Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Thumpalumpacus]

The IJN had the identical mix of LA torpedo and HA dive bombers strike groups. Upon spotting the incoming LA strike the HA CAP should have been asking, hmmm…. now where are the dive bombers? Let's wait for them.

They weren't divided up in that manner. However, Japanese fighter pilots were trained to regard torpedo bombers as more dangerous to ships. Also, dive-bombers at high level are much harder to see from a cruiser 10 miles away from KdB, and can't really cue the fighters in with main-battery fire even if spotted.

Bear in mind as well that while VT-8 and VT-6 had ended their attacks (well, been killed) by 1000 hrs, the Zeroes could hit 20,000 ft in eight minutes or so. Had they all gone to the deck and seen off the TBDs, they still had plenty of time to climb back up before the SBDs tipped over at 1020 hrs. But they had no directors giving them those orders.

At any rate, without radar and centralized direction, you can't fairly expect fighter pilots to anticipate the next vector and altitude of attack (especially on such a confused morning!) on their own. Us Americans struggled with that throughout 1942, and that was with radar and better radios.

They perhaps should have assigned high- and low-groups, but you still in either case risk getting caught out of place, and there's more than a bit of retrospectroscopy involved.

 

[PAT303]

My understanding is that the radios were pretty bad for reliable and clear reception, but in 1942 the absence of fighter-control radar still meant that flight leaders were reliant on personal observation for countering enemy attacks.

It's deeper than that, if you look at the difference in the carriers, the US commanders had a designated war room with a table showing updated information on ship and aircraft positions so everyone involved had a clear picture of the situation, the Japanese carriers had very small rooms without a plotting board or designated room for discussing attacks or defence without interference, I know from my experience I couldn't make sound judgments without real time information while havings lots of background clatter causing distraction.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's deeper than that, if you look at the difference in the carriers, the US commanders had a designated war room with a table showing updated information on ship and aircraft positions so everyone involved had a clear picture of the situation, the Japanese carriers had very small rooms without a plotting board or designated room for discussing attacks or defence without interference, I know from my experience I couldn't make sound judgments without real time information while havings lots of background clatter causing distraction.

Not in 1942. CICs weren't instituted until the end of 1942/early 1943, by CinCPAC edict. Before then, there was no integration of information into any one room of a USN ship.

 

[Admiral Beez]

At any rate, without radar and centralized direction, you can't fairly expect fighter pilots to anticipate the next vector and altitude of attack

Makes me wonder if radar, radios and centralized direction would enable a British CBG flying Fulmars and Albacores to prevail against an IJN group.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Makes me wonder if radar, radios and centralized direction would enable a British CBG flying Fulmars and Albacores to prevail against an IJN group.

Hard to say. All the radar in the world doesn't help a fighter aircraft with performance difficulties, as we Americans found out around Guadalcanal, and the Fulmar was ~50mph slower than a Zero, as well as much more unwieldy.

Albacore, on the other hand, couldn't do worse than the TBDs.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Albacore, on the other hand, couldn't do worse than the TBDs.

And the Albacore can dive bomb too. Can the Fulmar?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And the Albacore can dive bomb too. Can the Fulmar?

I don't think so. I think it can glide-bomb? I'm pretty sure it can carry a 500-lb bomb. But it's got to survive the approach run in the face of Zeros. Let me know how that works out.

 

[RCAFson]

I don't think so. I think it can glide-bomb? I'm pretty sure it can carry a 500-lb bomb. But it's got to survive the approach run in the face of Zeros. Let me know how that works out.

Yes, the Fulmar II can dive-bomb (drop a 500lb bomb at greater than a 45deg dive) and it's a faster aircraft than an SBD. However it wasn't cleared for dive-bombing until June 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

Makes me wonder if radar, radios and centralized direction would enable a British CBG flying Fulmars and Albacores to prevail against an IJN group.

And Sea Hurricanes. But what does 'prevail' mean?

 

[PAT303]

Not in 1942. CICs weren't instituted until the end of 1942/early 1943, by CinCPAC edict. Before then, there was no integration of information into any one room of a USN ship.

Shattered sword mentioned this problem with IJN carriers.

 

[RCAFson]

Not in 1942. CICs weren't instituted until the end of 1942/early 1943, by CinCPAC edict. Before then, there was no integration of information into any one room of a USN ship.

The FAA passed on their GCI experience to the USN and, IIRC, a quasi CIC was in place by pre PH and fairly advanced by mid 1942 on USN carriers.

See Friedman's 'Fighters over the Fleet'.

 

[EwenS]

The FAA passed on their GCI experiences to the USN and, IIRC, a quasi CIC was in place by mid 1942 on USN carriers.

USN officers had been trained in GCI techniques in Britain in 1941. They returned to the US and set up the first Fighter Direction School in Sept 1941.

July 1941 saw a decision to create a "radar plot" in ships fitted with CXAM radar sets. The first went into the carrier Hornet which was yet to complete. A new Tentative Fighter Direction Doctrine was published in Aug.

The Beginnings of Naval Fighter Direction - Chapter 5 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

The USN had the opportunity to see the British set ups while the carriers Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable were being repaired at Norfolk (the FDOs of all 3 ships got together in Nov 1941 to review techniques exchange experiences).

Feb 1942 seems to have been the first operational interception by a USN Fighter Director. USS Lexington.

The CXAM Goes to War - Chapter 6 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

All 3 US carriers at Midway had radar plots, but there were still problems to be ironed out.

Midway - Chapter 7 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

Failures at Santa Cruz and earlier battles forced a reappraisal of techniques. That led in Nov 1942 to instructions by Nimitz for Pacific Fleet ships to get a "Combat Operations Centre". Early 1943 then saw a complete overhaul of Pacific Fleet Carrier Task Force procedures which were practiced by the new carriers before they entered combat at the end of Aug 1943.

The Solomons - Chapter 8 of Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org

1943 also saw fighter direction move out of carriers into other ships in the fleet.

 

[PAT303]

So back to the original question, would 7 carriers have turned the tide or just add to the slaughter?.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The FAA passed on their GCI experience to the USN and, IIRC, a quasi CIC was in place by pre PH and fairly advanced by mid 1942 on USN carriers.

See Friedman's 'Fighters over the Fleet'.

Define "quasi". What ships carried it, what information systems fed it, and so on.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, the Fulmar II can dive-bomb (drop a 500lb bomb at greater than a 45deg dive) and it's a faster aircraft than an SBD. However it wasn't cleared for dive-bombing until June 1942.

Isn't dive-bombing per se>60?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Shattered sword mentioned this problem with IJN carriers.

Lundstrom goes into some detail on inept American CAP issues in all the 1942 carrier battles.

 

[mack8]

So back to the original question, would 7 carriers have turned the tide or just add to the slaughter?.

Imo any increase in the numbers of IJN carriers decreases by that much the chances they will lose, and gain looking at the flow of the battle it's possible they could have won even without any extra carriers present. You can still make scenarios either way as one pleases, but with 7 carriers the chances they will still lose are imo very small.

Btw, these extra carriers, do they come with the extra forces they were sailing with OTL? That's quite a few more cruisers, BBs and DDs!
Reading through some of the initial posts, yeah i'll probably leave Junyo home for more training, with her planes sent to Zuikaku and the CVLs. She's very slow anyway.

So you have Zuikaku, Zuiho and Ryujo, with their airgroups augmented from Junyo, something like this:

Zuikaku- even assuming all there is operational are the planes as of 9th of May, 24 A6M, 13 D3A and 8 B5N, you can add from Junyo's D3A so you have 27 D3A operational. Zeros are plenty, but needs at least 9-10 B5Ns, so either get 9 off Kaga's 27, or get 8-9 B5N2s from Ryujo, and couple from Zuiho. So you have 24 A6M, 27 D3A and about 18 B5N operational.

Ryujo- leave as is, or give 9 B5N2 to Zuikaku and instead get the 12 A6M from 6 Ku, so Ryujo is a fighter carrier like at Eastern Solomons, with 24 A6M and 9 B5N.

Zuiho- trade 6 A5M for the 6 Zeros from Junyo, and maybe give 1-2 B5N2 to Zuikaku. Give the A5Ms to Hosho so Yamamoto has a few fighters overhead (redundant anyway, but still), or just keep them, can use them for anti-sub patrols or whatever. Or get the 6 extra Zeros from Zuikaku for a normal 18 plane VF. So the total is 18 A6M (or 12 A6M and 6 A5M), and 9 B5N.

The B5Ns from the CVLs are to be used exclusively for search. That is if there are no extra cruisers (Kurita? Hosogaya?) and BBs(Kondo?) with Nagumo.

So we have 60 (!) extra Zeros with Nagumo, never mind the other planes, extra 27 D3A and about 36 B5Ns.

 

[EwenS]

Imo any increase in the numbers of IJN carriers decreases by that much the chances they will lose, and gain looking at thge flow of the battle it's possible they could have won even without any extra carriers present. You can still make scenarios either way as one pleases, but with 7 carriers the chances they will still lose re imo very small.

Btw, these extra carriers, do they come with the extra forces they were sailing with OTL? That's quite a few more cruisers, BBs and DDs!

No more capital ships. Everything in commission was committed to Midway/Aleutians. 7 with the Midway Forces & 4 with the Aleutian forces. Musashi was yet to complete.

Same story with heavy cruisers. Only ones not committed were 3 in refit and 2 based out of Rabaul.

That only leaves the old WW1 design light cruisers and the training cruisers. Of those 20, 9 were already allocated to those assaults.

I haven't looked in detail at the DD position, but the vast majority of the modern ones were already allocated to these forces.

Reading through some of the initial posts, yeah i'll probably leave Junyo home for more training, with her planes sent to Zuikaku and the CVLs. She's very slow anyway.

Hosho speed 25 knots
Junyo speed 25.5 knots
Zuiho speed 28 knots
Ryujo speed 29 knots
Zuikaku speed 34.25 knots


But how are you intending to deploy them? The Kongo battlecruisers used as carrier escorts are only capable of 30 knots with all the other old battleships only good for 25 knots. Yamato was 27 knots. And anyway carriers don't go haring around the oceans for most of the time at those kinds of speeds.

Historically Junyo & Ryujo went to the Aleutians & Hosho covered the First Fleet Main Force & Zuiho covered the Second Fleet Main Body. So what are you sacrificing?

So you have Zuikaku, Zuiho and Ryujo, with their airgroups augmented from Junyo, something like this:

Zuikaku- even assuming all there is operational are the planes as of 9th of May, 24 A6M, 13 D3A and 8 B5N, you can add from Junyo's D3A so you have 27 D3A operational. Zeros are plenty, but needs at least 9-10 B5Ns, so either get 9 off Kaga's 27, or get 8-9 B5N2s from Ryujo, and couple from Zuiho. So you have 24 A6M, 27 D3A and about 18 B5N operational.

Ryujo- leave as is, or give 9 B5N2 to Zuikaku and instead get the 12 A6M from 6 Ku, so Ryujo is a fighter carrier like at Eastern Solomons, with 24 A6M and 9 B5N.

Zuiho- trade 6 A5M for the 6 Zeros from Junyo, and maybe give 1-2 B5N2 to Zuikaku. Give the A5Ms to Hosho so Yamamoto has a few fighters overhead (redundant anyway, but still), or just keep them, can use them for anti-sub patrols or whatever. Or get the 6 extra Zeros from Zuikaku for a normal 18 plane VF. So the total is 18 A6M (or 12 A6M and 6 A5M), and 9 B5N.

The B5Ns from the CVLs are to be used exclusively for search. That is if there are no extra cruisers (Kurita? Hosogaya?) and BBs(Kondo?) with Nagumo.

So we have 60 (!) extra Zeros with Nagumo, never mind the other planes, extra 27 D3A and about 36 B5Ns.

 

[Conslaw]

None of the FAA Martlets got the 2 stage superchargers until the Martlet V.
The two speed supercharger version was single source, P & W only, not farmed out to Buick or Chevrolet.
Perhaps Grumman was the stumbling block after 1941, Until the last 3 months of 1941 P & W was delivering under 50 engines a month. In 1942 they were delivering over 100 and ended the year at 320 engines for Dec. They were building hundreds of the single stage engines per month.

 

[Conslaw]

If the IJN had brought 6 or 7 carriers to attack Midway, the odds are greater, under his principle of "calculated risk", that Nimitz would have avoided carrier combat entirely. Now, ignoring the issue of whether Japan would or would not have successfully taken Midway, this scenario creates another problem. More ships mean more oil consumption. Arguably Japan just lost the battle through the mere act of sorteeing the whole fleet, and using up a huge chunk of its strategic oil reserve - basically for nothing, no climactic battle and no defendable gain At best and an embarrassing defeat on the ground at worst.