Best Tank Killer of WW2 continued
- Thread starter Erich
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Hello tpikdave,
what Mitya is trying to show, is that a IL2 could take that kind of punishment, whilst a P-47, or any other fighter a/c would't live to talk about that. The Il2 or a Ha129 were "hovering" the battle field, whilst a P-47 or F-4U swooped in and flew home.
Since there are no reliable battlefield reports (at least not known to me) it will be almost impossible to determine which kind of a/c acctually caused more damage to ground troops or formations. But IMO besides the Hs129/75mm, or the Me410/40mm? there were no a/c that could acctually be termed Tank destroyers from 1943 onward.
Regards
Kruska
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Tony
There are indeed quite a few references that suggest the presence of Japanese tanks at the Imphal-Kohima battles, however, this is not supported by the Japanese reference materiel
My reference in this case is [I]"The Japanese Army Order Of Battle (Vols I II) Edited translated by Victor Medej Ready Printing Co, 1981, 558 pages[/I]. this is THE publication in English to refer to when trying to pinpoint Japanese Ground Formations.
This refereence works states that the 14th Independant Tank Regt arrived in the Mandalay area from Lower Burma in late March 1944, and had partly equippe with captured Stuarts.
Mandalay is NOT the Imphal-Kohima front. Beside it appearing to be physically impossible for any wheeled or tracked japanese vehicles being in the Imphal sector, (it being separated from the nearest roads under Japanese control by more than 200 miles of trackless jungle and a mountain range, which even today is only accessible on foot, or by mule, (at best), the facts are that the 14th Regiment was nowhere near the Imphal front during the course of the battle (according to Japanese source material). What may have happened is that vehicles may have been captured by the Japanese in the Imphal area. If that is the case, there was just one small section of road where the Japanese could have used them.
The Japanese tanks that were deployed around the Mandalay area may well have fallen victim to gun armed Hurricanes, although the time over the target for the Hurris would have been limited. The area around Mandalay is not Jungle, it is a plateau region known as the central Burma plain. It is entirely conceivable that that Japanese tanks and vehicles were destroyed in this limited area of Burma,
The Japanese do record the 14th Regt as having been destroyed by January 1945
There are indeed quite a few references that suggest the presence of Japanese tanks at the Imphal-Kohima battles, however, this is not supported by the Japanese reference materiel
"The 14th Tank Regiment fought with the Biritsh in the south of Imphal. In this battle, Japanese tanks first encountered M3 Medium Tanks. In the early fight, a Japanese captured M3 Light Tank destroyed one M3 Medium Tank. That tank shot at the rear of M3 Medium Tank at close range.
The regiment lost almost all tanks during the fights and the retreat. After the battle of Imphal, the regiment was rebuilt near Mandalay and its strenght was about one third of the previous strenght. The regiment fought with the British around Meiktila and was annihirated in April, 1945."[/COLOR]
The regiment lost almost all tanks during the fights and the retreat. After the battle of Imphal, the regiment was rebuilt near Mandalay and its strenght was about one third of the previous strenght. The regiment fought with the British around Meiktila and was annihirated in April, 1945."[/COLOR]
My reference in this case is [I]"The Japanese Army Order Of Battle (Vols I II) Edited translated by Victor Medej Ready Printing Co, 1981, 558 pages[/I]. this is THE publication in English to refer to when trying to pinpoint Japanese Ground Formations.
This refereence works states that the 14th Independant Tank Regt arrived in the Mandalay area from Lower Burma in late March 1944, and had partly equippe with captured Stuarts.
Mandalay is NOT the Imphal-Kohima front. Beside it appearing to be physically impossible for any wheeled or tracked japanese vehicles being in the Imphal sector, (it being separated from the nearest roads under Japanese control by more than 200 miles of trackless jungle and a mountain range, which even today is only accessible on foot, or by mule, (at best), the facts are that the 14th Regiment was nowhere near the Imphal front during the course of the battle (according to Japanese source material). What may have happened is that vehicles may have been captured by the Japanese in the Imphal area. If that is the case, there was just one small section of road where the Japanese could have used them.
The Japanese tanks that were deployed around the Mandalay area may well have fallen victim to gun armed Hurricanes, although the time over the target for the Hurris would have been limited. The area around Mandalay is not Jungle, it is a plateau region known as the central Burma plain. It is entirely conceivable that that Japanese tanks and vehicles were destroyed in this limited area of Burma,
The Japanese do record the 14th Regt as having been destroyed by January 1945
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
I wouldn't be too sure about that. (for the P-47 a least) I'll try and dig up some pictures.
I checked out Tony's website, finding the 'Brit WWII Multi' interesting, but not esp convincing...
The less than stellar achievments of the WWII cannon-armed 'tankbusters' is not surprising, given the wildly conflicting demands faced by the a/c designers.
Any cannon capable of reliably piercing the armor of the better tanks is inevitably going to be large and heavy, demanding a powerful twin-engine a/c for best effect. As cannon fire must directly impact the tank to be effective, accuracy demands a close-range attack at very low-altitude, the slower the speed the better. This in turn demands heavy armor to withstand the the inevitable ground-fire, which in turn demands yet more power if sufficient performance and agility to defend against fighter attack is going to be sustained. Barring that, then allowance must be made for a rear-gunner and weapons of sufficient firepower to repel fighters.Yet more weight... More weight> more power needed >larger airframe> more vulnerable> rear-gunners, more armor > more weight...a vicious circle that the technology of the day simply could not break. Neither the armament, the armor, or the engines existed to make the cannon-armed tankbuster a viable weapon on a hotly-contested battlefield. Not 'til thirty years later did a truly effective armored, big-gun tank-killer become a reality
The qualities required to make an a/c a viable combat weapon include more than imposing firepower and armor. First and foremost, it must be survivable and reliable. The Hs 129 was neither. The Ju-87 and the Il-2/10 were reliable but in the absence of local air superiority, were not survivable. That some pilots ran up impressive scores (scores that are likely excessive to an order of magnitude...) is more a reflection of the exceptionable abilities of the individual men than it is of their weapons. (It reminds me of the Finnish success with the Buffalo. Maybe it was one of the 'best' too...) The Jug (and even moreso, the F4U*), OTOH was both, and had specialized anti-tank units been armed and trained for the task as was done by the Germans, they would have been much more effective than they were. The P-47 is simply a much better a/c than the others. And napalm is a terrifyingly effective weapon against both tanks, and the morale of the men inside them. Just ask the N.Korean and Chinese tankers...
Where were those esteemed German big-gun 'panzerknackers' in the last desperate year of the war? Other than Rudel's elite little group, the so-called 'best' were no more, blown out of the skies, their few surviving pilots flying the very able, if less-specialized Fw-190 fighter-bombers against the ever-encroaching hordes of enemy armor. Curious indeed...
JL
* I prefer the F4U as a fighter-bomber, but as it only fought against the very inferior Japanese tanks, I went with the P-47.
The less than stellar achievments of the WWII cannon-armed 'tankbusters' is not surprising, given the wildly conflicting demands faced by the a/c designers.
Any cannon capable of reliably piercing the armor of the better tanks is inevitably going to be large and heavy, demanding a powerful twin-engine a/c for best effect. As cannon fire must directly impact the tank to be effective, accuracy demands a close-range attack at very low-altitude, the slower the speed the better. This in turn demands heavy armor to withstand the the inevitable ground-fire, which in turn demands yet more power if sufficient performance and agility to defend against fighter attack is going to be sustained. Barring that, then allowance must be made for a rear-gunner and weapons of sufficient firepower to repel fighters.Yet more weight... More weight> more power needed >larger airframe> more vulnerable> rear-gunners, more armor > more weight...a vicious circle that the technology of the day simply could not break. Neither the armament, the armor, or the engines existed to make the cannon-armed tankbuster a viable weapon on a hotly-contested battlefield. Not 'til thirty years later did a truly effective armored, big-gun tank-killer become a reality
The qualities required to make an a/c a viable combat weapon include more than imposing firepower and armor. First and foremost, it must be survivable and reliable. The Hs 129 was neither. The Ju-87 and the Il-2/10 were reliable but in the absence of local air superiority, were not survivable. That some pilots ran up impressive scores (scores that are likely excessive to an order of magnitude...) is more a reflection of the exceptionable abilities of the individual men than it is of their weapons. (It reminds me of the Finnish success with the Buffalo. Maybe it was one of the 'best' too...) The Jug (and even moreso, the F4U*), OTOH was both, and had specialized anti-tank units been armed and trained for the task as was done by the Germans, they would have been much more effective than they were. The P-47 is simply a much better a/c than the others. And napalm is a terrifyingly effective weapon against both tanks, and the morale of the men inside them. Just ask the N.Korean and Chinese tankers...
Where were those esteemed German big-gun 'panzerknackers' in the last desperate year of the war? Other than Rudel's elite little group, the so-called 'best' were no more, blown out of the skies, their few surviving pilots flying the very able, if less-specialized Fw-190 fighter-bombers against the ever-encroaching hordes of enemy armor. Curious indeed...
JL
* I prefer the F4U as a fighter-bomber, but as it only fought against the very inferior Japanese tanks, I went with the P-47.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Picks form this forum: Structural integrity of the P-47 why Oleg is wrong! - Topic Powered by eve community
The plane shown above was flown by Lt. Karl Hallberg of my fighter group, the 366th. He had one hung bomb and tried to land at our base at Asch, Belgium, in January 1945. As you can see, the bomb fell off and exploded, but, amazingly, Lt. Hallberg survived. He suffered a head injury, but made a full recovery.
Lt. Robert S Johnson. Lawton, OK. 61st Fighter Squadron. P-47C 41-6235 HV-P "Half Pint". Detail shot of damage to canopy area
Lt. Robert S Johnson. Lawton, OK. 61st Fighter Squadron. P-47C 41-6235 HV-P "Half Pint". Well known photo but worth looking at again as contrary to popular belief, this a/c was not written of but repaired and issued to the 9th AF's 36th FG where it was finally lost on 18 August 1944.
Capt. Warren S "Pat" Patterson Jr. Jarrettown, PA. 61st Fighter Squadron. P-47D 43-25579 HV-H "Widget". Damage to port stabiliser possibly the result of a mid-air collision suffered by Capt. Patterson over France on 7 August 1944
Lt. Bill May�s P-47D 42-75505, E9:M looked decidedly battered after the Munster mission of 22 February 1944. Following a scrap with Fw190s north of the Ruhr, 376th Squadron flights were reforming for return to base when Lt. May was attacked from astern by a single �190. With fuel running very low, he headed for the deck, but collided with trees and high tension wires. After landing at Manston, however, only ten gallons of fuel were found in his tanks.
Charlie Rife and Richard Kik
A Mission to Remember August 12th, 1944
20mm, 40mm 88mm flak hits taken
"We took off on a usual mission armor cover flight at the Falaise
track. Down at the Falaise track it was hard fighting, a lot of anti-
aircraft fire, a lot of infantry, armor, trucks, a lot of everything. I went
down on a strafing run and hit this truck Previous to that I heard a
thump somewhere in the airplane and I didn't realize what it was, but
when I came off the strafing run my wingman, Chuck Rife said "have
you got the water on?" I said "no, why?" Chuck said "you're trailing
smoke." He came up and looked around and said "it's coming off
the bottom of the engine." It Turned out a 20 mm knocked two or
three cylinders off my engine. I'm telling you, those people deserve a medal for that engine, I've
never seen one like it."
Chuck caught a burst of anti-aircraft fire. Both of his wings were struck by 40mm rounds. The flak rounds exploded and pieces of metal entered his cockpit. The explosion damaged his instruments and shredded his parachute pack. So as we got across the line I told Chuck, "you better get ready to bail out." He said "I can't, my parachute's all tore up." I told Chuck you've got two live bombs on your wings, you're not going to be able to belly land with those, can you drop them? He said "no, I can't" and held up his bomb release, "cause here's my bomb thing." It was a mess.
WW II ACE STORIES
SHOT FULL OF HOLES
Don Blakeslee's P-47 Upon Return From The Paris Mission
September 1943
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
In what respects? I've received a comment from an aeronautical engineer who likes examining old designs that the proposal is entirely feasible.
I don't think so - from what I recall of the Hurri IID accounts they were going flat-out when they attacked.
Besides, exactly the same could be said of planes firing rockets or dropping bombs, if they wanted to hit a small target.
It depends what you mean by "viable weapon". It was certainly possible to make a good ground-attack plane which was well-protected and armed with a gun powerful enough to be effective against tanks - but no-one quite managed to put the combination together.
If you mean something which can dice with fighters on equal terms as well as survive hits from ground fire and knock out tanks, you're right - but the same applies to the A-10: that would get eaten alive by a contemporary air combat fighters.
? I know the engines had reliability problems, but the Hs 129 was heavily armoured against ground fire. It was the closest WW2 equivalent to the A-10.
Not curious at all, but entirely understandable. The Luftwaffe was no longer able to provide air cover against the massive air supremacy of the Allies, so any specialised ground-attack plane was a dead duck. They were forced to use ground-attack versions of fighter-bombers, but in doing so they lost a lot of effectiveness, specifically in attacking point targets like tanks (I should add that the fighter-bombers were also considerably less accurate in bombing than the specialised dive-bombers like the Ju 87).
Basically, with the planes which actually saw service in WW2, you had a choice between versatile fighter-bombers which had little ability to kill tanks, or accurate tank-killers which couldn't survive against air opposition.
Of course, if my proposed multi-role plane had been built, it would have had a fighter-like performance, good armour protection and a tank-killing gun.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
As renrich pointed out, the F4U was nearly as accurate a dive bomber as the SBD (and about the same as the SB2C), so there's at least one big exception to the fighter-bombers being less accurate bombers. (although in this context, bombing a tank with anything other than napalm would be very difficult, even for a dedicated dive bomber)
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
I don't know what actual accuracy figures these planes achieved. The figures for average miss distances I have read are c.30m for a good Ju 87 crew and 120-140m for a Typhoon. Of course, even 30m isn't good enough to reliably knock out a tank (although it would give the crew one hell of a battering).
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
Or possibly knock a track off...
Tony, in ur opinion, where do u rate the 190F-8 Panzerblitzer II??? There are a few of us purists who think that arrangement with those R4M powered bastards was the best multiroller tank buster....
The thought of comparing a suped up, fire snortin 190F-8 at treetop level to a big hunkering beast like the 47 is almost appalling...
And as far as Im concerned, the only dedicated tank buster created in WW2 was the Hs 129B...
Tony, in ur opinion, where do u rate the 190F-8 Panzerblitzer II??? There are a few of us purists who think that arrangement with those R4M powered bastards was the best multiroller tank buster....
The thought of comparing a suped up, fire snortin 190F-8 at treetop level to a big hunkering beast like the 47 is almost appalling...
And as far as Im concerned, the only dedicated tank buster created in WW2 was the Hs 129B...
Tony,
My comment on your 'British Multi' was not derogatory. I do find it interesting and well-thought out (I like the rest of your site, too) but I'm not convinced that it would work as well on the battlefield as it does on paper. But who knows...On the same topic, what do you think of the Beech XA-28 Grizzly? It seems awfully big to me...
My comment about the need for gun attacks to be carried out at lower speeds concerns accuracy. A gun cannot accomplish anything without a direct hit. Even a glancing blow is generally ineffective. I'm not sure what speed the heavily-laden Hurricane IID could achieve on the deck, but I suspect it was not much more than 250mph. And the German and Soviet gunships were even slower. A napalm strike is effective from 50-60 feet away in azimuth, and as JoeB mentioned, short hits can also be very effective. Complete accuracy is not required. Nor will heavier armor stop the insidious burning ooze from finding its way into the cracks and crevices of the big tanks.
I'm not so dogmatic as to insist that a dedicated tank-buster must be able to tackle fighters on an even basis, per se. I just believe that it should be more than a sitting duck. The comparison of the Hs 129 to the A-10 is IMO, unjustified. That both are armored, and have big guns is merely superficial. What matters are the a/c themselves. Their qualities are very different. The A-10 is very manoueverable and gives the pilot excellent all-round visibility. The Hs 129 was the polar opposite. The A-10 is very damage-resistant, and reliable The Hs 129 was extremely vulnerable to even small-arms fire, and had a woeful serviceability record ( of the 12 a/c of the squadron ordered to Tunis, only 8 arrived...of which only 4 were considered serviceable) The gun of the A-10 is effective against Soviet armor. The Hs 129 was largely ineffective against the better Soviet tanks. And in defending against fighter attack, the agility, excellent visibility, rapid-fire gun, and optional Sidewinder armament gives the A-10 pilot a very sporting chance to escape. Not so the blinkered, sluggish, and vulnerable Hs 129. The Hs-129 and Il-2/10 are fundamentally different from the A-10, even allowing for the technological gap.
While the less-specialized fighter-bombers may seem less effective than the dedicated big-gun tankbusters, an argument can be made that the opposite is true.
While the WWII B-G TB was more effective on a per-pass basis, the inherent vulnerability of the a/c, and their absolute requirement for constant fighter support probably made them a less efficient use of resources (both men and materiel) than the more versatile FBs such as the P-47 and F-4U. The FBs may need to make more passes than the B-G TBs, but their ability to defend themselves meant that more a/c could be actually attacking the enemy. Nor do they need to waste time escorting slow-moving a/c back and forth. Add in their higher survivability and reliability, and their superiority over the B-G TBs is undeniable.
Making a flight of P-47s or the Corsairs into better tank-busters would not have demanded bigger engines, bigger and heavier guns (and the systems to handle those guns) or other difficult-to-achieve requirements. All that was needed was better training and more napalm...napalm, that even if it had missed, would have terrorized the enemy tankers and, unless they were made of very stern stuff indeed, sent them scurrying from the battlefield.
Of course, if your idealized 'big-gun tank-buster' would actually work as well as you imagine, I retract my support for the lowly Jug
JL
My comment on your 'British Multi' was not derogatory. I do find it interesting and well-thought out (I like the rest of your site, too) but I'm not convinced that it would work as well on the battlefield as it does on paper. But who knows...On the same topic, what do you think of the Beech XA-28 Grizzly? It seems awfully big to me...
My comment about the need for gun attacks to be carried out at lower speeds concerns accuracy. A gun cannot accomplish anything without a direct hit. Even a glancing blow is generally ineffective. I'm not sure what speed the heavily-laden Hurricane IID could achieve on the deck, but I suspect it was not much more than 250mph. And the German and Soviet gunships were even slower. A napalm strike is effective from 50-60 feet away in azimuth, and as JoeB mentioned, short hits can also be very effective. Complete accuracy is not required. Nor will heavier armor stop the insidious burning ooze from finding its way into the cracks and crevices of the big tanks.
I'm not so dogmatic as to insist that a dedicated tank-buster must be able to tackle fighters on an even basis, per se. I just believe that it should be more than a sitting duck. The comparison of the Hs 129 to the A-10 is IMO, unjustified. That both are armored, and have big guns is merely superficial. What matters are the a/c themselves. Their qualities are very different. The A-10 is very manoueverable and gives the pilot excellent all-round visibility. The Hs 129 was the polar opposite. The A-10 is very damage-resistant, and reliable The Hs 129 was extremely vulnerable to even small-arms fire, and had a woeful serviceability record ( of the 12 a/c of the squadron ordered to Tunis, only 8 arrived...of which only 4 were considered serviceable) The gun of the A-10 is effective against Soviet armor. The Hs 129 was largely ineffective against the better Soviet tanks. And in defending against fighter attack, the agility, excellent visibility, rapid-fire gun, and optional Sidewinder armament gives the A-10 pilot a very sporting chance to escape. Not so the blinkered, sluggish, and vulnerable Hs 129. The Hs-129 and Il-2/10 are fundamentally different from the A-10, even allowing for the technological gap.
While the less-specialized fighter-bombers may seem less effective than the dedicated big-gun tankbusters, an argument can be made that the opposite is true.
While the WWII B-G TB was more effective on a per-pass basis, the inherent vulnerability of the a/c, and their absolute requirement for constant fighter support probably made them a less efficient use of resources (both men and materiel) than the more versatile FBs such as the P-47 and F-4U. The FBs may need to make more passes than the B-G TBs, but their ability to defend themselves meant that more a/c could be actually attacking the enemy. Nor do they need to waste time escorting slow-moving a/c back and forth. Add in their higher survivability and reliability, and their superiority over the B-G TBs is undeniable.
Making a flight of P-47s or the Corsairs into better tank-busters would not have demanded bigger engines, bigger and heavier guns (and the systems to handle those guns) or other difficult-to-achieve requirements. All that was needed was better training and more napalm...napalm, that even if it had missed, would have terrorized the enemy tankers and, unless they were made of very stern stuff indeed, sent them scurrying from the battlefield.
Of course, if your idealized 'big-gun tank-buster' would actually work as well as you imagine, I retract my support for the lowly Jug
JL
Wildcat
Major
Interesting Parsifal, I just had a quick flick through "The air battle of Imphal" by Norman Franks and he states that 20 sqn RAF (Hurricane IID) knocked out 12 tanks in June 44. Franks states that the squadron was operating inside the valley, finding the tanks in the Southern end. Apparently 20 sqn weren't flying outside the valley because it was too dangerous to fly over the mountains due to the monsoonal clouds which were obscuring the tops.
parsifal
Colonel
I was sure about my facts when I started this, but now I am starting to get confused......I cant seem to make much sense of it all, the dates, the activities, the locations are just not adding up for me....
Its quite feasible for the allies to be knocking out tanks in June '44, because by that time the Japanese had retreated. They were back on the eastern side of the ranges by then, retreating towards their supply heads, with the Allies hot on their heels. What doesnt gel in this case is the statement about the a/c not wanting to cross the mountains. In order for the allies to be attacking Japanese in that "Imphal-Mandalay" axis, they would have had to be overflying numerous mountains by that time.
My reading of the basic history is this....the Imphal-Kohima battles were fought March-April, and early May 1944. The Japanese then finally retreated, believing that the Monsoons would cover their retreat. The allies did not react as expected, and instead broke into a hot pursuit that enable them to capture suitable jump off points inside of Burma once the wet had stopped in mid-october. At the same time this was all happening, the Allies, being basically a mix of Chinese, US (under Merrill) and CW forces managed to capture Mytikina, thereby making it possible to start the Ledo Road to China.
Im not as good a student as you guys about the aircraft histories, but I am not too bad with the general operational history stuff. I cant seem to reconcile what is being said here (your post, and Tony's) with the general history stuff. I dont doubt the veracity of what you and Tony are saying, but neither can I work it out. Its just the details that are wrong....
buzzard.....
Since you mentioned this aircraft, I thought why not give my "firsthand" account as to what I perceive its capabilities to be.
In 1989(not too sure about the date) I was lucky enough to be able to participate in the "Gathering Of Eagles" USAF Capabilities Exercise at Nellis AFB as a communications tech. There, I was able to witness up close and personal, the destructive power of the A10. I had been working at Nellis, and the Indian Springs AAFB gunnery and bombing range. I was on "hot" ranges many times and was able to see all kinds of aircraft scoring hits and misses on the various ranges. I have to say, the A10 was unmistakably the best weapons delivery system in the USAF inventory.
At the "Gathering Of Eagles" VIP capabilities demo three A10's came in on a convoy of 4 M60A1 tanks, two tanker trucks, 4 APC's and a couple of trucks. There was one pass using the GAU-8 gun of each of the three aircraft. Thats all it took. There was not one target left that was viable or not on fire. I will never forget the sound. At the time I looked at my buddy and said, it sounds like "God's zipper"!!
Since you mentioned this aircraft, I thought why not give my "firsthand" account as to what I perceive its capabilities to be.
In 1989(not too sure about the date) I was lucky enough to be able to participate in the "Gathering Of Eagles" USAF Capabilities Exercise at Nellis AFB as a communications tech. There, I was able to witness up close and personal, the destructive power of the A10. I had been working at Nellis, and the Indian Springs AAFB gunnery and bombing range. I was on "hot" ranges many times and was able to see all kinds of aircraft scoring hits and misses on the various ranges. I have to say, the A10 was unmistakably the best weapons delivery system in the USAF inventory.
At the "Gathering Of Eagles" VIP capabilities demo three A10's came in on a convoy of 4 M60A1 tanks, two tanker trucks, 4 APC's and a couple of trucks. There was one pass using the GAU-8 gun of each of the three aircraft. Thats all it took. There was not one target left that was viable or not on fire. I will never forget the sound. At the time I looked at my buddy and said, it sounds like "God's zipper"!!
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
I have no specific information on the combat record of the 190F series. However, it was an interesting and logial approach to producing a reasonably well-protected ground attack aircraft which still maintained some self-defence capability against fighters.
The main problem with switching to the 190F from the Ju 87 is that they gave up the ability to deploy the cluster bombs which were among the more effective anti-tank weapons. And while they tried hanging a pair of 30mm MK 103 under the wings, excessive recoil meant that these were too inaccurate.
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
I agree - size is not a benefit for a close-support plane, it just makes it a bigger target.
I'm not so sure that speed affects accuracy very much, but it will affect the number of shots the pilot has time to fire. Even so, the Tsetse (which was probably travelling fast when it attacked, although I have no specific info on that) had time to fire four 57mm rounds per pass. And with a 33% hit rate against a tank-sized target, that meant one tank per pass.
I am surprised to read that, since the Hs 129 carried more armour than any WW2 plane except for the Il-2. if it was indeed vulnerable (compared with a P-47 say) that means the designers must have made some fairly major errors.
The design purpose is the same, and the concept of substantial armour plating also, plus the ability to carry a big gun (for the Hs 129 anyway - the Il-2 was less successful at that). Of course, the execution of the design was very different, but I stand by my statement that the Hs 129 and A-10 were conceptually closely related.
An A-10 would be picked off by a radar-equipped fighter firing radar-homing missiles long before it could get within Sidewinder range. In aerial combat, speed and weapon range are what matter.
The USAAF/USAF has always made that argument. They regard fighter-bombers as far more versatile than CAS planes because they can be switched to other priorities when required. They also, I suspect, are doctrinally opposed to CAS because it subordinates the USAF to the needs of the army. They have on at least two occasions tried to scrap the A-10 fleet (in the early 1990s they produced a few "A-16" planes with a 30mm gunpod, but this proved a failure). Conversely, the army loves CAS planes like the A-10 for exactly the same reasons that the USAF hates them!
I should perhaps clarify that the ground attack version of my "multi-purpose compact twin" concept for the WW2 RAF was not really a dedicated tankbuster, but was more a fighter-bomber in the 190F mould: take one fighter and add armour to enhance protection against ground fire. It would have been comparable in size, weight and performance to the P-47, only with the safety benefit of two engines and with the ability to carry a big gun on the fuselage centreline - as well as a couple of 20mm cannon and all the RPs and bombs you could ask forOf course, if your idealized 'big-gun tank-buster' would actually work as well as you imagine, I retract my support for the lowly Jug
The problem with napalm (and, probably to a lesser extent, the cluster bombs like the Russian PTAB) was the huge safety distance from friendly troops. Even when dropping ordinary bombs, the P-47 was limited to attacking no less than 250 yards from friendly troops. I don't know the distance for napalm but I suspect it would have been even greater. With a big gun firing solid ammo you can open fire extremely close to friendly troops.
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
Effectiveness against modern tanks isn't necessarily that devastating. This is an extract from Flying Guns – the Modern Era: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations since 1945
"The 30 mm GAU 8/A in the A 10 "tankbuster" can get 80% of its shots within 5 mil, equal to 9 m dispersion at the 1,800 m maximum range. On test, the A-10 managed to hit a tank with about 10% of the shots fired at ranges varying between 500 and 1,340 m; a performance which has almost certainly improved since the LASTE package (low altitude safety and target enhancement), including a radio altimeter, autopilot and ballistic computer, was fitted in the 1990s. Incidentally, of the hits scored (against Russian T-62 tanks) just under 20% penetrated the armour (i.e. 2% of shots fired), although many others extensively damaged the track and suspension."
I should point out that the ballistics of the GAU 8/A's ammo are very similar to those of the Luftwaffe's MK 103 firing Hartkernmunition; the main differences being the DU rather than tungsten core, and of course the ten-times-higher rate of fire.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Wasn't the muzel velocity of the Mk 103 (for AP round) ~760 m/s for a ~500g AP round? (much slower than the GAU-8's ammo)
For the much lighter ~330g HE(M) round MV was ~940 m/s iirc (same ammo as the MK 101) Although, due to the lighter structure of the gun, acording to some sourses it was reduced to 860 m/s for HE ammo. (full propellant load was used on AP ammo though as it was deemed worth the risk)
For the much lighter ~330g HE(M) round MV was ~940 m/s iirc (same ammo as the MK 101) Although, due to the lighter structure of the gun, acording to some sourses it was reduced to 860 m/s for HE ammo. (full propellant load was used on AP ammo though as it was deemed worth the risk)
Tony Williams
Airman 1st Class
The M-Geschoss loading was derated to 860 m/s as you say, because of concerns over the longevity of the gun compared with the MK 101.
However, the Hartkern loading was kept at 940 m/s for 355g (compared with the GAU-8/A's 988 m/s for 425g). The GAU-8 is clearly more powerful than the MK 103 (with the DU providing a further improvement of 10-15% in effectiveness) but it doesn't outclass it.
Wildcat
Major
G'day parsifal, I'm no expert on the Imphal-Kohima battles myself, so I can't vouch for the accuracy of the book I mentioned. I only mentioned it because I recalled the use of the Hurricane IID's against Japanese tanks and when you said they weren't there, it struck me as being odd. Maybe the author got his dates and /or places confused, i don't know, however looking further along he contradicts himself by stating that only 3 tanks were destroyed and 18 damaged (by the whole of 221 group). Anyway, I'm confused and as you seem to be more knowledable on this theatre than I, I'm inclined to take your word.
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