d_bader
Airman
I shall hunt around for the facts, but agent tricycle had to do a questionnaire many pages long about the defences at Pearl Harbor. These however were dismissed by the Americans and ignored.......
Pearl Harbor Attack
- Thread starter Koty Owen
- Start date
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Propellorhead
Airman 1st Class
I'm pretty certain "Tricycle" was Dusko Popov who was turned double agent by MI5 in Spain before sailing for New York. Popov gladly shared with the british the information which he had including a microdot with a long questionaire about Pearl Harbour. Popov arrived at New York 4 months before Pearl Harbour was attacked and the British had tipped off the FBI.
J Edgar Hoover was so dismissive of the British advice that after a brief cursory interview, Popov was allowed to head to sunny Florida where he womanised and spent all his money on booze. Perhaps though since he was already turned to a double agent by the British he was told to go have a good time and let MI5 do all the talking?
Here's a question I'd like to ask please...
When did the carriers leave Pearl and why?
In which direction did they sail?
Which carriers were at Pearl in December 1941?
Has anybody ever read their orders?
J Edgar Hoover was so dismissive of the British advice that after a brief cursory interview, Popov was allowed to head to sunny Florida where he womanised and spent all his money on booze. Perhaps though since he was already turned to a double agent by the British he was told to go have a good time and let MI5 do all the talking?
Here's a question I'd like to ask please...
When did the carriers leave Pearl and why?
In which direction did they sail?
Which carriers were at Pearl in December 1941?
Has anybody ever read their orders?
Freebird
Master Sergeant
When did the carriers leave Pearl and why? CV-6 CV-2 Nov 28 Dec 4
In which direction did they sail? West
Which carriers were at Pearl in Dec 1941? Lexington, Enterprise Saratoga, joined by Yorktown on Dec 30
Enterprise: On 28 November 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel sent TF-8, consisting of Enterprise, the heavy cruisers Northampton (CA-26), Chester (CA-27), and Salt Lake City (CA-24) and nine destroyers under Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., to ferry 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 211 to Wake Island. Upon completion of the mission on 4 December, TF-8 set course to return to Pearl Harbor. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found TF-8 about 215 miles west of Oahu.
Lexington: On 5 December 1941, TF-12, formed around Lexington, under the command of Rear Admiral John H. Newton, sailed from Pearl to ferry 18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 to Midway Island. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found Lexington, heavy cruisers Chicago (CA-29), Portland (CA-33), and Astoria (CA-34), and five destroyers about 500 miles southeast of Midway. The outbreak of hostilities resulted in cancellation of the mission and VMSB-231 was retained on board [they would ultimately fly to Midway from Hickam Field on 21 December].
Saratoga: The Saratoga, having recently completed an overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, reached NAS San Diego [North Island] late in the forenoon watch on 7 December. She was to embark her air group, as well as Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 221 and a cargo of miscellaneous airplanes to ferry to Pearl Harbor.
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-9.htm
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diddyriddick
Staff Sergeant
A couple of points if I might....
The points about the Phillipines are correct here. Yes, an invasion fleet had been observed heading south. Yes, the Americans had beefed up the defenses of the Phillipines. But the Americans became fixated with the Phillipines much before Pearl Harbor. The fundamental assumption of War Plan Orange (later to become the "rainbow" plans) was that the Japanese would move south and into the Phillipines. This warplan was surprisingly unchanged since its inception during the Teddy Roosevelt administration. Frankly, the basis of the plan was for abandonment of the Phillipines as unsustainable in the event of Japanese attack; CincPac was then to bravely sally forth and beat the IJN on Japan's left flank.
We've missed a couple of things here.
1. American ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew reported a tip that he got from his Peruvian counterpart that the Japanese were specifically planning a raid on Pearl about a year prior. How in hell did that get **** canned?
2. One of the significant mistakes of Kimmel was that he ordered torpedo baffles/nets removed. His reasoning was that the defense measures hindered movement in the harbor, and that Pearl was too shallow for airborne torpedoes. Ok. I'll buy that to a point, but what about Taranto? The British proved that wrong if only the Americans had the wisdom to pay attention.
3. The fundamental failings of both Kimmel and Short, it seems to me, were their complete underestimation of and ignorance to airplanes as weapons of war. Remember that at the time the battleship was still the "ship of the line." Short's decision to park his fighters close to avoid 5th columnists made all the sense in the world....If one was an infantryman by training. Likewise, Kimmel still believed that carriers main role would be in support of the main battle fleet.
4. To clarify, Short's first and foremost task as specifically assigned by Marshall was the defense of the fleet and Pearl. Everything else was secondary. When he should have been thinking of how to use his assets to defeat a potential enemy, he was husbanding his resources.
The points about the Phillipines are correct here. Yes, an invasion fleet had been observed heading south. Yes, the Americans had beefed up the defenses of the Phillipines. But the Americans became fixated with the Phillipines much before Pearl Harbor. The fundamental assumption of War Plan Orange (later to become the "rainbow" plans) was that the Japanese would move south and into the Phillipines. This warplan was surprisingly unchanged since its inception during the Teddy Roosevelt administration. Frankly, the basis of the plan was for abandonment of the Phillipines as unsustainable in the event of Japanese attack; CincPac was then to bravely sally forth and beat the IJN on Japan's left flank.
We've missed a couple of things here.
1. American ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew reported a tip that he got from his Peruvian counterpart that the Japanese were specifically planning a raid on Pearl about a year prior. How in hell did that get **** canned?
2. One of the significant mistakes of Kimmel was that he ordered torpedo baffles/nets removed. His reasoning was that the defense measures hindered movement in the harbor, and that Pearl was too shallow for airborne torpedoes. Ok. I'll buy that to a point, but what about Taranto? The British proved that wrong if only the Americans had the wisdom to pay attention.
3. The fundamental failings of both Kimmel and Short, it seems to me, were their complete underestimation of and ignorance to airplanes as weapons of war. Remember that at the time the battleship was still the "ship of the line." Short's decision to park his fighters close to avoid 5th columnists made all the sense in the world....If one was an infantryman by training. Likewise, Kimmel still believed that carriers main role would be in support of the main battle fleet.
4. To clarify, Short's first and foremost task as specifically assigned by Marshall was the defense of the fleet and Pearl. Everything else was secondary. When he should have been thinking of how to use his assets to defeat a potential enemy, he was husbanding his resources.
buffnut453
Captain
Re the invasion fleet heading from French Indochina. Actually, there were 2 fleets, one out of Hainan and the second out of FIC. In addition, the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers were unknown. However, Japanese radio silence was so good, and Allied signals intellience still relatively embryonic, at least in that part of the world when it came to tactical comms of the Japanese Army and Navy, that the ultimate destinations and compositions of the various IJN fleetscould only be guessed at. PI was one option, the others being Thailand, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Ultimately, the Japanese ended up attacking the first 3 and Pearl Harbor virtually simultaneously, which nobody in Britain or the US expected.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Nit picking FB but Salt Lake City(the old Swayback Maru) was CA25. My uncle was aboard her that day and until 1943. Pensacola was CA24.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Oops, missed that.
Because in Jan 1941 there was no serious thought of Japan going to war with the us (it was before the embargo) so the "plans" to attack Pearl harbour were likely contingency plans, such as every nation makes.
Heck, in the 30's the US even had "War Plan Red" a plan to invade Canada.
War Plan Red - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The fact that in Jan '41 Japan had a "plan" to attack Hawaii is hardly surprising. AFAIK the "tip" actually came from the Peruvian Ambassador's cook - so not exactly the most credible of sources.
He may have overheard a few drunken Japanese officers talking in a saki bar for all we know... 
parsifal
Colonel
A few things worth noting. The Americans were unable to read the miltary traffic after 7 november because of the the change in codes. They had never been able to read the Army military codes, which continued to evade the Allies until the end of 1942. The new JN25 code was retained until just after Midway, and was broken as a result of the massive increases in signal traffic, often with plain text incriminating the coded traffic, that arose as a result of the Doolittle raids. As a result of the intell blackouts that arose after 7 november, the allies were left guessing as to the actual targets. They fell back on their instincts, and assumed the Japanese would attack into the PI and Malaya. incredibly, the british believed the malayan Jungle was impenetrable to a modern army, and therefore Singas would be safe. The whole allied reaction to the japanese invasaion is one of incredible miscalculation.
The Americans were even worse in their responses. Despite the ability to read much of the diplomatic traffic, courtesy of MAGIC, the Americans lacked the ability to analyze and determine appropriate countermoves to that information. The American command, from top to bottom proved incredibly lethargic and aparently incapable of a coherent response to the japanese attacks. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the PI, where depite advance warnings, at at least twelve hours of delay in the first japanese raids, the Americans under Mac were unable react decisively.
From these perspectives the Japanese plans were brilliantly planned and executed. There were a few errors on the japanese side however. Most obvious is the strategic miscalculation about what the Pearl Attacks would do to US resolve. Their target choices are another source of controversy, though they never envisaged the raid to be an all encompassing defeat of the USN, and only ever wanted to achieve a free hand in their southern drives.
The attacks into Siam were a small miscalculation....if the Japanese had waited just 24 hours longer, the thais probably would have voluntary joined the japanese as allies.
The Americans were even worse in their responses. Despite the ability to read much of the diplomatic traffic, courtesy of MAGIC, the Americans lacked the ability to analyze and determine appropriate countermoves to that information. The American command, from top to bottom proved incredibly lethargic and aparently incapable of a coherent response to the japanese attacks. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the PI, where depite advance warnings, at at least twelve hours of delay in the first japanese raids, the Americans under Mac were unable react decisively.
From these perspectives the Japanese plans were brilliantly planned and executed. There were a few errors on the japanese side however. Most obvious is the strategic miscalculation about what the Pearl Attacks would do to US resolve. Their target choices are another source of controversy, though they never envisaged the raid to be an all encompassing defeat of the USN, and only ever wanted to achieve a free hand in their southern drives.
The attacks into Siam were a small miscalculation....if the Japanese had waited just 24 hours longer, the thais probably would have voluntary joined the japanese as allies.
ccheese
Member In Perpetuity
I am currently reading a book, "The American Magic", by Ronald Lewin. In it he tells about "Ultra G" , "Ultra J", "Enigma" and "Magic."
He devotes almost an entire chapter to the fight between the US Army and Thomas E. Dewey,
who was running for President, against FDR. This was in 1944. Dewey knew all about Ultra
and Enigma, and planned to use it against FDR is his campaign for President. He was going to
tell the world that FDR had been reading the Japanese coded messages since before Pearl Harbor,
and use it as a means of scape-goating FDR for the surprise attack. He was going to claim FDR knew
all about the plans for the attack and did nothing.
General George Marshal, then Army Chief of Staff was to meet with Mr Dewey and explain the ramifications if what would happen if he told the world about us reading the codes. He had prepared a letter, which Dewey started to read, then stopped. "I stopped reading when my eye caught the word, 'cryptograph'. "Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of these codes are still in use, there is no point in my reading the letter, because I already know that." "Instead of being re-elected", Dewey observed, "Roosevelt should be impeached."
There was quite a to-do over it, but Dewey finally relented and kept quiet about Enigma, Ultra and Magic. He also lost the election.
The book is a good read, and recommended for anyone interested in codes and ciphers.
Charles
He devotes almost an entire chapter to the fight between the US Army and Thomas E. Dewey,
who was running for President, against FDR. This was in 1944. Dewey knew all about Ultra
and Enigma, and planned to use it against FDR is his campaign for President. He was going to
tell the world that FDR had been reading the Japanese coded messages since before Pearl Harbor,
and use it as a means of scape-goating FDR for the surprise attack. He was going to claim FDR knew
all about the plans for the attack and did nothing.
General George Marshal, then Army Chief of Staff was to meet with Mr Dewey and explain the ramifications if what would happen if he told the world about us reading the codes. He had prepared a letter, which Dewey started to read, then stopped. "I stopped reading when my eye caught the word, 'cryptograph'. "Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of these codes are still in use, there is no point in my reading the letter, because I already know that." "Instead of being re-elected", Dewey observed, "Roosevelt should be impeached."
There was quite a to-do over it, but Dewey finally relented and kept quiet about Enigma, Ultra and Magic. He also lost the election.
The book is a good read, and recommended for anyone interested in codes and ciphers.
Charles
buffnut453
Captain
I think that's something of an overstatement. The eastern side of the Malay peninsula was not well-served by transportation, and hence it was not conducive to operations by a large military force. The western half of the peninsula was a different story because it had the main north/south road which proved to be the main axis of advance for the Japanese Army. These facts were clearly understood by the British (Percival had done the first study to show the practicality of an invasion from Siam when he was a Colonel and Chief-of-Staff to GOC Malaya in the late-30s). The key problem was that nothing was done to strengthen defence alone the road, although it was recognised that the flanks of any defensive force could easily be turned by small-scale coastal landing operations. The primary failing of the British was in not developing tactics to meet these threats.
What's your source for this, Parsifal? Reading "Thailand and WWII" by Direk Jayanama, who was Deputy PM in Dec 41, I get the impression that Thailand was piggy-in-the-middle, caught between 2 major powers and unable to appease both. There were undoubtedly pro-Japanese elements within the Thai Government but there were also strong anti-Japanese feelings (they'd seen what had happened in French Indo-China and didn't want a repeat in Thailand...unfortunately for them they were to be disappointed).
Regards,
Mark
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
If Thomas E. Dewey believed that fairy tale, I'm very gald that he lost the election.
The WW II myth that "FDR knew" has long been discredited.
THe only Japanese code broken by the US prior to December 7 was the DIPLOMATIC code. No mention of an attack or hostlie action was ever mentioned in anything intercepted and read by the American code breakers.
We have the same thing today. They're called the "911 Truthers" and they're just as lost!
Long story short.....people love conspiracy theories. Especially people that write books about them!
TO
ccheese
Member In Perpetuity
According to this author [Ronald Lewin] the US was reading the Japanese Navy's coded messages in
1929 !! In 1931 a man who had been working on this stuff, Herbert Yardley, wrote a Book,
"The American Black Chamber", and some articles for the Saturday Evening Post telling everything
about the US reading "the Japanese mail". [Nothing is mentioned about the diplomatic code].
The Japanese were furious and the code was changed to what is now known as JN25. After Yardley
was 'blacklisted" he tried to go to work for Canada and Britian. Neither wanted anything to do with
him.
The Enigma was a bit different. It was manufactured and sold on the open market by Chiffreimaschinen
Aktiengesellschaft of Berlin, in 1923. It was adopted by the German Navy in 1926 and by the German Army
in 1929. It was used universally by Hitler's High Command and all his armed and secret forces.
In 1927 the US Army bought an enigma machine for $144.00.... which was the commercial version mentioned above.
As most people who have worked with the US or a foreign nation's crypto devices know.... the machine is
useless, unless you have the day's code set-up. [Italics mine !]
Charles
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
If they were reading it in 1929, and I'm not sure that they were, they certainly weren't reading it in 1941. Again, it was only the diplomatic code that was broken, and this fact led to many of the conspiracy theories about how "FDR knew" and let the attack happen. FDR's focus was on Europe and Hitler. Since American DDs and U-boats were already in a shooting match in the Atlantic, war was inevitable.
JN25 started to be deciphered after December 7 and it did tip off Nimitz as to the Japanese plans for the invasion of Midway.
TO
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
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ccheese
Member In Perpetuity
The Japanese code was changed in 1931 to JN25. The diplomatic code, first known as "Red" was changed,
broken again, and was called "Purple". "Purple" was being read throughout the war.
Charles
The Army had coatal guns to defend the islands, but nothing to defend against a large air attack. There were observation and plotting stations at the top of Diamond head that aimed the guns at Ft Derussey. The 2 gun battery at Ft Derussey is a museum now ( they tried to destroy it to make room for more hotels on the beach but it was constucted too well).
I was at Ewa airfield 7 Dec 08 for a wreath ceremony. The attack there killed 2 Marines and 2 civilians (an old man and little girl). Not much left, just overgrown runway and hangar foundation. The area had been closed off for a decade or two.
Recent study of attack photos show that one of the midget subs may have entered the harbor and fired their torpedos. This would be the sub that has never been located.
I was at Ewa airfield 7 Dec 08 for a wreath ceremony. The attack there killed 2 Marines and 2 civilians (an old man and little girl). Not much left, just overgrown runway and hangar foundation. The area had been closed off for a decade or two.
Recent study of attack photos show that one of the midget subs may have entered the harbor and fired their torpedos. This would be the sub that has never been located.
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BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
I suspect that no sub was ever located because none was ever used. 69 years after the event, we know what happened that day in near forensic detail, so do you really think that a few subs, albeit small ones, would be missed. they would have to be carried very close to Pearl by a large, cargo-type ship or a large submarine, launched, and then recovered the same way. Don't you think some record would have been made of this deployment, which essentially would have been a separate plan in itself? Or perhaps the Japanese might have discarded the idea due to the risk of giving the plan away?
And did the IJN have a midget sub or launch vehicle in service in 1941 anyway?
And did the IJN have a midget sub or launch vehicle in service in 1941 anyway?
Messy1
Master Sergeant
Yes, the IJN did have the means to launch the midget subs, and the midget subs were used, although maybe none made their way into the harbor itself. The USS Ward fired on and sunk a midget sub 5 miles outside of Pearl Harbor. The sub has been found recently with one hole in the conning tower right where the USS Ward claimed to have hit it. It was not believed for decades that the Ward had sunk a midget sub. Also the first Japanese POW was a survivor of a midget sub. He was captured when his sub was found beached on shore the following morning. Recovery was never a plan for the midget sub's crews, most planned on never coming back, so recovery was not that big of a worry. All the midget submariners that were lost were memorialized on a painting or lithograph, except for the one who was captured.
Japanese Midget Submarine
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japtp-ss/mdg-a-2.htm
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The POW's sub washed up on the beach at Bellows Field, the other crewman swam out to his death. Five Midget subs were launched, four have been accounted for/located. It's not that hard to check the facts, the sub that was captured was even used for War Bond drives.
Messy1
Master Sergeant
Thanks for the additional info. I didn't have that info available at hand. Knew there were 4-5 subs involved, just knew for sure three had been found.
