MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
and today Wiley got in the act as well. Non Sequitur by Wiley Miller for December 10, 2023 | GoComics.com
Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.
- Thread starter drgondog
- Start date
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I think I shall present a video about the merits of the P-39.
I have source material from an "expert" that I will use to present my point of view.
Anyone dares to refute my case will be blocked and I will belittle them in order to maintain my superior position.
Thus sayeth the Lord.
Y'all may be seated now.
I have source material from an "expert" that I will use to present my point of view.
Anyone dares to refute my case will be blocked and I will belittle them in order to maintain my superior position.
Thus sayeth the Lord.
Y'all may be seated now.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Amen.
Low Battery
Airman
- 20
- Sep 11, 2014
Be sure to invent a plentifully available centrifugal supercharger that was fully available in 1941 but the Air Force was refusing to use it because they would rather lose than use a supercharger.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
To keep my blood pressure under control, I don't bother with people like Greg, they're dumb and want to remain that way. I recognize that those nuts exist and there's nothing I can do about it except give them a wide berth (and no clicks on their shitty YouTube channels) and let them stew in their own misguided bullshit. It's like arguing with a drunk (or moron), there's no getting through their armor plated skulls let alone reaching their pea brains.
Although as amusement, I have been known to comment on some of them with a simple "You're wrong" and watch their "brains" do backflips.
Although as amusement, I have been known to comment on some of them with a simple "You're wrong" and watch their "brains" do backflips.
Those with open minds, who are prepared to learn, could find out how to become an ace in a day flying an Fw 190, just by watching the linked video. In the right hands man and machine were so superior to a Spitfire Mk IX that any pilot with the competence of Greg can predict what the Spitfire does before it is shot down. Learning history was never more simple or clearly demonstrated.
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Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Greg is a very sad example of someone ruining videos by going just than tiny but further than the evidence permits, which destroys trust. Effectively, if you become known for being unreliable, nothing you say ever again (even if true) will ever be trusted. He always starts well then insists on just throwing in a few personal opinions without any indication to the viewer of the transition from "this is in an archive file" to "when I was drinking with a friend I said that I reckoned that...".
There is always room for speculation, discussion and what-ifs, but not mixing up those with facts in random order.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
I`ve got limings book on mathematics for computer graphics, inside are the programs to do the lofting of sections. Its quite a book.
- Thread starter
- #49
drgondog
Major
I have it also as well as the Master Lines Manual, c/o Bob Boulier -prepared by Robert Curt Weebe. Apparently Weebe was dispatched from Inglewood to Dallas to not only serve as head of Lofting and Master lines but also teach at local UT classes - he retired as Group Leader back at Inglewood in 1966.
As you commented 'quite a book' with reference to both Liming and Weebe.
I know that Schmued is credited with preparing the Master lines for X73 but suspect that ALL the heavy math associated with Projective Geometry was in the hands of Liming and Weebe.
PlanesandShips
Airman
- 21
- Feb 25, 2024
Hello
This is my first post. I have recently read through the posts regarding Greg's videos in this and another thread
I would like to offer my thoughts on the ongoing controversy regarding the "bomber mafia," strategic bombing, and the range of the P-47. I am not an "expert" by a longshot but I do have a passing interest in these topics. I consider myself a "swing voter" in this debate.
To me, Greg makes some good points. He did not create idea of the "bomber mafia." It does seem that many of the top men in the USAAF were in fact bomber men, that the "bomber mafia" was real.
The idea of a flying fortress has always seemed faintly ridiculous to me. A .50 caliber machine gun, or even a pair of them, aimed by a man wearing all the necessary equipment to stay alive, in an airplane moving 150-200 mph, at a target moving at an oblique angle at 300+ mph, and getting any hits, well.... that seems remote. Given the relatively short range of the weapons involved, it seems that a gunner would only have a very short window of time in which to get any hits, perhaps only one or two seconds. However, other targets were in range. The requirement to have a tight formation seems to exponentially expand the likelihood that countless friendly fire incidents happened. The whole idea is, to repeat myself, ridiculous to me. Wouldn't huge fleets of Mosquitos and B-26s, escorted by fighters and flying at least 100 mph faster (perhaps faster) be much more effective?
IMO, the bomber men that ran the USAAF seem to have avoided any responsibility for sending tens of thousands of men to their death. They also seem to have not understood the rapid pace of technological advancement in aviation. In short, they underestimated the fighters. This explains why there was lots of problems implementing drop tanks in 1943. They should have been tested thoroughly and in use before the USA even entered the war. Why weren't they? The fact that the whole drop tank development was done under war time pressure tells me that the leaders didn't take it seriously, in short, it appears to me that Greg's claim is correct. Furthermore, why was P38 development set back ~2 years? Basically because of a crash following what was essentially a publicity stunt.
I have a host of other thoughts, many of them concerning tactics, which as near as I can tell hasn't been discussed much. Frankly, the debate has sometimes devolved into pilots arguing about data in performance charts, with little talk about how the equipment (aircraft) were actually used. I should like to offer the following tactical considerations:
I'll add just a few more thoughts. Implicit in the P51 range discussion is how much less fuel it used. Multiplied by hundreds of airplanes, this efficiency puts much less demand on the supply chain for fuel. And also, less dependence on drop tanks decreases pressure on the supply chain to supply thousands of these expendable pieces of kit. The expensive (two engines) P38 and the fuel guzzling P47 both put a lot of pressure on the supply chain. But in 1943, they were the only potential escorts available in any significant number and to say they were underutilized is insufficient criticism when 10's of thousands of bomber crew were dying. It doesn't matter that the P51 was a better escort in 1944. I'm interested in why the P47 and P38 weren't used more effectively in 1943, and why no one was ever called to account for it.
This is my first post. I have recently read through the posts regarding Greg's videos in this and another thread
I would like to offer my thoughts on the ongoing controversy regarding the "bomber mafia," strategic bombing, and the range of the P-47. I am not an "expert" by a longshot but I do have a passing interest in these topics. I consider myself a "swing voter" in this debate.
To me, Greg makes some good points. He did not create idea of the "bomber mafia." It does seem that many of the top men in the USAAF were in fact bomber men, that the "bomber mafia" was real.
The idea of a flying fortress has always seemed faintly ridiculous to me. A .50 caliber machine gun, or even a pair of them, aimed by a man wearing all the necessary equipment to stay alive, in an airplane moving 150-200 mph, at a target moving at an oblique angle at 300+ mph, and getting any hits, well.... that seems remote. Given the relatively short range of the weapons involved, it seems that a gunner would only have a very short window of time in which to get any hits, perhaps only one or two seconds. However, other targets were in range. The requirement to have a tight formation seems to exponentially expand the likelihood that countless friendly fire incidents happened. The whole idea is, to repeat myself, ridiculous to me. Wouldn't huge fleets of Mosquitos and B-26s, escorted by fighters and flying at least 100 mph faster (perhaps faster) be much more effective?
IMO, the bomber men that ran the USAAF seem to have avoided any responsibility for sending tens of thousands of men to their death. They also seem to have not understood the rapid pace of technological advancement in aviation. In short, they underestimated the fighters. This explains why there was lots of problems implementing drop tanks in 1943. They should have been tested thoroughly and in use before the USA even entered the war. Why weren't they? The fact that the whole drop tank development was done under war time pressure tells me that the leaders didn't take it seriously, in short, it appears to me that Greg's claim is correct. Furthermore, why was P38 development set back ~2 years? Basically because of a crash following what was essentially a publicity stunt.
I have a host of other thoughts, many of them concerning tactics, which as near as I can tell hasn't been discussed much. Frankly, the debate has sometimes devolved into pilots arguing about data in performance charts, with little talk about how the equipment (aircraft) were actually used. I should like to offer the following tactical considerations:
- In all the debate, I have not seen any comments about the techniques that Lindberg used to greatly extend the range of the P38 in the Pacific. Could not those same techniques have been used to great effect with both the P38 and the P47 in Europe in 1943? As near as I can tell, his main technique was to use high MP and low RPM's. Everyone thought it would damage the engines but it turns out that the engines ran quite rich when used as directed by the manufacturer.
- How to actually escort bombers? There is an interesting video on YouTube whereby Jimmy Thach gives a dissertation on how to attack another airplane. I think he gives 8 different methods if memory serves. What is the counter-vailing method of preventing those 8 types of attacks? The escorting fighter would have to be in the proper position at the proper time, all the time. Without the use of AWACS, this would have to be done by eye. Given the distances involved, and the speeds, it seems unlikely that the escorts could consistently be in the right place at the right time. In The Pale Blue Sky, by Jack Novey (B17 waist gunner), he gives examples when a single, slashing attack by enemy fighters shot down significant numbers of bombers. Chasing the attackers after they have made a successful attack is a pyrrhic victory. Yet, still, the mere prescence of fighters might be helpful in repelling or delaying attacks by German fighters.
- Forming up. It seems that significant time and fuel were expended in arranging formations after takeoff. The USAAF was very imprecise at that time. In both Schweinfurt raids, it appears that the bombers were late and disorganized. That would greatly complicate the task of escorting them. In short, the equipment and procedures of the time did not allow the level of precision required for both the bombers and the escorting fighters to organize their formations and maximize their effectiveness. And such operations weren't practiced in peacetime because "the bomber will always get through."
- Let's assume Greg is all wrong. Let's say that the bomber mafia believed in fighter escorts with drop tanks. If so, why did they screw up the implementation so badly, and why was it implemented so late?
- I have to say it. In the submarine war in the Pacific, lack of aggressiveness on the part of many skippers caused their relief from command. Is it possible that some of the fighter pilots in 1942 and 43 did not yet fully appreciate the tenacity and capabilities of the foe? Surely, the Schweinfurt raids were eye-opening, no one brainwashed by the daylight bombing narrative expected that level of loss in the bombers until it happened. One would think that after they saw how many bombers were lost, the resolve of the fighter pilots may have been bucked up somewhat. The submarine captain lack of aggressiveness is not highly publicized or talked about much, but it is recognized (Silent Victory by Clay Blair). Could some level of this same type of problem have been experienced in the fighter community of 1943 before Schweinfurt? We all want to think of fighter pilots as heroes in white scarves, but the reality is that they wanted to stay alive also, they were human beings not supermen, and they knew the value of their training and of their equipment to fighting in the future.
- Flak suppression. Was this not a thing? Or were there just far too few fighters to even attempt? I've never seen anything about strafing runs on flak guns. Were they too widely disbursed to be strafed? Were they too hard to sight from the air? Would it be possible to have flak suppression on the flak batteries actually engaged in a specific attack? Wouldn't the "second tier" level of fighters not suitable for escort duties (P39, P40) be perfect for this tasking?
- The P38. Why all the focus on the P47 with regard to escorting? I'm well aware of the .68M/dive flap thing. But they could still "be there." Their presence could provide some level of deterrent and protection to the bombers. And they had the range and altitude capability.
I'll add just a few more thoughts. Implicit in the P51 range discussion is how much less fuel it used. Multiplied by hundreds of airplanes, this efficiency puts much less demand on the supply chain for fuel. And also, less dependence on drop tanks decreases pressure on the supply chain to supply thousands of these expendable pieces of kit. The expensive (two engines) P38 and the fuel guzzling P47 both put a lot of pressure on the supply chain. But in 1943, they were the only potential escorts available in any significant number and to say they were underutilized is insufficient criticism when 10's of thousands of bomber crew were dying. It doesn't matter that the P51 was a better escort in 1944. I'm interested in why the P47 and P38 weren't used more effectively in 1943, and why no one was ever called to account for it.
Shortround6
Major General
A few replies.
2. The 88mm and larger guns had small numbers of 20mm guns as part of the battery makeup. Groups of batteries of large guns would have complete batteries of 20mm and/or 37mm guns sited near them to protect the big guns from strafing.
3. There were no US P-40s or P-39s in England. There wasn't room.
4, even for P-51s or P-47s, it would take 8-12 minutes to from ground level to 20,000ft (longer at lower power settings) and the fighters are burning fuel ( a P-47 can burn 50 gallons or more just climbing from ground level to 20,000ft) and getting way out of position. High altitude cruise uses less fuel.
Trouble was that the South Pacific wanted them. The P-39s and P-40s weren't very good at Island hopping. China/Asia wanted them (they never got more that 2 squadrons for most/all? of the war). North Africa/Italy wanted them. For the Sicily invasion the P-38 was the only Allied fighter that could provide support from North Africa. Any other fighter support was from carriers or Malta and Malta could only hold so many planes.
In the late summer and early fall of 1942 they were setting up 3 P-38 fighter groups in England to escort the 8th Air Force. But the P-38s were the Best fighters the US had and they swiped 2 groups to sent to North Africa right after they cleared a few landing fields in Operation Torch. Losses were high and they used the planes and pilots from the 3rd group as replacements. Not all the pilots from the 3rd group went and that Group was rebuilt in England. But as above, demand was high and replacements were being spread out in 3-4 theaters. P-47s were sent to England and none went to the Med/Italy until much later.
A big consequence was that there was NO P-38 combat experience in NW Europe in the winter of 1942/43 so they were learning in 1943/44 winter.
A lot of commentators do not look at supply. They built 4184 P-38s from 1940 to the end of 1943, over 1000 of them were in the last 3 month as P-38s in Burbank Cal in Nov are not going to be flying in England in Dec. They built another 4186 P-38s in 1944 alone.
Anybody who wants to use more P-38s in Europe in 1943 has to figure out who doesn't get P-38s, Like Italy, the SW Pacific, or ???
It was not just Lindberg. He may have leaned out the engines a bit more but the British, Allison and Lockheed (and others) all used or recommended the low RPM and high boost method. British were using for both bombers and fighters ( Spitfire Vs with single stage superchargers) at least in 1942 if not before. As mentioned Lockheed test pilot Tony Levier gave demonstrations in Europe in the Spring of 1944 on several things concerning the P-38. Newsletters/updates from both Allison and Lockheed used the Low RPM and high boost method. The USAAC didn't believe them. It was NOT the manufacturer/s.
1. The 2nd tier fighters do not have the range. If you are flying low and fast most fighters burn up fuel at a very high rate. Even around 250-260mph at 3000ft is going to burn around 60 US gallons and hour (for plane without drop tank/s). and at 250mph at 3000ft you are providing target practice for the German small AA guns and fighters. Fighters that were doing low altitude work near the channel generally used max continuous (2600rpm and 39in for an Allison) but that burned up 90-100 gallons an hour. Shooting up flak batteries for the first 50-60 miles of the trip into France when it was 200-400 miles more into Germany wasn't going to make much difference. Allies knew were the flak batteries were near the coast and they just flew around them.
2. The 88mm and larger guns had small numbers of 20mm guns as part of the battery makeup. Groups of batteries of large guns would have complete batteries of 20mm and/or 37mm guns sited near them to protect the big guns from strafing.
3. There were no US P-40s or P-39s in England. There wasn't room.
4, even for P-51s or P-47s, it would take 8-12 minutes to from ground level to 20,000ft (longer at lower power settings) and the fighters are burning fuel ( a P-47 can burn 50 gallons or more just climbing from ground level to 20,000ft) and getting way out of position. High altitude cruise uses less fuel.
P-38s were a scarce commodity in 1943. In 1942 they only exceed 150 planes per month twice and in 1943 they only exceeded 200 planes per month once before October. The last 3 months of the year saw over 300 a month in all three months.
Trouble was that the South Pacific wanted them. The P-39s and P-40s weren't very good at Island hopping. China/Asia wanted them (they never got more that 2 squadrons for most/all? of the war). North Africa/Italy wanted them. For the Sicily invasion the P-38 was the only Allied fighter that could provide support from North Africa. Any other fighter support was from carriers or Malta and Malta could only hold so many planes.
In the late summer and early fall of 1942 they were setting up 3 P-38 fighter groups in England to escort the 8th Air Force. But the P-38s were the Best fighters the US had and they swiped 2 groups to sent to North Africa right after they cleared a few landing fields in Operation Torch. Losses were high and they used the planes and pilots from the 3rd group as replacements. Not all the pilots from the 3rd group went and that Group was rebuilt in England. But as above, demand was high and replacements were being spread out in 3-4 theaters. P-47s were sent to England and none went to the Med/Italy until much later.
A big consequence was that there was NO P-38 combat experience in NW Europe in the winter of 1942/43 so they were learning in 1943/44 winter.
A lot of commentators do not look at supply. They built 4184 P-38s from 1940 to the end of 1943, over 1000 of them were in the last 3 month as P-38s in Burbank Cal in Nov are not going to be flying in England in Dec. They built another 4186 P-38s in 1944 alone.
Anybody who wants to use more P-38s in Europe in 1943 has to figure out who doesn't get P-38s, Like Italy, the SW Pacific, or ???
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Hi PlanesandShips.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
If you're into literature about such things and want either a hardcopy book or an E-book, check out "P-51B Mustang: North American's Bastard Stepchild That Saved the 8th Air Force" by Bill Marshall and Lowell Ford (Bill is a poster here under the handle drgondog). It goes into the politics of why the P-51s introduction and widespread use in the USAAF was initially held back, those who ultimately advocated for it (such as various 8th AF generals and Hap Arnold himself, as the Mustang basically became the epitome of the high performance long range fighter he wanted since at least 1940), and issues with the P-38 and P-47.
Biggest issue with the P-47 it seems was of course range and fuel consumption. Both of which would've mattered little in it's original role as a bomber destroying interceptor. But as an escort fighter, it left a lot to be desired. Also, the P-51 outperformed it in terms of climb and maneuverability (not that the P-47 wasn't formidable against most German fighters, which also lacked in maneuverability and climb often). But in terms of range, Republic seemed to be slow to adhere to USAAF requests for increased range. NAA and Lockheed were looking at options to increase internal fuel before the USAAF became more insistent on that fact in 1943, and both rigged their planes up to carry drop tanks (including Allison Mustangs such as the P-51A and A-36) again before USAAF RFPs became more urgent. Republic were slow to do both according to Bill's research and he does have documents and sources to back up that research.
The thing that didn't help the P-38 was difficulties in the winter of '43-'44 in NE Europe, partly because of so many of them getting sent to the MTO after Operation Torch. That meant that they didn't have the winter of 1942-43 (a period of relatively low activity from the 8th AF) to sort out those issues. Also, the P-38's low production rate didn't help matters, and it was just as (if not more) urgently wanted/needed in the Pacific and the MTO where the USAAF lacked high performance fighters (aside from Spitfires in the MTO obtained either though purchases or reverse Lend-Lease), let alone long range ones.
As to the 8th AF being dominated by bomber guys, well, to put it kinda bluntly, what do you expect? It was a strategic bombing force. It wasn't really a tactical arm like the 9th AF was, who ironically got P-51Bs before the 8th initially got them.
General Arnold and some other 8th AF/USAAF generals did take blame post war (or even during the war) for not pushing the Merlin Mustang into service faster, but there was a lot of early resistance to the P-51 from some circles that was out of their hands at first. Again, Bill and Lowell have a ton of details for that in their book.
Granted, I can also ask "how early do you want Merlin P-51s?". NAA had prototype/preproduction planes flying in late 1942, and there were the Rolls Royce Mustang Xs from earlier in the year. But it took time to optimize and refine the aircraft. However, the biggest hold up seemed to be Packard getting the two-stage Merlins into production. Some of this was tooling, perhaps having to expand the factory, and a lot of it was making single stage Merlins for British and Canadian Lancasters, and Canadian and Australian Mosquitoes, as well as for some P-40s.
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ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
re the anti-drop tank prejudice
This 16 May 1939 memo is the only original document that I have run across that expressed the anti-drop tank sentiment as sometimes attributed to Hap Arnold. He became chief of the Army Air Corps in September 1938, so that is who the memo is referring to.
I am sure that there were other such memos/orders/guidelines on the subject that have not come to light (or at least that I have not run across). If anyone has any such references please post them. I would be very interested as they would fill in some of the informational gaps in the history of the subject.
This 16 May 1939 memo is the only original document that I have run across that expressed the anti-drop tank sentiment as sometimes attributed to Hap Arnold. He became chief of the Army Air Corps in September 1938, so that is who the memo is referring to.
I am sure that there were other such memos/orders/guidelines on the subject that have not come to light (or at least that I have not run across). If anyone has any such references please post them. I would be very interested as they would fill in some of the informational gaps in the history of the subject.
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 787
- Sep 30, 2021
I would really like to see a calculation on a P-38 entering combat with 300 US gallons on board, then deduct the fuel for 20 minutes of combat, the fuel for 30 minutes economic cruise reserve, and then see what the range is at fast cruise (not economic) at height. Francis Dean's graph seems to indicate P-38G economic cruise at 10,000 feet was around 2.7 miles per gallon, the H slightly less.
Solution: 1) Start the P-47 drop tank program 3 to 6 months (preferably) earlier than historical, 2) Convince the British to retain all Spitfire VIII in Britain in units attached to the 8th Air Force, with a 90 gallon external tank they have good range and are the only other source of high performance high altitude fighters available, 3) convince the 8th Air Force Command the main 1943 objective is to pick fights with the Luftwaffe, not implement the pre war destroy key economic objectives idea, so the bombers stay within escort range, which is western Germany. Add learning to bomb by non visual methods. The early B-17F had a combat radius of 320 miles using 8th Air Force tactics. The 8th Air Force had its own fighters from August to mid October 1942, then from 10 March 1943, lots of time to practice escort tactics, but not a lot of operational aircraft at any given time in early 1943.
The USAAF 1943 force mix was based on decisions taken years before which set production targets for the different aircraft types and set in motion the formation of units, given it took around a year or more for a bomber group to go from being created to first mission. A bomber heavy policy, or rather a no long enough ranged fighter policy, saw the USAAF heavy bomber forces against the Axis in Europe have 39 (peak 40)+21 bomber to 15+7 fighter groups on strength although the fighter groups had more aircraft. Production restraints mean extra fighters in 1943 and into 1944 would have to be P-39, P-40 or Spitfires while concentrating on 1943 actually misses the point, the major USAAF losses were in 1944 when P-38, P-47 and P-51 were in full production, yet even then the types were in short supply. Asking for a 1941 or so policy change to up the number of fighter groups per heavy bomber group to say 2 to 1 means another 8 fighter groups to the 8th and 15th arriving in the first half of 1944. Against that the 9th Air Force grew from 1 to 18 fighter groups February to May 1944 and were often borrowed by the 8th during that time period. Makes it doubtful bomber losses would be reduced much with extra 8th Air force fighter units. If the USAAF wanted more long range fighters in Britain in mid 1943 it would need to relocate them from other theatres plus have the P-47 drop tank program 3 to 6 months ahead of historical. The 8th Air Force P-47 used half filled ferry tanks on operations for the first time on 28 July 1943, the 75 gallon tanks on 12 August then 108 gallon tanks on 28 September, but the latter tanks had very little ground clearance, causing problems.
Getting to tens of thousands of bomber crew casualties in the 8th Air Force requires operations well into 1944, to get to tens of thousands of deaths requires all the war, to get to tens of thousands of deaths due to fighter attack is not possible, given under half the bomber losses on operations were due to fighters. The USAAF thinks the 8th Air Force lost 2,452 heavy bombers to fighter attack, with over half the men on board surviving, around 12,000 deaths. After October 1943 almost all 8th Air force bomber raids were escorted, as were some of the earlier raids while making the obvious point more escorts on even the historically escorted raids would further cut losses. There were 599 reported bomber losses to fighters to end October 1943, there were 1,124 such losses January to June 1944.
In the Mediterranean the heavy bombers were better escorted from the start of operations, helped by the shorter ranges to most targets and the over water approaches enabling any escorts to stay at economic cruise for much of the mission. To end April 1943 the heavy bombers had dropped slightly over 7,000 tons, around 1,000 of that on Italy, 30 on Romania, the rest on North African targets or islands like Crete, Rhodes, Sardinia and Sicily with half the tonnage on ports and shipping. The 1943 bomber offensives in the Mediterranean were effective and in any case were largely what the allies called tactical bombing.
Bomber gunners were essentially the same as flak barrages, shoot down some, damage a lot more, spoil aims, deter some while trying to keep the enemy at a distance that reduced casualties/bomb damage. Like front line infantry you often try and shoot at the enemy attacking a nearby target, enfilade, not those going for you. Next comes it usually takes fewer hits to shoot down a fighter than a bomber, you want the defensive armament to be generally lethal to the fighter at longer or at least the same range as the fighter is to the bomber. A hand held single rifle calibre machine gun was in trouble against a pair of fixed rifle calibre ones, go to power operated turrets and your accuracy goes up significantly, hence the appearance of turret fighters, and fighters carrying 4 to 8 rifle calibre machine guns. Go to heavy machine guns in turrets and the balance appears to be fighters with 6 or more heavy machine guns or multiple 20mm cannon. If the fighters start carrying 30mm cannon you will probably need 20mm defensive fire. Add to this of course the general increase in aircraft weights which usually means more damage needs to be inflicted, requiring firepower upgrades regardless.
The whole point of the above is there were plenty of moving parts, what was a workable design in 1939 was not workable in 1945. To have provision for more long range fighters in 1943/44 requires people convinced the fighters will exist during planning meetings held years before and production plans that stay on schedule.
What is the definition of "Bomber Mafia"? What was the percentage of senior USAAF officers coming from careers in bomber units compared with those from fighter, reconnaissance, technical etc. units?
Would it help to note it seems in 1943 the 8th Air Force bombers shot down around 2 fighters for every 3 bombers shot down by fighters, it went to 1 fighter to 2 bombers in early 1944 thanks to an overall upgrade to Luftwaffe fighter firepower, seen by counting the causes of holes in returning bombers. It is correct that fighter attacks developed so quickly many gunners in range did not get a chance to shoot, the tight formations increased the number of gunners in range. As for countless friendly fire incidents there were attempts to quantify them, the numbers were low based on damage to returning bombers. A bigger risk was collisions, something like 247 B-17 lost that way out of 4,508 8th Air Force losses, with low crew survival rates.
The 8th Air force heavy bombers tried to cruise around 240 mph true, the B-26 could cruise about the same speed, but usually around 180 mph I think indicated, not true, at 10,000 feet as they were not normally going to heavily defended targets and deep into enemy airspace. Only the Mosquito gave the option of upping speeds to over 300 mph, with 2,000 pounds of bombs on board until early 1944. You have 117 available in 1942 and another 226 in 1943, then 199 in 1944 from British production, supplemented by Canadian production from 1943. Most do not have the altitude performance of the US heavies being single stage Merlins. Given the Mosquito pathfinder roles, especially with Oboe, they are really best kept to improve night bomber accuracy and protection by spoof raids etc.
You can make the claim WWII was fought with obsolete or obsolescent aircraft, there was always something better on the drawing board or flying. External fuel tanks require stronger undercarriages, probably airframe strengthening especially if wing mounted, increase risk, decrease performance and restrict moves the aircraft can do while attached. They also need to separate cleanly, no hitting the aircraft, whether full or empty or in between. Being bounced while drawing fuel from the external tanks requires the pilot to firstly switch to internal tanks then drop the external ones. Lots of reasons why pilots and command may not like them, besides the waste when jettisoned. As of May 1940 the western allies needed a fighter with a combat radius of a couple of hundred miles, which based in France could cover much of Germany. As of June the radius requirements about tripled. There were various experiments with drop tanks before WWII at what WWII would call medium altitudes, generally about ferry range not combat. Without radar interception chances were low, escorts likely to be not needed beyond the front line area. When it comes to external tank use the P-38 being a twin engine design was considered viable to fly across oceans, though a handful of P-47 flew across the Atlantic. Early war the British started doing such flights in Hudsons, using the best aircrew they could find, it was only "months" since trans Atlantic flights ceased to be major news. As of 1943/44 newly trained crews were doing it as a matter of routine. Single engined types went by ship, an echo of this is the long time restrictions on twin engined jet airliners flying trans continental.
The USAAF asked Britain to supply drop tanks from at least early 1943 but did not place large orders until June and final design approval was in early October. With a world wide shipping shortage the last thing the allies needed was to ship large numbers of empty containers from the US to Europe, ideally they could come as parts to be assembled in Britain.
P-38 production managed to get into double figures in June 1941, triple figures in February 1942, combat use starting in August 1942. The P-47 was the official next generation USAAF single engine single seater, 10 accepted in May 1942, 114 in November, first combat operations in March 1943, catching up to the P-38 numbers wise but still it was months behind and while Lockheed had issues managing production across a range of aircraft types, in 1942 Republic had setting up a second P-47 line, great long term, a problem short term. While the US took orders and supplied plenty of P-38, P-39, P-40, and P-51 to allies by end 1943 only a handful of P-47 had been sent. Not surprising that in 1943 the P-38 and P-47 had months of teething problems to sort out as usage moved to flying for survival, not just flying within limits. Republic spent a lot of 1943 trying to increase production and fix the obvious problems with the aircraft ahead of obtaining more range. The entire aviation system was overloaded, the need for numbers and improvements conflicting. It is clear the presence of P-38 cut bomber losses, even though the P-38 were not shooting down large numbers of enemy fighters. That can be seen in the initial decision to replace 8th Air Force P-47 with P-51, though that is tempered by the many P-47 units available in the 9th Air Force.
The RAF was aware of what Lindberg taught, Doolittle was very technically trained. The fundamental difference between the Pacific and Northern Europe was the latter required fast cruise almost all mission, given the average defences and penetrations into hostile airspace. The 8th Air Force found the better escorting tactics were fan out in front and to the sides of the bomber formations and patrol zones the bombers passed through while at fast cruise. Add communications between bombers and fighters so each could tell the other what was going on. Close escort was either going too slow to intercept the interceptors or weaving so much the effective range was significantly cut. In many ways air fighting is guerrilla warfare, hit and run, you do not have much ammunition anyway
The P-38 was used quite effectively in 1943 in the Pacific and Mediterranean, the production issues meant the initial 3 P-38 groups sent in 1942 were the entire Mediterranean force for the war, the next P-38 group arrival in Europe was in late August 1943, going operational in mid October. That leaves the P-47 which did a lot of sweeps rather than escort missions as the groups worked up, getting to 3 operational in mid April 1943, 4 in mid August, to 6 in mid September. The USAAF says it lost 505 heavy bombers to enemy fighters April to October 1943, including nearly 120 on two raids which deliberately went well beyond escort range of anything the USAAF had at the time. When General Eaker wrote to Air Vice Marshall Freeman about drop tanks Eaker estimated fighters could have saved about two thirds the losses on the 10 October 1943 Munster raid.
The 17 August 1943 Schweinfurt/Regensburg raid was done on the assumption the German fighter defence lacked depth and strength, punch through the "border" belt and then there would be no more fighters, mount a big enough raid, 300 bombers, and the Germans could not inflict enough losses, it was marred by mistimings, resulting in a second attempt based on the same ideas tried on 14 October. The everything that can fly mission on 24 December 1944 lost 35 bombers including write offs from 1,884 credited with attacking, 35 out of 300 was unsustainable losses.
The 1943 day offensive in northern Europe did little lasting damage while taking heavy losses but caused the Germans to redeploy many fighters away from the fronts to defending Germany, which really helped the fronts. The night offensive was doing more damage and was similarly forcing the Luftwaffe to concentrate on the defence of Germany.
The 1943 8th Air Force day offensive was inevitably compromised to an extent as the people involved learnt how to actually do the basics of raid planning, assembling, timing, experimenting with tactics, and so on and remove incorrect assumptions, like how good the weather would usually be, the weather assumption played a big part in bombing accuracy and weight of attack possible in 1943 and into 1944. The upping of raids during the 1943/44 winter was important, the Luftwaffe day fighter force had been able to use previous winters for replenishment and rest. As the Luftwaffe usually reacted to raids on Germany in 1943 and early 1944, regardless of target, the average range of escorts mattered less than later on when it required attacks on specific and deeper targets to provoke a reaction. The allies proved you need air superiority before you can start to systematically target a section of the enemy economy.
At the aircraft type level it amounts to something like a moment in time, a P-47 available in numbers in the period April to October 1943 able to escort all but the two special raids saving say 2/3 of 390 bombers lost to enemy aircraft or 260 bombers, with 2,600 crew on board, around half KIA. USAAF ETO Losses to enemy aircraft are put at 4,274, the half way point for such losses was end April 1944, this was from 16% of the USAAF ETO effective sorties flown for the war. Even though the 8th Air Force never felt truly comfortable with its fighter strength using the losses to enemy aircraft you can make the case the USAAF deployed "too many" fighters from the second half of 1944, which has its own costs. After all knowing what was to come could have seen US combat aircraft production at least largely shut down in early 1945.
Flak suppression sorties tend to be costly as the batteries shoot back and the heavy ones have light guns for protection, an anti flak mission is not an escort one. P-39 and P-40 did not have the range to make Germany from Britain. The general rule the more sweat in training the less blood in fighting, assuming the training is based on a realistic doctrine. Such training is expensive and the easiest thing to cut to make peace time budgets. Flying escorted day missions and then intercepting them uses a lot of flying hours, then comes how you assess the results. With hindsight everything could be done better.
8th Air force, operational group strength early in the month of
Apr-43, 6 bomber to 1 fighter
May-43, 6 bomber to 3 fighter
Jun-43, 12 bomber to 3 fighter
Jul-43, 13 bomber to 3 fighter
Aug-43, 15 bomber to 3 fighter
Sep-43, 16 bomber to 4 fighter
Oct-43, 18 bomber to 6 fighter
Nov-43, 20 bomber to 8 fighter
Dec-43, 21 bomber to 8 fighter
Jan-44, 25 bomber to 11 fighter
Feb-44, 25 bomber to 11 fighter
Mar-44, 29 bomber to 13 fighter
Apr-44, 30 bomber to 13 fighter
May-44, 32 bomber to 14 fighter
Jun-44, 39 bomber to 15 fighter
Solution: 1) Start the P-47 drop tank program 3 to 6 months (preferably) earlier than historical, 2) Convince the British to retain all Spitfire VIII in Britain in units attached to the 8th Air Force, with a 90 gallon external tank they have good range and are the only other source of high performance high altitude fighters available, 3) convince the 8th Air Force Command the main 1943 objective is to pick fights with the Luftwaffe, not implement the pre war destroy key economic objectives idea, so the bombers stay within escort range, which is western Germany. Add learning to bomb by non visual methods. The early B-17F had a combat radius of 320 miles using 8th Air Force tactics. The 8th Air Force had its own fighters from August to mid October 1942, then from 10 March 1943, lots of time to practice escort tactics, but not a lot of operational aircraft at any given time in early 1943.
The USAAF 1943 force mix was based on decisions taken years before which set production targets for the different aircraft types and set in motion the formation of units, given it took around a year or more for a bomber group to go from being created to first mission. A bomber heavy policy, or rather a no long enough ranged fighter policy, saw the USAAF heavy bomber forces against the Axis in Europe have 39 (peak 40)+21 bomber to 15+7 fighter groups on strength although the fighter groups had more aircraft. Production restraints mean extra fighters in 1943 and into 1944 would have to be P-39, P-40 or Spitfires while concentrating on 1943 actually misses the point, the major USAAF losses were in 1944 when P-38, P-47 and P-51 were in full production, yet even then the types were in short supply. Asking for a 1941 or so policy change to up the number of fighter groups per heavy bomber group to say 2 to 1 means another 8 fighter groups to the 8th and 15th arriving in the first half of 1944. Against that the 9th Air Force grew from 1 to 18 fighter groups February to May 1944 and were often borrowed by the 8th during that time period. Makes it doubtful bomber losses would be reduced much with extra 8th Air force fighter units. If the USAAF wanted more long range fighters in Britain in mid 1943 it would need to relocate them from other theatres plus have the P-47 drop tank program 3 to 6 months ahead of historical. The 8th Air Force P-47 used half filled ferry tanks on operations for the first time on 28 July 1943, the 75 gallon tanks on 12 August then 108 gallon tanks on 28 September, but the latter tanks had very little ground clearance, causing problems.
Getting to tens of thousands of bomber crew casualties in the 8th Air Force requires operations well into 1944, to get to tens of thousands of deaths requires all the war, to get to tens of thousands of deaths due to fighter attack is not possible, given under half the bomber losses on operations were due to fighters. The USAAF thinks the 8th Air Force lost 2,452 heavy bombers to fighter attack, with over half the men on board surviving, around 12,000 deaths. After October 1943 almost all 8th Air force bomber raids were escorted, as were some of the earlier raids while making the obvious point more escorts on even the historically escorted raids would further cut losses. There were 599 reported bomber losses to fighters to end October 1943, there were 1,124 such losses January to June 1944.
In the Mediterranean the heavy bombers were better escorted from the start of operations, helped by the shorter ranges to most targets and the over water approaches enabling any escorts to stay at economic cruise for much of the mission. To end April 1943 the heavy bombers had dropped slightly over 7,000 tons, around 1,000 of that on Italy, 30 on Romania, the rest on North African targets or islands like Crete, Rhodes, Sardinia and Sicily with half the tonnage on ports and shipping. The 1943 bomber offensives in the Mediterranean were effective and in any case were largely what the allies called tactical bombing.
Bomber gunners were essentially the same as flak barrages, shoot down some, damage a lot more, spoil aims, deter some while trying to keep the enemy at a distance that reduced casualties/bomb damage. Like front line infantry you often try and shoot at the enemy attacking a nearby target, enfilade, not those going for you. Next comes it usually takes fewer hits to shoot down a fighter than a bomber, you want the defensive armament to be generally lethal to the fighter at longer or at least the same range as the fighter is to the bomber. A hand held single rifle calibre machine gun was in trouble against a pair of fixed rifle calibre ones, go to power operated turrets and your accuracy goes up significantly, hence the appearance of turret fighters, and fighters carrying 4 to 8 rifle calibre machine guns. Go to heavy machine guns in turrets and the balance appears to be fighters with 6 or more heavy machine guns or multiple 20mm cannon. If the fighters start carrying 30mm cannon you will probably need 20mm defensive fire. Add to this of course the general increase in aircraft weights which usually means more damage needs to be inflicted, requiring firepower upgrades regardless.
The whole point of the above is there were plenty of moving parts, what was a workable design in 1939 was not workable in 1945. To have provision for more long range fighters in 1943/44 requires people convinced the fighters will exist during planning meetings held years before and production plans that stay on schedule.
What is the definition of "Bomber Mafia"? What was the percentage of senior USAAF officers coming from careers in bomber units compared with those from fighter, reconnaissance, technical etc. units?
Would it help to note it seems in 1943 the 8th Air Force bombers shot down around 2 fighters for every 3 bombers shot down by fighters, it went to 1 fighter to 2 bombers in early 1944 thanks to an overall upgrade to Luftwaffe fighter firepower, seen by counting the causes of holes in returning bombers. It is correct that fighter attacks developed so quickly many gunners in range did not get a chance to shoot, the tight formations increased the number of gunners in range. As for countless friendly fire incidents there were attempts to quantify them, the numbers were low based on damage to returning bombers. A bigger risk was collisions, something like 247 B-17 lost that way out of 4,508 8th Air Force losses, with low crew survival rates.
The 8th Air force heavy bombers tried to cruise around 240 mph true, the B-26 could cruise about the same speed, but usually around 180 mph I think indicated, not true, at 10,000 feet as they were not normally going to heavily defended targets and deep into enemy airspace. Only the Mosquito gave the option of upping speeds to over 300 mph, with 2,000 pounds of bombs on board until early 1944. You have 117 available in 1942 and another 226 in 1943, then 199 in 1944 from British production, supplemented by Canadian production from 1943. Most do not have the altitude performance of the US heavies being single stage Merlins. Given the Mosquito pathfinder roles, especially with Oboe, they are really best kept to improve night bomber accuracy and protection by spoof raids etc.
You can make the claim WWII was fought with obsolete or obsolescent aircraft, there was always something better on the drawing board or flying. External fuel tanks require stronger undercarriages, probably airframe strengthening especially if wing mounted, increase risk, decrease performance and restrict moves the aircraft can do while attached. They also need to separate cleanly, no hitting the aircraft, whether full or empty or in between. Being bounced while drawing fuel from the external tanks requires the pilot to firstly switch to internal tanks then drop the external ones. Lots of reasons why pilots and command may not like them, besides the waste when jettisoned. As of May 1940 the western allies needed a fighter with a combat radius of a couple of hundred miles, which based in France could cover much of Germany. As of June the radius requirements about tripled. There were various experiments with drop tanks before WWII at what WWII would call medium altitudes, generally about ferry range not combat. Without radar interception chances were low, escorts likely to be not needed beyond the front line area. When it comes to external tank use the P-38 being a twin engine design was considered viable to fly across oceans, though a handful of P-47 flew across the Atlantic. Early war the British started doing such flights in Hudsons, using the best aircrew they could find, it was only "months" since trans Atlantic flights ceased to be major news. As of 1943/44 newly trained crews were doing it as a matter of routine. Single engined types went by ship, an echo of this is the long time restrictions on twin engined jet airliners flying trans continental.
The USAAF asked Britain to supply drop tanks from at least early 1943 but did not place large orders until June and final design approval was in early October. With a world wide shipping shortage the last thing the allies needed was to ship large numbers of empty containers from the US to Europe, ideally they could come as parts to be assembled in Britain.
P-38 production managed to get into double figures in June 1941, triple figures in February 1942, combat use starting in August 1942. The P-47 was the official next generation USAAF single engine single seater, 10 accepted in May 1942, 114 in November, first combat operations in March 1943, catching up to the P-38 numbers wise but still it was months behind and while Lockheed had issues managing production across a range of aircraft types, in 1942 Republic had setting up a second P-47 line, great long term, a problem short term. While the US took orders and supplied plenty of P-38, P-39, P-40, and P-51 to allies by end 1943 only a handful of P-47 had been sent. Not surprising that in 1943 the P-38 and P-47 had months of teething problems to sort out as usage moved to flying for survival, not just flying within limits. Republic spent a lot of 1943 trying to increase production and fix the obvious problems with the aircraft ahead of obtaining more range. The entire aviation system was overloaded, the need for numbers and improvements conflicting. It is clear the presence of P-38 cut bomber losses, even though the P-38 were not shooting down large numbers of enemy fighters. That can be seen in the initial decision to replace 8th Air Force P-47 with P-51, though that is tempered by the many P-47 units available in the 9th Air Force.
The RAF was aware of what Lindberg taught, Doolittle was very technically trained. The fundamental difference between the Pacific and Northern Europe was the latter required fast cruise almost all mission, given the average defences and penetrations into hostile airspace. The 8th Air Force found the better escorting tactics were fan out in front and to the sides of the bomber formations and patrol zones the bombers passed through while at fast cruise. Add communications between bombers and fighters so each could tell the other what was going on. Close escort was either going too slow to intercept the interceptors or weaving so much the effective range was significantly cut. In many ways air fighting is guerrilla warfare, hit and run, you do not have much ammunition anyway
The P-38 was used quite effectively in 1943 in the Pacific and Mediterranean, the production issues meant the initial 3 P-38 groups sent in 1942 were the entire Mediterranean force for the war, the next P-38 group arrival in Europe was in late August 1943, going operational in mid October. That leaves the P-47 which did a lot of sweeps rather than escort missions as the groups worked up, getting to 3 operational in mid April 1943, 4 in mid August, to 6 in mid September. The USAAF says it lost 505 heavy bombers to enemy fighters April to October 1943, including nearly 120 on two raids which deliberately went well beyond escort range of anything the USAAF had at the time. When General Eaker wrote to Air Vice Marshall Freeman about drop tanks Eaker estimated fighters could have saved about two thirds the losses on the 10 October 1943 Munster raid.
The 17 August 1943 Schweinfurt/Regensburg raid was done on the assumption the German fighter defence lacked depth and strength, punch through the "border" belt and then there would be no more fighters, mount a big enough raid, 300 bombers, and the Germans could not inflict enough losses, it was marred by mistimings, resulting in a second attempt based on the same ideas tried on 14 October. The everything that can fly mission on 24 December 1944 lost 35 bombers including write offs from 1,884 credited with attacking, 35 out of 300 was unsustainable losses.
The 1943 day offensive in northern Europe did little lasting damage while taking heavy losses but caused the Germans to redeploy many fighters away from the fronts to defending Germany, which really helped the fronts. The night offensive was doing more damage and was similarly forcing the Luftwaffe to concentrate on the defence of Germany.
The 1943 8th Air Force day offensive was inevitably compromised to an extent as the people involved learnt how to actually do the basics of raid planning, assembling, timing, experimenting with tactics, and so on and remove incorrect assumptions, like how good the weather would usually be, the weather assumption played a big part in bombing accuracy and weight of attack possible in 1943 and into 1944. The upping of raids during the 1943/44 winter was important, the Luftwaffe day fighter force had been able to use previous winters for replenishment and rest. As the Luftwaffe usually reacted to raids on Germany in 1943 and early 1944, regardless of target, the average range of escorts mattered less than later on when it required attacks on specific and deeper targets to provoke a reaction. The allies proved you need air superiority before you can start to systematically target a section of the enemy economy.
At the aircraft type level it amounts to something like a moment in time, a P-47 available in numbers in the period April to October 1943 able to escort all but the two special raids saving say 2/3 of 390 bombers lost to enemy aircraft or 260 bombers, with 2,600 crew on board, around half KIA. USAAF ETO Losses to enemy aircraft are put at 4,274, the half way point for such losses was end April 1944, this was from 16% of the USAAF ETO effective sorties flown for the war. Even though the 8th Air Force never felt truly comfortable with its fighter strength using the losses to enemy aircraft you can make the case the USAAF deployed "too many" fighters from the second half of 1944, which has its own costs. After all knowing what was to come could have seen US combat aircraft production at least largely shut down in early 1945.
Flak suppression sorties tend to be costly as the batteries shoot back and the heavy ones have light guns for protection, an anti flak mission is not an escort one. P-39 and P-40 did not have the range to make Germany from Britain. The general rule the more sweat in training the less blood in fighting, assuming the training is based on a realistic doctrine. Such training is expensive and the easiest thing to cut to make peace time budgets. Flying escorted day missions and then intercepting them uses a lot of flying hours, then comes how you assess the results. With hindsight everything could be done better.
8th Air force, operational group strength early in the month of
Apr-43, 6 bomber to 1 fighter
May-43, 6 bomber to 3 fighter
Jun-43, 12 bomber to 3 fighter
Jul-43, 13 bomber to 3 fighter
Aug-43, 15 bomber to 3 fighter
Sep-43, 16 bomber to 4 fighter
Oct-43, 18 bomber to 6 fighter
Nov-43, 20 bomber to 8 fighter
Dec-43, 21 bomber to 8 fighter
Jan-44, 25 bomber to 11 fighter
Feb-44, 25 bomber to 11 fighter
Mar-44, 29 bomber to 13 fighter
Apr-44, 30 bomber to 13 fighter
May-44, 32 bomber to 14 fighter
Jun-44, 39 bomber to 15 fighter
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
About two years ago I asked Bill (
drgondog
) his best estimate how much sooner the P-51B could have started ops with 8th AF. There were more than just a few stars that would have had to align right and a certain Colonel getting hit by a beer truck was mentioned but in the end, Bill estimated maybe late fall early winter 1943, about five months earlier than it did. I wish I could find the post as he laid it out fairly well, if I have time I'll try to find it.Even if that came to pass, I doubt it would have resulted in an earlier start to "Big Week" simply because the weather is foul ad there isnt much daylight in December January, it may have resulted in a higher proportion of P-51s being used. One thing thee allies did to improve range was to reduce the distance. RAF Leiston was scheduled to be an RAF fighter base but was handed over before completion to the USAAF. Construction started in Sept 1942, completed in Sept1943, the 358th Fighter Group arrived with P-47s on 29 Nov from Scotland where they had been training and commenced Ops in December. The 357th arrived with P-51s on 31st Jan in time to take part in "Big Week". Some of my body fluids vaporise when I read that no one cared and nothing was done. Below is just one small example (RAF Leiston) of what was done in the exact period that is routinely moaned about. It was designated US station 373.About two years ago I asked Bill (
PlanesandShips
Airman
- 21
- Feb 25, 2024
Thanks for the very informative replies.
BarnOWL: I never said 8th AF leadership dominated by bomber guys. I said USAAC/AAF leadership dominated by bomber guys, and I think that was key to Greg's original contention. Its an interesting topic, the leadership mix. For example, in the USN you have basically 3 branches: Aviation, Surface Warfare, and Submarine. Yes there are other parts of the makeup, but generally those are the 3. They try to equally distribute the flag positions to those 3 branches, and even then some outstanding officers like Edward L. Beach, jr. do not make flag rank. I think the basic assertion is that the bomber mafia dominated the USAAF, and that their biases affected force structures, and thus outcomes. Thanks also for the reference to the book, which I keep seeing mentioned but had not yet seen the actual title.
Mr. Sinclair: Thanks for your long and informational reply. It appears that you have shown that I over-stated the bomber crew casualties caused by lack of fighter escort in the early part of the war. Having said that, those casualties were still very significant, far more than were anticipated. Whenever I listen to videos or read narratives from USAAF veterans, I always ask myself WHEN they were in combat. There aren't very many from 1942/43, a staggering number were killed. It would appear that the life expectancy of a bomber crewman arriving in the theatre in June/July/Aug/Sept of 1943 was very short indeed. Your question about the number of senior leaders coming from the bomber pipeline hits to the core of the claimed issue. I confess I don't know the percentages, but it APPEARS that the bomber mafia had undue influence over decision making, even if the %'s of general officers don't show that. Thanks also for the Eaker quote that 2/3 of the casualties on the Munster raid in Oct 43 could have been avoided with fighter escort. If I was FDR or Marshall, and Eaker said that to me, I would have unloaded on him, "So why weren't they provided? Don't you or the other USAAF leadership know what you are doing? You told me that this force could do this job, and now these boys are being hacked to pieces and we don't have the tools to protect them!" My guess is that those leaders never heard those words from the horse's mouth, since you say that they were in a letter to another person.
Mr Gunn: Thanks for your comments Oblique references such as the one to the Colonel are frustrating to newbies like me. Which Colonel, and when? There are a lot of those kinds of "toss off" remarks made in this forum that require hours of reading of old threads to figure out. There was a Colonel that was holding up the Merlin Mustang? I guess I need to read the book.
The bottom line to me is that the USAAF was poorly equipped and trained to carry out the planned operations, not unlike other services such as the submarine service I have mentioned several times. (How someone didn't end up in the stockade over the torpedo problems alone is beyond me but I digress.) I still see Greg's central argument as valid: the lack of drop tanks was scandalous and unforgiveable. (By "lack of drop tanks" I mean the whole program for tactical use: engineering, design, testing, implementation, production, training, etc.) I haven't seen anyone really refute that, and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.
BarnOWL: I never said 8th AF leadership dominated by bomber guys. I said USAAC/AAF leadership dominated by bomber guys, and I think that was key to Greg's original contention. Its an interesting topic, the leadership mix. For example, in the USN you have basically 3 branches: Aviation, Surface Warfare, and Submarine. Yes there are other parts of the makeup, but generally those are the 3. They try to equally distribute the flag positions to those 3 branches, and even then some outstanding officers like Edward L. Beach, jr. do not make flag rank. I think the basic assertion is that the bomber mafia dominated the USAAF, and that their biases affected force structures, and thus outcomes. Thanks also for the reference to the book, which I keep seeing mentioned but had not yet seen the actual title.
Mr. Sinclair: Thanks for your long and informational reply. It appears that you have shown that I over-stated the bomber crew casualties caused by lack of fighter escort in the early part of the war. Having said that, those casualties were still very significant, far more than were anticipated. Whenever I listen to videos or read narratives from USAAF veterans, I always ask myself WHEN they were in combat. There aren't very many from 1942/43, a staggering number were killed. It would appear that the life expectancy of a bomber crewman arriving in the theatre in June/July/Aug/Sept of 1943 was very short indeed. Your question about the number of senior leaders coming from the bomber pipeline hits to the core of the claimed issue. I confess I don't know the percentages, but it APPEARS that the bomber mafia had undue influence over decision making, even if the %'s of general officers don't show that. Thanks also for the Eaker quote that 2/3 of the casualties on the Munster raid in Oct 43 could have been avoided with fighter escort. If I was FDR or Marshall, and Eaker said that to me, I would have unloaded on him, "So why weren't they provided? Don't you or the other USAAF leadership know what you are doing? You told me that this force could do this job, and now these boys are being hacked to pieces and we don't have the tools to protect them!" My guess is that those leaders never heard those words from the horse's mouth, since you say that they were in a letter to another person.
Mr Gunn: Thanks for your comments Oblique references such as the one to the Colonel are frustrating to newbies like me. Which Colonel, and when? There are a lot of those kinds of "toss off" remarks made in this forum that require hours of reading of old threads to figure out. There was a Colonel that was holding up the Merlin Mustang? I guess I need to read the book.
The bottom line to me is that the USAAF was poorly equipped and trained to carry out the planned operations, not unlike other services such as the submarine service I have mentioned several times. (How someone didn't end up in the stockade over the torpedo problems alone is beyond me but I digress.) I still see Greg's central argument as valid: the lack of drop tanks was scandalous and unforgiveable. (By "lack of drop tanks" I mean the whole program for tactical use: engineering, design, testing, implementation, production, training, etc.) I haven't seen anyone really refute that, and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
Problem is that if you look into Bill's research, the USAAF (at Gen. Arnold's request) asked manufacturers to increase internal fuel on fighters, and equip them for drop tanks during 1943. NAA was looking at it with the P-51A and A-36 and Locheed with the P-38, especially drop tanks, as early as 1942 on their own initiative. Republic took forever to be browbeaten into doing both. It took until second half of '43 to carry drop tanks, it took until production block -22 to increase internal fuel, and it took until the P-47N to get a true long range variant. NAA did all of that with the P-51B and D (85 gallon fuselage tank) in late 1943 and ready for the beginning of 1944.
This is what I and Bill and others are trying to get at with Greg. It wasn't the USAAF at fault, but if anything Republic themselves were with the P-47.
This is what I and Bill and others are trying to get at with Greg. It wasn't the USAAF at fault, but if anything Republic themselves were with the P-47.
PlanesandShips
Airman
- 21
- Feb 25, 2024
Well I guess the experts can hash out how responsive Republic was or was not, and to what extent the P47 had any internal capability built in from the start. I think that inherent capability is one of their biggest areas of disagreement.
But it appears to me, as a non-expert, that the USAAF asking in 1943 (when in 1943?) for greater internal fuel and drop tanks was way too late. Anyone who cared to look at map and plan a flight from East Anglia to Western Germany could do the math. But if you didn't look at a map because you thought the bombers would always get through (until catastrophically proven otherwise), then you wouldn't have requested the capability in 1941 or 42 (and they didn't request that capability in 41 or 42?). Wikipedia shows first flight of P47 May 1941 and introduction in Nov 1942. And of course the P38 had an extended gestation because the prototype crashed on a publicity seeking excursion for which the USAAF should bear guilt.
But it appears to me, as a non-expert, that the USAAF asking in 1943 (when in 1943?) for greater internal fuel and drop tanks was way too late. Anyone who cared to look at map and plan a flight from East Anglia to Western Germany could do the math. But if you didn't look at a map because you thought the bombers would always get through (until catastrophically proven otherwise), then you wouldn't have requested the capability in 1941 or 42 (and they didn't request that capability in 41 or 42?). Wikipedia shows first flight of P47 May 1941 and introduction in Nov 1942. And of course the P38 had an extended gestation because the prototype crashed on a publicity seeking excursion for which the USAAF should bear guilt.
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