Thanks for the info. It's not something I know a lot about specifically, just in relation to other things. I'm only surprised because the Admiralty looked at the effects of aerial attacks on shipping in the early stages of the war and published, in 1941, the imaginatively titles 'Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to November 1941'.
High level bombing (from above 9,000ft) was considered ineffective. The Germans abandoned the tactic in May 1940 so they probably agreed.
Low level bombing from around 1,000ft was considered moderately effective against destroyer/escort classes and trawler/auxiliary classes, but not against anything heavier.
Very low level attacks, called 'flat bombing' by the British were usually considered to be machine gun runs, making the use of bombs impractical and exposing the aircraft to anti aircraft fire in exchange for little advantage.
Dive bombing was considered by far the most effective form of bombing attack on ships and the statistics support this. However, what was a relatively easy attack made on smaller vessels unable to elevate their guns above 40 degrees was not so when attacking larger vessels. The Ju 87 would have to dive slowly through an intense barrage. The British reckoned that the Ju 87 dived slower than its US or Japanese counterparts. Another consideration, particularly in Northern waters, was the weather. The Ju 87 ideally needed clear visibility and a cloud ceiling above 10,000ft.
The Germans didn't really have much of a torpedo bomber in 1939/41.
The Navy did not consider its larger vessels to be at serious risk from air attack, though smaller vessels were. Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet thought so. He dismissed the idea of small warships operating a flotilla defence in the English Channel in the face of German air superiority but others disagreed.
There was a debate pre-war in Britain about what sort of ordnance was best dropped on war ships. Much of the work was carried out by Henry Tizard (who must have been a busy man) and the correspondence between him and Dowding about the failure of RAF bombs to destroy German warships bombed at anchor on 4th September 1939 survives. Dowding had been involved in the earlier 'Job74 Trials'. Basically the RAF was using the wrong type of bomb with the wrong fusing (delay).
The Admiralty report above confirms that the Germans were doing the same thing. German bombs varied from 50Kg to 600Kg (the latter only 2% of those dropped). 70% of bombs dropped were up to 'about 100Kg'. 73% were fused for delay indicating that the Germans did understand the importance of timed fuses.
The figures are based on unexploded ordnance and 'bombs reported'. How accurately those being bombed assessed and counted the ordnance falling on them is open for debate but the figures convinced the Admiralty that the Germans were mostly dropping bombs too small to seriously inconvenience their larger vessels.
I suspect that the move to produce more carriers was based on other strategic and tactical considerations rather than an appreciation of the vulnerability of large vessels to aerial attack. At least in late 1941 the Admiralty didn't consider its larger vessels to be vulnerable at all.
Cheers
Steve
High level bombing (from above 9,000ft) was considered ineffective. The Germans abandoned the tactic in May 1940 so they probably agreed.
Low level bombing from around 1,000ft was considered moderately effective against destroyer/escort classes and trawler/auxiliary classes, but not against anything heavier.
Very low level attacks, called 'flat bombing' by the British were usually considered to be machine gun runs, making the use of bombs impractical and exposing the aircraft to anti aircraft fire in exchange for little advantage.
Dive bombing was considered by far the most effective form of bombing attack on ships and the statistics support this. However, what was a relatively easy attack made on smaller vessels unable to elevate their guns above 40 degrees was not so when attacking larger vessels. The Ju 87 would have to dive slowly through an intense barrage. The British reckoned that the Ju 87 dived slower than its US or Japanese counterparts. Another consideration, particularly in Northern waters, was the weather. The Ju 87 ideally needed clear visibility and a cloud ceiling above 10,000ft.
The Germans didn't really have much of a torpedo bomber in 1939/41.
The Navy did not consider its larger vessels to be at serious risk from air attack, though smaller vessels were. Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet thought so. He dismissed the idea of small warships operating a flotilla defence in the English Channel in the face of German air superiority but others disagreed.
There was a debate pre-war in Britain about what sort of ordnance was best dropped on war ships. Much of the work was carried out by Henry Tizard (who must have been a busy man) and the correspondence between him and Dowding about the failure of RAF bombs to destroy German warships bombed at anchor on 4th September 1939 survives. Dowding had been involved in the earlier 'Job74 Trials'. Basically the RAF was using the wrong type of bomb with the wrong fusing (delay).
The Admiralty report above confirms that the Germans were doing the same thing. German bombs varied from 50Kg to 600Kg (the latter only 2% of those dropped). 70% of bombs dropped were up to 'about 100Kg'. 73% were fused for delay indicating that the Germans did understand the importance of timed fuses.
The figures are based on unexploded ordnance and 'bombs reported'. How accurately those being bombed assessed and counted the ordnance falling on them is open for debate but the figures convinced the Admiralty that the Germans were mostly dropping bombs too small to seriously inconvenience their larger vessels.
I suspect that the move to produce more carriers was based on other strategic and tactical considerations rather than an appreciation of the vulnerability of large vessels to aerial attack. At least in late 1941 the Admiralty didn't consider its larger vessels to be vulnerable at all.
Cheers
Steve