Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Range finders are not gun directors. Gun directors cover quite a spectrum. But at a MINIMUM they need some sort of range finder. They need a spotting scope/glass. AND they need a way to get data to the guns. Shouting range and bearing to gun crews (or telephone) is not it. The guns need follow the pointer systems and even better, a repeater system that sends a signal back to the director so that the director officer knows the gun/s have been laid (aimed) according to orders.
We haven't even gotten to plotting table/predictors to "guess" where the target it going to be in 45-70 seconds of flight time.

Then there is the whole minimum salvo thing. Most gunnery officers figured you need a 4 shot salvo. If you get one outlier out 4 shots you can usually discount it and go for the 3 shots as the center of the group. 3 shots is not much better than 2 shots.

Most of the WW II British AMC and Boarding vessels used similar ex WW I 6in guns and simple fire control. Usually with less elevation and thus limited range.

On this topic:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbXyAzGtIX8&t=2s

 

[z42]

You entirely ignored my point that escort carriers are much easier to sink than battleships. Kare to take a swipe at it, or are you tapping out?

As I wasn't proposing that Germany should build an escort carrier, I decided to not answer what I considered a strawman argument.

But perhaps I was unclear, by "baby CV's" I meant something smaller than the 34 kton behemoth fleet carrier they historically tried to build. Not an escort carrier.

As I mentioned in one of the initial messages in the thread, I think Germany would have needed to build very fast ships, to be able to have a chance at escape from the superior numbers the Allies would be able to bring to the table.

A hypothetical commerce raiding carrier with something like a 32 kn top speed, some armor, and sufficient stores for long range missions would be, just spitballing, probably over 20k tons.

Also, to handle this fearsome escort carrier, what ships or other assets do you think the RN must sacrifice?

Again, I'm not suggesting building "an" escort carrier. If we take the historical tonnage they spent on the heavy cruisers and capital ships as fixed, they could potentially have built quite few 20k ton CV's, depending on how many heavy surface units they sacrifice.

As for what the RN response to that would be, hard to say. Maybe sacrifice one KGV for two more Ark Royals?

 

[Shortround6]

How fast does the 20,000ton CV have to go to out run a squadron of Swordfish?
Or several squadrons of Beauforts?

Now people built several different types of carriers of different sizes and capabilities which makes it hard to get a good "read" as even the same navies emphasized different things as different times. British Colossus class went 25 kts using 40,000hp engines while the USN Independence did 32kts with 100,000hp for instance. Different sized flight decks, different size hangers, different height of flight deck over water.

The Seydlitz as planed as a carrier (18,000 tons) was going to have 132,000hp, Prinz Eugen machinery. For some reason they were only planning 18 aircraft?

A purpose built hull may have a fuller bow and allow a longer flight deck?
But these things cannot wander around on their own anymore than the Glorious could.

32kts is in good weather and flat seas. You can outrun destroyers in rough seas, Cruisers kind of depend on the Cruisers and the sea. But in crappy weather you either can't fly or operations are limited and/or costly (crashes).

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As I wasn't proposing that Germany should build an escort carrier, I decided to not answer what I considered a strawman argument.

But perhaps I was unclear, by "baby CV's" I meant something smaller than the 34 kton behemoth fleet carrier they historically tried to build. Not an escort carrier.

As I mentioned in one of the initial messages in the thread, I think Germany would have needed to build very fast ships, to be able to have a chance at escape from the superior numbers the Allies would be able to bring to the table.

A hypothetical commerce raiding carrier with something like a 32 kn top speed, some armor, and sufficient stores for long range missions would be, just spitballing, probably over 20k tons.



Again, I'm not suggesting building "an" escort carrier. If we take the historical tonnage they spent on the heavy cruisers and capital ships as fixed, they could potentially have built quite few 20k ton CV's, depending on how many heavy surface units they sacrifice.

As for what the RN response to that would be, hard to say. Maybe sacrifice one KGV for two more Ark Royals?

Then this is a miscommunication, because here in America, "baby flattop" is most certainly a synonym for CVE specifically, not a converted fast carrier -- which we called "light" carriers or CVLs.

ETA: I think with the carriers and battlefleet they already had to hand, the RN wouldn't need to sacrifice much if anything. The Germans seem to have been allergic to direct confrontations with the RN for the most part anyway. Let the RAF handle scouting, keep the ships at readiness when a sortie appears imminent, whittle away with subs and medium bombers, and then crush with battleships sailing under a FAA umbrella.

 

[RCAFson]

Hood Sunk 24 May, Bismarck 27 May,

The airstrike from Victorious against Bismarck was small because the hangar held 48 Hurricanes stored without outer wings.

RN Carrier movements to Gibraltar.
Furious depart Liverpool 12 May with 64 Hurricanes, Furious and Ark Royal fly off 48 of them on 21 May, of these 42 flown on to Egypt. (1 returned UK on Furious)
Argus depart Greenock 22 May with 29 Hurricanes, Furious and Ark Royal fly off 44 Hurricanes on 6 June, of these 19 flown on to Egypt.
Victorious depart Rosyth 31 May, joining WS.8X, with 48 Hurricanes, Victorious and Ark Royal fly them off on 14 June, of these 43 flown on to Egypt.

That's useful info regarding Furious and Argus, but it's a bit more complicated for Victorious. When news of the Bismarck's sortie was received by the Home fleet Victorious was also earmarked 828 squadron (Albacores) but for various reasons the Albacore squadron's arrival was delayed and she had to depart Scapa Flow on 22 May with only 9 Swordfish and 6 Fulmars aboard.

 

[tomo pauk]

I recall reading somewhere (Wikipedia maybe?) that German naval strategy in the run up to the war as one characterized by "strategic confusion". An apt description, perhaps.

So what would be a better strategy, and what hardware should they have built instead of the historical one to support that?

For a very brief background, the Versailles treaty limited Germany to 6 light cruisers of up to 6000 tons and 6" guns, and 6 maximum 10000 ton ships to replace the 6 pre dreadnoughts they were allowed to keep after WWI. Furthermore the Allied Control Commission apparently allowed Germany to manufacture at most one gun larger than 28cm per year, effectively limiting the ships to that. These limitations resulted in the Königsberg class light cruisers and the Deutschland class armored ships / heavy cruisers / pocket battleships / however you wish to classify them.
Germany wasn't part of the Washington and London naval treaties, though via the 1935 Anglo-German naval treaty they effectively were, as that limited Germany to 35% of the RN for every class of ships (with the classes defined as in the Washington / London treaties).
So, what should Germany have done?
A slightly related thread, we discussed building CV's instead of gun equipped capital ships in Germany forgoes battleships, goes all in on CVs

If German ships want to stick around even when the newer French big-gunned ships are around, the 28 cm guns will not cut it. The S+G will need to be armed with 38cm guns IMO. Until these guns are available, make the CVs. But 1st make some not too big CVs, even the converted civilian ships will do for the aircrews to start learning the tricks of the trade.
The 'normal' CVs can be around 25000 tons, with 2/3rds of it's air group being fighters, and rest the dive-bombers. Forget the torpedo-bombers. 25 kton ship should be carriying 60-70 aircraft without problems. Fighters' main job is to kill/chase off enemy recons.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

25 kton ship should be carriying 60-70 aircraft without problems.

German designers are going to need to seriously up their game to hit this mark.

 

[Shortround6]

Going to aircraft carriers for merchant raiding needs a serious change in mindset. The change in mindset may have been needed rather badly in any case but one account claims that the Bismarck sailed with 80 men on board to provide prize crews for captured ships.
Carriers are going to use paratroopers or prize crews on gliders

In any case and forgetting that sort of nonsense. The Germans actually needing, instead of wanting, carriers requires looking at.

Japanese and Americans needed carriers to provide air cover over vast areas of ocean where they had no land based air. British were in gray area, Most of the area they operated in had land based air, some areas did not. Most of the areas the Germans were going to operate in, Western Europe and Russia, can easily be covered by land based air, anybody see the need for a Baltic carrier?
Germans only need a carrier force if they are going to go around England and play in the North Atlantic and do it hundreds of miles away from England. German carriers challenging British based land air??
Maybe if the Germans get their 1944 dream fleet they need carriers. But without a battleship fleet to protect the Germans don't need a carrier fleet. It is a very expensive way to put a small group of planes into the North Atlantic for what return? There are cheaper and easier ways to sink merchant ships.

I think the Germans were suffering from carrier envy, not an actual military need.

 

[tomo pauk]

Going to aircraft carriers for merchant raiding needs a serious change in mindset. The change in mindset may have been needed rather badly in any case but one account claims that the Bismarck sailed with 80 men on board to provide prize crews for captured ships.
Carriers are going to use paratroopers or prize crews on gliders

In any case and forgetting that sort of nonsense. The Germans actually needing, instead of wanting, carriers requires looking at.

Japanese and Americans needed carriers to provide air cover over vast areas of ocean where they had no land based air. British were in gray area, Most of the area they operated in had land based air, some areas did not. Most of the areas the Germans were going to operate in, Western Europe and Russia, can easily be covered by land based air, anybody see the need for a Baltic carrier?
Germans only need a carrier force if they are going to go around England and play in the North Atlantic and do it hundreds of miles away from England. German carriers challenging British based land air??
Maybe if the Germans get their 1944 dream fleet they need carriers. But without a battleship fleet to protect the Germans don't need a carrier fleet. It is a very expensive way to put a small group of planes into the North Atlantic for what return? There are cheaper and easier ways to sink merchant ships.

I think the Germans were suffering from carrier envy, not an actual military need.

What is going to provide the anti-aircraft umbrella beyond what LW can do, like north of Bergen, in the vicinity of Iceland, or south of Greenland?

 

[z42]

Then this is a miscommunication, because here in America, "baby flattop" is most certainly a synonym for CVE specifically, not a converted fast carrier -- which we called "light" carriers or CVLs.

Fair enough, point taken. Sorry for leading people astray with an accidental use of established terminology.

ETA: I think with the carriers and battlefleet they already had to hand, the RN wouldn't need to sacrifice much if anything. The Germans seem to have been allergic to direct confrontations with the RN for the most part anyway. Let the RAF handle scouting, keep the ships at readiness when a sortie appears imminent, whittle away with subs and medium bombers, and then crush with battleships sailing under a FAA umbrella.

That's the crux of the thread. RN and KM both knew KM couldn't win a Mahanian final fleet battle, yet KM still went ahead and built a small balanced fleet rather than something optimized for commerce raiding and keeping as much of the RN as possible tied up. So, what should they have done instead?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So, what should they have done instead?

They should have given their navy more resources. The Royal Navy was simply too powerful to challenge on the resources allocated. Operationally, they did the only things they could -- and lost hundreds of subs, a battleship, two battlecruisers, and a pocket battleship in the course. The U-boat campaign was their best avenue of effort, but I think the numbers show that the Battle of the Atlantic wasn't such a narrow victory as portrayed.

 

[z42]

How fast does the 20,000ton CV have to go to out run a squadron of Swordfish?
Or several squadrons of Beauforts?

I was thinking more of a "Gott im Himmel! Scout aircraft reports an enemy cruiser squadron heading our way. We need to GTFO!" kind of scenario. But yes, hard to outrun aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

What is going to provide the anti-aircraft umbrella beyond what LW can do, like north of Bergen, in the vicinity of Iceland, or south of Greenland?

Simple answer, don't go there.
That is playing to the British strength.

The Germans needed 3-4 large ships (more than 10,000 ton cruisers) to tie up British units, crews, and use up oil.
Actually trying to break out into the middle Atlantic was very risky game.

And like the Battleship race, the carrier race is race the Germans cannot win. Sending "balanced" fleet of 4 large ships (max historic) and two carriers (one large and one small) is going to cost the British but at what cost to the Germans? How many BBs and carriers can the British use oppose such a force. And the British always have better chance of recovering damaged ships.

Trying to take on one of the two largest navies in world was never going to end well. Threaten them, poke at them, but do NOT go into their back yard and play their game.

 

[EwenS]

That's useful info regarding Furious and Argus, but it's a bit more complicated for Victorious. When news of the Bismarck's sortie was received by the Home fleet Victorious was also earmarked 828 squadron (Albacores) but for various reasons the Albacore squadron's arrival was delayed and she had to depart Scapa Flow on 22 May with only 9 Swordfish and 6 Fulmars aboard.

The squadrons on board Victorious during the Bismarck chase were not her intended air group. 800Z (Fulmar) and 825 (Swordfish) squadrons had been supplying flights to the various carriers engaged in running Hurricanes to Gib & Malta as either guides (Fulmars) for the Hurricanes or as AS protection (Swordfish). So they were aboard because that was what Victorious was supposed to be doing. Victorious spent the 22 May at sea giving deck landing practice to the Fulmar & Swordfish crews, arriving back at 2000. She then left Scapa Flow at 2245 on 22nd May 1941 with KGV to search for the Bismarck.

828 had been attached to 18 Group Coastal Command in March 1941 based at Hatston in the Orkneys carrying out local AS patrols. It had been hoped that if Bismarck could be located 828 would be able to make a torpedo strike on her. (See Hobbs "The Fleet Air Arm and the War In Europe"). For that purpose it was moved up to Sumburgh in the Shetlands on 23rd May 1941 before returning to Hatston the next day when it was clear that the opportunity was gone. It subsequently spent a month in July/Aug on Victorious before being sent to operate from Malta.

A number of FAA Albacore squadrons were working up around the UK at the time awaiting completion of their carriers. If a squadron was ready in advance of its intended parent carrier they would often be attached to Coastal Command which was overstretched at the time.

Her intended airgroup was 809 (Fulmar) and 817 & 832 (Albacore squadrons) which finally came together in August 1941. As she worked up after the Bismarck chase she operated aircraft from a number of squadrons for short periods including 828.

 

[MikeMeech]

It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?

Hi
There were various RN ships in different locations that were trying to block the Bismarck's exit into the Atlantic (indeed there were also about 5 British convoys in the sea area covered by the chase), just south of Hood/PoW was the King George V/Revenge/Victorious and other ships, including Force H, south of them. Visibility was poor which is why Suffolk's radar became very important in keeping track of Bismarck. While many CC aircraft had ASV II bomber Command had no radar, however, despite this on 27 May 1941 BC sent out 52 Wellingtons and 12 Stirlings (see page 158 of 'The Bomber Command War Diaries' by Middlebrook & Everitt) to do a visual search for the Prinz Eugen after it had separated from the Bismarck, presumably the visibility had improved?

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

They should have given their navy more resources. The Royal Navy was simply too powerful to challenge on the resources allocated. Operationally, they did the only things they could -- and lost hundreds of subs, a battleship, two battlecruisers, and a pocket battleship in the course. The U-boat campaign was their best avenue of effort, but I think the numbers show that the Battle of the Atlantic wasn't such a narrow victory as portrayed.

Trouble was they playing against a stacked deck.
British had 3 1/2 modernized old BBs, (forget the Rs) two Nelsons the KGVs under construction and one small BC and one big old BC and one relic class BC and horde of Cruisers.
Germans have to play catch up. re arming the twins and building two more Bismarcks is not going to do it. (British find out the Germans are building ships past the Tirpitz and the British are going to build one or more Lions).
And you have to build all of the support ships. Like cruisers and Destroyers and they actually have to work. Not have their machinery go belly up after a week or need fuel every 3 days or some other problem.

 

[tomo pauk]

Simple answer, don't go there.
That is playing to the British strength.

The Germans needed 3-4 large ships (more than 10,000 ton cruisers) to tie up British units, crews, and use up oil.
Actually trying to break out into the middle Atlantic was very risky game.

Not having aircraft carriers severely curtails any surface action the German gun ships can venture into. Even an aircraft carrier that sports 30 Bf 109Ts is an asset that can hamper the RN recon assets, and trash the Swordfishes and the like.
Germans were not averse of playing risky games, having a better hand helps more than trying to bluff all the times.

And like the Battleship race, the carrier race is race the Germans cannot win. Sending "balanced" fleet of 4 large ships (max historic) and two carriers (one large and one small) is going to cost the British but at what cost to the Germans? How many BBs and carriers can the British use oppose such a force. And the British always have better chance of recovering damaged ships.

Trying to take on one of the two largest navies in world was never going to end well. Threaten them, poke at them, but do NOT go into their back yard and play their game.

Not having the suitably armed ships (bar Bismarck) and sailing without the air support was like firing themselves twice in the feet.
Taking out a big gun ship or two every now and then can be achieved, but not with as-is S&G and without recon and AA umbrella, and also without the means to bomb enemy ships.

 

[z42]

Not having aircraft carriers severely curtails any surface action the German gun ships can venture into. Even an aircraft carrier that sports 30 Bf 109Ts is an asset that can hamper the RN recon assets, and trash the Swordfishes and the like.
Germans were not averse of playing risky games, having a better hand helps more than trying to bluff all the times.



Not having the suitably armed ships (bar Bismarck) and sailing without the air support was like firing themselves twice in the feet.
Taking out a big gun ship or two every now and then can be achieved, but not with as-is S&G and without recon and AA umbrella, and also without the means to bomb enemy ships.

Without a robust naval aviation capability (which, realistically, they couldn't afford particularly if it's in addition to the historical big gun ships rather than replacing them) basing them in Norway to threaten the arctic convoys and making use of land based aviation coverage was perhaps the best choice available to them.

As for risk taking, huge strategical gambles with no plan B ultimately doomed the Third Reich. Not sure making even more of them would have helped.

 

[tomo pauk]

Without a robust naval aviation capability (which, realistically, they couldn't afford particularly if it's in addition to the historical big gun ships rather than replacing them) basing them in Norway to threaten the arctic convoys and making use of land based aviation coverage was perhaps the best choice available to them.

They were already doing that.
BTW - arctic convoys were not a ting until well into 1941. Our American friends might say: "that's pretty early", but our British friends will say: "blimey, that is already mid-war".

Germany was able to afford a few dozens of navalized 109s and Ju 87s, it is not like I've suggested that they make 4-engined bombers by thousands, or even by hundreds.

As for risk taking, huge strategical gambles with no plan B ultimately doomed the Third Reich. Not sure making even more of them would have helped.

Sailing out in the mid Atlantic without the air support and just with one big-gun ship was far riskier than what I've suggested.

 

[z42]

They were already doing that.

I know. Just pointing out that I think they made the right choice at that time, with the resources they historically had.

BTW - arctic convoys were not a ting until well into 1941.

Wikipedia says the first one sailed in August 41. Took until mid January 42 before Tirpitz arrived in Norway.

So yes, they need to figure out something useful to do before that.

Germany was able to afford a few dozens of navalized 109s and Ju 87s, it is not like I've suggested that they make 4-engined bombers by thousands, or even by hundreds.



Sailing out in the mid Atlantic without the air support and just with one big-gun ship was far riskier than what I've suggested.

I think one problem with this scenario is that Germany was limited by available slipways, as well as steel production. More ships means less steel for other users like shells, tanks, synthetic fuel plants and whatnot. Sacrifice Bismarck and Tirpitz and use the tonnage for 4 20k ton CV's?

Might be useful for Atlantic raids early in the war to provide better situational awareness for the BB and a bit of extra strike capability? However as Allied aerial reconnaissance gets better it probably becomes too dangerous so the task force(s), assuming they survive, will have to retreat to Norwegian waters.