This Day in the Battle of Britain (2 Viewers)

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The river barges in particular would have benn dodgy as hell in the channel

A good point which I have made several times on similar threads. Anyone unfamiliar with the sea who thinks crossing the Channel is easy because its only 20 miles or so across doesnt have a clue just how fearsome the currents and weather can be. A flat bottomed river barge with a max speed of 6 knots in the Channel is basically a way of killing lots of your own soldiers.
 
A good point which I have made several times on similar threads. Anyone unfamiliar with the sea who thinks crossing the Channel is easy because its only 20 miles or so across doesnt have a clue just how fearsome the currents and weather can be. A flat bottomed river barge with a max speed of 6 knots in the Channel is basically a way of killing lots of your own soldiers.

The trouble is, its not a twenty mile trip, its more like an 80mile journey, because the points of embarkatrion are widely scattered. It would take several days to tactically load the 100000 or so troops in the assault waves, and sea speed would not be 6 knots....thats the speed these craft could do on a calm flat body of water. With currents and swell, its probably more like 2-3 knots. That means it takes about a week for some troops to get emabraked, make the journey and disembark.....no latrines, no means for hot food hounded by all that the RAF and the RN could throw at them, no real way to disembark. Its a recipe for disaster IMO
 
The trouble is, its not a twenty mile trip, its more like an 80mile journey, because the points of embarkatrion are widely scattered. It would take several days to tactically load the 100000 or so troops in the assault waves, and sea speed would not be 6 knots....thats the speed these craft could do on a calm flat body of water. With currents and swell, its probably more like 2-3 knots. That means it takes about a week for some troops to get emabraked, make tsailed from he journey and disembark.....no latrines, no means for hot food hounded by all that the RAF and the RN could throw at them, no real way to disembark. Its a recipe for disaster IMO

I know we once sailed from Vlissingen meaning to head for the River Crouch. After 2 days at sea in filthy unseasonal weather we ended up in Ijmuden even further from England than when we started. A big low in the Bay of Biscay and spring tides meant we spent our whole time going nowhere with 6 knots showing on the log.
 
I remember reading a quote to the effect that if the Germans attempted anything resembling launching the invasion, Churchill, who had previously been First Lord of the Admiralty would have had the entire Home Fleet storming down the Channel, guns blazing! The reaction of the Royal Navy was one factor often overlooked in the debate about whether the German invasion would have succeeded.

I, too am of the opinion that the German seaborne invasion would have ended disastrously. I read once about a practise towing of unpowered barges (as many of them were) led by a single motorised barge out off the French coast. The motorised barge broke down and the towed barges got swamped in the swell, meanwhile a destroyer had to take the lot into tow back to port. The result was a farce for the German unit concerned. It was an enormous exercise and a vast amount of equipment was gathered for the invasion, but it would have failed miserably, I'm afraid.
 
I read that Churchill forbade any capital ships from entering the Channel to counter any invasion unless the Germans had already deployed capital ships of their own. He thought it was just too risky otherwise.

The incident with the barges was conducted early in the mission to trail sea born invasion concepts examined in the 1920s and 1930s. More of the navy showing the army just how difficult it would be at that time. As I recall they lost a couple of barges out of the 50 that were used, one due to the troops all massing to one side capsizing the barge. Small wonder the Germans would go on to install about 100-150 tons of concrete ballast and steel girder strengthening to about 2150 barges by the end of September.

As such, the original exercise was political in nature as the navy was damned if he was going to throw away their limited fleet on Hitler's bidding, when it was Hitler who had most blocked any fleet development in the first place. With more practice these landings became easier to do. The Germans had set up an amphibious assault battalion back in 1926 when the USMC counted only a brigade structure. By 1930 they had drawn up plans for converting merchant ships into troop ships and the plans for massed conversion of coastal/river barges into landing barges for troops/Vehicles and artillery.

The idea of allied bombers and warships swamping and sinking masses of such barges is pure Atlantic nation fantasy, maybe by mid to late war it might have been possible but not at the start of the war. British strategy envisaged the need for a couple of years to mobilize their armed forces. In 1940 the British forces were just too weak. Neither the RN/RAF had enough to fire power to sink enough ships in the time period available, to prevent any invasion. The fact is once unleashed the Germans would have landed enough troops, supplies, artillery tanks, etc to smash the British defenses and drive on London, probably taking the capital after a bloody fight.

The combined physical and psychological shock of such an attack could have been enough to topple the government and neutralize the UK in the short term, even if the RN was able to cut off any invasion from its line of supply after the fact. Its possible in such a crises Churchill would have been kicked out of power and some kind of deal struck with the nazi to shut down the second front to allow Hitler to get on with his massacre of the Slavs. In spite of the fact most posters would recoil at the above suggestions, the real life situation at that time was far too precarious to predict and could easily have gone either way.

But any invasion would have been very costly to both sides and no one could guarantee Hitler it would result in certain victory. Hitler was not going to risk his string of victories on anything short of a guaranteed victory… which is where Goering stepped in.
 
I read that Churchill forbade any capital ships from entering the Channel to counter any invasion unless the Germans had already deployed capital ships of their own. He thought it was just too risky otherwise.

I sincerely doubt that if the invasion was launched that Churchill would have continued this stance. I, too have read this, but I also read said quote mentioned before. (Churchill was a man of paradoxes). In an invasion scenario the heavy units of the KM would most certainly have been deployed, which, by necessity, the Royal Navy would have done so too. For the Germans to have launched a cross channel invasion without support from the KM's heavy units would have been suicide.

The fact is once unleashed the Germans would have landed enough troops, supplies, artillery tanks, etc to smash the British defenses and drive on London, probably taking the capital after a bloody fight. The combined physical and psychological shock of such an attack could have been enough to topple the government and neutralize the UK in the short term, even if the RN was able to cut off any invasion from its line of supply after the fact. Its possible in such a crises Churchill would have been kicked out of power and some kind of deal struck with the nazi to shut down the second front to allow Hitler to get on with his massacre of the Slavs. In spite of the fact most posters would recoil at the above suggestions, the real life situation at that time was far too precarious to predict and could easily have gone either way..

I certainly don't think it is too unpalatable, just highly unrealistic. I think you credit the Germans with more capability than they actually had. I think you also underestimate just how difficult it would have been for them to have crossed the Channel with their barges. Also, the depth of feeling in Britain regarding Churchill's stance in 1940, sure, he wasn't always popular, but I doubt he would have been kicked out. Chamberlain was dumped because he showed a lack of leadership; Churchill was instated as PM for the opposite reasons. Likewise, the British were not completely broken and had an invasion been launched, I'm sure the British armed forces would have demonstrated just how much fight they had in them.

But any invasion would have been very costly to both sides and no one could guarantee Hitler it would result in certain victory. Hitler was not going to risk his string of victories on anything short of a guaranteed victory… which is where Goering stepped in.

This I agree on. The Germans 'lost' the Battle of Britain as much as the British 'won' it.
 
This old chestnut keeps bobbing to the surface.
The Germans were not capable of launching a seaborne invasion of the UK in 1940. No purpose built landing craft,no amphibious vehicles,no special armour,the list goes on.
Just compare the materiel available to the allies in 1944. They even laid their own fuel pipe lines under the channel and took harbours (Mulberry) with them. The Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe were to all intents and purposes absent and yet there were still some sticky moments.
'Sealion' was a bluff with a political objective not a military one. If things had gone differently through the summer/autumn of 1940 it might just have worked. It certainly scared the sh*t out of the British people,particularly my Grandma who,living in Canterbury,was expecting paratroopers to kick in her door at any moment. In that sense it played into Churchill's hands.
Cheers
Steve
 
Another chestnut is the claim that the RAF lacked the strike capability to do much harm to the Germans assets at sea. Just as an indication, Coastal Command in early 1941, in the Coastal waters of Europe sank well over 50000 tons of Axis shipping, just on the Atlantic seaboard. by July of 1941, they were completely dominating the coastal water around Britain. These barges were going to be travelling at less than 1 knot, and with 2000 of them it would be like sinking fish in a barrel. A combination of mines, bombs even torpedoes would have decimated the germans.....provided the grermans didnt have air superiority.
 
Another chestnut is the claim that the RAF lacked the strike capability to do much harm to the Germans assets at sea. Just as an indication, Coastal Command in early 1941, in the Coastal waters of Europe sank well over 50000 tons of Axis shipping, just on the Atlantic seaboard. by July of 1941, they were completely dominating the coastal water around Britain. These barges were going to be travelling at less than 1 knot, and with 2000 of them it would be like sinking fish in a barrel. A combination of mines, bombs even torpedoes would have decimated the germans.....provided the grermans didnt have air superiority.
In 1940 can you just picture the swarms of Ansons amd Straeners swoopimg in for the kill , the RAF was willing to sustain 50% losses on ferrying Hudsons over the ocean because they lacked a useful maritime aircraft. Fortunately the losses in Ferry Command were much much lower
 
Germany didn't have any operational capital ships for Sealion, because of both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were badly damaged during Norway operations and were on docks to near the end of 1940. IMHO capital ships were not needed, cruisers and smaller ships would have been enough against German invasion fleet at sea. BBs might have been used to bombard invasion beeches and embankment ports, R-class BBs bombarded a couple times French ports during the BoB.

On lack of firepower by RN/RAF. Hardly, even DDs were in fact unnecessary powerful against barges, a couple 4.7" shells would have made a quite a mess inside a barge. And even if 8 .303mgs might have been too light armament to sink a barge, IMHO after a couple strafing runs there would not have been too many combat capable soldiers inside it.

Juha
 
Germany didn't have any operational capital ships for Sealion, because of both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were badly damaged during Norway operations and were on docks to near the end of 1940. IMHO capital ships were not needed, cruisers and smaller ships would have been enough against German invasion fleet at sea.

They might not have been needed but if the Germans began their invasion I betcha they wouldn't have shied away from using them! We are talking about the threat of invasion here, not just some exercise. The Brits would have thrown everything at the Germans; capital ships or not, mines or U-boats in the Channel or not. They fitted light bombs to Tiger Moth trainers to attack beach landings, they placed stakes in almost every open field near the coast for fear of glider landings; parts of the UK are still scattered with tank traps. No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we know today back in August 1940 about what ships the Germans were going to use or whether their invasion barges could cross the Channel or not. Sure, they would have known that German capital units were out of action, but that would not have stopped the Home Fleet from gearing up for the worst. Fear is a great motivator and the Brits were fearing for their existence. If I were Churchill, I would have sent every ship in the entire Royal Navy down the Channel if I knew the b*****ds were coming! :twisted:
 
"..... No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we know today back in August 1940 about what ships the Germans were going to use or whether their invasion barges could cross the Channel or not. Sure, they would have known that German capital units were out of action, but that would not have stopped the Home Fleet from gearing up for the worst. Fear is a great motivator and ....." :)

I like the way you think Nuuumannn :).

I am so sick of today's revisionist history. To understand the past you must FIRST put yourself in the moccasins of the person you would study ... without (after-the-fact) judgement ... or new knowledge. Once you have thoroughly mastered the subject's situ ... and motivations ... and outcome ... you are then permitted to introduce "new" knowledge ... with which to re-cast the historical case. 67 years after WW2 there is not that much NEW knowledge ... there are plenty of artifacts (buried T-34, drowned P-39 etc. etc.) important to understanding the past - but mostly they put day-to-day flesh on the bare bones of statistics. The exception to the no "new" is in the fields like economics (Adam Tooze) where the learned are able to glean and assemble data into snapshots of the Nazi economy (like MRI's or tissue cross sections). The fall of the Iron Current and implosion on the Soviets have also provided massive quantities of NEW material. I do not object to history being re-written to include valuable new sources. I absolutely object to history being re-written (revised) by POLITICAL CORRECTNESS. Imposing contemporary values and motives on the long-since dead is unfair, disrespectful, bad history and political bull sh ... ite.

"No one in Britain could have seriously predicted what we know today ...." and that is ... ???? :) ..... that many, many young Englishpersons (and others worldwide) today consider Britain's night bombers, War Criminals and the German population .. innocent victims. The reversal of social values (through neglect, abuse, overuse or conscious perversion) can lead to great injustices. Heros are suddenly cast in the role of piranhas ... in a heart beat.

"Those who cannot remember the pasta are condemned to reheat it..." (increasing the risk of dryness, burning, and reduction of taste and nutritional value). :)

MM
 
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Has anyone looked at the planned route of the invasion? I just saw in a book that the invasion route wasn't direct but skirted the Dover coast southwards until landing. Whether this is true or not, I don't know but it looks dangerous. This is a quick map I made based upon what was presented. I dunno.......
england-map3.gif
 

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