Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?
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Shortround6
Major General
A couple of points here as we seem to looking at the Luftwaffe capabilities with the aid of our infamous "retrospectroscope".
1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form aside from twin engine machines?
2. What Nation had more long range bombers in service than Germany in 1939/40?
Long range being relative, what was long range in 1939 was NOT long range in 1942/42. He 111s could hit a good part of England from bases in Germany and could hit Northern Ireland once bases in the low countries and France were obtained. How much more range was needed for strategic purposes in 1939/40? 1941 starts to change things.
3. What nation didn't believe that the bomber "would always get through" without escortsin 1939?
To fault German thinking or planning in 1938-39-40 (first 1/2) when just about every other nation thought the same way seems to be using the "retrospectroscope".
Exceptions can be found, like American bombers, but then the Americans were faced, in peace time, with buying a few really long range bombers or lots and lots of shorter range bombers to cover the same area. It is 2565 miles from San Francisco to New York (or almost 1200 miles from Miami to Panama) and only 1737 miles from Dublin to Moscow. American requirements for simply deploying aircraft were far different than European nations.
1. In 1939/40 what nation/s had long range escort fighters in service/production or even prototype form aside from twin engine machines?
2. What Nation had more long range bombers in service than Germany in 1939/40?
Long range being relative, what was long range in 1939 was NOT long range in 1942/42. He 111s could hit a good part of England from bases in Germany and could hit Northern Ireland once bases in the low countries and France were obtained. How much more range was needed for strategic purposes in 1939/40? 1941 starts to change things.
3. What nation didn't believe that the bomber "would always get through" without escortsin 1939?
To fault German thinking or planning in 1938-39-40 (first 1/2) when just about every other nation thought the same way seems to be using the "retrospectroscope".
Exceptions can be found, like American bombers, but then the Americans were faced, in peace time, with buying a few really long range bombers or lots and lots of shorter range bombers to cover the same area. It is 2565 miles from San Francisco to New York (or almost 1200 miles from Miami to Panama) and only 1737 miles from Dublin to Moscow. American requirements for simply deploying aircraft were far different than European nations.
buffnut453
Captain
I'm pretty sure a doctor once used one of those retrospectroscopes on me...and jolly uncomfortable it was too!
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Sorry, I had to...
A fair point, but the failure of the British to develop one can be laid firmly at Portal's door and is one of the gravest strategic shortcomings chargeable to him and the Air Staff.
It led in 1941 with Fighter Command being squandered in France when, with a suitable fighter it should have been escorting Bomber Command, in force, to make meaningful attacks on German airfields in France and Belgium from where the Luftwaffe was launching the night time blitz. It was the only realistic way the night time bombing could have been countered, given the state of AI radar and night fighters, and it should have been the number one priority of Fighter Command. AI technology needed time to develop, a long range fighter was demonstrably possible.
It led to an inability of the RAF to support the Americans as late as 'Pointblank' and led to a fairly acrimonious dispute between Arnold and Portal. Arnold "found the spectacle of a fighter force which Portal stated to consist of 1,461 with crews remaining inactive whilst his bombers were shot out of the sky both incomprehensible and unacceptable."
Whilst all these fighters and support sat idly in Britain or were being misused on operations making pin pricks in NW France and Belgium there was no air defence worth talking about in India and the Far East. In the Middle East and North Africa Bf 109 Fs were being confronted by Hurricanes (at best).
The offensive fighter proved in the hands of the Americans to be one of the major strategic weapons of the war. It determined the outcome of not just purely aerial battles. No one at the Air Ministry understood this, certainly not the baleful trio of Portal, Douglas and Leigh Mallory.
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
This is true to some extent but in the technical climate of 1937-39 in England the escort fighter was a technical impossibility. What those men failed to realize was the impossibility faded in 1940 and then trailed away/vanished with almost every month.
A Spitfire or Hurricane saddled with a fixed pitch propeller and operating from 1938/39 airfields/aerodromes had little capacity for external fuel tanks. The fitting of the two pitch propeller shortened the take-off run from 420 yds to 320 yds on the Spitfire and the constant speed prop helped even more despite the gains in weight. Hurricanes showed similar improvement. The British were behind the Americans and Germans in the adoption of two pitch and constant speed propellers and in 1939 the bombers got first "pick".
For the Spitfire take-off power went from 880hp with a Merlin III ( and even a fair portion of that could not be used with the fixed pitch prop) to 1175hp on a Merlin XII with a constant speed prop but only a small attempt was made to increase the fuel capacity.
The Hurricane II with the Merlin XX went to 1280hp but again, little effort was spent on drop tanks until well after the planes went into service. In under 3 years the take-off power due to slightly better engines, better props and and better fuel had improved by 33-50% for the Merlin engine with little increase in engine weight.
Improved (larger?) airfields and the throwing out of the 35lb per sq in tire inflation rule opened up the possibility of much increased take-off weights which as you say, were not taken advantage of, either with new airplanes or with extensive modifications of the old ones.
A Spitfire or Hurricane saddled with a fixed pitch propeller and operating from 1938/39 airfields/aerodromes had little capacity for external fuel tanks. The fitting of the two pitch propeller shortened the take-off run from 420 yds to 320 yds on the Spitfire and the constant speed prop helped even more despite the gains in weight. Hurricanes showed similar improvement. The British were behind the Americans and Germans in the adoption of two pitch and constant speed propellers and in 1939 the bombers got first "pick".
For the Spitfire take-off power went from 880hp with a Merlin III ( and even a fair portion of that could not be used with the fixed pitch prop) to 1175hp on a Merlin XII with a constant speed prop but only a small attempt was made to increase the fuel capacity.
The Hurricane II with the Merlin XX went to 1280hp but again, little effort was spent on drop tanks until well after the planes went into service. In under 3 years the take-off power due to slightly better engines, better props and and better fuel had improved by 33-50% for the Merlin engine with little increase in engine weight.
Improved (larger?) airfields and the throwing out of the 35lb per sq in tire inflation rule opened up the possibility of much increased take-off weights which as you say, were not taken advantage of, either with new airplanes or with extensive modifications of the old ones.
I agree that it was an impossibility in 1939-7 but it wasn't an impossibility in 1940-1. Cotton had got an admittedly highly modified PR Spitfire up to 2,000 mile range in February 1941. I'm not suggesting that this was a viable fighter but the principle was established. I believe the Americans had also built a long range version of the Spitfire but my memory is not clear of when or how. Interesting that Portal was a prime mover in Cotton's 'removal'.
None of the three I mentioned had any grasp of fighter tactics or fighter potential, they were all essentially pre-war 'bomber boys'. Leigh Mallory demonstrated consistently through out the BoB that he did not understand how Fighter Command's system worked at all. After the BoB they had a fighter arm that kept growing but had no clear idea what to do with it. They lamely continued the useless and wasteful operations over France simply because they did not have the imagination or leadership to envision any other use for their fighters.
I'm not sure whether Dowding (a personal hero) would have done much better, but he couldn't have done worse. The men and women who disposed of him (Sholto Douglas, Trenchard, Portal, Sinclair, Freeman, Salmond and Irene Ward MP (who had no idea what she was involved in) along with certain other serving officers, Bader, MacDonald, Kingston-McCloughry and of course Leigh Mallory made sure we'll never know.
Cheers
Steve
None of the three I mentioned had any grasp of fighter tactics or fighter potential, they were all essentially pre-war 'bomber boys'. Leigh Mallory demonstrated consistently through out the BoB that he did not understand how Fighter Command's system worked at all. After the BoB they had a fighter arm that kept growing but had no clear idea what to do with it. They lamely continued the useless and wasteful operations over France simply because they did not have the imagination or leadership to envision any other use for their fighters.
I'm not sure whether Dowding (a personal hero) would have done much better, but he couldn't have done worse. The men and women who disposed of him (Sholto Douglas, Trenchard, Portal, Sinclair, Freeman, Salmond and Irene Ward MP (who had no idea what she was involved in) along with certain other serving officers, Bader, MacDonald, Kingston-McCloughry and of course Leigh Mallory made sure we'll never know.
Cheers
Steve
The problem with discussing a British escort fighter is it leads to a discussion of which bombers it world escort, much as I like the Lancaster as an aeroplane as an escorted daylight bomber it would be mince.
parsifal
Colonel
Again, you make the same unsubstantiated claims as just a short while ago, and again, i am compelled to correct your error.
Up to May 1941, when the blitz ended, LW losses were considerably higher than those suffered by the RAF. Thats within the period from January to May 1941. before that, i make no comment. My source for that is Foremans daily loss reports for both sides.
After May, the LW pulled out of western Europe except for two fighter groups, and one bomber group (and not including the roughly 160-250 fighters left in Ersatz formations in Germany itself) . Western Europe was later reinforced by a further fighter and one LR Anti shipping unit to augment the VLR Gruppen already deployed.
In the period July to November, losses in air combat were heavily in favour of the Germans, however overall airframe losses were actually fairly similar. The numbers of aircraft damaged and then written off in these groups is astounding.
Moreover, whilst FC losses were undeniably heavy, and many of the operations ill advised and an over-extension of RAF capabilities (for exactly the reasons you suggest....a lack of long range fighter aircraft), these operations were absolutely essential, and absolutely successful....eventually. The British, in order to move to a truly offensive stance, had first to lay some essential ground work over Britain, its waterways, and coastal regions, and also establish dominance over the French and Belgian coastlines and in the channel itself. It took a while, not fully achieved in 1941, but it was eventually successful, and critically accounted for the lions share of LW losses at that time, and gave them no real rest at a time that it needed that above anything. Throughout 1941, the LR group continued to attempt mining operations mostly off the western coastline of england, with a steadily declining level of success. I did some really detailed research into this about 3 years ago, looking at the day by day records from various sources. in 1940 through to the first half of 1941, about 1 million tons of shipping were lost to mines in the coastal waters around the British isles. In the latter half of 1941, through to the middle of 1942, this tonnage , despite a much increased temp of operations by the LW in this field (it was intended this would be the LWs main offensive weapon against Britain after the redeployment East) losses plummeted in that period to under 250000 tons. Thanks to the efforts of the KMs S-Bootes, this collapse was partially offset by a further loss of about 250000 to these small craft, but that was not FCs issue, and eventually these small boats were also mastered and pushed back.
youve made much about alleged losses on the east Front at this time. Yes, but they were recoverable losses. Unserviceable aircraft awaiting repair is not the same as an aircraft either shot down outright, or recovered, damaged, and then written off. Whilst i dont have monthly figures on the LW (East) recovery rate, we do know that this TO was down to less than a 1000 aircraft in December, but by June'42 had staged a fairly remarkable recovery as their logistics recovered. Hayward and Hardesty give a pretty good overview of this recovery. In the West, most losses were permanent, and therein lies the difference, and why the RAF was accounting for well over 50% (some sources claim 70%) of overall German losses.
Be prepared to back up your claims on this issue. I for one dont agree with your position on this issue.
Losses in the East were always higher than in the East. The idea that many of these were somehow recoverable shows a lack of understanding of the Luftwaffe system. The operational side of the Luftwaffe (all units subsidiary to a Fliegerkorps) simply raped lightly damaged aircraft for parts. They did not have the spare parts that they should have had, but more seriously nor did the administrative arm ( a 'Werft' was subsidiary to a Luftgau) whose job it was to repair anything but the light damage, including replacing functional parts, engine changes etc. In fact this infra structure barely existed in a working sense in the East. Aircraft more severely damaged had to leave the Luftwaffe and return to 'industry', that is the manufacturers or specialised repair and salvage companies. This usually meant a return to Germany by train and seems rarely to have been possible from the Eastern Front.
The idea that the RAF, operating to about as far as Lille, was seriously attriting the Luftwaffe in 1941 I'm afraid I don't buy.
I have an account of one of Mallory's conferences, held at Northolt, attended by both fighter and bomber leaders. Johnnie Kent (commanding officer of No. 303 (Polish) squadron, who surely needs no introduction) said that using bombers in such small numbers had no effect on enemy industry and wondered what the objective was. He continued.
"If the bombers are merely there as bait to bring up the fighters so that they could be destroyed then we should restrict our radius of activity to that which would permit us to fight without the nagging fear of running out of fuel. This mental obstacle seriously interferes with the pilots' fighting spirit and it is my opinion that we have already lost far too many first class men because these factors are not receiving sufficient attention."
Mallory looked taken aback at this criticism (according to Kent) and turned to his Group Operations Officer to reply. This was Group Captain Victor Beamish, an accomplished and experienced fighter leader in his own right. To Mallory's bewilderment Beamish agreed with Kent. Mallory turned to another staff officer, one without operational experience, who gave the reply he wanted. Mallory's eventual reply was "My answer to Kent is - we've done it!"
There ensued a bit of a row after which Kent remembers that
"The AOC preferred the second opinion and we continued to go to Lille and lose good men, all to little purpose. Worse even than the fact that these operations were virtually useless from a military point of view was the fact that they dominated all thinking about fighters."
My emphasis. A very perceptive comment by Kent, illustrating precisely my point about the lack of vision and imagination displayed by Mallory (et alter) in the leading of Fighter Command.
In 1944 Jonnie Johnson wrote an appreciation of Leigh-Mallory following his death in a flying accident.
"Leigh-Mallory was very much a fatherly figure and at his best when he led conferences with his young wing leaders, because he did not pretend to know about fighter tactics and relied on us to keep him up to date."
This of a man who had been in Fighter Command since 1937. Johnson may have intended a compliment but it beggars belief.
Cheers
Steve
The idea that the RAF, operating to about as far as Lille, was seriously attriting the Luftwaffe in 1941 I'm afraid I don't buy.
I have an account of one of Mallory's conferences, held at Northolt, attended by both fighter and bomber leaders. Johnnie Kent (commanding officer of No. 303 (Polish) squadron, who surely needs no introduction) said that using bombers in such small numbers had no effect on enemy industry and wondered what the objective was. He continued.
"If the bombers are merely there as bait to bring up the fighters so that they could be destroyed then we should restrict our radius of activity to that which would permit us to fight without the nagging fear of running out of fuel. This mental obstacle seriously interferes with the pilots' fighting spirit and it is my opinion that we have already lost far too many first class men because these factors are not receiving sufficient attention."
Mallory looked taken aback at this criticism (according to Kent) and turned to his Group Operations Officer to reply. This was Group Captain Victor Beamish, an accomplished and experienced fighter leader in his own right. To Mallory's bewilderment Beamish agreed with Kent. Mallory turned to another staff officer, one without operational experience, who gave the reply he wanted. Mallory's eventual reply was "My answer to Kent is - we've done it!"
There ensued a bit of a row after which Kent remembers that
"The AOC preferred the second opinion and we continued to go to Lille and lose good men, all to little purpose. Worse even than the fact that these operations were virtually useless from a military point of view was the fact that they dominated all thinking about fighters."
My emphasis. A very perceptive comment by Kent, illustrating precisely my point about the lack of vision and imagination displayed by Mallory (et alter) in the leading of Fighter Command.
In 1944 Jonnie Johnson wrote an appreciation of Leigh-Mallory following his death in a flying accident.
"Leigh-Mallory was very much a fatherly figure and at his best when he led conferences with his young wing leaders, because he did not pretend to know about fighter tactics and relied on us to keep him up to date."
This of a man who had been in Fighter Command since 1937. Johnson may have intended a compliment but it beggars belief.
Cheers
Steve
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Good information, Steve. Mallory's pigheadedness got him and his family killed when he insisted that his pilot take off in the Avro York taking him to India, and make its way over the Alps in bad weather, despite the pilot raising his objections to the conditions. Mallory's brother George's body still lies on the side of Mt Everest. Interesting that both were killed high up the sides of mountains.
Or 1942 for that matter. In August 1942, after nearly two years of such operations by the RAF and with all the other commitments that the Luftwaffe had in other theatres, there were still three full strength fighter Geschwaders covering the Channel and North Sea coasts. They were thinly spread not because the RAF had reduced them in any way, they comprised 442 fighters, mostly Fw 190s, but precisely because the Luftwaffe had so many other commitments and, for reasons discussed elsewhere, the total fighter establishment in late 1942 was similar to that in 1940.
When the Americans started their tentative raids on the European mainland in August 1942 they discovered just how little effect the RAF had had on Luftwaffe capabilities over the previous two years and were quite happy to say so.
The 9th October raid on Lille was the first time the 8th AF sortied more than 100 bombers. No less than 36 squadrons of allied fighters undertook various feints and sweeps. None of this prevented III./JG 26 intercepting the bombers and claiming six. Priller would later say that he never saw an allied fighter that day! Lt. Otto Stammberger's (III./JG 26) combat report at least mentions con trails from allied fighters, but they did not intervene in his attacks and he shot down a B-17 (Capt. Olson, 306th B.G.)
In 1941 there were only two regular Groups assigned, by Luftflotte 3, to the daylight defence of the area which the RAF could reach, I./JG 3 and I./JG 3. How exactly the RAF was going to grind down the entire Jagdwaffe when opposed by these two Gruppen I don't know. Put this in perspective. There were, by December 1941, six regular night fighter Gruppen in the same area under Luftflotte 3.
The RAF became increasingly desperate. The 12th August raid on two power stations near Cologne by 54 Blenheims was a vain attempt to persuade the Luftwaffe to recall fighter units from the hard pressed Eastern Front.
Cheers
Steve
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The Bf 109 variant that was entering service at the start of the Battle of Britain was the Bf 109E4. The E1,E2,E3 were already supersceded, they had inferior 20mm guns and often lacked a full fit-out of pilot armour. The first version of the Me 109 that had the ability to carry a jetisonable fuel tank was the Me 109E7 more specifically the Me 109E7/N which started coming of the production lines in August 1940 about one month before the Battle of Britain was over. However a certain number of Me 109E1 had been produced as Me 109E1/B to carry up to 250kg bomb however these aircraft were not plumbed for external fuel tanks nor did they have the enlarged oil capacity that would be needed to exploit the extra range from carrying extra fuel. Standard Me 109E1 nor any subsequent variant of the Me 109E2,E3 or E4 could carry bombs or fuel tanks. If the RAF recovered a Me 109E1 plumbed for a jetisonable fuel tank then it is almost certainly an Me 109E1/B which likely had been damaged and during rework in the factory was upgraded to near as possible Me 109E7 standard since it already had the strengthening needed to carry a bomb rack.
It is possible that the aircraft recovered had been upgraded, many E-7s were upgrades from earlier versions. The British CEAR would have taken the designation from one of the aircraft's data plates (standard procedure) and these were not always altered to reflect an upgrade and the upgraded aircraft retained their original werknummern.
There is no IF about the recovery of the aircraft and separate fuel tank and the identity of the aircraft is clear.
You are correct that the first version of the Bf 109 factory equipped with the plumbing to carry an auxiliary fuel tank was the E-7, but that doesn't mean that other options were not trialled before the system went into production. The relevant plumbing was part of the E-7 standard. An E-7/N had a DB 601 N engine fitted and the N designation has nothing to do with the rest of the aircraft's production standard.
The E-7 standard included the drop tank plumbing and bomb release mechanism wiring as standard in order to enable easy field conversion from fighter bomber to extended range fighter and vice-versa.
You are not quite correct about the fitting of bomb racks. A Bf 109 E-1,3 or 4/B could be fitted with either the ETC 500/IXb or ETC 50/VIIId rack. The relevant wiring etc was not, however, standard.
Cheers
Steve
There is no IF about the recovery of the aircraft and separate fuel tank and the identity of the aircraft is clear.
You are correct that the first version of the Bf 109 factory equipped with the plumbing to carry an auxiliary fuel tank was the E-7, but that doesn't mean that other options were not trialled before the system went into production. The relevant plumbing was part of the E-7 standard. An E-7/N had a DB 601 N engine fitted and the N designation has nothing to do with the rest of the aircraft's production standard.
The E-7 standard included the drop tank plumbing and bomb release mechanism wiring as standard in order to enable easy field conversion from fighter bomber to extended range fighter and vice-versa.
You are not quite correct about the fitting of bomb racks. A Bf 109 E-1,3 or 4/B could be fitted with either the ETC 500/IXb or ETC 50/VIIId rack. The relevant wiring etc was not, however, standard.
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
The attrition suffered by Germany on all fronts prevented the LW from 1940 on from ever being able to recover, or expand at anything like the rate of her opponents. Germany entered the war in 1939, with 2916 front line combat aircraft. By December 1940, despite having added 3350 into the LW, the LW a/c strength stood at 2885. Between January and June 1941, the LW grew to 3451 front line a/c, having received an additional 1800 a/c in that period (approximately....overall acceptances in 1941 was 3746). From July to December 1941, the LW shrank to 2961, despite having received another 1800 aircraft. from January to June 1942, the LW recovered, and expanded back to 3573 aircraft, having accepted 2500 a/c. From July to December 1942, the LW shrank slightly to 3440 a/c after receiving over 3000 a/c in that period
From 1939 through to the end of 1940 the RAF had received 4283 aircraft, with the RAF growing from a front line strength of 1660 a/c to 2900. In the period January to June 1941, the RAF grew to 3106 a/c, and in that same period received about 3500 a/c.From July to December 1941, the RAF received 3564 ac, and the force grew to 4287 a/c. From January 1942 to June 1942, the RAF grew to 5500 a/c, having received some 4200 a/c. From July 1942 through to December, the RAF grew to 6430 front line aircraft, having received a further 3900 a/c
One method of determining losses is to add starting total plus aircraft received, and then subtract the final aircraft on strength. For the LW this reveals the following losses in the specified periods
For germany, losses in those periods were as follows:
1939 to end of 1940: 3381
Jan to June 1941 1234
July to Dec 1941 2290
Jan to June 1942 1888
July to Dec 1942 3133
For Britain the overall losses suffered in those same periods were about
1939 to end of 1940: 3043, of which 689 were BC losses
Jan to June 1941 3294, of which 555 were BC losses
July to Dec 1941 2383, of which 828 were BC losses
Jan to June 1942 2988, of which 960 were BC losses
July to Dec 1942 2970, of which 842 were BC losses
Losses in the period July to December 1941 for the LW were just over 1400 outside the EF, dropped slightly in the first half of 1942. I havent done the detailed breakdaown for the last half of 1942, but it seems to trend about the same, except at the very end of the year.
Seems very clear to me. Without the sacrifices made by the RAF made January 1941 through to December 1942, the LW would have been in a far better position than it was to prosecute its war against the Russians,and further, would have enjoyed a substantial period of growth. LW losses were replaced, but LW expansion was curtailed by RAF operations. Mor3eover, the break even point, excluding the wastage that was occurring within BC appears to have been achieved from about June 1942. in that month in western Europe, the RAF lost 68 aircraft (not including BC) and a further 148 damaged, compared to 89 LW aircraft (including all types) and 105 damaged. I dont see much changing or trending away from that after that month.
From 1939 through to the end of 1940 the RAF had received 4283 aircraft, with the RAF growing from a front line strength of 1660 a/c to 2900. In the period January to June 1941, the RAF grew to 3106 a/c, and in that same period received about 3500 a/c.From July to December 1941, the RAF received 3564 ac, and the force grew to 4287 a/c. From January 1942 to June 1942, the RAF grew to 5500 a/c, having received some 4200 a/c. From July 1942 through to December, the RAF grew to 6430 front line aircraft, having received a further 3900 a/c
One method of determining losses is to add starting total plus aircraft received, and then subtract the final aircraft on strength. For the LW this reveals the following losses in the specified periods
For germany, losses in those periods were as follows:
1939 to end of 1940: 3381
Jan to June 1941 1234
July to Dec 1941 2290
Jan to June 1942 1888
July to Dec 1942 3133
For Britain the overall losses suffered in those same periods were about
1939 to end of 1940: 3043, of which 689 were BC losses
Jan to June 1941 3294, of which 555 were BC losses
July to Dec 1941 2383, of which 828 were BC losses
Jan to June 1942 2988, of which 960 were BC losses
July to Dec 1942 2970, of which 842 were BC losses
Losses in the period July to December 1941 for the LW were just over 1400 outside the EF, dropped slightly in the first half of 1942. I havent done the detailed breakdaown for the last half of 1942, but it seems to trend about the same, except at the very end of the year.
Seems very clear to me. Without the sacrifices made by the RAF made January 1941 through to December 1942, the LW would have been in a far better position than it was to prosecute its war against the Russians,and further, would have enjoyed a substantial period of growth. LW losses were replaced, but LW expansion was curtailed by RAF operations. Mor3eover, the break even point, excluding the wastage that was occurring within BC appears to have been achieved from about June 1942. in that month in western Europe, the RAF lost 68 aircraft (not including BC) and a further 148 damaged, compared to 89 LW aircraft (including all types) and 105 damaged. I dont see much changing or trending away from that after that month.
Luftwaffe expansion wasn't curtailed by RAF operations, it was curtailed by bad planning. Yes, there were of course Luftwaffe losses in NW Europe, but these were not the critical losses, not least because so few fighters (and we are talking fighter losses) were actually based there.
You have 3,381 aircraft lost in 1939/40. I can tell you that between May 1940 and December 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 1,528 bombers, roughly half the total and about 1,000 single engine fighters (I have two numbers either side of that figure).
In 1941 (excluding November for which the records are lost) in all theatres, the Luftwaffe lost 5,002 aircraft of which only 1,327 were single engine fighters.
The Jagdwaffe had roughly three times as many aircraft in the East than the West and was suffering a monthly loss rate of 36.3% for single engine fighters in the East. This is where it began to be dismantled prior to the American intervention which came later, not by losses incurred by two (or three) Gruppen based in NW Europe.
The Luftwaffe was still continuing other operations against the UK. The first blitz is usually dated by the British from September 1940 to December 1941 followed by the two series of 'Baedecker' raids from April to June 1942. By 1943 the few under strength Kamfgruppen left on the Western Front had become less relevant, though still capable of mounting some strategic raids. This had nothing to do with the RAF and everything to do with commitments elsewhere.
The RAF operations of this period had no effect whatsoever on the German ability to continue its night time blitz. They had virtually no effect on Germany's industrial capability and had minimal effect on the Jagdwaffe's ability to oppose the day time USAAF raids as the gathered pace into 1943.
So worried were the Germans by this series of pin pricks inflicted by Fighter Command under Leigh-Mallory, that they based a mere two fighter Gruppen between the French Channel coast and Denmark!
The limit of Fighter Command's range was roughly Lille and even there we know that the pilots were fretting about running out of fuel. Anyone not familiar with the geography of NW Europe should look at a map to see for what a large number of RAF fighter pilots were sacrificed. Mallory's 'leaning forward' barely crossed the Channel.
Cheers
Steve
You have 3,381 aircraft lost in 1939/40. I can tell you that between May 1940 and December 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 1,528 bombers, roughly half the total and about 1,000 single engine fighters (I have two numbers either side of that figure).
In 1941 (excluding November for which the records are lost) in all theatres, the Luftwaffe lost 5,002 aircraft of which only 1,327 were single engine fighters.
The Jagdwaffe had roughly three times as many aircraft in the East than the West and was suffering a monthly loss rate of 36.3% for single engine fighters in the East. This is where it began to be dismantled prior to the American intervention which came later, not by losses incurred by two (or three) Gruppen based in NW Europe.
The Luftwaffe was still continuing other operations against the UK. The first blitz is usually dated by the British from September 1940 to December 1941 followed by the two series of 'Baedecker' raids from April to June 1942. By 1943 the few under strength Kamfgruppen left on the Western Front had become less relevant, though still capable of mounting some strategic raids. This had nothing to do with the RAF and everything to do with commitments elsewhere.
The RAF operations of this period had no effect whatsoever on the German ability to continue its night time blitz. They had virtually no effect on Germany's industrial capability and had minimal effect on the Jagdwaffe's ability to oppose the day time USAAF raids as the gathered pace into 1943.
So worried were the Germans by this series of pin pricks inflicted by Fighter Command under Leigh-Mallory, that they based a mere two fighter Gruppen between the French Channel coast and Denmark!
The limit of Fighter Command's range was roughly Lille and even there we know that the pilots were fretting about running out of fuel. Anyone not familiar with the geography of NW Europe should look at a map to see for what a large number of RAF fighter pilots were sacrificed. Mallory's 'leaning forward' barely crossed the Channel.
Cheers
Steve
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Hello Steve, difficult to say what you mean, I./JG 3 participated the Op. Barbarossa and then spent the autumn at Magdeburg and arrived to West (in Holland) only on 13 Dec 41, but Stab, II. and III./JG 2 and the whole JG 26, i.e. 5 Gruppen were stationed in the areas that could be reached by FC single engine fighters and one of the Gruppe of JG 2 was stationed at Brest to cover Western Bretagne from possible daytime raids by the BC and the CC.
And generally, don't forget MTO, it was at times important drain of LW resources.
Juha
Lille is the first place I ever went to in France almost exactly the same distance from Calais as London is from Dover. The RAF learned very little from the BoB about offense.
