Dateline 1941: Did the Martin Baltimore have any advantages over the Douglas A-20 Havoc sufficient to justify US adoption?

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I suspect one of the factors may have been adaptability to the very rough field conditions often encountered in the PTO, especially airfields vis a vis takeoff and landing. B-25 was famously easy to fly, and A-20 was also considered a 'pilots aircraft'. But the B-26 units they did have in Theater (I believe in the Solomons area) did pretty well. 22nd Bomb Group used them through 1944 and I know they did some raids on Rabaul with them and sunk a few ships.

Once a pilot was used to the B-26, it was probably at least as good as a B-25. It carried a heavier bomb load, was a bit faster, and could carry torpedoes, though the range of the B-25 was a little better as you say. But newer crews probably had a higher accident rate, especially taking off from and landing on rutted, muddy fields.
 
After 1940, a bomber that goes ~300 mph is very easy to intercept for Luftwaffe, that are flying 370+ mph fighters.
DB-7 (ie. the ones powered by R-1830s) were around 300 mph - very good value for 1940 indeed. Maryland was thereabout. Both flew sorties with low loss rates in the FAF service in 1940.

Fair points, you are forgetting though that there was a lag in the 370 mph fighters (Bf 109F and MC 202) arriving in MTO, and it was certainly a while before they were there in any numbers. When the Maryland was first deployed Axis fighters were mostly MC 200 and the Bf 110s of JG 26, with a few Bf 109E coming into Theater with JG 27 in April 1941. 109F didn't start arriving until June 1941, and transition wasn't complete until September when a second Staffel came into the zone. The MC 202 started trickling in in November.

So until late Summer 1941, I would say a 300 mph bomber was still relatively fast for the Theater. Higher speed also helped against Flak as well of course. And against fighters, the speed is not just a matter of a strait line chase, but also of intercept vectors, obviously, particularly if the fighters don't have an altitude advantage. So even if the fighter is faster it may still have trouble catching the bomber. V-1 flying bombs were only going around 550 kph but were still considered fairly hard to intercept as we know. And to attack heavier armed bombers, the fighters needed to approach from oblique angles or from the front. Faster bombers meant longer time to line up attacks which meant fewer attack passes.

There was a point toward the late summer of 1941 where the increasing fighter opposition was probably making both Boston and Maryland too vulnerable, unless they were well escorted. This is when the Baltimore started replacing the Maryland. The Baltimores were apparently going quite fast in their 'exit dives' - I had an anecdote somewhere mentioning specific numbers but I can't find it. But they apparently had the lowest loss rate for the British in the last years of the Desert War, and were able to operate successfully in Italy (a more risky environment for AAA). I suspect speed was the major reason.

It's a bit tangential but the Axis fighter units (esp. Luftwaffe) in North Africa don't seem to have been all that good at shooting down Allied bombers in general when they were escorted. They preferred to pick off the fighters from above, to rack up their scores. Many German and Allied pilots made note of this and it was a controversy between Rommel and the Luftwaffe. Engaging with the bombers required lingering in the combat area which reduced the advantages of the 109 and MC 202 and greatly increased the risks, plus there was always the hazards of defensive fire from the bombers. In early 1940 that might typically be a single hand held Vickers 'K' gun in each bomber, by the mid war this was increasingly replaced by powered turrets and multiple LMG or HMG.

640px-Martin_A-30A.jpg


Some Baltimore squadrons were replaced by later model Bostons though, later in the war, so maybe that says something.
 
1. In mid-1942 the design was being reworked to accommodate a larger wing to address the poor take off and landing performance. B-25 production quickly surpassed B-26 production.

High wing-loading in an area where operations are low-level and the air is quite warm would add difficulties, right?
 
I just checked to be sure. Lyndon Johnson ,aka LBJ, flew a mission on a B-26 over New Guinea. Not as crew but part of Congressional "fact finding" or some such. General MacArthur had him issued a Silver Star.
The plane he was on aborted due to mechanical trouble. Of the remaining 10 aircraft that attacked the target, one was shot down and another made a forced landing back at Port Moresby. Nobody else got any medals for that mission. Not even the observer aboard the downed plane, LTC Francis Stevens. Awarding medals is as much about politics as it is about merit.
 
Getting this back on thread, the USAAF could have repossessed as many Baltimores (A-30) as they wished, but didn't. They did repossess many Lockheed Hudsons, which were pressed into service for maritime patrols until replaced by more modern aircraft.
 
Well they (5th AF) evaluated the A-26 and had a specific beef with it, to do with lateral visibility. And that was a bit later in the game I think. But you do have a point about simplifying supply lines. I was never really clear why the B-26 was phased out in the PTO. B-24 did seem like the better fit as far as the heavies.
Attached are a couple of AAF memos discussing the A-26 and the lack of interest by the 5th AF
 

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Getting this back on thread, the USAAF could have repossessed as many Baltimores (A-30) as they wished, but didn't. They did repossess many Lockheed Hudsons, which were pressed into service for maritime patrols until replaced by more modern aircraft.

Indeed, it's basically what they did with the A-20s, the first of which were from a repurposed French shipment. The Hudson of course had very different capabilities - nearly twice the range for one thing, and ideally suited for the many roles they did in fact use it for. With it's comparatively tiny bomb load and relatively low speed it wasn't really in the same league (or niche) as the Boston or the Baltimore as a strike aircraft of course. Whether they ever considered the latter (or it's predecessor, the Maryland) for PTO use is unknown to me. I was just saying I suspect they would have used them if they had them. Battle worthy combat aircraft were in fairly short supply and badly needed.

But it's also true, as you say, they rejected some types.
 
The plane he was on aborted due to mechanical trouble. Of the remaining 10 aircraft that attacked the target, one was shot down and another made a forced landing back at Port Moresby. Nobody else got any medals for that mission. Not even the observer aboard the downed plane, LTC Francis Stevens. Awarding medals is as much about politics as it is about merit.

Aaaand back down to previous levels lol
 
If we're talking about politicians active service. Winston Churchill resigned from the government after being demoted following the Gallipoli debacle and became commander of 6th Battalion Scots Fusiliers. His battalion was in the front line at Ploegstreet for 3 months and he was nearly hit by a lump of shrapnel that landed beside him.
 
There was a point toward the late summer of 1941 where the increasing fighter opposition was probably making both Boston and Maryland too vulnerable, unless they were well escorted. This is when the Baltimore started replacing the Maryland.
Problem here is that the Baltimore didn't really start to replace the Maryland until 1942. It took until late in 1942 to get 7 squadrons of Baltimores which is probably why the US showed little or no interest in the plane. Granted the route to get Baltimores into service was a long one, both in distance and time as the Planes had to be shipped from the factory to England and then shipped around Africa to the mid-east.
See; Martin Baltimore - Development and Combat Record

a few excerpts.

"The first Baltimore Mk I reached the UK in October 1941, and underwent trials at Burtonwood near Liverpool. It entered service three months later, in January 1942, with No.223 Squadron at Shandur, Egypt."

"The first operation unit to get the Baltimore was No.55 Squadron, also in Egypt, in May 1942."

The British (and French) had ordered 400 Baltimores in May of 1940. These were delivered as 50 Baltimore I's, 100 Baltimore II's and 250 Baltimore III's. The Baltimore III's were the first ones to get the dorsal power turret. The First flight of a Baltimore at the factory was June 14th 1941.

Comparing this to the B-25 time line the first B-25 flew in August of 1940. In Jan of 1942 NA delivered the 184th B-25 completing the initial order. the last 120 or so were were B-25Bs with the dorsal and ventral turrets.

For the A-20/DB-7 time line the 1000th aircraft was delivered in the fall of 1941. This does include the P & W R-1830 powered versions.

For the B-26, I would simply note that 1131 of them were on order as of Sept 28th 1940 before the first one ever flew. Something of a gamble but helps explain the US lack of interest in the Baltimore. Production had started in the Spring of 1941 and the 500th was completed in the summer of 1942.

See also: Martin Baltimore Squadrons
 
B-26 production began in February 1941. Maryland production ended in April 1941. Baltimore, 1 produced in June 1941, then production from August, first 3 reported en route to the Middle East via the cape on week ending 3 October 1941, first arrivals week ending 28 November, total of 55 by week ending 2 January 1942. Deliveries by air began in October 1942. (AIR 8/511 to 513 and 38/23), 2 Baltimores arrived in Britain in September 1941, another 2 in October, 2 in March 1942, 1 in May 1943 (AIR 19/524)

B-25 production February to May 1941, 24 built. B-25A 40 built May to July 1941, B-25B 120 built August to May 1942 (but the 15th B-25B 42-2243 crashed and was not counted in the acceptance figures). B-25C production began in December.
 
B-26 production began in February 1941. Maryland production ended in April 1941. Baltimore, 1 produced in June 1941, then production from August, first 3 reported en route to the Middle East via the cape on week ending 3 October 1941, first arrivals week ending 28 November, total of 55 by week ending 2 January 1942. Deliveries by air began in October 1942. (AIR 8/511 to 513 and 38/23), 2 Baltimores arrived in Britain in September 1941, another 2 in October, 2 in March 1942, 1 in May 1943 (AIR 19/524)

So if I understand you correctly here, some were being shipped to England and then flown to the Middle East, while some (most?) were being shipped directly to Africa.

B-25 production February to May 1941, 24 built. B-25A 40 built May to July 1941, B-25B 120 built August to May 1942 (but the 15th B-25B 42-2243 crashed and was not counted in the acceptance figures). B-25C production began in December.

So in this sense, B-25 and Baltimore were produced and deployed on a similar timeline, which amounted to the second or third generation of DB-7.
 
Problem here is that the Baltimore didn't really start to replace the Maryland until 1942. It took until late in 1942 to get 7 squadrons of Baltimores which is probably why the US showed little or no interest in the plane. Granted the route to get Baltimores into service was a long one, both in distance and time as the Planes had to be shipped from the factory to England and then shipped around Africa to the mid-east.
See; Martin Baltimore - Development and Combat Record

a few excerpts.

"The first Baltimore Mk I reached the UK in October 1941, and underwent trials at Burtonwood near Liverpool. It entered service three months later, in January 1942, with No.223 Squadron at Shandur, Egypt."

"The first operation unit to get the Baltimore was No.55 Squadron, also in Egypt, in May 1942."

The British (and French) had ordered 400 Baltimores in May of 1940. These were delivered as 50 Baltimore I's, 100 Baltimore II's and 250 Baltimore III's. The Baltimore III's were the first ones to get the dorsal power turret. The First flight of a Baltimore at the factory was June 14th 1941.

Comparing this to the B-25 time line the first B-25 flew in August of 1940. In Jan of 1942 NA delivered the 184th B-25 completing the initial order. the last 120 or so were were B-25Bs with the dorsal and ventral turrets.

For the A-20/DB-7 time line the 1000th aircraft was delivered in the fall of 1941. This does include the P & W R-1830 powered versions.

For the B-26, I would simply note that 1131 of them were on order as of Sept 28th 1940 before the first one ever flew. Something of a gamble but helps explain the US lack of interest in the Baltimore. Production had started in the Spring of 1941 and the 500th was completed in the summer of 1942.

See also: Martin Baltimore Squadrons

Yes so to the OP, in 1941 the Baltimore isn't yet a factor, though this would have been the decision making time to get some into the pipeline for US use.

The difference here is probably that the Boston and Maryland were able to prove themselves in French use quite early (1940) and therefore attract the further interest of the British (who already liked the type), with the Boston also interesting the Russians, and the Americans had put in a small pre-war order as well. The Baltimore was as yet unproven and a somewhat unknown quantity.

Why Maryland wasn't more widely adopted may be simply down to relatively small production run / initial order (?). The Wiki on the Maryland is a bit misleading because the British certainly put it into fairly heavy use as a bomber for a while, (i.e. not just recon from Malta) as the Blenheim was hopelessly outclassed for MTO use and was basically a death-trap by 1941. The DAF shifted to the use of fighter-bombers but never stopped using their twin engined light bombers and (later) American medium bombers, for which which they developed effecitve methods of attack (even boming in 'box' formations to break holes in Axis battle lines).

The British certainly appreciated the Baltimore once it became available and that may be down to field experiences in North Africa, and a different perception of the role and priorities of a light or medium bomber. The Americans liked a lot more defensive guns. The British (at least in North Africa) were relying more on fighter protection and speed. Wartime experience seems to suggest that the latter priority did in fact make a bit more sense, and when you look at probably the ultimate war-time bomber in this role, the A-26, it was a bit lighter armed, had a smaller crew, and was certainly quite a bit faster than the B-25 or B-26.

The British though of course favored aircraft which could carry massive bomb loads, so this entire class of light, fast attack bombers ended up being something that was a bit out of sync with both British and American bomber design theory, at least by say late 1941. They were basically designed by industry according to late pre-war specs, which ended up proving to be useful. The A-26 was kind of the ultimate expression of this niche, but arrived in combat later than say, the Baltimore or A-20G, so had less overall impact than either.
 

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