Japan and the Soviet Union

[Colin1]

Originally Posted by imalko

Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front.

(Why do we always have to return to this issue is beyond me.) Look at the total numbers of aircraft for example

Conversations with N G Golodnikov Part Four
A.S. I was referring to the arguments that one frequently hears now, that if the quality of our aviation had been better, we could have accomplished what was required with fewer numbers.

N.G. Those who hold this position have a poor understanding of the subject. Numerical superiority with parity in equipment quality and flight crew training is a great thing. It will bring victory.
At the beginning of they war the Germans were beating us, and why? Tactics, radio communications, and so on. But what was the main reason? The Germans were able to create tactical and strategic numerical superiority.
In their initial attacks the Germans destroyed an enormous number of aircraft. The Germans bombed our equipment directly on the airfield and shot us down in aerial combat. What we were unable to evacuate we destroyed ourselves to prevent it falling into enemy hands. This all happened. But there was still another cause that few mention.

A.S. Insufficient training of Soviet pilots?

N.G. No, that’s not it. Our pilots were not bad. In fact, we had good pilots and we had outstanding pilots. The main reason was that the Germans captured enormous number of facilities to produce and, particularly important, to repair aircraft. Plus gigantic reserves of spare parts were seized by the Germans.

This is why we did not have enough aircraft in the first half of the war.

The production of new aircraft had fallen sharply and it was impossible to rehabilitate and restore old types in the required quantities. No aircraft! We had to get aircraft from every possible source!
The Germans achieved numerical superiority and did not allow us to catch up. Continuous combat with no time to catch our breath! Losses, of course, occurred on both sides.

First half of the war takes us into the end of 1943, which is a little after your 'failing at the gates of Moscow' scenario.
If the Soviet Union 'had to get aircraft from every possible source' (bar their own, which seem to have been denied them) then where would those precious aircraft have come from, in sufficient numbers, to repel the Germans at Moscow?

Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?

[imalko]

Originally Posted by Colin1

Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?

Short answer: in December 1941 - no. Simple because there wasn't any US land lease aircraft delivered to USSR at that time, but only limited British shipments.

If this is your argument, then why did Germans fail at the gates of Moscow in 1941 if not because of their mistakes, logistic problems and stiff Soviet resistance. Moscow was defended almost completely by fighter units armed with Soviet build aircraft. Land lease equipment was (to my knowledge) mainly used at Leningrad and Murmansk at that time. But again in 1941 Soviets received only that amount equipment which British were able to spare. This was valuable but not decisive.

In 1942 maybe, but to answer that correctly I would have to check for number of aircraft produced in USSR and those received by land lease during that year. First half of 1942 was critical in Soviet aircraft industry because many factories were relocated to the East and only beginning to restart their production. Later in the war land lease aircraft continued to provide usefull service supplementing Soviet aircraft production...

[m kenny]

Hkans Aviation page - Sino-Japanese Air War 1937-45

East Asian / Pacific Area Minor Air Forces

Changing* from Donkeys to Mustangs



1931-39 The Japanese Army was issued 1,976 tanks and 167 A/Cars.

1n 1941/42 they got a further 1,941 tanks and 593 AFV's

By December 1941 The Army had 2,200 tanks

From Tank Power 10, Japanese Armour Vol 2

AJ Press TankPower GunPower

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Soren

Parsifal,

Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.

Not really as the new types replaced the old tanks in the fighting units. They didn't create new units and keep the old ones running. Also as you would expect the older tanks were even worse that new ones.

[m kenny]

Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.

[vikingBerserker]

That's 16% of the total, not exactly a small force.

[m kenny]

Add in the 16 Divisions on the Kalinin Front and the 18 on the South West Front (the left/right flanks of Moscow)and that is another 34 non-Siberian Division.

[vikingBerserker]

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.

[parsifal]

Just as an aside. I think this has been an excellent choice of topic, and an excellent debate, whatever peoples opinions are. I have learnt a lot from all the submissions

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by vikingBerserker

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.

I think what MK is alluding to is that the defence of Moscow, contrary to ppopular opinion, was not contingent upon the arrival of the Siberians. I concede that is rather controversial, but the fliup side is that the germans were so comprehensively defeated that an 11% shift in force availabilty is not going to make much of sa difference either way. Also, that the german attacks had actually stalled before the arrival of the Siberians....

[m kenny]

Originally Posted by vikingBerserker

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia ..................

17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.

And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by m kenny

17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.

And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.

To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.

My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak

[Glider]

I have added to my previous posting to try and complete the picture.

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese Infantry Division are as follows:-

Russia
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

Japanese Type B 36 x 75mm Howitzers

Looking at the Infantry component
Japanese
A Japanese Type B Infantry Division had three Infantry Regiments, each of which had

114 light machine guns (LMG),
108 50mm mortars (LMRT) (also known as grenade dischargers.)
24 heavy machine gun (HMG)
6 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns (ATG),
6 70mm battalion guns,
4 75mm regimental guns

Russian
A Russian Rifle Division in July 1942 had three Infantry Regiments each with
4 x 45mm AT Guns
4 x 76mm Guns
4 x 120mm Mortars
27 x 82mm Mortars
54 x 50mm Mortars
48 x AT Rifles
27 x HMG
168 x LMG

[freebird]

Originally Posted by m kenny

Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.

Originally Posted by parsifal

To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.

My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak

Actually they were more critical than numbers suggest. In addition to being "fresh", they were tough, veteran divisions {the ones that had thrashed the Japanese earlier} not the green conscripts that STAVKA was throwing at the Germans. More importantly, the Siberian divisions were all WINTERIZED. The regular green Soviet divisions were almost as useless as the summer-equipped Germans, but these tough winter-equipped Siberian divisions played a huge role in the success of the attack.

[parsifal]

There were experience and full strength units also on the western front. Its just that the Siberians represented an easy access ready reserve of assault troops