"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (4 Viewers)

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Long-time customer Taiwan finds itself in the queue alongside Bahrain, Bulgaria, Greece, Jordan and Slovakia, and likely Ukraine soon. The island's air force is a major operator of the airframe, but its pilots and aging fleet continue to be strained by Chinese warplane maneuvers in its surrounding airspace.
Can't Taiwan produce comparable fighters instead of waiting for Vipers? Their AIDC F1 Ching-kuo looks sharp, as does the new T5 trainer.

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Can't Taiwan produce comparable fighters instead of waiting for Vipers? Their AIDC F1 Ching-kuo looks sharp, as does the new T5 trainer.

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I'd imagine industrial capacity comes into play too. Lockheed already had the plant up and running and has produced a few thousand airframes.

I have no doubt the Taiwanese have the technical know-how, but do they have the time to build the plant and train up the workers? Do they have available labor? Do they have the money for long-term investment like this, and can their indigenous ongoing contracts keep it afloat? You might need offshore markets for that, but who would buy from a supplier that might be invaded in the next ten years?

Why did South American nations outsource battleships in the early 20th century? probably for many of the same considerations.
 
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Before the war the US was apparently producing about 10k 155mm shells per month. Now the US is producing about ten times that number.
To be fair, while the exact number is classified, in 2022 the US officially had "over 10,000,000" 155 rounds in ready-use inventory. The actual number is a lot higher. While I agree that the US and other countries - really any country serious about producing armaments for self defense or support of other countries - should have significant and easily uprated production capacities, there are practical limits. For countries with smaller economies than the US it becomes a matter of economically sustainable (or unsustainable) practices rather than potential production capacity. Also, remember that the inventory has to be rotated and reworked on a regular basis. If you already have such a huge inventory that you have to spend more time on rework than would be required for new production, then either there is no point in such a large inventory or there is no point in continuing volume production beyond what is required for peacetime training expenditure.

It is kind of a catch 22 situation.
 
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A fairly good summary of the problem re the inventory of weapons vs production levels, although of a relatively general nature. It is from Sep'22. Note the more detailed CSIS study link about halfway down the article.

"Is the United States Running out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine?"

On a related note, the US has supplied over 1,500,000 artillery rounds of various caliber to Ukraine to date. This includes ~300,000 rounds from our ready use forward deployment stocks in Israel, which were the first(?) source we transferred from to Ukraine.
 
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The Russians are smart here, knowing they have perhaps two weeks before the UAF has the ammunition to resist them and Ukraine so far having a demonstrably limited ability to retake territory, the Russians are pushing forward with all they have.
 
The Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade denied a recent report that Ukrainian forces had pulled US-provided M1A1 Abrams tanks from the frontline. The Associated Press (AP) reported on April 26, citing two unspecified US military officials, that Ukraine has removed Abrams tanks from the frontline partly because Russia's widespread drone usage has made it too difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate Abrams without Russian forces detecting and striking Abrams with drones.[23] The Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade denied the report, stating that Abrams perform well on the battlefield and that the 47th Mechanized Brigade would not "hide [a tank] from the enemy that makes the enemy hide themselves" or leave Ukrainian infantry without fire support.[24] ISW does not report on the specific Ukrainian tactical deployment or use of its own or Western-provided weapons systems apart from what US or Ukrainian officials say.

 
Dont think the Abrams were designed for a sitting war nor for killer drones in the masses now seen on the front. I think they are more a breach tank : Punch through fan out destroy.
Further more i do not think they will be shipped back. I think to big of an asset to be destroyed in a fight it was not designed for.
 
Dont think the Abrams were designed for a sitting war nor for killer drones in the masses now seen on the front. I think they are more a breach tank : Punch through fan out destroy.
Further more i do not think they will be shipped back. I think to big of an asset to be destroyed in a fight it was not designed for.

The Abrams was primarily designed for the battlefields of Northern Europe of the early to mid 1970s, intended to fit in with the 'Active Defense' doctrine of the time, which was primarily a defensive doctrone.

The concern was that weapons lethality had grown so much - particularly ground/air launched ATGMs, tank cannon and cluster munitions - that an attacker needed at least 3:1 superiority to overcome prepared defenses (and potentially as much as 6:1).

From my reading of the doctrine, the idea for the XM-1 was for a tank that could sit in prepared and well sighted fighting positions and work as part of a combined mechanised arms team to slow/destroy mass armoured waves of Warsaw Pact forces. Once one wave had been disrupted, then the force could rapidly reposition to the next set of prepared positions.

Hopefully, you got got to rinse and repeat this until the Warsaw Pact forces lost momentum, or you retreated into the Rhine and/or supporting forces arrived from CONUS.

Offensive action was only to be taken if there was an opportunity to cause overwhelming losses on the enemy. The idea was a narrow front assault leading to penetration in depth and breakthrough into enermy rear areas. The chief killing arm of the Warsaw Pact was seen as massed artillery, so the intent would have been to break through deep enough to disrupt/destroy that.

In the mid/late 1970s, the Active Defense doctrine was replaced by the more offensively oriented AirLand Battle. This was due to a bunch or reasons, including the increasing mobility of firepower (particularly wider Western adoption of MLRS, SPGs and IFVs, along with air launched PGMs) and Soviet doctrinal shifts away from the WW2 style massed armour attack with equally large follow on waves.
 
The Abrams was also designed to be part of the integrated battlefield component system.
Two other components were to be the M2 Bradley and M3 Sergeant York.
The development of the M3 fell short and the project was abandoned, however, during the Gulf War, the M1 and M2 interacted remarkably close to what was originally intended.
 
The Abrams was primarily designed for the battlefields of Northern Europe of the early to mid 1970s, intended to fit in with the 'Active Defense' doctrine of the time, which was primarily a defensive doctrone.

The concern was that weapons lethality had grown so much - particularly ground/air launched ATGMs, tank cannon and cluster munitions - that an attacker needed at least 3:1 superiority to overcome prepared defenses (and potentially as much as 6:1).

From my reading of the doctrine, the idea for the XM-1 was for a tank that could sit in prepared and well sighted fighting positions and work as part of a combined mechanised arms team to slow/destroy mass armoured waves of Warsaw Pact forces. Once one wave had been disrupted, then the force could rapidly reposition to the next set of prepared positions.

Hopefully, you got got to rinse and repeat this until the Warsaw Pact forces lost momentum, or you retreated into the Rhine and/or supporting forces arrived from CONUS.

Offensive action was only to be taken if there was an opportunity to cause overwhelming losses on the enemy. The idea was a narrow front assault leading to penetration in depth and breakthrough into enermy rear areas. The chief killing arm of the Warsaw Pact was seen as massed artillery, so the intent would have been to break through deep enough to disrupt/destroy that.

In the mid/late 1970s, the Active Defense doctrine was replaced by the more offensively oriented AirLand Battle. This was due to a bunch or reasons, including the increasing mobility of firepower (particularly wider Western adoption of MLRS, SPGs and IFVs, along with air launched PGMs) and Soviet doctrinal shifts away from the WW2 style massed armour attack with equally large follow on waves.
Did the doctrine account for swarms of drones. Think not.
So there you go with whatever pre drone battle plan. The mbt is now just an essy target for a kid with lots of war thunder hours.
These cheap easy to produce killers are now for the first time in mass use with both sides.

The race is on to create a vehicle that can a) stay alive when attacked by drones, b) counter drone attacks to make it possible to break through or hold defensive position against incoming armour etc.
 

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