RAF daylight strategic bombing campaign results

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Your overall point is sound but the sort of incident you describe happened all the time.

Any first hand accounts? I'm referring to the US daylight campaign and interceptions by the Luftwaffe. As I said, I can't recall a single example. I've read tens (maybe even hundreds) of combat reports and many published recollections and memoirs of this campaign.

My memory is not infallible but to say that this sort of incident occurred all the time simply doesn't fit the facts. The facts are that most US escort combats with the Jagdwaffe's would be interceptors took place literally miles away from the bomber formations. Stragglers or damaged bombers might receive a 'close' escort. Close in this context meaning within maybe 1,000 yards.

Cheers

Steve
 
Last edited:
The later US daylight campaigns aren't my area of 'study' whatsoever. A quick look over at wwiiaircraftperformance turned up this combat report.

Having said that, what comparatively little I've read on that portion of the air war - the tools and tactics used by the USAAF certainly seems to have made it a far less common occurrence as compared to, say, the Battle of France.

EDIT: spending a couple more minutes looking at the combat reports on that site and I'm seeing many cases.
 
Last edited:
I said this

Agreed, just keeping the attacking planes up near maximum speed is a help, it took an average of 25 hits to take down a US bomber IIRC not so easy to do at maximum speed with someone following you.


Can anyone provide a single instance in which an intercepting fighter was shot down, by an escort, off the tail of a bomber formation? I can't recall one. These battles (Luftwaffe/USAAF which is the only concerted daylight campaign we have for reference) took place over miles of air space, not hundreds of yards. There seems to be a misunderstanding about how escort fighters operated successfully.
Once and if the interceptors could evade or break through the defending escorts they only had to worry about the bombers defensive fire. I'd recommend Boiten and Bowman's 'Battles with the Luftwaffe' which tells the story of the US strategic bombing offensive in Europe from both sides.

Cheers

Steve

I didnt say that the interceptor was on the tail of the bomber I said the escort was on the tail of the interceptor. In the case a bomber or group was caught without escorts they would attack from the above and behind or from the beam as they saw fit. The job of the escort is to get the bombers to the target and back, the job of the interceptor is to eventually get the bombers. Dogfights between the fighters almost regardless of losses are a victory for the escorts so long as you can keep it up throughout the mission.

Here is some gun cam film of a Bf110 attacking a B17, the Bf110 was withdrawn as it coulnt survive in the presence of S/E escort fighters just as it couldnt perform as an escort itself in the BoB.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyJAlsJAbZw
 
The Luftwaffe escorts in the BoB, unlike their 8th AF counterparts in the strategic offensive against Germany were 'tied' to the bombers in a tactically limiting (some would later say idiotic) close escort role. Galland later said that it was this denial of freedom to manoeuvre to which he was referring with his famous 'give me a squadron of Spitfires' quip. Rather than being allowed to range ahead of the bombers, attacking and breaking up RAF formations they were forced to fly close to, usually above, the bombers and attempt to protect them at relatively close quarters.

Apart from that this example illustrates my point. Not only did the escort fighter manage to inflict damage on the bomber it was supposed to be protecting, it could have been the victim of the defensive fire of the 'friendly' bomber too.

Luftwaffe interceptors later had only to evade or defeat the escorts to get a run at the bombers. Easier said than done. Earlier I said they then needed only to worry about the bombers defensive fire, but they also braved 'friendly' flak.

Cheers

Steve

The massed raids of the LW during the BoB were short lived, the escorts were ordered by Goering to stay with the bombers during the daylight raids on London handing the tactical advantage to the RAF, the only role the Bf 100 served was being easier to down than a bomber, Goering sacrificed all its plus points. Attacking and breaking up RAF formations is exactly what I was referring to.

If the US did not have long range escorts and the Germans had a plane like the Mosquito it could just cruise up behind the bombing formation and pick the bombers off out of range of 0.5" Mg defensive fire but within range of 20mm cannon. No one would send mosquitos out to face a bomber force with escorts but with no escorts they would be devastating, more so than the Bf110 was.
 
If the US did not have long range escorts and the Germans had a plane like the Mosquito it could just cruise up behind the bombing formation and pick the bombers off out of range of 0.5" Mg defensive fire but within range of 20mm cannon. No one would send mosquitos out to face a bomber force with escorts but with no escorts they would be devastating, more so than the Bf110 was.

Nice theory but wouldn't actually work. Effective range of the .50cal and most 20mm guns was actually about the same. Some 20mm guns actually had less effective range.

Now a twin engine fighter carrying a heavy battery of 20mm guns might very well be more effective than several different gunners each trying to direct 2 guns apiece onto the same target but there was no safe zone/range where a fighter could sit and fire at a bomber.
 
Thanks for the clarification. If the main advantage of your aircraft is in its general agility then play to your strengths. If your aircraft has the advantage in dive and climb, then again play to your strengths. The trick is not getting confused when considering who your fighting.

In Europe the RAF normally had the advantage in agility over the Luftwaffe but when they tried it against the IJAAF they came seriously unstuck. In the Far East the RAF normally had the advantage in boom and zoom, in Europe the Luftwaffe had that advantage
One addition to the previous mentioned of the AVG's success with the P-40 that I forgot to mention was that they fairly routinely pushed the engines beyond officially accepted operating limits, pushing the early V-1710-33s into almost 1300 HP both overboosting and overspeeding the engines for higher power and higher FTH and suffering higher mechanical wear rates as a consequence. I'm not sure on the use of that on their later P-40s and post-peral harobor operation of the Flying Tigers, but I suspect they similarly pushed the aircraft. (granted, other units in the far east and MTO were known for overspeeding and overboosting V-1710s too ... and it likely shortened the engine life but the Allison did seem to tolerate being pushed beyond spec more than contemporary merlins -albeit that may in part have been due to more conservative ratings and slower rate of official WER clearance -despiration during the BoB probably drove some of that experimentation on the Merlin end)

Would have been interesting if the British had had enough Tomahawks during the BoB to make them worth pressing into service as interceptors. (longer endurance would have made roaming patrols more feasible too)



HoHun calculations sustained turn rate
109F-4
S.L. 21.5°/sec, 3 km 17.5°/sec, 6 km 13°/sec, 9 km 7.5°/sec
P-40C (44" Hg)
19°/sec, 15.5°/sec, 11.5°/sec, 6°/sec
P-40E (44" Hg)
17°/sec, 12.5°/sec, 7°/sec, too high
Hurricane IIB (+12/9 lbs)
22°/sec, 18°/sec, 13°/sec, 8°/sec
Spit VC (+16 lbs)
21.5°/sec, 18°/sec, 12.5°/sec, 7°/sec
I remember a discussion that pointed out a number of the examples of P-40s showing turning (or other performance) advantages over the 109s in the MTO were at low altitude with engine overboosting employed. (not 'stripper' P-40s, but just pushing the engine beyond spec)


Nice theory but wouldn't actually work. Effective range of the .50cal and most 20mm guns was actually about the same. Some 20mm guns actually had less effective range.

Now a twin engine fighter carrying a heavy battery of 20mm guns might very well be more effective than several different gunners each trying to direct 2 guns apiece onto the same target but there was no safe zone/range where a fighter could sit and fire at a bomber.
Against RAF bombers sporting .303 turrets they could be beyond range ... or same for actual mosquitos vs German bombers sporting rifle caliber and heavy machine gunes. (possibly 20 mms too given the longer range and shorter slight time of the hispano)

Against .50 BMGs, the Germans only had the Mk-103 and 15 mm MG-151 to out-range them, but the former was too heavy/high recoil for most aircraft (or not worth the trade in Mk-108 firepower -possibly the case on the Me-262) and the latter was too weak to be really affective against heavy bombers ... probably. (would have been interesting to see how 4x MG-151/15 fared on the Fw-190 with HEI/API type ammo)
 
"Agreed, just keeping the attacking planes up near maximum speed is a help, it took an average of 25 hits to take down a US bomber IIRC not so easy to do at maximum speed with someone following you."

Some have been suggesting, including one perfectly valid example given from the BoB, albeit in a different tactical situation, that it was commonplace for escorts to shoot down interceptors off the bombers tails. I do not believe this to be the case, as I haven't seen any evidence for this being a common occurrence.
For an escort fighter, pursuing a Luftwaffe fighter into the defensive fire of a US bomber box would be as dangerous for it as the interceptor. As the interceptors made their final attack on the bombers they would not usually have 'someone following' them

US escort fighters tried to engage the Luftwaffe interceptors well before they attacked the bombers. Luftwaffe interceptors tried to avoid the escorts, not fight them. Interceptors fighting escorts was a victory for the attackers.
The sky is a big place. These confrontations took place over many miles.

Cheers

Steve
 
One addition to the previous mentioned of the AVG's success with the P-40 that I forgot to mention was that they fairly routinely pushed the engines beyond officially accepted operating limits, pushing the early V-1710-33s into almost 1300 HP both overboosting and overspeeding the engines for higher power and higher FTH and suffering higher mechanical wear rates as a consequence. I'm not sure on the use of that on their later P-40s and post-peral harobor operation of the Flying Tigers, but I suspect they similarly pushed the aircraft. (granted, other units in the far east and MTO were known for overspeeding and overboosting V-1710s too ... and it likely shortened the engine life but the Allison did seem to tolerate being pushed beyond spec more than contemporary merlins -albeit that may in part have been due to more conservative ratings and slower rate of official WER clearance -despiration during the BoB probably drove some of that experimentation on the Merlin end)

I remember reading here that the Soviets were notorious for pushing the American engines (some crew chiefs would surely say abusing)
 
By that you mean, Interceptors fighting escorts was a victory for the defenders. (i.e., the escorts)?

Yes I did....slip of the senses.

The Luftwaffe declined to intercept US escorts close to the European coast, forcing them to jettison drop tanks, something the Americans expected them to do, for precisely this reason.

Cheers

Steve
 
Yes I did....slip of the senses.

The Luftwaffe declined to intercept US escorts close to the European coast, forcing them to jettison drop tanks, something the Americans expected them to do, for precisely this reason.

Cheers

Steve

Wonder if single-engine fighters intercepted the escorts early in their flight, forcing them to jettison drop tanks, if that would have freed up twin-engine fighters to better intercept the bombers unmolested by escorts?
 
Wonder if single-engine fighters intercepted the escorts early in their flight, forcing them to jettison drop tanks, if that would have freed up twin-engine fighters to better intercept the bombers unmolested by escorts?

Generaloberst Weisse (commanding 'Befehlhaber Mitte') suggested in November 1943, as the US escorts were significantly increasing their range, that single engine types should engage the US escorts allowing heavy fighters/destroyers to engage the bombers. He also suggested that some heavy fighter squadrons should convert to single engine types to provide an escort to the heavy fighters. One officer suggested that the entire fighter force should convert! Finally Weisse conceded that the only aircraft available to escort the heavy fighters (he recognised that they could not survive alone) were Hermann's 'wild boar' fighters.
The problem was a lack of aircraft and pilots to fly them. It was General Schmid who finally turned down Weisse's proposal, saying that there were simply not enough single engine fighters available to 'hold off' the US escorts whilst the heavy fighters engaged the bombers.

About a month later, in December, Galland and the staff of Jagdkorps I issued a report explaining why the Germans were failing against these new, escorted, US formations.

a) the weather

b) the considerable inferiority of German strength.

c) the impossibility of gathering sufficient strength in an area because of time and distance limitations; result: weak and dispersed fighter attacks.

The report didn't mention the increasing unwillingness of the Luftwaffe fighters to even attempt an attack on heavily escorted formations. The US escorts often did their job just by being there.

Cheers

Steve
 
One addition to the previous mentioned of the AVG's success with the P-40 that I forgot to mention was that they fairly routinely pushed the engines beyond officially accepted operating limits, pushing the early V-1710-33s into almost 1300 HP both overboosting and overspeeding the engines for higher power and higher FTH and suffering higher mechanical wear rates as a consequence. I'm not sure on the use of that on their later P-40s and post-peral harobor operation of the Flying Tigers, but I suspect they similarly pushed the aircraft. (granted, other units in the far east and MTO were known for overspeeding and overboosting V-1710s too ... and it likely shortened the engine life but the Allison did seem to tolerate being pushed beyond spec more than contemporary merlins -albeit that may in part have been due to more conservative ratings and slower rate of official WER clearance -despiration during the BoB probably drove some of that experimentation on the Merlin end)

Would have been interesting if the British had had enough Tomahawks during the BoB to make them worth pressing into service as interceptors. (longer endurance would have made roaming patrols more feasible too)

I have never heard of the RAF pushing the Merlin beyond its normal operating limits with the exception of 12lb boost being used for longer than five minutes. That did happen a number of times.

As for the P40 in the BOB it was never going to happen being nine months too late for the battle. Even then it lacked climb, performance, protection, agility and altitude performance. The engine only produced 1040hp the 12lb boost Merlin was looking at 1,300hp a significant difference. A P40B could hold its own up to approx. 15,000ft but above that forget it and I think that only made service in mid 41..
 
The 1st production P-40 was delivered at June 1940, the 1st Tomahawk I was delivered (still it is in the USA) at Sept 1940. Production-wise, they might qualify for the BoB, but obviously not when we count in the training and logistic needs.
The early P-40 will climb better than any subsequent P-40, being far lighter. With 120 US gals, the P-40 was at 6800 lbs and doing 357-360 mph tests.
Their engines were making 1040 HP at ~13500 ft; at 16300 ft it was good for 980 HP vs. 1030 HP of the Merlin III. The Db 601A (with newer supercharger version) was doing 1006 HP at 14746 ft (1020 PS at 4.5 km); makes ~960 HP at 16300 ft. Version with older SC was worse by some 1500 ft (500 m) in the altitude power.

Protection of 1940 BoB fighters was not equal with what fighters carried in 1941, let alone, say, in 1943.
 
The P-40s big problem was weight. A P-40B with 120 US gallons of fuel went almost 7200lbs. A Spitfire I or II was under 6200lbs.
The P-40 is going to need 16% more power just equal the Power to weight ratios of the Spitfires and that is if you stuck A Merlin in it. Over revving the Allison at altitudes above 13-14,000ft is NOT going to get you 16% more power. The P-40 also had a higher wing loading. Unless you have anti-gravity paint the P-40 is NOT going to come close to a Spitfire for altitude performance.
 
I admit that I only have the figures on the N Williams site but they seem to give the Tomahawk I 1020hp at 11,600ft and performance is poor. This is considerably less power than the then current Merlin. . Naturally the protection of a 1941 fighter is less than a 1943 fighter but the protection was often sufficient against the LMG and I understand that the Tomahawk I of 1940 had no protection and only 2 x HMG and 2 x LMG.
 
The Spitfire is not the only aircraft that fought during the BoB. Early P-40 does have it's shortcomings, but it's performance was closer to the Spit and 109E, than to the Hurricanes and Bf 110.
 
The P-40 didn't have the appropriate engine early in the war. However, like the successor P-51, it had an airframe that would do the job with a better engine.

P-40 Performance Tests

If it was employed, the improvements would come …maybe.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back