Questions about the Me-262

[kool kitty89]

Ok, sorry I meesed up with that 1/4 comment.


It seems the fighters got more priorety by early '45.

[HoHun]

Hi Juha,

>Only one thing to say, EKdo Lechfeld/EKdo 262 were forerunners of Kommando Nowotny, and got their first Me 262 in April at latest and first series production a/c in May, so fighter arm had its head start

"Erprobungskommando" means "Trial Command" - they tested the operational aspects of flying a fighter with ground-breaking new technology, not a job you could simply skip. They didn't have enough aircraft to train new fighter pilots anyway, and this breakdown of breakdown of early Me 262 deliveries (until 10 August 1944) provided by Price shows that KG 51 had first priority even early on:

I./KG 51: 33
Erpr. Kdo. 262: 15
Erprobungsstelle Rechlin: 14
Messerschmitt testing: 11
Junkers engine testing: 1
Two-seater conversion at Blohm und Voss: 10

If the KG 51 aircraft would have gone to the Erprobungskommando, this would have tripled its capacity, effectively making it possible to being the training of jet fighter pilots in addition to the trial duties. Instead, Hitler's order diverted the jets to KG 51 ... at the expense of the fighter arm.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Juha]

Hello HoHun
I agree, even if EKdos had some capacity to train pilots, without it it/they would not have pilots to fly its/their Me 262s.

But the overlook of need of 2-seater model in time meant that conversion training wasn't going on as effectively as it should have been.

Juha

[Timppa]

Originally Posted by kool kitty89

The alloy referred to doesn't seem to match quite right either as those used on the 004 should be:
"The production Junkers Jumo 004B-1 and the Jumo 004B-4 turbines and
stator blades used an austinitic 'stainless steel' like steel alloy
called tinadur or an concurrently used alternative called cromadur.
Tinadur was about 6% titanium 18% nickel 12% chromium with the balance
steel while cromadure substituted super scarce nickel with manganese to
achieve an alloy of about 18% chromium, 15% manganese with only traces
of nickel with the balance steel."

This source:
http://www.enginehistory.org/German/...2_Engine_2.pdf

says the blades were made alloy containing 30% nickel, 14% chrome, 1.75% titanium and .12% carbon.

Also, "exhaust cone is made up of aluminized mild steel".

[syscom3]

OK, so you are all saying that even without Hitlers interference, the Me-262 still wasnt available in quantity untill the fall of 1944.

And even then, because of training issues and no effective tactics, the -262 still was not effective untill 1945.

I am also wondering about the numbers of airframes on hand. What were the true numbers for aircraft available for use? It must have been a fraction of the total, at any given month.

[Erich]

what do you mean by not-effective till 1945 ? it wa very effective in the terms of chaos in 1944 to bomber crews flying over the Reich mis-matching ID of LW A/C, the bomber crews never seeing a jet till later in the war.

at least for propaganda purposes the ruse worked till Nowotny could get airborne.

the Ekdo's were palnned for training and testing new weapons systems as well as A/C, and if need be during that training to schedule military operations if need be. the jet was ready in the summer of 1944 to be filled to the units, the jets were not in mass production nor acceptable for a variety of reasons to replace any one particular JG, the reason behind Nowotny's small band of experimental staffel, the same applied to KG 51 and 54 who trusted their own small twin engine Me 410's

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>OK, so you are all saying that even without Hitlers interference, the Me-262 still wasnt available in quantity untill the fall of 1944.

"In quantity" is a qualitative rubber term that doesn't permit any conclusions. Here are the quantified quantities, which I had posted earlier:

From the strength reports at The Luftwaffe, 1933-45, listing the Me 262 aircraft with the different units:

07/1944: 6 @ KG 51
08/1944: 20 @ KG 51
09/1944: 32 @ KG 51
10/1944: 52 @ KG 51, 5 @ KG 54
11/1944: 72 @ KG 51, 8 @ KG 54, 38 @ JG 7
12/1944: 100 @ KG 51, 21 @ KG 54, 14 @ JG 7, 23 @ EJG 2, 6 @ Kommando Braunegg

Note that due to "Hitler's interference", jet fighters made only an average 30% of the available Me 262 strength in the second half of 1944.

>And even then, because of training issues and no effective tactics, the -262 still was not effective untill 1945.

"Effective" again is a rubber term. What is "effective" supposed to mean?

>I am also wondering about the numbers of airframes on hand.

The strength reports of for one specific point in time each month. During the course of the month, the units received additional aircraft and lost (or transferred) other aircraft so that at any other date, they might have a larger or smaller number available, depending on re-supply and combat results.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Erich]

Henning your figures for JG 7 in November 44 is from where ? the unit did not exist........yet, still Kommando Nowotny unless you are using JG 7 is the broadest terms ?

E ~

[HoHun]

>Henning your figures for JG 7 in November 44 is from where ?

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, III./JG7

[Erich]

III./JG 7 still in the training mode at Lechfeld did start to operate at Decembers beginning though this was in 1's and 2's. JG 7 as a JG did not really become one till January 45.

of interest hopefully from the focus of the 9. (J) Fliegerdivision under G. von Maltzahn, January 1945 converting bomber pilots over to fighters as an advisement. From the GdF as a request: JG 7 at present undergoing conversion at the Brandenburg facility, to conclude by the end of March 1945.

this is almost too funny: Jg 300 and Jg 301 to be converted, from April 45 probably to the Me 262. avoidance of double conversion of the units of IX. (J) Fliegerkorps
the units of the above Korps have beeter blind flying training than JG 300 and JG 301 pilots............ my thoughts it does not matter during the spring of 45 time frame, it was of essence to produce and expand the Jg fighter arm to include as many 262's as possible.

December 44 it was planned to produce some 681 262's but OKL only received 499 crates. almost 200 were lost due to storage part probs, only 186 were delivered, while the remainder were smashed out due to bombings, ferry flight accidnets and railway transportation being attacked by Allied ground attack. the reports contine with supplied night fighter units, for the sturmgruppen and to the Versuchsverband.

really weird stuff. In ?De3cmber of 44 Welter was only testing a breif few examples of 262 -2 of them an an Ar 234 as for comparison trials. Obviously the Sturmgruppen never recieved any as the Fw 190A-8/R2 and R8 variants were expressly used.

[Erich]

one step further on JG 7

moved to bases outside of Berlin in late December 44 as I. gruppe was trying to form up as well as the abortive II. gruppe; it was not yet recorded as being on operational strength with Luftflotte Reich during this winter month .........

[syscom3]

Effective meaning that it was taking down more than one bomber per sortie, in mass formations. Just like what Erich mentioned what happened on March 17th.

Of course the jet was very capable on its own. But if it wasnt inflicting punishing losses (alone or in groups) then it wasnt effective so to speak.

From what people are saying, although it had tremendous capabilities and potential, by the time it all fell into place for the LW, the airwar was already won by the allies. And even if Hitler had left developement alone, it still wouldnt have changed things to any degree.

[HoHun]

Hi Erich,

>III./JG 7 still in the training mode at Lechfeld did start to operate at Decembers beginning though this was in 1's and 2's. JG 7 as a JG did not really become one till January 45.

The point is, the timeline shows that for several months, the jets went to KG 51 and not to fighter units. Whatever the fighter training timeline might be, these months were lost for building a jet fighter force.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Erich]

Henning I agree the bomber units were filled first, am just pointing out the time frame for JG 7, much of it looked great on paper and it had to as viewed for encouragement by the higher ups in the LW general stab then off to the small moustached kook der "F"

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>Effective meaning that it was taking down more than one bomber per sortie, in mass formations.

During the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command "took down" one bomber per 104 sorties (in daylight combat). Considering that the RAF won the battle anyway, I think your definition of effectiveness still needs some polishing.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)