Marianas Turkey Shoot

[renrich]

During the Battle of the Philipine Sea (Marianas Turkey Shoot) on the afternoon of June 20, after putting up a succesful defense against all the IJN carrier strikes and bagging around 400 EA, TF 58 launched it's own air strike against the IJN force. This strike comprised around 226 VFs, VBs and VTs and was at the extreme range of around 300 miles and because of the late launch time, recovery would have to be at night. Few of the USN pilots were night qualified. The IJN force included 5 BBs and numerous CAs and CLs as well as CVs. The BBs incuded Musashi and Yamato. Task Group 58.7 had 7 fast BBs, including Iowa and New Jersey as well as CAs and DDs. TF 58 had AC with night radar capability to use as snoopers. What could have happened if, instead of launching the air strike, TG 58.7 had cranked up and gone after the IJN battle force. If they had started the pursuit at 1600 hours at a speed of 25 knots, they could have probably have made contact at around 0500 hours, sunup on the morning of the 21st, for a day surface action.

[comiso90]

I understand that by that time in the War, the Japanese heavies including the Musashi and Yamato were severely undermanned and were essentially best used as decoys and not equipped for a full scale engagement.... correct?

How many subs of both sides were in the area?

[vikingBerserker]

Now that would have been an interesting battle.

[timshatz]

My understanding of the US Battlefleet at that time was it wasn't up to taking on the Japanese Battlefleet. The best part of the US Navy was the carrier groups. The Battleships were great ships but all of them were working with fairly new crews due to the expansion of the Navy for the Pacific/Atlantic naval wars. The Admiral in charge of the US Battlefleet, I think it was Lee, voiced the opinion that he did not want to get into a gunfight with the Japanese at that time. Not as the primary, maybe as cleanup.

I had not heard the Mushashi and Yamato were understrength.

[wheelsup_cavu]

I think a battleship duel at that time played into the Japanese strengths.
It would have also led to many more casualties on the US side.
With the possible/probable loss of some US capital ships.
It was a risk that was not necessary due to the US carriers being available, IMO.


Wheels

[Thorlifter]

So if the two battle groups saw each other, do you think the American's would have turned to keep their capital ships out of reach, then used their carriers for the battle, or do you think they would have used everything available to slug it out?

[comiso90]

Originally Posted by timshatz

My understanding of the US Battlefleet at that time was it wasn't up to taking on the Japanese Battlefleet. The best part of the US Navy was the carrier groups. The Battleships were great ships but all of them were working with fairly new crews due to the expansion of the Navy for the Pacific/Atlantic naval wars. The Admiral in charge of the US Battlefleet, I think it was Lee, voiced the opinion that he did not want to get into a gunfight with the Japanese at that time. Not as the primary, maybe as cleanup.
.

Thats a hallmark of a great commander... history is full of incidences of where a better trained crew won the day. They have no business steaming into battle if they aren't ready...

The BBs were earning their keep just as AA platforms... let the aircraft do the dirty work.

.

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by Thorlifter

So if the two battle groups saw each other, do you think the American's would have turned to keep their capital ships out of reach, then used their carriers for the battle, or do you think they would have used everything available to slug it out?

IMHO, if you're that close, the question is solved and you're in a gunfight. Don't think the US Battlefleet would've turned tail and run. They would've fought, but like wheels said, the casualty rate would've spiked for the non-carriers.

Matter of fact, the BBs might've been sent in to cover the CVs. The way the fleet was set up at the Marianas, the BBs were out in front in their own Task Force. I think there were 4 of them with attendent escorts. They were a buffer for the Japanese air attacks. So, you figure heading west towards the Japanese, they are the first bunch to bump into the Japanese surface forces. At that point, Spruance would have to figure "We are way too close to these guys (considering his CVs here)". Turn the CVs around and head out at top speed leaving the Battleline to cover (not neccesarily a retreat but putting a little space between the fleets).

At this point in the war, the BBs were no longer the queens of the sea. The CVs were. Sad to say, but losing a BB would not affect the strategic balance the way losing a CV would. They were more expendable than the CVs.

[renrich]

It is correct that "Ching" Lee expressed the thought that he did not want to get in a night surface engagement at the beginning of the battle, but how about a day battle, after the IJN carrier air assets were pretty well exhausted? A few months later, the IJN gunnery, at Leyte Gulf was nothing to write home about.

[timshatz]

Originally Posted by renrich

It is correct that "Ching" Lee expressed the thought that he did not want to get in a night surface engagement at the beginning of the battle, but how about a day battle, after the IJN carrier air assets were pretty well exhausted? A few months later, the IJN gunnery, at Leyte Gulf was nothing to write home about.

Dunno. Good question. What changed in the 4 or so months between the two battles. I gotta believe it wasn't much in terms of training. There wasn't any time for it.

So it comes down to air power and position. The Japanese Fleet got that much closer to the US Invasion Fleet at Leyte Gulf (at the Marianas, the fleet was on the far side of the islands, away from the fighting). Proximity might've limited the options for the Battlefleet as well.

[renrich]

Some interesting points about the battle, ( at least to me.) The TF58 strike sank only one IJN CV, Hiyo. Previously two CVs were sunk by US subs. 80% of the downed US flyers were picked up. In the battle, the Japanese lost 476 planes and 445 pilots and aircrewmen. Another 440 or so IJN aircrewmen were lost during sinkings. The US lost 76 fliers. In the air strike, 84.3% of the Helldivers were lost, while only 15.3% of the SBDs went down. The Beast was not very survivable. Cook Cleland flew an SBD in the battle. Old timers like me will remember he won a number of air races in Corsairs, post war. During the scramble to find a carrier and get aboard, an F6FN and F4U2N were launched and with their radar helped find and lead groups of AC to a deck. The Corsair was not even officially approved for carrier operations at that time, much less at night.

[Ivan1GFP]

Joining in late as usual:

In my opinion, a undermanned WW2 battleship actually doesn't lose much in a surface action. A lot of crew is needed for all the AAA that was typically shipped. AAA becomes irrelevant in a surface action against other battleships.

A night action favors the USN because of the excellent radar that was typical. A daytime action makes it much too fair of a fight. A daytime surface action plays into all the remaining strengths of the IJN in my opinion. Why give the other side an even break when you don't need to?

- Ivan.

[wheelsup_cavu]

Originally Posted by Thorlifter

So if the two battle groups saw each other, do you think the American's would have turned to keep their capital ships out of reach, then used their carriers for the battle, or do you think they would have used everything available to slug it out?

Originally Posted by timshatz

IMHO, if you're that close, the question is solved and you're in a gunfight. Don't think the US Battlefleet would've turned tail and run. They would've fought, but like wheels said, the casualty rate would've spiked for the non-carriers.

Matter of fact, the BBs might've been sent in to cover the CVs. The way the fleet was set up at the Marianas, the BBs were out in front in their own Task Force. I think there were 4 of them with attendent escorts. They were a buffer for the Japanese air attacks. So, you figure heading west towards the Japanese, they are the first bunch to bump into the Japanese surface forces. At that point, Spruance would have to figure "We are way too close to these guys (considering his CVs here)". Turn the CVs around and head out at top speed leaving the Battleline to cover (not neccesarily a retreat but putting a little space between the fleets).

At this point in the war, the BBs were no longer the queens of the sea. The CVs were. Sad to say, but losing a BB would not affect the strategic balance the way losing a CV would. They were more expendable than the CVs.

Tim sums my thoughts up pretty well.
I don't think the US fleet would have turned tail and run either.
They didn't when they took a pasting at Savo Island earlier in the war.
If the fleets had ran into one another I also believe that the BB and destroyers would have been sacrificed over the CV's.
THE CV's give you the option of fighting at a distance whereas the BB's and destroyers are in close and dirty.
Why fight that close when you don't have to if you use the CV's ?


Wheels

[renrich]

Ivan, Admiral Lee specifically did not want to engage in a night action because of the IJN night fighting skills, especially the torpedoes. Might not a day fight favor the US because they would be able to visually and with radar keep track of the enemy ships and possible torpedo launches, like at the Komondorskis? The idea behind the surface fight would have been that the air strike was a long shot because of the extreme range and the fact that the returning AC were not night operation capable. In the event, the air strike was not very productive. A suface attack in the daylight might have yielded much better results.

[vikingBerserker]

Wasn't the Clash between USS Washington/South Dakota & IJNS Kirishima/Hei(?) at night?