Japan and the Soviet Union

[Soren]

Parsifal,

So far we've only been listing the manpower & equipment available to the Japanese, so we're not really speculating much in regards to strength. Simple addons to existing equipment can't really be said to be highly speculative under these circumstances either, as based on where the fighting was expected to take place the various equipment available would be adapted towards it as best as possible.

If we were to really start speculating a lot then we might as-well have concluded from the start that if the Japanese planned a land based invasion of the USSR instead of a war in the Pacific, then tank production would've recieved a much higher priority status and thus a lot more tanks would've been produced in the 1939 to 41 time frame. This would also be the most likely thing to occur actually. But for now we're just gonna stick with what was available in 1941 at the time where a war in the Pacific had been the original goal.

Furthermore in the case of an invasion of the USSR, China wouldn't have been given much priority at all. The Japanese weren't importing any meaningful amount of important resources from the place yet anyhow. So it would've really been no concern to the Japanese at that point, esp. as they would know that after the defeat of the USSR an invasion of China would prove a lot easier. All they needed to do was hold on to the areas already conquered, and they had over 2 million reserves ready for that task. Way more than was ever needed. The airforce over there wasn't needed either. It was just about having the reserves dig in and hold the ground already gained.

Moving on..

The Japanese air strength:

By July 1941 around 600 A6M2 Zeros had been produced, of which 400 had so far been delivered to the Navy, 108 of which were used for the raid on Pearl Harbour. Another 200 were stationed in mainland Japan, just sitting there waiting for Navy pilots to come fly them (Sounds cute eh ? ).

But like you already stated the IJN had only a little under 300 pilots for its Zeros, with an extra 100 a/c standing without pilots.

However in the scenario suggested the IJN would be stationing all its Zeros near the Russian east coast, while the entire reserve would be handed over to the IJA, which was a total of roughly 300 a/c, 100 of which were from the IJN reserve.

So combined the IJN & IJA could muster around 600 A6M2's for the invasion of the USSR. Half being flown by the Navy Airforce and the other half by the Army Airforce. The Japanese knew that they had one of the worlds best fighters in the A6M2 and would've no doubt wanted them all ready in an invasion of the USSR.

In addition to this around 300 or so newly built Ki-43Ia's were standing ready in Japan. These would've been handed over to the army.

So the Japanese could at least gather roughly 900 new fighters for the invasion of Russia, which would be opposing the roughly 1,400 mixed bag fighters of the VVS. And knowing that the Japanese fighters & pilots were in general much superior to the Soviets', this would've proven no hard task for the Japanese. The VVS would've been swepped from the skies in a relatively short space of time. Also while the VVS pilots stationed in the east were destined to later become Guards, at this point in time (1941) they didn't have much experience, and it must also be said that throughout the war the Germans in general didn't notice any real distinction between guards & regular pilots, it was all the same to them; There were the occasional good ones, as Hartmann said.

Also lets us not forget the number of Ki-27's, A5M's & A4N's available either ofcourse.

On top of this the Japanese also had a good number bombers & ground attack a/c ready for operations. These included the Ki-51, D3A, B5M & G4M1 etc etc. These would be tasked mainly with destroying Soviet airfields & tanks, and once far enough in land also target Soviet production facilities.

The numbers available included:

G4M: >100 (~120)
G3M: >400 (?)
D3A: >250 (~300)
B5M: >150 (~200)
B5N: ~250
Ki-30: 704
Ki-49: >100 (~120)
Ki-51: ?
Ki-46: ~60 to 70

So plenty of a/c were available for role of ground attacks & bombing.

Next are the land based forces available to the Japanese;

By mid 41 the Japanese had at their disposal 2.25 million trained soldiers and another 4.5 million armed reserves. All of the trained soldiers would be needed for the war against the USSR, with at least an extra 1.5 million reserves standing ready. ~2 million could be stationed in China over time.

To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well.

As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:

Type 97 Tankette: 557
Type 95 Light tank: ~500
Type 97 Medium tank: ~850

So a total of around 2,000 tanks, not a really impressive number, but these tanks had proven very effective in forested areas, and they were certainly a match for the far majority of the tanks that the Soviets could ever afford to deploy in the east.

So that means that for the invasion of the USSR the Japanese could have available atleast 900 new fighters (+ the older a/c), over 1,000 bombers & ground attack a/c, ~2,000 tanks, 2.25 million trained troops & 1.5 million armed reserves.

This would be more than enough to take a lot of pressure off the German army in the West while at the same time putting an unsustainable amount pressure on the Soviets.

Next comes the navies, which I'll deal with later, the Japanese had it all over the Soviets there.

But the whole point of the Japanese invasion would simply be to divert as much of the Soviet manpower as possible, letting the Germans do the true damage.

[Colin1]

Originally Posted by Soren

Furthermore in the case of an invasion of the USSR, China wouldn't have been given much priority at all. The Japanese weren't importing any meaningful amount of important resources from the place yet anyhow. So it would've really been no concern to the Japanese at that point, esp. as they would know that after the defeat of the USSR an invasion of China would prove a lot easier. All they needed to do was hold on to the areas already conquered, and they had over 2 million reserves ready for that task. Way more than was ever needed. The airforce over there wasn't needed either. It was just about having the reserves dig in and hold the ground already gained

After the Japanese
first began their invasion of China in 1937, in each place the Japanese captured, a collaborationist army might be formed and given various names, such as IJA Assistant Army, Peace Preservation Corps or Police Garrisons and so on. Later on, particularly under the Nanjing Nationalist Government they were re-organized in a system of Divisions, Corps and Armies.
This system would have come in highly useful for policing the Chinese territories whilst the IJA troops they released could be deployed in the invasion, I don't think there'd be a political or military vacuum in China as a result of the invasion. Conceivably, some of these units could be used in the invasion.

[Lucky13]

Knock out the railroad and roads to cut off the peninsula...?

[Amsel]

Originally Posted by Lucky13

Knock out the railroad and roads to cut off the peninsula...?

You are correct. The IJN covers the sea approaches and the rail line should be cut from the north by attacks at Voroshilov and Iman. The Kwangtung fortifications in Miaoling area provide for the attack near Lake Hanka, and push south into the Maritime Province to link up with the attacks in the Mo River area and a spearhead into the rear of the fortified zone near Voroshilov. Cut the Trans-Siberian railway and it renders the Maritime Province as encircled from resupply. The Japanese would hope the the German armies would make the transfer of any army groups to the region from the west, unlikely.

There was also alot of planning into "political" sabotouge after having contact with many dissedants and anti-Stalinists who looked forward to the fall of Stalin. The Japanese knew that the USSR was so large that a military victory over the entire nation was not feasible and looked to the Siberians, Mongolians, and even Serbians for political support.

[proton45]

This is getting interesting....


BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...

[GrauGeist]

Originally Posted by proton45

This is getting interesting....


BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...

Stalin's 37-38 purge decimated the Soviet high command, many of whom were seasoned veterans...

The purge removed:
3 out of 5 Marshals (equivalent to a 6 star General)
13 out of 15 Commanders (equivalent to a 4-5 star General)
8 out of 9 Admirals
50 out of 57 Army Corps Commanders
154 out of 186 Division Commanders
16 out of 16 Commissars
25 out of 28 Army Commissars

[freebird]

Originally Posted by Soren

Sorry but there is no way that the Soviets could've dealt with both the Germans and the Japanese, it would've been over quickly.

The Japanese didn't have good tanks, true, but tanks are but one thing. The Japanese had lots of infantry to boot, and fanatic infantry at that. Furthermore and even more crushing was the the Japanese airforce, which would quickly sweep the VVS out of the skies in the far east while the Luftwaffe easily dealt with their part in the west.

There's simply no way the Soviets could've dealt with this at all. They were hard pressed enough against the Germans alone, so a Japanese attack from the east would've proven disasterous for them. There's also no doubt that a combined landbased invasion of the USSR by the Germans and the Japanese would've resulted in a lot of technology shared, esp. within the area of tanks. So the Japanese would've very likely had a tank similar to the Panzer IV not far after.

.
However, the Soviet forces in the far east were winter trained, and the Japanese would have had a hard time in winter. Now if the attack occured in summer, maybe different

Originally Posted by renrich

What would have happened if, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, Japan had only attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies and had mounted an attack against the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1942?

Originally Posted by Glider

The British would have lost Burma and China, the US would ae attacked Japan as they were the ones applying political and economic pressure on Japan over their actions in China. I do not believe that the USA would stand on one side and wach Japan up the stakes. The difference of course is that Japan wouldn't have had the advantage of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and their losses would have been significant when they faced the USN in open conflict.

There is one big factor to consider though - the US had a secret deal with the UK & the Dutch to enter the war if Japan attacked. It has only been hinted at, but it's the only logical conclusion. In ~1940 the UK closed down the Burma road to avoid conflict with Japan, and in 1941 the Dutch were prepared to sell oil to Japan. Then as tension with the US increased, the UK & the Dutch suddenly have a hard-line position - the UK reopens the Burma road, and the Dutch refuse to sell oil.

Now ask yourself, why would the Dutch, having already lost their homeland, want to provoke the Empire of Japan? Why would the UK, seriously in trouble in Europe, not make a deal with Japan to keep out of a Pacific war?

The only reason that makes sense is that their was a Quid-pro-quo. The Allies agreed to go along with Washington's policy, and the Americans promised to support the UK & Dutch should they be attacked.

Remember that while the US public was against involvement in a EUROPEAN war, there was coniderable support for action agaist Japan, even before Pearl.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by imalko

Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front.

Sorry, but this was not just a "morale boost", it's been estimated that due to huge Soviet tank losses in the summer/fall of 1941, that from a quarter to a third of the tank forces in the defence of Leningrad & Moscow in the winter of '41 were British supplied. A substansial number of aircraft were supplied as well, not very many compared to the total, but they were desperately needed at the time.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well.

The average Japanese soldier wasn't nearly as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier but was in many ways better trained with some surprising omissions. For example on the plus side, at the start of the war every Japanese soldier was issued with a compass and trained how to use it which was very unusual. On the negative side, they generally were poor shots and even snipers were only trained to shoot out to 300yards.
The rifle was 6.5mm which even the Japanese found wanting and was in the process of being reissued in 1939 in 7.7mm but both continued in use causing complications.
The LMG's varied but were basically
The type 11 which was very poor and jammed as soon as you looked at it.
The Type 96 which was a major improvement but was in the now obsolete 6.5mm
The type 99 which was the best of the lot and now came with the 7.7mm round.

HMG The best of the bunch was the Type 92 which had a rate of fire of 450 rpm which is low.

As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:

Type 97 Tankette: 557
Type 95 Light tank: ~500
Type 97 Medium tank: ~850

Type 97 Tankette
Designed for a 37mm AT gun which had a penetration of 45mm at 300 yards, however most were fitted with an LMG instead. Max armour 17mm

Type 95 Light Tank
37mm gun 25mm at 500yds with a one man turret that only turned 45 degrees each way, max armour 12mm

Type 97 Medium Tank
Came in two types one with 25mm armour and the other 33mm but with thinner side armour. Most had the 57mm low velocity gun which could penetrate 20mm at 500yards.

Russian Tanks
T26
45mm gun penetrating about 40mm at 500yards, 25mm at a 1000 yards, armour 16mm

T28
76mm howitzer, 80mm of armour

T34/KV1
Need I mention them

To sum up, the T28/KV1 and T34 are almost immune to Japanese tank fire and the T26 has a massive advantage in range.

[imalko]

Originally Posted by Amsel

There was also alot of planning into "political" sabotouge after having contact with many dissedants and anti-Stalinists who looked forward to the fall of Stalin. The Japanese knew that the USSR was so large that a military victory over the entire nation was not feasible and looked to the Siberians, Mongolians, and even Serbians for political support.

Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.

Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.

[Juha]

Small additions to Glider's list
T-26, last model, Finns called it T-26C, was that Model 37 or 38, has 25mm frontal armour and IIRC already the older T-26B had 10-25mm turret armour.
BT-5 11.5ton Cruiser type tank, 45mm gun, armour 10-13mm, narrow tracks
BT-7 13,8 tons, development of BT-5, same gun, 10-22mm armour, narrow tracks

And Soviet had more A/T guns than Japanese. And good LMG, some troops had automatic rifles, but those were not usually much liked. Some Finns on the other hand valued highly war booty Soviet semi-automatic rifle.

On generals, there were generals in FE already, IIRC names of some are shown in Dr. Niederhorst's OoBs which Parsifal posted.

Juha

[Glider]

There was at least as big a difference in the Artillery

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese are as follows:-

Russia
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

Japanese Type B 36 x 75mm Howitzers

I should emphasise that the above are purely divisional weapons. Both sides had additional weapons within the Infantry units, I have that for the Russians and will put it up when I have the same info for the Japanese.

[Amsel]

Originally Posted by imalko

Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.

Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.

Hello Imalko, I believe we are still on topic concerning this elusive part of the Go-North strategic plan of the Japanese military. It is an elusive subject as well and I did make an error in my mention of the Serbian anticommunists. The Serbians that were in contact with the Japanese intelligence were in fact living in Siberia and possibly were communists as well. The Japanese learned from these Serbians in Siberia that the Siberians were stealing and hoarding arms for an eventual social revolution against the communists. It appears that the Japanese had agents all over Russia and Mongolia interviewing anticommunist factions. Many of these anti-Stalinists supported the defeat of the communists. This was extremely important to the Japanese to have support from Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, Siberians, White Russians and very surprising, the anticommunist Jewish paramilitary that lived in the east region.

The Japanese command put as much importance on the political subterfuge as they did the war plans for the North Strike Plan. They did so in case of the failure of Germany to win in the west and just the vastness of Russia itself. The Japanese considered the defection of the NKVD General Lushkov to Japan to be a "gift from the war god" and did in fact use his anti-stalinist contacts to began to build a web of support.

[parsifal]

Some understanding of the nature and scope of the war in China is needed here. It appears that some view it as a minor sideshow, in which the Japanese could basically ignore or reduce the scales of deployment in with no ill-effects.

The Chinese war did ultimately develop into a sideshow, but only because the Japanese widened the scale of the conflict, because they found they could not win there. They believed that continued Chinese resistance was due to the support being provided by the western allies the Soviets, and Germany (yep, thats right, the Germans were gunning for a Chinese victory against the Japanese, this continued even after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, just proving, incidentally that agreements with the Nazis were worthless)

Another little political reality that sort of erodes the notion that Japan and Germany might somehow co-operate over Russia was that the 1939 non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was viewed with great anger on the part of the Japanese, and led directly to some major offensives in China in which the Japanese were heavily defeated ). Under those circumstances the Japanese would never have been properly informed of an impending attack (as indeed they werent.....officialy at least. The Japanese high command was as surprised as everyone by the German attack). So, this notion of German -Japanese coperation before 1941 is basically navel gazing. It was never going to happen...

Anyway, to return to the issue of China, the Japanese are often assessed as having suffered about 1.5 million army casualties. However this is not correct, because it only measures the losses from 1941 to 45. In fact, Japan had been waging war in China, more or less continuously since 1931. Since 1937, the fighting had intensified, and in total Japanese military deaths in the period 1937-41 (excluding operatiuons outside China) amounted to 1.6 million additional losses(they had lost about 200000 before 1937). Thus the casualties 1931-41 amounted to 1.8 million, in addition to those lost after 1941. The Japanese army had suffered approximately 50% casualty rates amongst its frontline formations, which of course had been replaced, but it was these causalty rates that influenced the Japanese to decide to attack the west directly. That (or at least the relaisation that they could not win under the current conditions) plus the threat of the Allied oil embargo (which would have brought them to their knees in less than 10 months unless they did something about it) were the reasons why the war was expanded by the Japanese. Whilst China became a backwater eventually, in 1937-41 it was not viewed that way by anybody.

So why did the Japanese come to believe they could not win, and in fact were facing ultimate defeat if things remained the same as they were. Its not that they did not try to seek a result in China, but from 1939-41 they actually suffered a series of quite heavy defeatsas they stepped up their efforts to achieve a decisive result in the theatre.

The following is a list of the major Battles fought in China from 1937-41. It shows that the battles fought in 1937-38 were uniformly Japanese victories, whilst those fought after 1939 were uniformly Japanese defeats. I have marked the clear Chinese victories by the words (China) after the relevant battle


Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937 (Jpn)
Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
Chahar August 1937
Battle of Shanghai August 1937
Beiping–Hankou August 1937
Tianjin–Pukou August 1937
Taiyuan September 1937
Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937 (China)
Battle of Xinkou September 1937
Battle of Nanjing December 1937
Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938 (China))
Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
Battle of Lanfeng May 1938 (China)
Xiamen May 1938
Battle of Wuhan June 1938
Battle of Wanjialing (China)
Guangdong October 1938
Hainan Island February 1939
Battle of Nanchang March 1939
Battle of Xiushui River March 1939
Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939 (China)
Shantou June 1939
Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939 (China)
Battle of South Guangxi November 1939 (China)
Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939 (China)
1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
Battle of Wuyuan March 1940 (China)
Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940 (China)
Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940 (China)
Vietnam Expedition September 1940
Central Hupei November 1940 (China)
Battle of South Henan January 1941 (China)
Western Hopei March 1941 (China)
Battle of Shanggao March 1941 (China)
Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941(China)

The biggest defeat for the Japanese was at 100 regiments, where Japanese casualties ran at 35-50000 men.

Ther are several important observations to be made from all this. Firstly, China was not a walkover. The KMT decreased their levels of activity after 12.41 for the obvious reason that they expected the US to win the war for them, plus their ability to wage offensive war had been severely curtailed after the Burma Road had been closed. If the Soviets had been attacked in 1941, the Chinese can be expected to continue, and intensify their actions, because they could now supplement their re-equipment via the Silk Road through Kazakhstan. To believe that the the Japanese could decrease their level of committment in China, leaving the collaboratuionist armies to hold more of the line, is sheer wishful thinking. The more likley outcome is a renewed effort by the Chinese, particulalry the CCP formations and therefore an increased force level for the Japanese, just to hold the current line. They could try and withdraw from China to Manchuria, but this would only allow the Chinese to advance in their wake, and permit a link up with the British forces, which one could expect to be advancing up through Vietnam.

And this talk of 2000 Japanese tanks does not take into account the losses that had been suffered in China since 1937, or the continued need to provide tank support there as well. The Japanese had lost somewhere in the vicinity of 1000-1200 tanks since 1937 (I can be no more accurate than that).

So this idea of raising another 50 divisions and another 1000 aircraft needs to be balanced against the fact that the Japanese were locked in a bitter struggle that they appeared to be losing, were not aware of the impending german attack (and were never going to be told either),

The other furphy was this idea that the japanese were going to win hearts and minds. Whilst as at December 1941 they had raised collaborationist forces in China totalling 669000 men, these were very rarely risked in battle, because they were so unreliable. 50% desertion rates were not unheard of, with the wepons they carried usually ending up in KMT or CCP hands. After the rape of Nanking, and the deaths of over 20 million Chinese citizens, the sparse populations in Far Eastern Russia were under no illusions as to what they might expect under a Japanese occupation. After the initial greetings, the true intentions of the nazis had soured any real hopes of "turning" the Russian population (though torture, racism and brainwashing did have its successes). This was never going to work in the Far East any better than in the West with the Russian population , in fact past Japanese abuses would probably have returned even less than it did for the germans

[Soren]

Parsifal,

Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.