Marianas Turkey Shoot

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by vikingBerserker

Wasn't the Clash between USS Washington/South Dakota & IJNS Kirishima/Hei(?) at night?

Nov 13/14 of 1942. Japanese though they were fighing one BB. Fight was pretty much over when they realized there were two. Guess darkness doesn't always do you a favor.

[renrich]

I think that Lee was pretty spooked that night off Guadalcanal because of IJN torpedoes. He lost several DDs and torps were exploding in his wake. He probaly felt that in 1944 he did not want to confront that situation again.

[parsifal]

A day surface action in the Pacific was a very rare bird. I think the possibility is extremely remote to be honest. The calculations for an intercept dont take into account course changes or the current fuel status of the US fleet. I understand some elements had started the operation from Pearl, some from Kwajalein, so chances are that at least a portion of the US fleet would be short of fuel.

A rough comparison might be to compare the RN experiences in hunting down the Bismarck. Only after the Bismarck had been immobilized by carrier strikes was it possible for the British to close for the surface engaement. And even though the Bismarck was easily within range of the RN bases in terms of the ships endurances, the need for constant changes of course and speed, meant that by the time the interception had been effected, the British ships were running dangerously low on fuel. Bottom line is that it is extremely difficult to engage an enemy with surface forces that does not wish to be engaged

The difficulty also with this scenario is that at least a portion of the USN would need to be kept back to protect the amphibious forces.

So even though the USN outnumbered the Japanese, it is highly unlikley that in an actual battle that the full strength of the USN could be used. The DDs in particular are highly unlikely to make it.

In a stern chase situation, one might expect the Iowas to push ahead of the main fleeet, to attempt to slow down the main portions of the Japanese fleet. Whilst their top speeds were 33 knots, their best sea speeds were no more than 30 knots (commonly US reported speeds are the speeds as new, not taking into account refit, engine wear and the like). Against this the sea speed of the Mobile Fleet was 24-26 knots. The Iowas would therefore be closing at just 4 knots, or 8000 yds per hour. Assuming the Yamato and Musashi were detailed as Stern Guards, they would commence firing at a whopping 42000 yds. The immune zone of the Iowas against 18 shells ceases below about 36000 yards (outside of that, the belt would not be penetrated, but they still risk deck penetrations, or damage from fire or "special damage"....like the Hood). In exchange, the 16 in shells cannot really hurt the Yamatos until the range is something like 20000 yds (more or less). That means that the Iowas must endure a sustained bombardment for more than 2 hours. If they heave to for a full broadsides, the time is even longer, as a general rule, if this broadside to approach is adopted, the rate of closure is about half that of a direct, Nelsonian charge. So the Iowas are going to be under attack for something like 3 hours before they can effectively return fire.

The South Dakotas have an effective sea speed of only 27 knots, so they are not going to reach the battle. The destroyers will have to reduce speed to conserve fuel. The cruisers can keep up with the Iowas, but they will need to close to under 15000 yards to be effective, and that exposes them to concentrated Long Lance attack.

This appraisal is far from complete, but it should be obvious that when you look at the detail, a surface engagement is most unlikley to favour the US, in the circaumstances presented at Phillipinnes Sea.

[lesofprimus]

Great discussion fellas....

[timshatz]

Parsifal. Good analysis. Giving different speeds of the units and effective ranges is helpful. But I wouldn't think any Admiral worth his salt is going to let his units get strung out and defeated in detail. So keeping up is less the question, than the formation speed. My guess is the US Fleet would be able to do a 27 knot formation speed. Give the Japanese a 24 knot formation speed.

However, I'm not convinced the Japanese would've run. When the Air Strike hit them, they were in a refueling pattern. The Admiral in charge was doing everything possible to stay in the fight as he believed a substantial part of his air power was still intact on Guam. Further, the Japanese were more inclined to engage in a surface fight than the USN. It wasn't the US Navy's perfered way of fighting (a method forced on them by the Japanese when they sank all the BBs at Pearl Harbor). To put it another way, the US put it's money into Carriers, the Japanese still believed in the Battleline concept (but knew the CV was the principal warship). If the Japanese knew the US was going to force a surface action some time around daybreak, it is probable they would've moved towards the US Fleet rather than ran from it.

In short, I don't see the Japanese as running from a surface fight as much as I see the US trying to avoid it. Such a fight did not play to the US strengths, but did so to the Japanese strengths.

Good points on the fuel states. As a matter of fact, that is an excellent point that is to often overlooked. A variable to the equation.

One last point that should be brought up about the Marianas Battle. The US was also concerned there was a Japanese fleet (unknown composition) to the south of the US fleet. They knew about the fleet to the West from Sub interceptions and contact reports, but were under the impression there was a second fleet to the south, doing one of those patented Japanese pincer attacks. It was only late in the battle that the threat was dismissed. However, I do not know when in the battle that was.

[renrich]

I originally gave the sea speed of TG58.7 as 25 knots which was well within their capability. They would have had to cover around 300 miles so an afternoon departure would bring them into range at dawn or before. They could have coordinated with air borne radar in TBFs so the Japanese force would be pin pointed. As mentioned, the IJN gunnery was very suspect. Musashi and Yamato were formidable, but Nagato, Haruna and Kongo were much less so. Yamato had little success hitting targets at Leyte Gulf four months later and was not under meaningful attack. No reason to expect she and her sister would do any better in June, especially with 16 inch rounds incoming. It is doubtful that Nagato could make much over 20 knots, so in a stern chase she would have to be abandoned. The Japanese tanker formation would probably have been encountered first and destroyed by CAs and DDs. The IJN at that point in the fight had an overoptimistic view and were still closing with the Americans. The DDs in TF58 were short of fuel but unrep was available from tankers and the big ships and enough may have been topped off for a relatively short range mission. A thought is, and I cast no aspersions on the USN, if the RN had been in the same situation with similar capabilities this fight may well have taken place.

[parsifal]

Tim, I agree with much of what you say, but dont forget that the Japanese attacks finished up on the 19th. The US then spent nearly the whole of the 20th searching for the Mobile Fleet before receiving a report at 1600. Until that point in time I dont believe the Americans really knew the location of the Japanese. So, with all due respect to Rens parameters, the US really could not attempt their interception until that point. Coincidentally, it was not until 1600 that Ozawa was able to regain control of his fleet (after the loss of Taiho he had transferred his flag to a Destroyer, effectively cutting him off from his command. He was unable to effect a transfer to the Zuikaku until 1300). Even so, as you say he was not withdrawing, but he was steaming away from the Americans, with the idea of launching further long range attacks the next morning. He still had, at that stage 130 or so aircraft (many of them unready for action possibly they may have been readied by the next morning)He believed that the Americans had suffered a lot of damage, and that the Guam/Saipan based airpower was still potent. Toyoda gave the order for withdrawal at 2046, I believe this order was given before the full extent of the US air strikes on the Mobile Fleet were known. Toyada was basing his decision primarily on the known losses of the 19th, and the undiminshed intensity of US air activity over the invasion areas.

The question is, therefore, if the US fleet commences its pursuit at 1600 hours insteadf of launching airstrike, can it intersept the IJN by daybreak of the 21st, given that the Japanese were withdrawing at about 15 knots up until 1830, and then increased to 24 knots after that? If the USN does not make the interception by mid morning, there is a strong risk of the US fleet being discovered out of position, being subjected to attacks from undamaged land based air units outside the combat area, and of course the repaired Carrier planes on Ozawas carriers.I doubt that they can, given that the US fleet is going to close at only 3 knots, and still have to find the Japanese. The only way they can even hope to do this is is they detach the fast battleships, supported by some cruisers, and try and run down, corner and sink a part of the Japanese fleet bewfore it knows ehat is happening. Surprising the Japanese at night is no easy task, surprising them in daylight relies on no successful air searches, again an unlikely event.

The best bet was the one the US followed, namely to use their airpower to drive the point home that the US had won the battle, and actually, the war.

I have often daydreamed about what it would take for the Japanese to win the war. They needed time to rebuild their air groups after Midway, and never got that....but what if the Japanese had used their subs to sink merchantmen rathe than on pointless and risky military targets. With an average of only 25% of their subs used on anti-shipping operations, they still managed to sink about 1 million tons of shipping....if they had increased this to say 70%, by simle extrapolation the shipping losses would increase to something like 3-4 million tons. That amount of loss will rule out Guadacanal, and delay the pacific drive for at least a year. The US will be forced to spend more replacing shipping losses, and less on carriers,

Lets assume that the battle still goes ahead in June 1944, but that the japanese have the carriers Ryujo, the uncompleted light carrier conversion Mizuho, and say Shinano. They have two extra fast battleships. They have about 1000 land based air, and a carrier based air component of about 550. Insteadf of aviator with an average of about 150 flying experience, they have an average of about 500-600 hours, slightly less than their US counterparts. The Japanese have sufficient airpower to put 500 aircraft into the Marianas, and a further 500 at Truk, with a further 300 (say) scattered about the Bonins and Philipinnes. The fleet is not out position....it is based at Truk which is still very functional. The excellent Japanese recon forces give proper warning of the invasion fleet, which this time is attacked east of the Marianas, not west of it, by a combined land basede and carrier based force. If I were Ozawa I would put the carrier west of the Marianas, and use the islands to shuttle aircraft to and from the target.....thus minimizing the risk to the Japanese fleet. The US, instead of being attacked piecemeal will be attacked by a stronger more co-rdinated, vastly better trained defending force...things may have been different under those circumstances.....

[davebender]

Some good information on that battle.
The Robert Lundgren Historical Resource

From the USN perspective it appears the battle was a confused mess. The American battleships assisted in sinking their own destroyers. The green crew on U.S.S. South Dakota had a power failure during the fight due to lack of operator experience. This allowed the IJN to use the South Dakota for target practise. Fortunately Japan had nothing larger then a pre-WWI battle cruiser in the fight. The USN won because they had overwhelming force.

Battle of Leyte Gulf - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Admiral Oldendorf fought a fine night battle at Surigao Strait on 25 October 1944. Evidently the USN surface fleet was a lot more proficient during the final year of WWII.

[renrich]

On June 20 at 1538, Enterprise scouts located and transmitted the location of the IJN fleet. The original plot looked like the distance was 230 NM but it later proved to be 300 NM except the oiler group was located and attacked at 260 NM. On June 21 at 0530 Ozawa was located at 252 NM from Enterprise by radar equipped TBFs. The Japanese could not have increased speed to 24 knots without leaving Nagato behind. During her original trials in 1920 she was only able to make 23.5 knots. To catch Ozawa with the fast BBs, it would probably have required an allout pursuit beginning as early as possible on June 20. If the US had caught them, it could have wound up being a little like Dogger Bank in WW1 with Nagato being in the position of Blucher. It could have been interesting. I believe that the six US BBs in a gunfight would have overpowered the Japanese.

[renrich]

I don't believe there are any circumstances where the Japanese could have won the war in the PTO, once the US was in it. Even if the Japanese high command was unified and the Japanese language was more precise. They just bit off more than they could chew.
However, reflecting on this discussion, the points made by many about the unlikelyness of a surface battle during the Phillipine Sea Battle ring true. The fact is that Spruance was unaware of the successes of the US subs in sinking two CVs. The US was fixated on killing the carriers and their expectations given the success of carrier air at Midway must have been high. In going back and reviewing daylight surface sea battles since the age of dreadnoughts, it is astonishing how few were decisive. Looking at probabilities, it would seem that an air strike would have a better chance of getting the CVs with a lot less downside where as chasing the Japanese with the BBs was fraught with downsides. The fact is that the fast BBs were only good for two things. That was guarding against a surface attack by the Japanese on our carriers and acting as mobile and almost unsinkable by bombs AA nests. As far IJN gunnery their record at Leyte Gulf was abysmal and in an earlier engagement, two crack IJN CAs in good visibility and in daylight fired at CA25 for four hours at ranges of around 18-20000 yards and got, if memory serves, 3 hits. Much of that time the IJN was under fire from only 5- 8 inch guns and seldom was there more than 10- 8 inchers returning fire. If and it is an unlikely if, there had been a daytime surface engagement, it probably would have been indecisive but failing extremely good luck, the IJN would have gotten the worst of it.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by davebender

Some good information on that battle.
The Robert Lundgren Historical Resource

That analysis of the Kirishima damage was interesting.

It was interesting to note that the Japanese said she was hit far more times by 16" gunnery than what Adm. Lee realized. Those "shorts" that looked like misses were actually shells hitting the water and arcing into the under water part of the hull.

Good find Dave.

[renrich]

davebender, that link you posted was most interesting. The picture of the Washington shows one beautiful ship. To me the North Carolinas are much more graceful than the Alabama and her sisters. Twenty major caliber hits on Kirishima is pretty good gunnery, especially at night.

[timshatz]

Great post Dave. I honestly thought for a long time that 9 hits seemed a little on the low side. Firing as the Washington did, at almost point blank range, no return fire and both visual and radar tracks on the Kirishima, that seemed like a great setup.

Thanks for posting.