had pretty good intelligence on the fortifications put up to protect the railway and could find a way to seep through the Soviet lines to sever the Trans-Siberin railway and cut off the resupply of the province from the west.

The Japanese only had an army of 51 Division in December 1941, and 31 of them were engaged in holding China. 14 were in Manchuria, and 6 were earmarked for operations in South east asia and the Pacifc. There were four divs in the Home Islands (some of the southern force units were drawn from China, plus the South Seas and other marine assets of the IJN can be included to increase that 51 to about 53 Divs). However, at least two divs were needed to watch the northern parts of Japan from invasion, whilst the IGHQ was concerned for the safety of the emperor, and allotted one complete Div....the Imperial Guards Div, to his protection.

Quite simply, the numbers you are touting dont exist in the japanese army, unless we are going to start navel gazing like some around here.

Now, as far as being able choose where they could attack, this is another furphy that needs to be put to bed early. There was a railway leading northwest into Transbaikal, intersecting the main reanssiberian line near Chita. From the border to this junction is a distance of 270 miles, and the main railhead in Manchuria, the town of TsiTsihar, is a further 560 miles beyond that. There were some frontier depots and villages, no roads, and couple of camels. There is no way this direction is going to work as an MLA for a 30 division attack.

Then there is the long frontier stretching from the Khentii Mountains in the Northwest to the Amur River near Komsolosk in the east. The Khentii Mountains are formidable, to say the least, there are no roads (it takes four solid days of riding on horseback to even reach the foothils) rising up to a massive 9180 feet, ther is just no crossing this range with any large body of men.

The area between the Khentii mountains to the Amur is dark, mountainous forest no roads, and the nearest railheads are Hegang and Nunjiang, on the manchurian side of the border. These are some 240 miles from the frontier, with the Transsiberian line passing to about 80 miles from the border, at Kubyshev. A 300 mile trek across trackless freezing tundra....yeah right.

In addition ther is the obstacle of the Amur River, which also has navigable tributaries further to the south (and therefore represent a risk to the activities of the Soviet River Flotillas). The Amur is a major river system that the Japanese would find extremely difficult to cross, and even harder to maintain as a supply line. In 1941 ther were no bridges across the Amur, any large scale crossing would need to wait until a reliable bridge had been built, and that would have taken weeks of months, and would have been under extreme threat from Soviet air power and the Amur River flotilla. In 1941 the flotilla boasted 9 monitors, 17 large gunboats and over 150 guardboats (about 60 tons from memory) . It was the biggest river flotilla in the world, and a major obstacle to crossing the Amur. In winter, the Amur is impassable to river traffic, and unsuitable to pontoon bridges and the like. It is, in effect, impassable.

The only real game in town for the Japanese is the eastern flank of this long border, and even here it is limited. The area north of Khanka Lake to the Amur River is low lying and swampy at the frontier, but once again rises sharply into deeply incised mountain ranges further to the east. Once again there are no roads on either side of the border, the nearest railheads are more than 200 miles from the frontier for the Japanese. In short, another nightmare

To the south of Khanka lake, which really a small ocean, again dominated by the Soviet naval gungoats, stretching for more than 180 klms from north to south, lies the only real corridor into Siberia. There are no roads, as usual, but at least the japanese have a railway close by (about 30 miles from the frontier). Here there is a mountain range, rising about 6000 feet here, and heavy fortifications. If they are going to attack it will have to be here, albeit at a terrible cost. There is a lesser route further to the south, along the coast from Chosen (Korea) which is flatter, but mined and again with no roads and heavily fortified. These approaches to Vladivostock are all fully covered by the 12 inch (and smaller) batteries I mentioned earlier. An advance by a large body of men in this direction would need to wait until the coastal batteries were dealt with, and that would take at least a month, if at all

Taking out the Soviet Far Eastern Forcesis simply beyond the capacity of the Japanese.

And for the record, I am a fan of the Japanese military (not their behavioour). They proved their tenacious attitudes and military prowess on many occasions as far as Im concerned. I am no great fan of the Russian, but lets just say I am in a position to know how tough a nut to crack Vlasdivostock is, and leave it at that

[Amsel]

Bear in mind that the locations and dispositions of the Japanese military would be much different if the North plan was decided upon instead of the south. This is all speculative of course and would depend upon political negotiations and stealth.

Also if we start delving into the tactical situations such as terrain and the plans to attack the railroad it can get real murky. But realize that in war the situation is fluid and ever changing. I can gaurantee that the Japanese had a plan to nuetralize Vladivistock by cutting them off from their resupply. You simply cannot put the idea to bed by showing somepictures of the terrain. Just like any campaign, the invasion of the Maritime Province would be made up of maneuvering and deception. Those forests and mountains were not impenetrable.

If the premise of the whole thread is; could Japan attack the Soviets while they maneuvered against the US, then no. That is preposterous. If the North Strike Group Plan was implemented instead of the South Strike Group Plan, then they could have been successful and that is precisely what I am writing about. It is also alot more interesting to me.

[Colin1]

Originally Posted by parsifal

Then there is the long frontier stretching from the Khentii Mountains in the Northwest to the Amur River near Komsolosk in the east. The Khentii Mountains are formidable, to say the least, there are no roads (it takes four solid days of riding on horseback to even reach the foothills) rising up to a massive 9,180 feet (1) , there is just no crossing this range with any large body of men (2)

The Amur is a major river system that the Japanese would find extremely difficult to cross (3)...

It's been done before, with a far less well-equipped army. And a bunch of elephants...

By now Hannibal had abandoned his Spanish base with his army of 100,000 mercenaries (2) and embarked on one of the most daring maneuvers in military history. He had successfully crossed the treacherous Rhone River (3), avoided a confrontation with the Roman army, and replenished his troops on "the island" by following the river northward... ...he was successfully guided to the foothills of the Alps. Hannibal had now come to the Alpes du Dauphine. Although formidable mountains of from four to five thousand feet high, behind them, miles and days ahead loomed the most difficult part of the march at even higher altitudes and over more dangerous roadways. Eventually, after being ambushed by the shadowing allobroges and a three-day march, Hannibal's army had reached the Durance river valley.
The last and the most difficult leg of the march laid in full view for the army to stare at in awe.
The Carthaginian column now stood at the valley of the Hautes Alpes, the highest and most difficult mountains in the French Alps and the last barrier that stood between them and Italy. They stood and gazed at the giants that lay before them, the peaks of these mountains soared into the sky and touched the clouds. These were mountains whose summits rose to 13,000 feet (1), and stood like an unassailable wall guarding Rome and daring the mercenaries to scale their heights.