Rn vs IJN (1 Viewer)

[EwenS]

But there was some oil production in Persia, and they had struck oil in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the 1930s. ARAMCO was established in 1943.

Oil exploration in Persia / Iran dated back to 1901 and was discovered in 1908 leading to exploitation by the Anglo Persian Oil Company (later Anglo Iranian Oil Co later BP). By WW2 their refinery at Abadan was I believe the single largest in the world. It became the biggest source of oil for the Admiralty in WW1. Exploration from there then spread around the Gulf through a network of British companies. The US got involved in WW2 to help increase production and refining capacity in the region.

Iraq oil developed interwar following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the acquisition of German oil concessions by British & French interests. Oil was piped across the desert from 1934 to refineries at Haifa in Palestine (then a British mandate) and Tripoli in Lebanon (then a French mandate).

There were also some small oilfields in Egypt along the Red Sea Coast by WW2. But exploration in the Western Desert had to wait until the 1970s to be discovered.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

How long would it take to expand whatever was going in Iraq and Egypt? I.e. trying to assess the Axis chances of conquest in the Middle East.

 

[EwenS]

How long would it take to expand whatever was going in Iraq and Egypt? I.e. trying to assess the Axis chances of conquest in the Middle East.

Much information here about Middle East oil production.

Middle East Oil Production in WW2 - Axis History Forum

Problem for the Axis is how to get to the major ME oilfields in the Gulf and Iraq before the allies destroy the facilities. Look at the distances involved. Egypt is small in comparison.

Cairo to Abadan - 1000 miles
Cairo to Kirkuk in Iraq - 850 miles

All this largely over desert, with all the supplies having to be shipped from Italy or Greece. Bit of a nightmare even if the Med Fleet and RAF have to withdraw.

Alternatives?
Tripoli in Lebanon to Kirkuk - 500 miles. But how to get there? By sea? Sailing past British bases in Cyprus & Egypt?

By comparison Tripoli in Libya to Cairo is 1100 miles as the crow flies, 1300 by road.

Other options:-
Via Turkey? Big logistics problems there getting troops and supplies through the Balkans and Turkey due to lack of railways. Done to death on the Axis History Forum a couple of years back ISTR.

Via the Caucasus? First the Germans have to get there (capturing Soviet oilfields along the way)

In 1941, prior to the outbreak of war with Japan Britain occupied Syria & Lebanon and ,along with the USSR , Persia /Iran. It intended to reinforce military assets in the region against the possibility of invasion via Turkey or the Caucasus, the latter in the event of a Soviet collapse. Itvwas these assets that were diverted to the Far East in Dec 1941. The ME region would not be given up without a fight.

 

[Peter Gunn]

I think it looks slightly silly that the rear turret is so high, but yes, the Littorios are very pretty.

I agree, but then again, I like a nice rear end...

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Much information here about Middle East oil production.

Middle East Oil Production in WW2 - Axis History Forum

Problem for the Axis is how to get to the major ME oilfields in the Gulf and Iraq before the allies destroy the facilities. Look at the distances involved. Egypt is small in comparison.

Cairo to Abadan - 1000 miles
Cairo to Kirkuk in Iraq - 850 miles

All this largely over desert, with all the supplies having to be shipped from Italy or Greece. Bit of a nightmare even if the Med Fleet and RAF have to withdraw.

Alternatives?
Tripoli in Lebanon to Kirkuk - 500 miles. But how to get there? By sea? Sailing past British bases in Cyprus & Egypt?

By comparison Tripoli in Libya to Cairo is 1100 miles as the crow flies, 1300 by road.

Other options:-
Via Turkey? Big logistics problems there getting troops and supplies through the Balkans and Turkey due to lack of railways. Done to death on the Axis History Forum a couple of years back ISTR.

Via the Caucasus? First the Germans have to get there (capturing Soviet oilfields along the way)

In 1941, prior to the outbreak of war with Japan Britain occupied Syria & Lebanon and ,along with the USSR , Persia /Iran. It intended to reinforce military assets in the region against the possibility of invasion via Turkey or the Caucasus, the latter in the event of a Soviet collapse. Itvwas these assets that were diverted to the Far East in Dec 1941. The ME region would not be given up without a fight.

Ok but let me play devil's advocate here a bit.

First, there is some oil drilling going on near Cairo, right? So that is something right there. If there is already a refinery in Haifa that can be repaired too.

Second, though those distances are indeed very long, and the Axis were limited in the amount of motor transport they had etc., they did manage to accomplish some extraordinary things in terms of projecting their armed forces quite long distances. Kursk is 1894 kilometers / 1180 miles from Dresden or Berlin, by road. Similar distance to Leningrad.

Budapest to Sevastopol is 2000 km / 1242 miles (again, by road).

Graz to Athens is 1670 km / 1037 miles

But they obviously managed to get a lot of men, weapons of war, materiel and supplies out to those distances.

Third, if there were already pipelines from Iran and Iraq, those could probably be repaired rather than built anew.

Fourth Abadan is 1000 + to Cairo over land. But if the Germans and Italians conquered Egypt, possibly the German or Italian navy could operate in the Persian Gulf and bring petrochemicals and oil through the Red Sea. Admittedly, that's a long and potentially perilous voyage, but might be easier to manage.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think the Axis powers in general may have really dropped the ball by not committing more assets to North Africa much earlier. Instead of - or at least before- say, conquering Yugoslavia and Greece.. (although those do go together with taking Egypt). Maybe a more focused and less wide invasion of Russia.

Maybe skip the Battle of Britain which was a massive drain of resources.

I don't know, but it seems like taking Egypt was closer to feasibility in 1941-42 than taking Stalingrad / Caucasus oil fields was, as we can see with the benefit of hindsight.

 

[EwenS]

Ok but let me play devil's advocate here a bit.

First, there is some oil drilling going on near Cairo, right? So that is something right there. If there is already a refinery in Haifa that can be repaired too.

Well everything depends on
1. How well these facilities can be destroyed.
2. How long it takes to get to Haifa and Tripoli (Lebanon)
3. Just how much of the Med fleet is withdrawn through the Suez Canal and how much moved to Haifa (ships were withdrawn to there in 1942 when Alexandria was threatened by the German advance.
4. Where is the equipment to rebuild the oilfields and refineries coming from? So long as the RN retains subs and destroyers at Haifa, they can threaten supply routes. And don't forget Cyprus as an air base, at least short term.

Second, though those distances are indeed very long, and the Axis were limited in the amount of motor transport they had etc., they did manage to accomplish some extraordinary things in terms of projecting their armed forces quite long distances. Kursk is 1894 kilometers / 1180 miles from Dresden or Berlin, by road. Similar distance to Leningrad.

Budapest to Sevastopol is 2000 km / 1242 miles (again, by road).

Graz to Athens is 1670 km / 1037 miles

But they obviously managed to get a lot of men, weapons of war, materiel and supplies out to those distances.

Third, if there were already pipelines from Iran and Iraq, those could probably be repaired rather than built anew.

The main pipeline was as from Kirkuk in Iraq to Haifa with a spur to Tripoli (Lebanon) which was turned off after the French Armistice. There was no pipeline linking that to oilfields and refineries in the Gulf itself in WW2. There were also a dozen or so pumping stations along the route. Those would be less easy to replace. And 500 miles of pipeline are impossible to protect 24/7. That leaves it vulnerable to attacks by Special Forces (LRDG/SAS/SBS/Popski's Private Army were all active in the Middle East).

Fourth Abadan is 1000 + to Cairo over land. But if the Germans and Italians conquered Egypt, possibly the German or Italian navy could operate in the Persian Gulf and bring petrochemicals and oil through the Red Sea. Admittedly, that's a long and potentially perilous voyage, but might be easier to manage.

Do you really think that the Suez Canal will be captured without Britain making efforts to block it and mine it and to continue minelaying efforts thereafter? And to wreck the ports on the Red Sea Coast. In Spring 1941 the Luftwaffe mined the Canal and ships were sunk. It delayed the passage of Illustrious for about a week on her way to the USA for repairs.

There were a fair number of RAF bases spread throughout Palestine, Iraq, East Africa, Aden and into the Persian Gulf area, for retreating RAF units to operate from.

During the 1956 Suez Crisis the Egyptians successfully closed it off by doing precisely that. It was closed for 5 months and took an international effort , including by RN salvage ships, divers etc to reopen it. How quickly can the Axis assemble the resources to achieve that?

But you need to capture a lot more than just Egypt to make naval operations in the Red Sea / Arabian Gulf Indian Ocean / Persian Gulf area viable. You need to take Sudan, Ethiopia and the various British, French & Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa to secure the Bab El-Mandeb Strait giving access from the Red Sea to the Arabian Gulf.

The main Italian Red Sea base pre-war was at Massawa in Eritrea. It fell to the British East African Campaign on 8 April 1941, just 3 months after Rommel turns up at Tripoli (Libya). The East African campaign rumbled on until Nov 1941 when the Italians in Ethiopia and other Italian colonies were swept up. Those British forces will need to be pushed south to open the bottom of the Red Sea.

Red Sea Flotilla - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

East African campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

So long as a reinforced Eastern Fleet exists (with at least some assets coming from the Med) then the RN will seek to close off the bottom of the Red Sea to prevent Axis warships breaking out into the Arabian Gulf. The RN Eastern Fleet withdrew from Ceylon to Kilindini / Mombasa (Kenya) in April 1942. After the Japanese went to war the main job of the Eastern Fleet was to protect the western part of the IO. Axis movements like you suggest, represents the kind of threat it was there to counter.

And there you also have to secure both sides of the Persian Gulf to secure the choke point at the Straits of Hormuz.

You need to a map out to study. Again it demonstrates how WW2 was a true world war. The various theatres interact with one another. What happens in one does affect what happens elsewhere.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Second, though those distances are indeed very long, and the Axis were limited in the amount of motor transport they had etc., they did manage to accomplish some extraordinary things in terms of projecting their armed forces quite long distances. Kursk is 1894 kilometers / 1180 miles from Dresden or Berlin, by road. Similar distance to Leningrad.

Budapest to Sevastopol is 2000 km / 1242 miles (again, by road).

Graz to Athens is 1670 km / 1037 miles

But they obviously managed to get a lot of men, weapons of war, materiel and supplies out to those distances.

None of those routes are vulnerable to the RAF or RN -- unlike an army transiting the Levant and Near East.

Third, if there were already pipelines from Iran and Iraq, those could probably be repaired rather than built anew.

These are also pretty difficult to guard and pretty easy to sabotage. I think it's clear that Iraqis resent any foreign domination (they evicted the British twice and Amerika once).

Fourth Abadan is 1000 + to Cairo over land. But if the Germans and Italians conquered Egypt, possibly the German or Italian navy could operate in the Persian Gulf and bring petrochemicals and oil through the Red Sea. Admittedly, that's a long and potentially perilous voyage, but might be easier to manage.

They're going to have to get past the straits at the heel of the Saudi boot -- and then past the nearby major RN base at Aden, and if the manage all that and get into the Persian Gulf, they could easily be bottled up in it by RN patrols (both surface and submarine) in the Gulf of Oman.

We've had a similar discussion before, I think.

 

[don4331]

I think the Axis powers in general may have really dropped the ball by not committing more assets to North Africa much earlier. Instead of - or at least before- say, conquering Yugoslavia and Greece.. (although those do go together with taking Egypt). Maybe a more focused and less wide invasion of Russia.

Maybe skip the Battle of Britain which was a massive drain of resources.

I don't know, but it seems like taking Egypt was closer to feasibility in 1941-42 than taking Stalingrad / Caucasus oil fields was, as we can see with the benefit of hindsight.

I think Hitler's biggest incorrect assumption was that Stalin would fold like the Czar did in WWI - threaten Moscow/St. Petersburg and he would sue for peace. Then Germany gets both food and oil production from Ukraine/Caucasus.

Stalin wasn't a Czar's whose family had lived in Moscow/St. Petersburg for generations, so threatening those cities didn't faze him.

A less destructive march through Belarus/arming Ukraine against Russia might have got Germans to Caucasus without 1/2 the effort. But that would require SS looking after the local populations from the Heer. Which is about 180* from what was happening...​

 

[WARSPITER]

Hitler made the same mistake with Britain.

Japan made the same mistake with the United States.

Napoleon mad the same mistake with Russia in 1812.

None of these lot realised that life is something that gets in the way of our plans.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Stalin wasn't a Czar's whose family had lived in Moscow/St. Petersburg for generations, so threatening those cities didn't faze him.

Whilst I agree wholeheartedly Stalin also wasn't fazed by casualty lists, military or civilian, human life meant nothing to him, maybe less than nothing if that's possible.

 

[Frog]

Napoléon :
'' I went to Russia to put an end to the colossus of the northern barbarians. The sword is drawn. They must be kept in the mirror so that they will no longer meddle in the affairs of civilized Europe. Even under the Great Catherine, the Russians were little or nothing in Europe's political affairs. It was the sharing of Poland that brought them into contact with civilization. Now Poland in turn must push them home. ''

 

[Reluctant Poster]

One reason was the greater range : diesel engined S-Boot compared to the US gasoline powered PTs.

The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,
"9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage."
were small destroyers, not S-boats. They were actually larger than the Hunt Class destroyers they often faced.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Much information here about Middle East oil production.

Middle East Oil Production in WW2 - Axis History Forum

Problem for the Axis is how to get to the major ME oilfields in the Gulf and Iraq before the allies destroy the facilities. Look at the distances involved. Egypt is small in comparison.

Cairo to Abadan - 1000 miles
Cairo to Kirkuk in Iraq - 850 miles

All this largely over desert, with all the supplies having to be shipped from Italy or Greece. Bit of a nightmare even if the Med Fleet and RAF have to withdraw.

Alternatives?
Tripoli in Lebanon to Kirkuk - 500 miles. But how to get there? By sea? Sailing past British bases in Cyprus & Egypt?

By comparison Tripoli in Libya to Cairo is 1100 miles as the crow flies, 1300 by road.

Other options:-
Via Turkey? Big logistics problems there getting troops and supplies through the Balkans and Turkey due to lack of railways. Done to death on the Axis History Forum a couple of years back ISTR.

Via the Caucasus? First the Germans have to get there (capturing Soviet oilfields along the way)

In 1941, prior to the outbreak of war with Japan Britain occupied Syria & Lebanon and ,along with the USSR , Persia /Iran. It intended to reinforce military assets in the region against the possibility of invasion via Turkey or the Caucasus, the latter in the event of a Soviet collapse. Itvwas these assets that were diverted to the Far East in Dec 1941. The ME region would not be given up without a fight.

The following graphs are from

To put those numbers into perspective:

Excerpt from the following:

Page Not Found | U.S. Army Center of Military History

"Although oil existed in plenty in Iraq and Iran, and there were Allied-controlled refineries at Haifa, Bahrein, and Abadan, the exigencies of the war situation in the Middle East in 1941 and 1942 tended to limit the use to which these vital Allied war assets could be put in behalf of the war effort. As Dr. Herbert Feis has written, "The dangers of German destruction or conquest of Middle Eastern oil fields and refineries, the virtual closing of the Mediterranean to tanker transport, and the length of the sea haul from the Persian Gulf to western Europe combined to confine the usefulness of Middle Eastern oil mainly to nearby military operations and safely accessible points until 1943-k." American interest in increasing Middle East refinery capacity was expressed late in 1941 by the U.S. Army Air Forces. In November arrangements were made by the appropriate governmental agencies to expedite shipment of needed machinery and equipment to Abadan for increase of its output. Early in the new year, 1942, the Office of the Petroleum Co-ordinator (which in December 1942 became the Petroleum Administration for War) asked the Bahrein Petroleum Company (BAPCO) to submit proposals for the addition to their refinery of 100-octane gasoline facilities. At the same time the co-ordinator, Harold Ickes, proposed a general program to increase Middle Eastrefinery capacity which was deferred on the advice of military officials pending clarification of the war situation in that area. Further shipments to Abadan of machinery and equipment were expedited in May and July 1942 and in May and June certificates of priority for materials for the general expansion of the refinery at Haifa were issued. In 1943 agreement was reached to undertake the Bahrein plant expansion. In the same year the construction of the Arabian American Company's refinery at Ras Tannura, Saudi Arabia, was begun. By the end of the war all this activity had provided an increase of 43 percent in total Middle East refinery capacity, that at Abadan amounting to more than 100 percent."

 

[Glider]

The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,
"9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage."
were small destroyers, not S-boats. They were actually larger than the Hunt Class destroyers they often faced.
View attachment 780596

As for the weapons carried they were well matched with 4 x 4in each but the Type 39 was a lot faster, 33kts to 25kts.

 

[Admiral Beez]

A less destructive march through Belarus/arming Ukraine against Russia might have got Germans to Caucasus without 1/2 the effort. But that would require SS looking after the local populations from the Heer.

But then they wouldn't be Nazis.

I think that had a non-Nazi Germany not attacked the USSR, eventually Stalin would have attacked Germany and all of eastern Europe. AIUI, a combining of Europe and the USA against the USSR was a big concern of Stalin's and thus he was relived and delighted when Germany and then Italy started attacking France and Britain, leaving Stalin to watch from the sidelines as his greatest worry attacked itself..... until summer 1941.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Taranto was aircraft only, launched at max range from off the Greek coast.

But sadly it was not all good news for the RN in its night surface actions in WW2, particularly in the English Channel.

9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage.

Then from 5/6 Sept 1943 to 22/23 Oct 1943 the RN ran 10 Operation Tunnel sorties along the French Coast from Cherbourg to Brest. These used a mix of Hunt class and fleet destroyers and half included a cruiser. Only 2 engaged the enemy and neither represented success for the RN.

3/4 Oct 2 fleet & 3 Hunt were sent to attack a coastal convoy. Instead 4xT39 found them. In the following confused action the 2 fleet destroyers were damaged (partly blue on blue & partly enemy) while the Germans suffered splinter damage only.

22/23 Oct 2 fleet & 4 Hunt destroyers and the "Toothless Terror" Dido class AA cruiser Charybdis were again sent to intercept a convoy but instead ran into 5 T39 TB, who succeeded in getting the drop on the British force. The result was the cruiser Charybdis torpedoed & sunk, the Hunt, Limbourne, torpedoed and scuttled. The cause was a mix of things - poor planning at short notice, recent changes of command in some ships, CO of the operation in Charybdis had no experience of these operations as his ship had been operating in the Med and on the Gib convoy routes immediately prior to this assignment, disparity of speed amongst the RN ships, the "right" equipment was spread amongst the ships and communications were poor.

Operations began again in Jan 1944, with another 12 Tunnels through to the end of April 1944 of which only 2 met the enemy. These all involved the big Tribal class and after 4/5 Feb the Hunts were dropped. The ships also had the opportunity to work together regularly and practice Night Encounter Exercises. Better support was available from Coastal Command & Coastal Forces. Success came with the final Tunnel on 26/27 April when the cruiser Black Prince and 4 Tribals set out to intercept a convoy. This time the German commander made a mistake and his 3xT39 ran into the RN force. The T29 was sunk and the other 2 damaged. The T24 & T27 we're intercepted a couple of days later by the Tribals, then involved in another operation. T24 was sunk and T27 driven ashore for RAF to complete her destruction.

These operations set the scene for the more successful operations in the Bay of Biscay between June & Aug 1944.

From the German perspective, they had the advantage of their coastal radars being able to track the RN warships. And the routes used by the RN warships pretty much had to follow defined paths to avoid minefields and coastal gun batteries. And there were ports into which convoys could seek shelter if detected.

The same could be said for the IJN. Their record as night fighters supreme is distorted by the two spectacular victories at Savo Island and Tassafaronga , which are indeed two of the most one sided naval battles ever fought , but those two victories bookended three failures. The Japanese night fighting record in 1942 was far from perfect. Cape Esperance was clearly a loss for the Japanese despite the typical confusion on the American side. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was a loss for the Japanese despite having a far superior force and again while facing an extraordinarily disorganized American force. The follow up Second Naval Battle was a case of being overwhelmed by a far superior American force, but it still interesting to note that the one time the Type 93 torpedo had the chance to accomplish the mission it was designed for it failed to score a single hit on the American battleships.
Its also interesting to note that the two successes were ad hoc battles without the usual overly complex battle plans that the Yamamoto lead IJN was famous for. The Savo Island force was formed from scratch with no time to craft the usual well choreographed Japanese plans that never seem take into account that enemy might react differently. The battle plan was simple follow me, and fire upon the enemy when you think the time is right. Tassafaronga was a quick reaction to a dull witted American force.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

They were all good but in different degrees.
Japanese 18in aerial torpedoes don't seem to have much advantage over British 18in Torpedoes for most of the war. Both types were modified several times during the war so let's make sure we are comparing the correct versions and not comparing 1944 specs for earlier battles, for both sides.

A perusal of the data on the NavWeaps site shows the motive performance of the British and Japanese aerial torpedoes to be similar. The Japanese have an advantage in warhead size over the Mark XII that the British entered the war with, but the British match the size when they introduce the Mark XV in 1943. This also has the much superior Torpex filling. Later in the war the Japanese trade speed for warhead as they did for their submarine and surface vessel torpedoes.

The combat record of the Japanese aerial torpedoes is surprisingly slim. Note that the larger warships sunk were also struck by bombs and/or submarine launched torpedoes
Not including the Pearl Harbor attack:

Sunk by aerial torpedoes

Aircraft Carrier
Lexington
Yorktown
Hornet

Battleship
Prince of Wales
Repulse

Heavy Cruiser
Chicago

Destroyer
Meredith
Twiggs

ADP
McKean

Damaged by aerial torpedoes

Battleship
Maryland

Light Carrier
Independence

Heavy Cruiser
2nd Houston
2nd Canberra

Light Cruiser
Denver
Birmingham

Destroyer
Jarvis
La Vallette

 

[RCAFson]

The torpedo boats in referenced in the original post,
"9/10 July 1943 3 Hunt class destroyers attacked a convoy protected by 5 minesweepers managing to sink only one minesweeper. In turn the Hunts were attacked by T-24 & T-25 (Type 39 "Elbing" class torpedo boats - small destroyers) and came off worst. All the Hunts were damaged, Melbreak badly, while the German TB escaped with splinter damage."
were small destroyers, not S-boats. They were actually larger than the Hunt Class destroyers they often faced.
View attachment 780596

Here's an account of that action:

HMS Wensleydale. 1943

www.hmswensleydale.co.uk

so 3 Hunt class DEs versus 5 KM minesweepers, 2 KM DEs and several E-boats.

 

[Ovod]

The combat record of the Japanese aerial torpedoes is surprisingly slim. Note that the larger warships sunk were also struck by bombs and/or submarine launched torpedoes
Not including the Pearl Harbor attack:

Sunk by aerial torpedoes

Aircraft Carrier
Lexington
Yorktown
Hornet

Battleship
Prince of Wales
Repulse

Heavy Cruiser
Chicago

Destroyer
Meredith
Twiggs

ADP
McKean

Damaged by aerial torpedoes

Battleship
Maryland

Light Carrier
Independence

Heavy Cruiser
2nd Houston
2nd Canberra

Light Cruiser
Denver
Birmingham

Destroyer
Jarvis
La Vallette

It's not that slim a record. It's an impressive list of warships attacked and even sunk, It's a better record if you compare it with the RAF and FAA record, surely?