British Dive Bombers or lack thereof

[tomo pauk]

My father was involved in taking 75mm shells captured from the French from Syria to Egypt to be mated with 75mm cases captured from the Germans to make effective rounds until better ones were delivered from the USA.

Interesting times and stuff he was involved with.
BTW - it would be French cases and German shells (and shots)?

 

[yulzari]

Interesting times and stuff he was involved with.
BTW - it would be French cases and German shells (and shots)?

Quite so. Muddy nomenclature on my part.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Germans had about negative 0% chance of making a successful invasion with hindsight. In July of 1940 things may not have looked quite so rosy. France with a bigger army than Germany had just collapsed. People were working on not just plan B but all the way through the alphabet and beyond.
Plans changed with time even by the day? certainly by the week. More weapons were coming out of the Factories to reequip the forces than came back from France but things like this showed up just incase the worst happened.
View attachment 696022
View attachment 696023
This thing fired a glass bottle filled with petrol and phosphorus (self igniting Molotov cocktail) with a small black powder charge a few hundred yards. Said to be quite exciting if a bottle broke in the barrel with the wind blowing into the muzzle opening.
This thing, turned by the ordnance board, (what were they thinking wasn't actually placed into production until 1941 and not issued until 1942 ( Dad's Army has a bit of documentary to it)
This thing also showed up and according to Wiki 19,000 were made before somebody regained sanity and stopped it.
View attachment 696024
Used some of the same projectiles including the ever popular glass bottle filled with petrol and phosphorus.
Wiki says the 19,000 number was as of the beginning of 1943. You Know, just in case the whole North Africa and Russian invasion was just a "clever plan" by the Germans.

Ammo dumps of this stuff used to be found all over England although it has gotten a lot rarer.

Although developed later in the war nothing beats the Panjandrum

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Best summed up by comments from Wing Commander Slessor in 1934
"The aeroplane is NOT a battlefield weapon"

Even in Spring 1941, now promoted to Air Marshall, and with the experience of WW2 to date, protested:-
"....we dont want aircraft skidding around over Kent looking for enemy tanks. that is the job of the anti-tank gun."

It was Beaverbrook, as head of MAP from May 1940, that ordered dive-bombers like the Bermuda & Vengeance, from the USA very much against the wishes of the RAF.

I think the RAAF ended up with some of the Vengeances, and they used them in New Guinea and some of the Solomon island campaigns, according to them with success. I know they were also used in Burma but I don't recall if that was RAF or RAAF.

 

[buffnut453]

I think the RAAF ended up with some of the Vengeances, and they used them in New Guinea and some of the Solomon island campaigns, according to them with success. I know they were also used in Burma but I don't recall if that was RAF or RAAF.

RAF (45, 82, 84, and 110) and Indian Air Force (7 and 8) squadrons used the Vengeance operationally in Burma.

 

[EwenS]

I think the RAAF ended up with some of the Vengeances, and they used them in New Guinea and some of the Solomon island campaigns, according to them with success. I know they were also used in Burma but I don't recall if that was RAF or RAAF.

RAAF users were 12, 21, 23 and 24 squadrons in the New Guinea area between June 1943 and March 1944. Not the Solomons. Also 25 squadron in Western Australia. All these squadrons subsequently reformed on B-24 Liberators.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Although developed later in the war nothing beats the Panjandrum

The Panjandrum is show in the World At War episode on the Invasion.

 

[Elvis]

"Beaverbrook's biographer recorded the behind-the-scenes in fighting as follows. 'Beaverbrook also wished to meet the needs of the Army. In July 1940 he placed a large order for dive-bombers in Canada [sic] and the United States. Eden (then Secretary of State for War) was enthusiastic. The Air Ministry protested and refused to 'supply or train pilots'."

This falls in line with something someone here told me, last year I think it was, when I raised the question of, if there was an A-24 varient of the SBD, why didn't we send some to Britain? and I was basically told that it just wasn't in-line with the way the British thought and they refused to supply or train pilots for that duty.
I am surprised to see that some dive bombers were indeed purchased from the US, so at least some pilots and crew must've been trained for that duty.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

After the fall of France, Group Captain Wann, a commander of Battle squadrons in France 1939-40, along with a Col JD Woodhall conducted a series of exercises in Army/Air cooperation, while in Northern Island, and issued a report, the Wann/Woodhall report. I don't know much more about it, as to whether he recommended dive bombers or not, but my little knowledge of this was that the report was met with a less than enthusiastic reception, the RAF clearly wedded to its Fighter and Bomber command roles and tasks.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Stuka probably gets the accolade for the best dive bomber, although some of the American types were pretty successful. The Stuka was very vulnerable to fighters, partly due to low speed and partly due to the attack profile of a relatively slow approach in good visability at a medium height, with a long exposure to ground defences in the attack.
The dive profiles were supported by dive angle markings on the canopy from 30 degrees to a full 90 degrees. Achieved accuracy would be interesting to have figures for but generally, the steepest 90 degree dives can be very accurate, although accuracy is very good even at 30 degrees if the sighting solution is fairly accurate.
Capt. Eric Brown gave the following details for 90 degree dive bombing in the Ju 87 D. Level cruise approach at altitude. Dive entered with throttle closed and dive brakes out, probably about 250kmh, speed rose to 540kmh in 1,370m altitude lost, then slowly increasing to 600kmh if dive continued. 6G recovery with the automatic pull-out used 450m altitude.
This sounds fast but, the drag was very high and the centreline bomb required a swinging crutch to swing the bomb down and forward to clear the propeller in high angle dives as the bomb accelerated in freefall.
Generally, Capt.Brown felt that although good for accurate bombing, the aircraft and the attack profile was very vulnerable to effective defence.

Eng

I don't think the Stuka was so vulnerable to fighters actually.

It got a reputation as such during the BoB when they were flying in big formations of them, basically trying to use them for Strategic bombing. In these large formations they would be relying on their (very limited) defensive armament and group. In this case they were sitting ducks to Hurricanes

But in the Med, in spite of very spotty coverage by the fighter JG units (due to preference on how to fight more than any real difficulty in staying with the bombers) they were often on their own at least part of the time, but proved remarkably successful at evading enemy fighters. Sometimes they got caught and slaughtered but often the Allied pilots thought they shot down a lot more than they actually did. Stukas could make very hard turns, and they apparently had an escape maneuver in which they would make a very hard turn and dive, while doing something with their mixture so as to emit black smoke. This often fooled the Allied fighter pilots into thinking they had shot them down when they actually hadn't.

I haven't done a count but I think the Allied fighter pilots in Malta and North Africa actually shot down more Bf 109s than they did Stukas. It wasn't until later in 1943 when the Allies were really reaching air superiority that the Germans had to retire the Stukas from the Med, but I think they kept them in action longer on the Russian front.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I would say the UK could have used a more accurate bomber as they tended to have trouble intercepting German ships making the channel dash on a few occasions.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This falls in line with something someone here told me, last year I think it was, when I raised the question of, if there was an A-24 varient of the SBD, why didn't we send some to Britain? and I was basically told that it just wasn't in-line with the way the British thought and they refused to supply or train pilots for that duty.
I am surprised to see that some dive bombers were indeed purchased from the US, so at least some pilots and crew must've been trained for that duty.

A-24s didn't do very well, in fact SBD's didn't do nearly as well either when flown by Marines as compared to with USN pilots. It seems like both for survival in air combat and accuracy in dive bombing, the much more extensive navy training was key to making the "Slow But Deadly" live up to it's name. A-24 was more or less a disaster in combat. Now A-36 on the other hand, might have been quite a useful toy for the British if they had wanted it.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Ju87 simply did not have the speed to evade Allied fighters regardless of how well they could turn or dive. Also, in turning to evade an initial attack, they have scrubbed off more speed, leaving them even more vulnerable to attack.

A good example of a dive bomber's vulnerability is during the Battle of France, the French lost virtually all of their Loire-Nieuport LN.401/411 dive bomber's in less than a month.
In one particular battle, twenty LN.401/411s were committed and only three remained operational afterwards.

That debacle was nearly a third of their total dive bomber force.

 

[tomo pauk]

A good example of a dive bomber's vulnerability is during the Battle of France, the French lost virtually all of their Loire-Nieuport LN.401/411 dive bomber's in less than a month.
In one particular battle, twenty LN.401/411s were committed and only three remained operational afterwards.

Perhaps that is a good example of how a slow and a defenseless* bomber was vulnerable, be it a dive bomber or not? Cruising at 350+- km/h in a contested airspace was a recipe for disaster, as confirmed by the Battle squadrons in the same time and place. Both LW pilots and AA gunners have had a field day when Battles, Blenheims and L-Ns appeared.
It is also example of why people should not be sending bombers against a competent enemy without a working fighter escort.

* "defenseless" meaning "without the defensive gunner"

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Ju87 simply did not have the speed to evade Allied fighters regardless of how well they could turn or dive. Also, in turning to evade an initial attack, they have scrubbed off more speed, leaving them even more vulnerable to attack.

A good example of a dive bomber's vulnerability is during the Battle of France, the French lost virtually all of their Loire-Nieuport LN.401/411 dive bomber's in less than a month.
In one particular battle, twenty LN.401/411s were committed and only three remained operational afterwards.

That debacle was nearly a third of their total dive bomber force.

France had a lot of problems with aircraft teething issues, tactics, training, logistics, which they never had time to work through before their defeat. A Ju-87 isn't a LN.401 despite the superficial resemblance.

I'm just pointing out that the Stuka was actually able to survive at a better rate than it's normally given credit, both in the MTO and on the Russian Front. They seemed to be fairly good at evading fighters, albeit at the cost of jettisoning their bombs and scrubbing their airstrikes. Yes a hard turn that thwarts one shooting pass doesn't necessarily mean an escape, but they often did seem to escape. I can post some examples from MAW series if needed.

Faster, higher-performance Ju 88s seemed to die at a faster rate in the MTO (at least when there were fast enough fighters around to catch them, Fulmars, Gladiators and Hurricanes often couldn't), and He 111 were so vulnerable they were kept to coastal and night missions almost exclusively.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm just pointing out that the Stuka was actually able to survive at a better rate than it's normally given credit, both in the MTO and on the Russian Front.

I am reminded of the Soviets trying to analyze the I-16 near the end of it's career when it was noticed that the I-16 suffered few losses per 100 missions that the other Russian fighters and they were debating about either keeping it in production or re-instating it. Then they looked closer, The I-16 was doing the least amount of damage to the Germans per 100 missions.

I would note that the Fw 189 had pretty good reputation for survivability too. But hedge hopping, redundant rudders (getting home with one shot/chewed off) and depending on a well timed turn to throw off the attackers aim is not a long term survival plan.

 

[Snautzer01]

He 111 were so vulnerable they were kept to coastal and night missions almost exclusively.

Uhmm no.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Uhmm no.

I stand by that statement. In the Med, on land, the He 111 was scarce. it was a dead duck around Allied fighters by 1941.

 

[Shortround6]

I stand by that statement. In the Med, on land, the He 111 was scarce. it was a dead duck around Allied fighters by 1941.

It was a dead duck in 1940 without escort, but so was a Wellington or a DB-3.

So was the Ju 87.

This assumes a decent number of interceptors vs bombers.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I am reminded of the Soviets trying to analyze the I-16 near the end of it's career when it was noticed that the I-16 suffered few losses per 100 missions that the other Russian fighters and they were debating about either keeping it in production or re-instating it. Then they looked closer, The I-16 was doing the least amount of damage to the Germans per 100 missions.

I would note that the Fw 189 had pretty good reputation for survivability too. But hedge hopping, redundant rudders (getting home with one shot/chewed off) and depending on a well timed turn to throw off the attackers aim is not a long term survival plan.

Mission effectiveness and survivability are two different issues. I was addressing the latter in my post, but the big picture is also worth looking at.

On the one hand, by the mid-war period (say, 1942) the Luftwaffe had problems with mission effectiveness with their bombers in the land war, at least in the Med, mainly due to Luftwaffe fighter unit tactics and the decisions of their fighter pilots and squadron leaders. Basically they preferred to fight in a way which optimized fighter pilot survival and gradually racking up high scores for the "experten" (usually by swooping down from above to pick off Allied fighters, and then, ideally, climbing away before their comrades could retaliate). This didn't lend itself well to bomber escort which Luftwaffe pilots in general and units like JG.27 in particular hated to do. Escort required German pilots to linger in the vicinity of the bombers and to remain in combat with Allied fighters if they arrived, which negated a lot of their advantages.

So there was considerable tension between the Luftwaffe and the ground forces, and between fighter and bomber units within the Luftwaffe, due to the perception that they did not contribute enough to the ground war. Though they didn't always take so many losses (often one or two rather than the 5-10 claimed by Allied fighter pilots) Ju-87 strikes were routinely disrupted by Allied fighter attacks as they jettisoned their bombs (sometimes over their own troops) and just did everything they could to survive. Ju 88 crews did the same thing of course. So the net effect in the Med was the Allied air power was far more decisive in the overall outcome of battles than the Axis, especially from mid-1942 onward.

Part of the survival of Stukas is also, as you I think alluded, due simply to it's being a large, strongly made aircraft with fairly good internal protection, in addition to being quite agile. The Ju 87 was a very accurate bomber, given the right circumstances, and was pretty good at surviving AAA and fighters, but it was not an 'uber weapon'. They could be and were shot down and prevented from inflicting damage much of the time.

However, this needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The Stuka was a devastating weapon, and was absolutely key to German victories in France, Poland, the Low Countries, and the early days in Russia. I think this is part of what got so many other countries so keen on making their own dive bomber for a while, and why the German bomber designs, even ones way too big to do the job, were also tasked to have dive bomber capability. Stuka strikes definitely won a lot of key ground battles. When they were in range, Stukas proved to be quite deadly against relatively poorly defended British shipping both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean. When relatively protected from enemy fighters, (and in spite of the relatively good air defenses of US and British forces), the Stuka turned out to be pretty deadly in the Western Desert as well. Luftwaffe air strikes caused panic among American forces around the time of Kassernine Pass. Stuka and Ju 88 raids done with surprise or with heavy fighter cover still wrought havoc several times against British and later American airfields, logistics and ground forces positions. And Stukas sunk quite a few ships in the Mediterranean convoys. For example Ju-87s hit Indomitable twice on the flight deck during Operation Pedestal, sank the destroyer Dorset, helped sink the transport Ohio, and damaged several other ships.

IMO the biggest limitation for the Stuka was really it's range, which was somewhat improved in some later types but always remained inadequate. If they had a longer ranged version and a fighter that could fly with it (theoretically the job of the Bf 110, though it never worked out in that role) it would have been far more dangerous. Eventually the Fw 190 proved to be a good replacement though, not as accurate but it had the speed to hit and run in the increasingly lethal mid to late war battlefield.