July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force.

[oldcrowcv63]

In 2002 I had the opportunity to spend around two weeks with a number of Bataan vets while on a trip to the PI for the 60th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Among them were former enlisted men from the 17th Pursuit, 28th Bomb Squadron, and 7th Material Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
the majority being destroyed by strafers. There's an excellent site that has some great shots of Clark prewar including pics of the decoys. The site is run by the son of a POW who was at Clark and was in the same squadron as one of the vets I met on my trip. Check it out. www.alyoung.com/MyFathers_Captivity/Images/

Wish I had known more about the FEAF campaign when I was in the PI in '74, 82, and 83... I made a trip out to Corregidor island by Banka boat and saw the death march memorials lining the highway on the east shore of the Bataan Pensula but could have seen so much more. None of the books I've been reading lately were written and of course the internet didnt exist then. The damage due to the IJA shelling on corrregidor was impressive: concrete blocks the size of houses overturned on top of big guns if my memory serves. Everything I saw at Clark was new.

Duane, your link doesn't seem to work.

I'm facinated by all this talk about A-20s taking out ships in a late 1941 context. Pilots weren't trained in anti ship tactics
and skip bombing methods later used in the Bismark sea hadn't been invented yet.
Duane

The one squadron that might have done some good was the 27th Bomb Group (light) of 54 A-24's whose aircrew ended up in the PI without their mounts. The dozen planes or so that got to Java don't appear to have fared well or contributed much, being flown by relatively untrained replacement pilots (assuming Edmunds is correct). He claims Navy VB experienced pilots reached out with an offer to train the pilots but the USAAF refused their assistance and apparently the Navy Brass also nixed the idea too.



That might be the most promising part of Dave's suggestion, assuming an alternate history that reunites the original pilots with their aircraft. However, just getting the planes and pilots together wouldn't be enough. The A-24s, like their companion 18 P-40s on the Pensacola convoy arrived in Oz sans some critical components that made their numbers irrelevant. An apparently herculean effort to work around these shortcomings was undertaken. I assume the original crews of the A-24s were better trained than the ones that ended up flying the dozen or so that appeared to have gotten into combat in Java. 54 arriving in the PI appears a goodly number but their survival would have depended on a chain of what-ifs that had to play out perfectly in the modified time line. In the end, I still think there was little that could be done, beyond delaying the inevitable. As pointed out elsewhere in the forum. The people involved had to shake off a peacetime mindset. A logistical base had to be built almost from scratch and assets both human, facilties and hardware had to be created to fight the long war. It seemed that what ever could go wrong did go wrong. The combination of logistical difficults, mind set, and unfavorable initial conditions created to deep a hole.

[Shortround6]

The DB-7 with the R-1830 engines had, according to one source, 205 US gallons of fuel. One model of the DB-7 had the R-2600s and still had 205 gallons. the DB-7B is supposed to have had the R-2600s and 394 gallons. These planes were intended to be high performance, short ranged planes that took part in the land battle much like a Stuka. Thinking that they are medium bombers with a funny name is a mistake

Initial B-25s with R-2600 engines carried 912 gallons but when fitted with self sealing tanks and armor fuel capacity dropped to 694 gallons. Lockheed Hudson's carried around 630-640 US gallons in the wings for their R-1830s.

[tomo pauk]

Now that we are talking about the other US bombers, I wonder how well would've fared? Maryland, or Hudson, in 'defend the PI' assignment? Maryland (with different name) fared pretty good in French hands back in 1940.

[varsity078740]

Varsity,
that's very interesting, but the link didn't work when I tried it.

Joe

Try this:

Photos - My Father's Captivity

[oldcrowcv63]

works. Thanks.

[Shortround6]

The Hudson might be the only real alternative. The last of a 150 plane order for Maryland IIs was completed in April of 1941 and the first Baltimore doesn't roll out until late 41. Whatever is sent has to be on board ship in Aug/Sept in order to be delivered, assembled, test flown and then trained with in time to do any good at all. Just about any other "medium" bomber is available in too few numbers to really do anything. 38 B-23 built, few dozen early B-25s may be available as are few dozen early B-26s but the high stalling speed would probably rule the B-26 out from grass runways.

[davebender]

Without proper training it wouldn't matter if FEAF were equipped with F-15Es. They would still fail to intercept IJN airstrikes and bombs would still fail to hit anything besides the ocean. Then half the fighters would be destroyed on the ground after Gen. Brereton orders pilots to lunch en mass.

So let's assume competent leaders who know how to train aircrew are part of the package.

[oldcrowcv63]

From what I've read, assuming all supply problems solved and A-24 aircraft early arrival, A situation is produced wherin the probably 18 or so grounded P-40Bs destroyed at Clark could have provided an AVG-similar high altitude intercept capabilty especially if all aircraft are flown from camouflaged secret bases. The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm. WRT to secret airfield construction, the Dutch were apparently able to build, fairly quickly, well hidden airfields from rice paddy and jungle environment. The A-24's could have enjoyed the lower altitude capabili escorts of the P-40Bs bringing the zeros into a somewhat more favorable engagement situation where many would be focused on countering the A-24s. Of course this is still assuming ideal circumstances where you are only able to catch the transports in dayilight, in good weather, nearer to shore and before they've unloaded . To be be more robustly effective you need a good antishipping bomber with longer legs (add about another 100-150 miles for one day grace) or airfields appropriately fashioned nearer all the potential beachheads which in reality were VERY widely separated.

Each beachhead distributed airfield would need to be able to handle about 18 fighters and about as many A-24s, with no less than a dozen of each continually being operational. That means installing a far better communication system than existed at the time. A lot of wire stringing or very reliable wireless voice comm. Add a few miles for denavalized weight lightening.


Apology for the continous editing if anyone is attempting to keep up...

again!! Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.

[davebender]

These would be little more then forward area arming and refueling points.

Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.

[oldcrowcv63]

Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.

Good points, of course you want to hit them as early as possible when weather allows.

I should add, that researching the A-24 range issue in USN published data confirms for me the desirability of using actual operational mission examples for such quantities.

[JoeB]

The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm.
... Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.

Somewhat strangely, since the USN quoted a/c speeds in kts, all official USN data for their a/c ranges in WWII era are in statute, ie land, miles. Even when authors quote US WWII naval a/c ranges in nautical miles, they are often mistakenly assuming the official ranges are nm, rather than correctly converting the official land mile ranges.

The SBD-5 without drop tanks had similar characteristics to the SBD-2/3 which USN used in 1942 and which equated to early A-24's. The SBD-5's official radius with 1000# bomb was quoted in the original document "Airplane Characteristics and Performance" dated June 1 1944 as 240 statute miles. However this assumed highly conservative reserves for carrier operations (which are given in detail in the document). A land based SBD could be expect to safely range farther, especially in a mainly overland flight, as from a Luzon base against transports unloading just offshore.

Note though that we have a reality check on Army A-24's v Japanese shipping only a few months later in the DEI. They managed to sink one Japanese transport, a relatively unusual event for the Allies in that portion of the war, and avoided interception by Zeroes. But on one of the two missions their P-40 escort was almost wiped out by Zeroes. Eventually the A-24's also would have suffered heavy losses to Zeroes (as they eventually did in New Guinea, after which the USAAF swore off the a/c for use in areas with enemy fighters).

IMHO some 'what ifs' have a hard time dealing with the basic reality that Japanese air units at this stage of the war were just better trained and prepared than US Army ones. Switching around the types of a/c might gain another bomb hit here or there but isn't going to change anything dramatically. The bottom line is that the modern US Army fighter force could not stand on equal terms with the Zero force. This was repeatedly demonstrated in encounters over the early months of the war beyond the PI; it applied as much or more for the other Allied fighter arms in action at the time (RAF, Dutch). And there was a strict ceiling on what bombers could accomplish in face of enemy fighter superiority.

OTOH if you magically assume USAAF competence typical of around a year later, even B-17 units will score hits against ships in low altitude strikes, including at night (as B-17's did in several cases in Solomons in late 42-early 43), besides P-40 units standing up to Zeroes on at least roughly equal terms (though still no better than that); and IJN AA was even more deficient against such attacks in Dec 41 as a year later. But it's unrealistic. The USAAC of Dec '41, trying desperately to expand in size from a quite small force even in 1940, just wasn't the USAAF of spring 1943. It was necessarily cutting lots of corners on material and training readiness to build raw numbers, and its leaders were still subject to a peacetime mentality, in particular to systematically underestimating a potential opponent about whom they knew almost nothing. Frankly the latter tendency still has slight echoes even now, 70 years later, which makes it all the more ironic to assume the USAAC of then could have understood and countered Japanese capabilities. There was no alternative to US forces learning hard lessons about the Japanese in defeat, IMO.

Joe

[JoeB]

delete double post

[oldcrowcv63]

An excellent summary Joe! I was remiss in not adding the poor quality of VP operations at that stage of the war which didn't really improve substantially until the later half of 1942 with the maturation of black cat operations and better aircraft communications ID organization.... the latter sounds like it would require a pretty simple fix but it took a while to incorporate.

As you and others have more eloquently ponted out, the USA just wasn't ready for war in any of he many ways it needed to be as a nation and it took almost a year for the shock of PH and war to wear off. Looking at the USA's military capability as only specificaions on paper fails to reveal just how unprepared it was beyond numbers and strategy. How could the US force of modern cruisers have been beaten so badly at Savo Island? On paper it makes no sense whatsoever, considering the USN had search and fire control RADAR in its favor. Nearly a year after PH, the USA didn't know how to fight with the weapons it had, let alone with the ones it hoped to develop.It had yet to absorb just how good were the weapons and skill of its opponent. This despite the fact it had been warned by Chennault about the Zero and by Hart (I believe) about the Long Lance.

[davebender]

Which is why they shouldn't be piddled away on missions that aren't important. The light bombardment group(s) should be at 100% strength 22 Dec 1941 when 27 Japanese troop transports steam into Lingayen Gulf. Destroy those transports and the battle is won, even if it costs every aircraft in FEAF.

[oldcrowcv63]

Dave,

Let's look at a successful example of this kind of an operation and try to extrpolate back in time. The date is November 16, 1942. Enterprise dive bombers and those from Henderson field have searched for and found the 11 transports carrying 7,000 troops and their dozen or so surface escorts (mainly DDs) they have been expecting, all heading South to reinforce the IJA Guadacanal garrison. The IJN convoy is cyclically covered by perhaps 6 zeros from the nearby Junyo or from land based staged through Buka. Recall that this action occurs after the IJN's big deck carriers have had their air wings savaged during the battle of Santa Cruz so they are not able to play a role. The USN/USMC strike includes roughly 2 dozen aicraft (SBDs and TBFs) covered by 8 F4Fs and 4 Army P-39s. They were able to fataly damage 3 transports while losing none of their own US aircraft although some were damaged. Therafter the full weight of the combined Cactus and Enterprise strike force (over 40 VB with as many escorts) was felt as they apparently fataly damaged or sunk another 4 transports even though protected by a number of zeroes. But let's only consider the results of that first strike of the day.

On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers covered by a force of Formosa roughly 200 land and carrier based fighters which had apparent access to airfields in Northern Luzon if needed. Yes, the zeros would have been attrited by the air battles over Luzon, but they must have had replacements in the pipeline becaue their factories were building aircraft and they had interior lines of supply. Also, if things hadn't gone their way. They could ultimately call on 6 big deck carriers with over 100 fighters to cover their invasion fleet. Even if they hadn't been piddled away, it seems to me the odds are hugely stacked against them. Based on what happened a year later under far more benigh circumstances, they could take out perhaps a dozen of the 76 ships. That would have been a severe blow to the IJ forces but I don't think a fatal one. And the USAAF strike aircraft are being attrited with every attack they make. That's my devils advocate take on the situation. I wish it weren't so but that's how it looks to me. I think I mentioned I started out a week or so ago thinking something could be done to reverse the historic outcome and salavage some kind of victory from the disaster. I don't think that now...

What if is a fun thing to do but in this case it just seems to be hopeless without some kind of miracle like a Pro-Phillipine version of the Divine Wind.

PS: If you contest the smaller landings in the North and South you may prevent them from obtaining those smaller beachheads but you also attrite you small force of bombers which diminishes your ability to contest the main assault.

OC