RAF daylight strategic bombing campaign results
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Shortround6
Major General
True.
Please, I am not claiming the B-17 or B-24 was the equal of the Lancaster when it came to lugging bombs over distance, just that difference isn't really as great as is sometimes reported because the reports/stories aren't comparing quite the same thing. Lancasters and Halifaxes didn't burn much fuel chasing planes like this around for 1/2 hour to two hours (?) before heading for Germany.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aircraft-pictures/story-17-a-19761.html
Please, I am not claiming the B-17 or B-24 was the equal of the Lancaster when it came to lugging bombs over distance, just that difference isn't really as great as is sometimes reported because the reports/stories aren't comparing quite the same thing. Lancasters and Halifaxes didn't burn much fuel chasing planes like this around for 1/2 hour to two hours (?) before heading for Germany.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aircraft-pictures/story-17-a-19761.html
I dont disagree with the point but o heavy BC raids the crews were given a take off time and coordinates and times to make rendezvous for the bomber stream, one navigator used to take a route across England almost into Wales and then back instead of stooging around over the North Sea. The US bombers were mainly in East Anglia while Bomber command in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire/Durham. Maybe the US forces would have been better further north to allow a smoother forming up?
The poster is right to query as to whether a high altitude impellor and gear ratio could be introduced for Lancaster's Merlin in 1941. The topic is RAF daylight strategic bombing campaign results around 1941. RAF concerns about contrails above 18000ft disclosing their bombers in moonlight are irrelevant during the daylight.
18000ft is in effective range of the widespread 8.8cm FLAK 37. Go higher and only the far less common 10.5cm and 12.8cm FLAK can reach.
June/July 1941 marks a major advance in radar with the introduction of the Wurzbug D and its big brother the 7m dish Wurzburg-Riesse radar. The Wurzburg-D featured conical scan and could track a target to within 0.3 degrees. The larger 7m dish Wurzburg-Riesse was twice as accurate again. It had accurate ranging to 25m and could transfer directly into the Kommandogerät 40 FLAK predictor which would provide a full firing and fuse setting solution. The Kommandogerät 40 featured its own tracking optics and a long base coincidence range finder but the combination of optical tracking plus radar ranging was very synergistic. Deployment was rapid since the Wurzburg C and Wurzburg A had been in production for nearly a year.
The point being that a target could now be accurately located and targeted through cloud and night. The angular accuracy was a little less than desired but in daylight quick glimpses of the target through cloud could provide a very accurate update of elevation/azimuth while the radar provided accurate range.
Degrading accuracy of FLAK now meant relying more on altitude to induce the natural dispersal of projectiles at range rather than on instrument errors in the coincidence range finders.
In 1941 to at least mid 1942 it would seem it was the Germans that had the superior high altitude engines so flying lower to benefit an allied escort might be advantageous from the escorts point of view but not the point of view of avoiding FLAK.
The deployment of a new generation of technically advanced German gun laying radars was suppressed by the collapse of the Reich in 1944 so the RAF was able to rely on the jamming of many of the older radars thus giving the Lancaster a chance.
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wuzak
Captain
Contrails were very much a factor during teh daylight
Perhaps more than during the night.
wuzak
Captain
The people of England could see the contrails during the Battle of Britain
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Would the Typhoon be at all more favorable for conversion to escort range capability than contemporary Spitfires or would its teething troubles make that moot? The cannon bays take up a lot of space that seem prime for fuel (along with potential leading edge space with no cannon barrel punching through it), so omitting 2 of the cannons might be enough to faciliate long range combat radius.
Typhoons might also make better matches for intercepting Fw-190s in the 1942 timeframe.
I meant more that with fast bombers cruising close to 300 MPH, fighters would be forced to fly even faster to allow a decent escort perimeter and scout around for interceptors. (otherwise resort to flying static top cover formations, which might help fighter range a bit -straight line cruising- but hurt ability to bounce enemy fighters)
The differnce being that it would be an interim measure until precision bombing capabilities were actually combat feasible.
What would be the minimum cruising altitude for bomber formations to practically avoid daytime flack well enough that enemy interceptor vs escort abilities become the deciding factor? Would 20,000 ft be enough?
With the lighter configurations of the earlier models of bombers themselves, pushing it a bit higher might have been more feasible in some respects too (without heavier modifications to engine performance envelope -supercharger and reduction gearing- or propellers used) but a different shift in long-term strategy and Bomber Command doctrine could have meant follow-on changes that kept the bombers high altitude capable as they got heavier.
The more practical counter-point is whether shifting production from historical merlin XX levels (along with propellers in use at the time) would have been practical if indeed they actually made a notable difference at altitude.
The Merlin XX series already cruised well enough in the 20,000 ft range, but having enough power to climb beyond 20,000 ft in a reasonable manner is more the problem.
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Shortround6
Major General
Beside the teething troubles there weren't enough to much of anything until the end of 1942.
First batch of 250 Mk 1a and 1b delivered between September 1941 and June 1942.
Second batch of 250 Mk 1a and 1b delivered between June 1942 and September 1942.
Third batch of 700 Mk1b delivered between September 20th 1942 and May 5th 1943.
Depending on how far you want to go into Germany you need 2 or 3 sets of escorts in relays to cover one set of bombers.
you aren't going to get 300mph bombers (cruise) in 1941/42 due to the power of the engines available.
If somebody has a data Sheet for a Mosquito MK IV??
Mosquito MK XVI with Merlin 72/73 engines could cruise at 311/321mph (with/wo stores under wing) but using such speeds cut the range to 850-1156 miles depending on bomb load and fitting of underwing or bombay tanks. Slowing the plane down extended the range. Cutting several hundred horsepower from each engine is going to lower the 'cruise' speed.
.
Interim measures seldom produce good results. The whole "lean forward into France" campaign was sort of an interim measure and it was a disaster. Less known at the time but with post war records of actual German losses the British were big losers just trying to bomb (and suck the Luftwaffe up to fight) coastal Belgium, France, and Holland.
Hard to say what the dividing line is. Definitions change with time. British figured (in 1944) effective ceiling for an AA gun was the Ceiling at which a 300mph flying directly over the gun could be engaged (fired at) for 20 seconds. Not sure what the Germans used for a definition or if definitions had changed from 1941/42. German early 88s were good for (new gun/not worn) a max ceiling of almost 32,500ft and had an effective ceiling of just over 26,000ft. In 20 seconds an 88 could fire 5-6 shells. A 200 mph bomber gives 50% more firing time. The lower the bomber flies the more firing time and the more accurate the fire is. The further to the side of the gun the less firing time the gun has. Due to times of flight of the shells a short engagement time leaves little room for correction, several shells are in the air before the first one/s burst to give gunners any indication if corrections need to be made to the sight settings.
It goes back to what you had for available bombers and try to compare them to the American bombers of 1942/43. The American bombers had engines with turbos that would give 1000hp max continuous to 27,000ft or above and they weren't good enough to keep 4 engine bombers doing 200+mph at altitudes over 20,000ft in large formations. Mainly because by the time you get to max cruise lean you are down to around 750hp. The Melrin XX wasn't much different. Max lean cruise was around 725-760hp depending on altitude (and without the turbo that was down around 18-20,000ft). Problem for the Melrin XX is that as you go above 18-20,000ft the cruise power drops. The B-17 could hold 750hp cruise to 35,000ft. Makes cruising at 24-26,000ft a breeze.
So the interim solution seems to be, use bombers that have lousier gun defense than the Americans used, bombers that can't fly any faster, bombers that can't fly as high, and bombers that can't (if you try for high altitudes) carry much more than the American bombers. And use escort fighters that had trouble matching the German fighters over the coastal areas without being burdened with long range fuel tanks. Why the panic over getting MK IX Spits in service? Because the MK Vs couldn't to the job and yet somehow adding several hundred pounds of tanks and fuel will improve the combat results?
See above.
Cruising Speed at 15,000 feet according to data sheet
Mosquito IV (Merlin 21) economical: 265 mph - max weak mix: 320 mph
The idea of a bomber stream was to overwhelm the flak defences. There are only so many aircraft that the flak and searchlights could track.
Similarly the stream overwhelmed the then current night fighter system. When the stream was introduced the night fighters still operated under Kammhuber's original system. Each fighter operated in an area of sky (a 'Himmelbett') from which it could not exit. It couldn't track or follow the stream, the ground interception radar and control system did not allow it. The Germans were eventually forced to change the system, making it more flexible.
Additionally the stream could concentrate the bombing in time and space , absolutely essential to a successful, incendiary, area raid.
Cheers
Steve
I don't think higher than 20000ft is needed in 1941/42 in fact if only Allison engined escorts are available I was thinking as low as 15000ft for bombers since fighters could provide top cover at about 20000ft before being forced down to 15000ft where the bombers they were protecting were (Allison's full throttle height). At 15000ft bombers are more vulnerable to FLAK but the numbers of guns and numbers of radar was nowhere near as high as it would become and fighters are far more dangerous.
They would have been capable of some very accurate bombing over the highly industrialised Ruhr in the summer and fall of 1941.
If the Merlin XX is available for the escorts then Attack altitude over 20000ft would seem to be practical.
When English Electric purchased Napiers in December 1942 the Sabre engine problems were still prevalent. The Typhoon certainly would make a capable escort as its range was greater than the Spitfire V or IX. The Fw 190s engine issues were generally regarded as solved by then.
There are often throw away statements that the typhoon out performed the Fw 190 but the charts on ww2 perform org show no such thing. They were about even.
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Glider
Captain
Fair point. The RAF didn't use formation ships or wait until the last aircraft took off. On daylight mission the norm was to set course at a slower speed until the others caught up. Also they didn't fly in such tight formation which in turn saved them fuel along the way. That said your point is a good one and flying in formation of any kind does use more fuel up than being an individual
Glider
Captain
I admit that I hadn't thought about it. On the face of it the Typhoon would be a respectable escort for the bombers and I know it was often used to escort Mosquito bombers. It had a decent range but obviously not in the league of the P51, as for the P47D it had a shorter range but by how much I am not sure. I am confident that others know more than me about this.
It was roughly equal of the Fw190A and that would be the major threat to the Bombers. Numbers would be the problem in 1942 and reliability
Shortround6
Major General
What "range" on the Typhoon?
It can go further on 154 imp gallons than a P-47 can on 254imp gallons????
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/typhoon/typhoon-ads.jpg
You put on the drop tanks (assuming they are available in 1942) you fly IN 400 miles, drop the tanks and fight for 15 minutes. You now have 385 miles of fuel left at most economical. The 610 mile range at most economic minus the 3 X 75 miles/5min combat allowance=225 miles. Hope you ended the fight at something over 15,000ft instead of well under because you are going to see how well a Typhoon glides.
This is assuming there are no headwinds on the trip back or you may be testing the dingy.
If you want the pretty much standard 30 min reserve to take care of navigation errors, head winds, clouds over home airfield, etc you need to save 20-25imp gallons or about 125 miles worth of range after dropping the tanks.
Basically the practical radius of a standard typhoon was closer to 250 miles if you count the combat allowance and provide a decent reserve.
It can go further on 154 imp gallons than a P-47 can on 254imp gallons????
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/typhoon/typhoon-ads.jpg
You put on the drop tanks (assuming they are available in 1942) you fly IN 400 miles, drop the tanks and fight for 15 minutes. You now have 385 miles of fuel left at most economical. The 610 mile range at most economic minus the 3 X 75 miles/5min combat allowance=225 miles. Hope you ended the fight at something over 15,000ft instead of well under because you are going to see how well a Typhoon glides.
This is assuming there are no headwinds on the trip back or you may be testing the dingy.
If you want the pretty much standard 30 min reserve to take care of navigation errors, head winds, clouds over home airfield, etc you need to save 20-25imp gallons or about 125 miles worth of range after dropping the tanks.
Basically the practical radius of a standard typhoon was closer to 250 miles if you count the combat allowance and provide a decent reserve.
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drgondog
Major
To contemplate low level attacks from RAF Bomber command is to ask:
1.) How far into Germany before bombers reported by ground observers all along the penetration route? And how much easier to plot return routes and deploy day fighters along the probable routes home or attach a recon Ju 88 or Me 110 to shadow the returning bombers?
2.) How survivable is a Lancaster vs a B-24 against fighter attack - or against flak of all calibers?
3.) Is there any reason to expect better results with low level Lancaster attacks than the August 1, 1943 Tidal Wave attacks on Ploesti?
4.) How easy is it to flood approach routes to key targets with 20mm flak?
As to escort strategy? If we are selecting 1941 as the opening of RAF daylight bombing campaign, even given not enough production to offset 10% attrition MIA and 10-20% Class A/B battle damage, then RAF have to have the 'feasible' design in mind in 1939 to get through trials and into serial mass production. The Spitfire is the only airframe with escort potential but the NOTION of long range escort was deemed impossible by RAF, as well as USAAF, through 1941.
The Mustang was an Accident, not clever planning, and forever linked to the idea of "P-40 replacement" for low to medium altitude utility fighter. The Wing Rack and Fuel drop tank ideas first originated with the notion of keeping the NAA Mustang line (and plant and workers) employed by slipping the A-36 procurement into available AAF Dive Bomber funding in early 1942. The notion of Merlin engine modification originated with RR in the last days of April, 1942.
So, the Mustang in numbers to perform medium altitude escort could not begin until late summer of 1943, and immediately subordinated to the P-51B in early fall, 1942 after the RR/RAF results were surfacing.
The Notion of Ferry Tanks on the sly, for the P-38 and P-47 is what stimulated NAA to incorporate the fuel pump and pressurization feed to/from external tanks via vacuum pump - which was mid 1942 - attributed to Ben Kelsey, who was still behind the knowledge curve on P-51 potential as long range escort. The A-36/51A wing tank (external) beat the P-47D by nearly a year - but still two years after RAF BC needs daylight escorts.
So, IMO the Spitfire design team has to have the resources and funding and foresight to design a long range wing for the Spit starting in early 1939, have it operational in mid 1940 and in squadron deployment by late summer 1940 for the RAF to contemplate daylight strategic bombing.
1.) How far into Germany before bombers reported by ground observers all along the penetration route? And how much easier to plot return routes and deploy day fighters along the probable routes home or attach a recon Ju 88 or Me 110 to shadow the returning bombers?
2.) How survivable is a Lancaster vs a B-24 against fighter attack - or against flak of all calibers?
3.) Is there any reason to expect better results with low level Lancaster attacks than the August 1, 1943 Tidal Wave attacks on Ploesti?
4.) How easy is it to flood approach routes to key targets with 20mm flak?
As to escort strategy? If we are selecting 1941 as the opening of RAF daylight bombing campaign, even given not enough production to offset 10% attrition MIA and 10-20% Class A/B battle damage, then RAF have to have the 'feasible' design in mind in 1939 to get through trials and into serial mass production. The Spitfire is the only airframe with escort potential but the NOTION of long range escort was deemed impossible by RAF, as well as USAAF, through 1941.
The Mustang was an Accident, not clever planning, and forever linked to the idea of "P-40 replacement" for low to medium altitude utility fighter. The Wing Rack and Fuel drop tank ideas first originated with the notion of keeping the NAA Mustang line (and plant and workers) employed by slipping the A-36 procurement into available AAF Dive Bomber funding in early 1942. The notion of Merlin engine modification originated with RR in the last days of April, 1942.
So, the Mustang in numbers to perform medium altitude escort could not begin until late summer of 1943, and immediately subordinated to the P-51B in early fall, 1942 after the RR/RAF results were surfacing.
The Notion of Ferry Tanks on the sly, for the P-38 and P-47 is what stimulated NAA to incorporate the fuel pump and pressurization feed to/from external tanks via vacuum pump - which was mid 1942 - attributed to Ben Kelsey, who was still behind the knowledge curve on P-51 potential as long range escort. The A-36/51A wing tank (external) beat the P-47D by nearly a year - but still two years after RAF BC needs daylight escorts.
So, IMO the Spitfire design team has to have the resources and funding and foresight to design a long range wing for the Spit starting in early 1939, have it operational in mid 1940 and in squadron deployment by late summer 1940 for the RAF to contemplate daylight strategic bombing.
It is common to quote losses in percentages. However losses are in aircraft which have to be replaced. I doubt that any group of 10 bombers (4 engined heavies) trying to raid deep into Germany at any time during the war in daylight would suffer less than 60% losses and would probably be 100% more often than not. You need a massive number of bombers and escorts to keep the losses down to 10%. The UK had just staggered through the BoB in 1940 , I think it is very very fanciful (as some have) to think about forces of 500 x 4 engined bombers and escorts in 1941 when we were struggling to cope with defence of the UK plus N Africa.
Shortround6
Major General
Quite right, see the link for Lancaster production;
LancasterMonlty Production
For most of 1942 they were building around 50 Lancaster a month getting up to about 100 a month the last two months of the year. Most of 1943 saw around 150 a month and by late summer of 1944 they were over 250 a month.
Lancasters were not the only arrow in the quiver but some of the other arrows were a bit bent or needed new fletchling if you were going to try to use them as day bombers.
LancasterMonlty Production
For most of 1942 they were building around 50 Lancaster a month getting up to about 100 a month the last two months of the year. Most of 1943 saw around 150 a month and by late summer of 1944 they were over 250 a month.
Lancasters were not the only arrow in the quiver but some of the other arrows were a bit bent or needed new fletchling if you were going to try to use them as day bombers.
SR6 it is easy to quote the successes of mosquito raids, those raids were conducted while other mass raids were being performed, if they were the only raids they would have met much more resistance. Of the main British bombers available in any numbers in 1941 I can hardly think of any that could form a "group" Sterling Hampden Halifax Wellington? The lanc didnt even appear until 1942 in service.
Some raids had success at low level but operating at low level increases accidents, knocking an engine out at 20,000 ft gives the pilot a problem but knocking an engine out at 50ft is a kill in most cases.
Some raids had success at low level but operating at low level increases accidents, knocking an engine out at 20,000 ft gives the pilot a problem but knocking an engine out at 50ft is a kill in most cases.
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