Too Little, Too Late - The B-32 Dominator

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Especially with the newly developed hydorogen bomb. That thing was, what about 35,0000lbs or some ridiculousness. I would love to hear a high fidelity recording of the B-36. That must have been awesome to hear.
 
Is this drawn wrong? Toilet/Dunny/Crapper (173) appears to have no headroom. And just above is the Upper gunner's sighting platform (172). Nasty! And it's a LONG way from the cockpit.

 
Consolidated's original six engined design in response to the 'very-long-range bomber' proposal, the Model 35, submitted on 3 May 1941.

 
Note that the orignal single tires were scratched due to sheer weight upon known runways and their inability to accept such high PSI. At some point in time, I read the they tried "treads" to minimize load bearing to acceptable levels. But I have never seen pics of these bogies. If anyone has pics, I would love to hear about the engineering behind treads that could accept such weight and yet handle the relatively high speeds necessary for takeoff and landing.
 
I read the they tried "treads" to minimize load bearing to acceptable levels. But I have never seen pics of these bogies.

From the 'Story of Flight' pp553.

The experimental caterpillar track gear tried out on the B-36 weighed 5,600 lb more than the wheeled installation it replaced.



The original 100 inch wheel.



The 56 inch bogie wheels eventually selected.



And a comparison of the 100 inch wheel (2) with the caterpillar track (1) showing that they had the same 'footprint' area.

 
Agreed good post. However, I dispute that some assumptions regarding GCI capability around primary targets may offset your loss suppositions. The B-36 flew for most of the 50s, was (initially at least) a maintenance nightmare whose sortie rate was severely curtailed. Given that most aircraft would be unable to fly at max altitude with a heavy load out, the altitude defense seems much less effective, and perhaps very unlikely to avoid performance envelopes of Soviet interceptors.

FlyboyJ is exactly right that the whole Soviet GCI doctrine was developed during these years and based upon western tactics. However, I think we tend to underestimate the effectiveness border radar may have had, coupled with target defences. Certainly this is a multi-element problem, but the following were working against a successful overall mission assumed to be total annihilation -

- B-36 aircraft fleet size, reduced by sortie rate and aircraft geographic capability
- B-36 loadout (weapon effectiveness) for max range operations. They weren't flying 10,000nm at FL500 with the thermonuclear bomb of the era. They likely were carry a weapon of SIGNIFICANTLY less yield.
- B-36 defensive weapon capability were marginally effective as evidenced by their ultimate removal
- Targets necessary to declare mission success (mutual assured destruction accomplished) were large in numbers.
- Target diversity in a 8.7Million square mile geography meant few B-36s per target and likely only one
- Sheer number of interceptors scrambled to seek out aircraft whose inbound run was likely 4 to 5 hours
- Ability to obtain target run altitudes under max range + weapon loading that exceeded max altitude of interceptors was unlikely
- Effectivity of ECM by individual aircraft elements would likely have been counterproductive to minimizing detection.

Surely some would have gotten through and caused horrific destruction, but recall that the Russians had moved the majority of war production facilities to deep internal locations as part of the lessons learned from WWII. Thus targets were diverse and geographically isolated. I stick with my conclusion that the B-36 fleet would be decimated and unable to cripple the Soviet war machine.

I recognize that our conclusions are based upon our hypothetical scenarios, but again I am under the impression that we are talking about a super-long range penetration bomber over hostile territory with no friendly support. The classic SAC mission that was used to sell the B-36 to begin with. Just don't believe it would have ever lived up to the hype. Thank God for submarines. :)

Matt - I never have seen a strike plan from the 1950-1954 timeframe when the '36 was the only a/c able to make a long range penetration.. but consider this.

If the USSR had the same respect for SAC in 1953-1954 that you apparently do (and SAC was basically all B-36/B-47 then) then why didn't they just move into Europe and be done with it? By your logic there is no way that Russia or Soviet industry was at risk. Maybe they were just 'peace loving' flower children?

Ditto in 1949 when each B-36 could carry 4 x 50Kt bombs each.. just exactly what was going to effectively stop them at night? At the end of the day a lot of B-29 crews would have volunteered to make one way trips - so it would not have rested solely on the 36. The B-36 was the only a/c that could carry the first 40,000 pound thermonuc and only one to carry H-Boms at all until the Mk20-26 series came into production so the B-47 could also carry them.

Do you suppose that with the incredible air defense capability that exists today, that either China or Russia consider a B-52 'insignificant' 50 years after the design and with far less altitude and airspeed capability relatively speaking, than a B-36 in 1950?

And at the end of the day how many 20 megaton Mk26's really needed to get through to 'make the point' say, in 1954?

I suspect that while the B-36 may not meet your personal standards for a great airplane - it was 'effective' and certainly a Major Deterrent.

And nuc subs didn't exist, or ICBMs or IRBMs.. just the lowly and over hyped B-36 from 1947-1955 capable of strikes over all of USSR... and after that B-52s and B-47s until the 60s.

I'm not trying to change your mind that the B-36 was a POS, just posing different questions to perhaps view the beast from the USSR POV?

Regards,

Bill
 
Agreed good post. However, I dispute that some assumptions regarding GCI capability around primary targets may offset your loss suppositions. The B-36 flew for most of the 50s, was (initially at least) a maintenance nightmare whose sortie rate was severely curtailed. Given that most aircraft would be unable to fly at max altitude with a heavy load out, the altitude defense seems much less effective, and perhaps very unlikely to avoid performance envelopes of Soviet interceptors.

FlyboyJ is exactly right that the whole Soviet GCI doctrine was developed during these years and based upon western tactics. However, I think we tend to underestimate the effectiveness border radar may have had, coupled with target defences. Certainly this is a multi-element problem, but the following were working against a successful overall mission assumed to be total annihilation -

- B-36 aircraft fleet size, reduced by sortie rate and aircraft geographic capability
- B-36 loadout (weapon effectiveness) for max range operations. They weren't flying 10,000nm at FL500 with the thermonuclear bomb of the era. They likely were carry a weapon of SIGNIFICANTLY less yield.
- B-36 defensive weapon capability were marginally effective as evidenced by their ultimate removal
- Targets necessary to declare mission success (mutual assured destruction accomplished) were large in numbers.
- Target diversity in a 8.7Million square mile geography meant few B-36s per target and likely only one
- Sheer number of interceptors scrambled to seek out aircraft whose inbound run was likely 4 to 5 hours
- Ability to obtain target run altitudes under max range + weapon loading that exceeded max altitude of interceptors was unlikely
- Effectivity of ECM by individual aircraft elements would likely have been counterproductive to minimizing detection.

Surely some would have gotten through and caused horrific destruction, but recall that the Russians had moved the majority of war production facilities to deep internal locations as part of the lessons learned from WWII. Thus targets were diverse and geographically isolated. I stick with my conclusion that the B-36 fleet would be decimated and unable to cripple the Soviet war machine.

I recognize that our conclusions are based upon our hypothetical scenarios, but again I am under the impression that we are talking about a super-long range penetration bomber over hostile territory with no friendly support. The classic SAC mission that was used to sell the B-36 to begin with. Just don't believe it would have ever lived up to the hype. Thank God for submarines. :)

Matt - I never have seen a strike plan from the 1950-1954 timeframe when the '36 was the only a/c able to make a long range penetration.. but consider this.

If the USSR had the same respect for SAC in 1953-1954 that you apparently do (and SAC was basically all B-36/B-47 then) then why didn't they just move into Europe and be done with it? By your logic there is no way that Russia or Soviet industry was at risk.

Border radar and bases Were subject to strikes from Navy and most every other aircraft in USAF arsenal.

Ditto in 1949 when each B-36 could carry 4 x 50Kt bombs each.. just exactly what was going to effectively stop them at night? At the end of the day a lot of B-29 crews would have volunteered to make one way trips - so it would not have rested solely on the 36. The B-36 was the only a/c that could carry the first 40,000 pound thermonuc and only one to carry H-Boms at all until the Mk20-26 series came into production so the B-47 could also carry them.

Do you suppose that with the incredible air defense capability that exists today, that either China or Russia consider a B-52 'insignificant' 50 years after the design and with far less altitude and airspeed capability relatively speaking, than a B-36 in 1950?

And at the end of the day how many 20 megaton Mk26's really needed to get through to 'make the point' say, in 1954?

I suspect that while the B-36 may not meet your personal standards for a great airplane - it was 'effective' and certainly a Major Deterrent.

And nuc subs didn't exist, or ICBMs or IRBMs.. just the lowly and over hyped B-36 from 1947-1955 capable of strikes over all of USSR... and after that B-52s and B-47s until the 60s.

I'm not trying to change your mind that the B-36 was a POS, just posing different questions to perhaps view the beast from the USSR POV?

Regards,

Bill
 
Don't patronize me with the "Matt disrespects SAC" bullshit. We are trying to have a moronic discussion that is of necessity overly simplified with respect to our battleplan assumptions. If we want to contrast US and Soviet airforce's, battle doctrine and integration with land and sea assets, then I don't want to play. The solution space quickly becomes so complex and technical, that neither you nor I are qualified to make any meaningful statements. I believe that we can have a discussion of its role as a long range penetration bomber over hostile territory (its classic SAC role, as sold to congress) and as evidenced by the numerous desperate attempts to attach parasitic fighters all over the bloody thing (including one on each wingtip??). Anything beyond that and I suspect the US historical order of battle is probably still not available under the Freedom of Information Act.

Let's both agree that the B-36 was an engineering marvel and contributed to our safety. And it did so without erroneous claims that it would be loaded with a 42,000lb Mk17 15MT thermonuclear bomb flying at night at 50,000ft with a full fuel load and 420kt max speed for 10,000nm in the late 1950s against soviet interceptors incapable of operations at night.
 
Don't patronize me with the "Matt disrespects SAC" bullshit.

You implied SAC palmed off a giant selling job on the B-36 Mission - which was to be THE deterrent to USSR by virtue of being able to reach central Russia with the biggest stick in the world... and then went on to 'thank god for submarines'.. so I took your meaning that it made far more sense to you to put faith in the deterrence capability of the sub.

If you take the comment I made that I thought you had little respect for SAC, well I have to say you are perceptive - that is exactly what I read into your comment.

But 'patronizing', no.. but it was not meant to be.

But let's take the 'sub analogy a little further, I'm wondering how frightened the Sov Planners were in 1953-54 (or 47-52) of fleet boats sinking the Kremlin in Red Square or T-54 factories in the Urals .. Is that the force threat you had in mind while blessing our Father for the 'submarine' (or did you mean Rickover?)

It would be some time before the Triad came into play, so I confess you confused me - Again - but you know I am easily confused!


We are trying to have a moronic discussion that is of necessity overly simplified with respect to our battleplan assumptions. If we want to contrast US and Soviet airforce's, battle doctrine and integration with land and sea assets, then I don't want to play. The solution space quickly becomes so complex and technical, that neither you nor I are qualified to make any meaningful statements.

Nah, its not really complicated at all. It's pure belief/disbelief w/o one shred of hard evidence. The only soft evidence is that we either believe SAC was an effective instrument of World Peace in the 47-54 time - or not. Ditto USN and/or 'submarines'

The only thing complicated is how many of the fleet has to get in to eliminate USSR ability to a.) make stuff that hurts, and b.) how quickly they starve to death - no matter how far the troops get in Europe - as a result of whatever number gets through with Nucs... and it's all SAC Matt- submarines don't contribute squat to the scenario (at least not any of ours). So if you don't believe that the B-36 could deliver you have every right to believe what you believe. Neither one of us will deliver facts in this discussion

BTW a shot down down B-36 crew that arms its weapons makes an ugly mess 'somewhere' in USSR even if it isn't what the strike planners had in mind


I believe that we can have a discussion of its role as a long range penetration bomber over hostile territory (its classic SAC role, as sold to congress)

But not bought by you..? I can see you might be too clever to be fooled by that LeMay rascal or the capability of those arrogant old SAC'sters- (he was a real laugh wasn't he) - but he sure could sell against all those brilliant admirals that just knew in their heart of hearts that the Carrier was the answer to USSR expansion notions.. You suppose the USSR was all that confident it was 'con job' over Congress?

BTW - if you aren't tuned into 1947-1954 in this discussion then I apologise for falling back 15-20 years from the timeframe when we actually had ballistic missiles and SAC wasn't the ONLY deep USSR delivery team


and as evidenced by the numerous desperate attempts to attach parasitic fighters all over the bloody thing (including one on each wingtip??). Anything beyond that and I suspect the US historical order of battle is probably still not available under the Freedom of Information Act.

Those dumb SOB's at SAC never could get it right, could they? Wonder if that is the reason so many clever (and workable) schemes for stand off launch capability of missles came about?? Try, and try again and someday you will succeed?? or just more dumb ideas

Let's both agree that the B-36 was an engineering marvel and contributed to our safety. And it did so without erroneous claims that it would be loaded with a 42,000lb Mk17 15MT thermonuclear bomb flying at night at 50,000ft with a full fuel load and 420kt max speed for 10,000nm in the late 1950s against soviet interceptors incapable of operations at night.

Agreed, and from the very beginning of my arguments if you want to go back. I was one of those that agreed with You that the jetless B-36 was a 200-230 TAS wonder with a MAX range - no refuel- no H-Bomb, in the 3500-4000 mile arena.. I am also aware that with the jet engine capability and it's radar that it was still a formidable adversary to the Mig 15/17 through 1954, in singles - at night and with any semblance of planning on striking at early defense capabilities... you wouldn't have to take out many airfields and radar sites to open a dark corridor.

Neither we NOR the USSR was particularly adept at stopping 50,000 ft 450-550 mph penetration over the North Pole until SAMs came into play with an integrated ADC.

As to moronic - maybe 'shallow', I believe the tone might have set by someone describing the B-36 as a POS (point of sale?) and then thanking god for submarines..maybe he meant sub marines? or subsurface boats capable of carrying ICBM's - which did not exist when the B-36 was the sole delivery capability... whoever made those comments did not follow up to describe HIS personal choice for a better alternative, so I felt it was a little shallow but didn't state that.

none of it made sense to me, but I'm slow...and I wouldn't describe You as 'moronic' - in all seriousness!!

And to your last point I can agree with you that while it was NOT the greatest thing since sliced bread it was the best available and the only one that perform its mission, namely take the first thermo nucs to central Russia until the B-52 (and smaller Mk26) arrived. You have a better nomination?

Matt - very much like you I am often wrong but NEVER uncertain.

Regards,

Bill
 
See all is good in the world. The moronic comment was not aimed as a personal slight. Rather it was a description of two internet junkies discussing WWIII weapon systems and tactical doctrine. And you have to admit, that compared to real world planning and analysis, our contributions could very well be described as "moronic".

...off to another thread.
 
See all is good in the world. The moronic comment was not aimed as a personal slight. Rather it was a description of two internet junkies discussing WWIII weapon systems and tactical doctrine. And you have to admit, that compared to real world planning and analysis, our contributions could very well be described as "moronic".

...off to another thread.

I Do agree. Tip of the hat to you -

Bill
 
Northern and Eastern Russia via the Chuchki Sea. I'd believe it.

Kinda like saying that the Soviets routinely flew into the Canadian Northern Territories via polar routes. This was the CF-101 SOP.
 
Interestingly, our AF regularly flew recon missions over the USSR in B45s until the Mig 15 became operational and then the B47 took over that mission. There were some hairy moments between the B47s and Mig 15s but, as I recall, no B47s were ever downed.
 

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